TRENDS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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TRENDS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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F. STUART CHAPIN, EDITOR

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TRENDS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY
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TRENDS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

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W. I. THOMAS
L. L. BERNARD

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

It is the editor's opinion that the trend in contemporary American sociology of greatest significance is the fact that a book of this sort was conceived and executed by a representative group of the younger generation of American sociologists. The significance of this effort lies in its intelligent challenge to the existing attitudes and theories. The challenge is not an abortive effort, because each writer has previously demonstrated his capacity as an author of originality and scholarship. Furthermore, although each writer has approached his topic from his own point of view, the reader will soon discover that in all scientific essentials there is a striking degree of agreement, considering the diversity of views in the graduate schools at which the authors studied. These facts augur well for the future development of the science of sociology in the United States.

F. Stuart Chapin

PREFACE

Sociology means many things to many men. In some circles it is a science as objective as biology; in other quarters it is a program of reform. To some it is a social philosophy and nothing more. To others, sociology is the happy hunting ground of this, that, or another ism. Not only is there confusion on the part of the public and among the followers of other academic disciplines, but there is controversy among sociologists themselves as to the definition of the subject and the delimitation of the field. Much of this confusion is a natural result of the recent development and rapid growth of the subject. Much of it is the result of the variety of background of many sociologists in theology, philosophy, and social work. This variety of viewpoints has, of course, found reflection in the literature of the subject, much to the befuddlement of even serious students.

The purpose of the present volume is to set forth what are, in the opinion of these younger workers in the field, the domains and methods of sociology. To this end, one chapter has been devoted to each of the major fields which are at present usually classified as sociology. Three additional chapters deal with the history of sociology, sociological theories, and sociological research. The result is, we believe, a comprehensive survey of the field at present known as sociology.

While the editors are somewhat responsible for the form and length of the several contributions, and have tried to prevent unnecessary overlapping and repetition, each contributor is solely responsible for the merits and demerits of his own work. The amount of agreement among the contributors gave the editors a pleasant surprise and leads them to believe that the volume represents something of a consensus of the views of the rising generation of sociology. Especially are we pleased to note that the dominant note throughout the book is its emphasis upon the fact that social phenomena are natural phenomena, that sociology

is a natural science, and hence must study human associational activities in the spirit and by the methods of natural science. We believe that this is becoming the outstanding characteristic of American sociology.

Although most professional sociologists may find little in this book that is new to them, we believe that many sociology teachers can profitably read it. We are quite sure that all students who are beginning their graduate work will find it a valuable summary of the literature and general points of view of the several phases of sociology herein discussed. We believe also that our academic colleagues in other fields, as well as the general reader, will find here an answer to his frequent query as to what sociology is or at least aspires to be.

Our indebtedness to our teachers and other writers in the field of sociology will be apparent throughout the book, and it would be futile to attempt to enumerate our obligations in full. We can only hope that the writers on whom we have drawn will feel repaid in the use we have made of their works. Special mention, however, should be made of Professor F. Stuart Chapin, the editor of Harper's Sociological Series, for his early interest and assistance in the preparation of this volume.

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Read Bain
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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES[1]

By Jessie Bernard

I. History

1. PRE-SOCIOLOGY: NON-ACADEMIC

Pre-sociology in the United States took both academic and non-academic forms. Of the latter, one had its origin and development in the Old South, whereas the other was distinctly a New England product. Writers of the southern school used the name "sociology" in their works, and were definitely Comtean, at least in theory. But it was the Comte of the *Positive Polity* rather than of the *Positive Philosophy* who acted as godfather to these southern sociologists.

In order to justify slavery, which was put increasingly on the defensive by the attacks from the North, the South required a philosophy radically opposed to the Jeffersonian ideal of democracy. This philosophy was furnished by Professor Thomas R. Dew, at William and Mary College. Dew had studied in Germany at a time when Fichte and Hegel were coming into prominence. He found slavery normal and necessary, as he also found property basic to civilization, and Jefferson's theories were pronounced "glittering fallacies."[2] This new faith was,

[1] The contents and organization of this chapter have been largely influenced by the investigation into the history of sociology in the United States by L. L. Bernard which is now in process and which is to be published in three volumes. They have been particularly influenced by a paper on "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," read by him at the annual meetings of the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association at Baton Rouge, April 21, 1928, which appeared in the *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* vol. ix, 1928, pp. 264-293.

[2] William E. Dodd, "The Social Philosophy of the Old South," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxiii, p. 737.

naturally, very acceptable to the South and it found adherents immediately.

The same thesis reappears in the *Memoir on Slavery* by Chancellor Harper of South Carolina in 1837, this time with a more or less Aristotelian bias. There are natural proclivities to domineer or to be subservient, and, quoting Dodd's analysis, "through the evolution of men in society . . . each man or class of men comes to find its proper place and level. And society then crystallizes and legalizes the differences and guarantees to men the privileges that have been usurped." [3]

As yet this philosophy had not become Comtean, for the *Positive Polity* did not appear until 1851-54, and even the *Positive Philosophy* was not completed until 1842. By 1854, however, the term "sociology" was taken over by these southern writers, and two books on "sociology" appeared in that year, namely, George Fitzhugh's *Sociology for the South* and Henry Hughes' *Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical.* The theses of Fitzhugh's book may be taken as representative of southern sociology. He confirms the theory of caste as developed by Dew and Harper. He attacks Adam Smith; he argues for inequality in law and economics. Dodd summarizes his theories as follows: "Society must be organized for positive purposes . . . ; men must be restrained, governed, and subjected to discipline; and states must take care that every man, woman, and child shall have his due place and suitable support." In his work we see positivism drafted to justify a preconceived system of society. The goal to strive for is universal peace. With the exception of this ideal, the whole philosophy which went by the name of "sociology" was markedly similar to contemporary German social philosophy.[4]

It can readily be seen, however, why it was the Comtean *Polity* that became the avowed sanction invoked by these writers. Comte's *Positive Polity* contemplated an order of society based, as Bernard points out, "on a hierarchy of the intellectual and

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 740.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 746.

spiritual élite, not wholly unlike that of the Catholic church, except that it was to be secular instead of clerical. . . . The outcome would of necessity be a paternalistic, benevolent system which would, as applied to local American conditions, justify slavery, take care of the slave, and promote the best interests of society by providing an opportunity for the élite to serve society untrammelled by sordid economic cares. All this is duly emphasized by the southern philosophic apologists in their treatises." [5]

This southern pre-sociological movement, however, was relatively short-lived, and proved to have little influence on the later developments of sociology proper. In fact, the writings on "sociology" which characterized that period were for a long time unknown to sociologists, and are only now being rediscovered and evaluated.

The New England pre-sociological movement, on the other hand, although it did not apply the term "sociology" to itself, had more influence, quite indirectly, to be sure, on the later history of sociology. This movement was, as Bernard indicates, largely an Americanized version of "Hegelian transcendentalism and the Saint-Simonian humanism of LeRoux, Fourier, and Lamartine." [6] Further, "this new philosophy . . . found its most effective leadership in Emerson and the Concord group, and gradually applied itself to the doctrinaire aspects of practical issues, especially to that of anti-slavery. . . . This movement was in its early development closely bound up with religion. . . . It mixed mysticism with practical human affairs or rather supported practical propaganda with mystical and metaphysical sanctions. In its maturer development it was perhaps the driving spirit of social reform which produced the American Social Science Association." [7] This latter organization, it will be remembered, pro-

[5] L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* vol ix, pp. 267-268.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 266.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 266-267.

duced in turn such powerful reform organizations as the National Conference of Charities and Correction, and the National Prison Association.

It was through the American Social Science Association that this New England pre-sociological movement became linked up with one of the academic forerunners of sociology proper. This Association was organized in 1865, just after the Civil War had left the country confronted with a host of problems which would require trained insight to solve. Although the influence of the British Social Science Association was perhaps the chief factor in the early history of the organization, evidence is not altogether lacking to show that the members felt they were pursuing the Comtean "science of society," or at least helping to establish that science. Frank B. Sanborn, in recounting the early history of the Association, says:

> It seems that Robert Owen, the English socialist . . . was the first user of the phrase "social science" in English. But the French positivist, Comte, was employing it about that time, in a different sense, as if there was a science of society not less strict than any of the sciences. The European philanthropists, before Lord Brougham initiated the British Social Science Association in 1856-57, had spoken of "social sciences" in the plural, and applied the term to those numerous and rather indefinite branches of knowledge which concern the existence and activity of mankind in civil society. I suppose it was in this sense, and following the lead of the British Association, that we employed the phrase. But it gave us trouble, more or less. Some dull people, easily shocked by that bugbear of modern society, Socialism, . . . stood aloof from us as "Socialists." Others said, with more point, but captiously, "Do you mean to assert that there is a *science* of society in the same sense as of mathematics, or even of chemistry or physics?" To which we could only reply, meekly, that provisionally we would use the strict term more loosely, for convenience. What we really meant, most of us, was to apply the methods of research and reasoning to those institutions and necessities

of society which we saw daily treated unreasonably or merely by tradition.[8]

It will readily be noted that the science of society conceived by the American Social Science Association was not at all the science of society of modern sociologists. But for many years there existed this pronounced confusion between "social science" and the science of sociology.

The reformistic activities of the American Social Science Association included such varied and interesting projects as the following: The Freedmen's Bureau, Taxation, The Promotion of Efficiency in the Internal Revenue Bureau, Education in the South, Prison Reform, Instruction of the Deaf, Infant Welfare, Civil Service Reform, Building Associations, Public Health, the National Conference of Charities, and the promotion of the study of "social science." In connection with the last-mentioned activity, a plan was proposed by Professor Benjamin Peirce of Harvard in 1878 for the introduction of "social science" courses into university curricula. His plan involved something in the nature of an annual institute for the discussion of current social problems to be conducted at some university where the permanent secretary of the Association would reside as a member of the faculty.[9] Apparently, however, nothing definite ever came of this proposal. Carroll D. Wright, when he was president of the Association in 1886, made a plea for the teaching of "social science" "not only in colleges, but in high schools, in upper grammar schools, and even in Sunday schools." [10]

2. PRE-SOCIOLOGY: ACADEMIC

But social science had already become established in many universities, even before Professor Peirce made his plan or Carroll

[8] Frank B. Sanborn, "Past and Present in Social Science," *Journal of the American Social Science Association*, Number 43, 1905, p. 3.

[9] F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. vii, pp. 799-800.

[10] Herbert Baxter Adams, *The Study of History in American Colleges and Universities* (1887), p. 163.

D. Wright his plea. It was one of the four academic precursors of sociology in the United States. The other three were courses in social problems with a religious coloring, or philanthropy, in the history of civilization, and in the philosophy of history.[11] "Social science" and social problems courses represent the logical forerunners of the cross-section or contemporaneous study of sociological phenomena, while the history of civilization and philosophy of history courses were the early prototypes of the evolutionary or historical approach.

Social Science.—As early as 1865, "social science" was treated by Professor Perry at Williams College in connection with political economy.[12] In 1869-70, a course on "social science," based on Carey, was being given at the University of Pennsylvania. "This is the first time the term social science appeared in the Pennsylvania catalog, or, perhaps, in any other. The instructor was Robert Ellis Thompson of the department of Mathematics." [13] In 1876-77 President Laws at Missouri gave a course called "Social Science." [14] In 1881 Professor Dunster introduced a course with the same title at Michigan. The title of the chair occupied by Richmond Mayo-Smith at Columbia was that of "Political Economy and Social Science," and during the 'eighties he was giving courses in "social science." At Cornell, in 1885, Sanborn himself was teaching a course in "social science" at Cornell. Courses in social problems and philanthropy began to be introduced in the 'eighties, chiefly in the theological seminaries. Thus in 1880, Reverend G. A. Gordon of Milwaukee, offered a course of lectures in the Harvard Divinity School, on charities and reforms. Similarly, Professor Peabody of Harvard at the same time began to treat social reform in his courses in practical ethics. At Iowa, in the 'eighties, in the department of Political Science, a course in social problems was being offered. Andover

[11] Classification adopted from L. L. Bernard.
[12] Tolman, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 824.
[13] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 269.
[14] C. A. Ellwood, in document furnished to L. L. Bernard.

Theological Seminary, the Yale Divinity School, the Hartford Theological Seminary, the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Johns Hopkins, all had courses in social problems by 1890 or before.[15]

As representative of the nature of the various "social science" courses which had become so important during the 'eighties, may be cited those given by Sanborn at Cornell and by Dunster at Michigan. Sanborn's course was on

> . . . practical instruction calculated to fit young men to discuss intelligently such important social questions as the best methods of dealing practically with pauperism, intemperance, crime of various degrees and among persons of different ages, insanity, idiocy, and the like.[16]

Professor Dunster's course was more theoretical. It contained:

> Lectures on the following topics: (1) Introductory; the scope and purpose of social science, and its relations to socialism, so called, to sanitary science, and to political economy. (2) Historical, theoretical, and ideal systems: Plato's *Republic,* Campanella's *Civitas Solis,* More's *Utopia;* practical efforts to establish social systems or communities: the Essenes, the Shakers, the Perfectionists of Oneida, the colonies of St. Simon, Robert Owen, Charles Fourier. (3) Poverty and prevention; causes of poverty; organized efforts for the relief of the worthy poor; the problem of the tramp; almshouses and their superintendence. (4) The prevalence of crime and the means of diminishing and preventing it: (a) the relation of crime to poverty, to vicious habits, and to hereditary influences; (b) prostitution, its causes, prevalence, and dangers, and the means of preventing it; (c) care of children of the criminal and pauper classes; state schools for abandoned or neglected children; the Michigan state school at Coldwater; (d) the punishment of crime; the object of punishment, prison labor, treatment of criminals after release. (5) Practical questions in social science: (a) the care of the insane and the management of asylums: the cottage system; the associated or central

[15] Bernard, *op. cit.,* p. 271.

[16] A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxi, p. 733.

system; qualifications of superintendents and assistants; (b) the care and training of the feeble-minded; (c) the care and training of the blind. (6) Economic problems: (a) conservation of life; the prevalence and increasing frequency of suicide; means of preventing suicide; (b) conservation of property; (c) conservation of food. . . .[17]

In brief, "social science" was a hodgepodge of various odds and ends that deserved a place in a school of political science but that belonged specifically to none of the established social science subjects.

This, then, was the situation with regard to "social science" at the beginning of the last decade of the nineteenth century. But before continuing chronologically with the relations of social science and sociology, it is necessary to go back and pick up another thread among the academic precursors of sociology in the United States, namely, courses in the philosophy of history and in the history of civilization.

Philosophy of History and History of Civilization.—Guizot's lectures on the history of civilization in Europe, when they appeared in book form, seem to have exerted a tremendous influence upon the academic mind in America. Herbert B. Adams says of Guizot's *History of Civilization,* that it "has probably been used more than any other text-book for advanced or senior courses in American colleges."[18] And in studying the old catalogues of American colleges and universities, one is struck with the accuracy of this statement. Almost no college was so poor as not to boast of a course based on this work. It appears again and again, in all parts of the country. Harvard was offering a course based on this book soon after 1839. In many, if not most of the courses on the philosophy of history, Guizot was used, sometimes alone, sometimes in combination with other similar works.

Closely allied with the history of civilization courses were those in the philosophy of history. As early as 1846, there appears in the Michigan catalogue, a "Professor of Logic, Rhet-

[17] Tolman, *op. cit.,* vol. vii, p. 818.
[18] *Op. cit.,* p. 99.

oric, and the Philosophy of History."[19] Reverend Daniel D. Whedon was the teacher of the philosophy of history. A course which was in fact, though not in name, a study of the philosophy of history was given at the University of Virginia in 1850-51, in the School of Moral Philosophy, under the title of "Philosophy of Social Relations," or "Ethics of Society." [20] The teacher was Professor William H. M'Guffey, editor of the M'Guffey readers. The subtitle of the course was "Progress of Society." References were made to Ferguson, Guizot, Taylor, McCinnon, and later to Grimke and DeTocqueville. At Amherst, "history fell into neglect for more than a generation [after 1833]. Conscious of the great need of the college, Professor Edward Tuckerman, the distinguished specialist in botany . . . volunteered yearly, after 1854, a course of twelve lectures on the Philosophy of History to the senior class. At one time he gave them systematic instruction in Guizot's *History of Civilization.*" [21] At the University of Pennsylvania, in 1869-70, "The History of Civilization" was offered along with the course in "social science" already mentioned, by Professor R. E. Thompson.[22] DePauw (in 1870), Syracuse (in 1873-1874), Cornell (from its opening in 1868), Minnesota (in 1878), Louisiana State (in 1878), Bryn Mawr (from its opening in 1885), are only a few of the more outstanding schools which gave courses either in the history of civilization or in the philosophy of history. Adams has tables showing that by 1887 courses based on Guizot were being offered in Adrian, Franklin, Heidelberg, Hope, Napa, Trinity, and Wellesley Colleges, and in the Universities of Illinois, Indiana, and Kansas.[23] And data being gathered by Bernard indicate that the number of institutions in this list could in all probability be at least doubled.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[20] Floyd N. House, in document furnished to L. L. Bernard.
[21] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
[22] James H. S. Bossard, in document furnished to L. L. Bernard.
[23] *Op. cit.*, pp. 278-285.

As indicative of the contents of these courses, we may cite the course given at Cornell by Professor William D. Wilson.

He lectured twice a week to the senior class upon the philosophy of history, with the intention of explaining the origin, course, and progress of civilization, and the causes that have contributed to it. A specimen set of the questions . . . for the final examination is appended, and will . . . illustrate the nature of his course. . . .

> 2. What are the three agents that control the causes and results of history? What are the different theories of their relative influence?
>
> 22. Why may we not expect any high civilization in extreme latitudes? What is the effect of elevation above sea-level on civilization?
>
> 42. What influence has intellectual culture on religion with reference to (1) fetichism, (2) polytheism, and (3) monotheism?
>
> 62. Describe the circumstances of race and physical position that made Athens the place of origin of modern civilization.[24]

At the University of Virginia, in 1881, the course was called "Process of Historical Change," and it studied "the laws and movements, the growth, decay, and constitution of Societies, in the different stages of social development." [25] President Rhodes of Bryn Mawr said in 1885 that "from the beginning of the organization of Bryn Mawr it has been a matter of solicitude that history should be so taught here as to bring into prominence the great laws which underlie historic movements and events. . . ." [26] At Columbia, according to Professor Burgess, history was taught so as "to find the origin, follow the growth, and learn the meaning of our legal, political, and economic principles and institutions." [27] These descriptions are sufficient to indicate how closely the courses in the philosophy of history were approaching to the field later preëmpted by sociology.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[25] Floyd House, *op. cit.*
[26] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
[27] Quoted in Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

We may now summarize the history of pre-sociology by the end of the 'eighties. Two non-academic pre-sociological movements had already appeared by the 'fifties, one in the Old South and one in New England. The southern movement was Comtean and appropriated the name "sociology." It was of no significance in the later academic development of sociology proper. The New England transcendental philosophy, with its broad, humanitarian viewpoint, while not itself sociological, furnished the intellectual matrix in which was developed the "social science" movement. "Social science," in turn, was one of the important academic precursors of sociology. By the end of the 'eighties most of the large universities were offering courses in "social science," including a wide range of subjects relating to social problems and social reform. The other academic forerunner of sociology was purely theoretical and was in the nature of courses in the philosophy of history or in the history of civilization. Like "social science" courses, courses of this kind were being offered in practically all institutions of collegiate or university rank in the United States in the 'eighties.

3. TRANSITION TO SOCIOLOGY

The 1890's might well be called the era of confusion in the history of sociology in the United States. For about a decade, the whole atmosphere was befuddled and clouded, and it did not begin to clear up until the last years of the century. In part this confusion was due to the lack of well-defined division of labor among social scientists, and in part it was a matter of terminology.

Although the term "sociology" had, as we have seen, been used in American works much earlier, it was not until Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* began to appear in the *Popular Science Monthly* during the 'seventies that the word began to have general acceptance. Even then the revolutionary implications involved in a "science of sociology" seem not to have elicited great academic concern from the social scientists of the day. In fact, in view of the importance of these implications, and of the bomb

explosion that was impending, the men in power at that time seem to have treated the advent of sociology with extreme casualness. As administrators, of course, they could not be expected to have had the insight to see what a ferment Spencer had started in the younger social scientists of the day. Those younger men themselves, indeed, did not know what was happening until some time later.

At first "sociology" seems to have been merely a word, and it crept into university catalogues with astonishing lack of flourish. It is interesting to note that in 1886-87 Miss Coman reported that there were 850 books on sociology in the Wellesley library.[28] One cannot help but wonder what the titles of this prodigious list were.

It was not Spencer, however, so much as Ward who did most to popularize sociology in the United States. Sumner seems to have been the only one who called a course "sociology" before the appearance of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883. As early as 1873-74 the statement appears in the catalogue of the University of Virginia, under the caption of "Political Economy," that "fundamental questions in Sociology are also considered."[29] But it was not until after 1883 that the term sociology began to appear consistently in university catalogues. In 1884-85 "it is also reported that sociology was taught by means of lectures, perhaps by the president, at the University of Arkansas."[30] In 1885 "the first entirely separate course bearing the title sociology was given at Indiana University."[31] "'Christian Sociology' was taught at Trinity College, North Carolina, in 1888-89, by President J. P. Crowell."[32]

But sociology in the 'eighties and 'nineties meant all things to all men. As indicative of the general confusion, we find that

[28] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[29] Floyd N. House, *op. cit.*

[30] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 272, citing document furnished to him by A. W. Jamison.

[31] U. G. Weatherly, in document furnished to L. L. Bernard.

[32] Tolman, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 824.

in 1890 History of Civilization at DePauw University became History of Civilization and Sociology. On the other hand, the course called Social Science at the University of Missouri was using Spencer's *Sociology* as a textbook in 1876-77. In 1885-86, President William Preston Johnston of Tulane began to use Spencer's *Sociology,* along with Tylor's *Anthropology,* as a textbook in his philosophy of history course. It is easy to see, of course, how well the Spencerian system of evolution and anthropology could serve as a backbone for a philosophy of history course. It is more difficult to understand the use of Spencer in the social science course at Missouri.

In announcing the establishment of a chair in sociology at Columbia, the following description appeared:

> This newly established chair will provide for a thorough study of philosophical or general sociology and of the practical or concrete social questions in their relation to sociological principles. By the term "general sociology" is meant the scientific study of society as a whole, and search for its causes, for the laws of its structure and growth, and for a rational view of its purpose, function, meaning, or destiny. This will lead up to the more particular study of the phenomena of modern populations and their concentration in great cities. Of such phenomena none are of greater concern, from either the theoretical or practical point of view, than the growth and characteristics of the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes. Special courses of instruction will therefore be offered on pauperism, poor laws, methods of charity, crime, penology, and social ethics.[33]

This description sounds like a combination of the typical courses on the philosophy of history and on social science. The general similarity to Dunster's course already described is obvious enough. It appears, in fact, as though the administrators had just such a combination in mind as suitable data for courses in sociology. The emphasis in their minds was upon the side of social problems, for we read further:

[33] Tolman, *op. cit.,* vol. vii, p. 808.

It is in the city that the problems of poverty, of mendicancy, influences are met in their most acute form. Hence the city is the natural laboratory of social science. . . . Here the student can observe how far vice, poverty, and crime are due to bad economic conditions, how far to neglected moral training, how much simply to the social struggle for life. . . . Such study emphasizes all that is taught by theory, and, like "field work" in natural science, it trains the faculties of observation and makes the subject "real." [34]

There was, then, a situation in which "history of civilization" became connected up with "sociology," in which both "social science" and "philosophy of history" courses began to use Spencer, and in which "sociology" came to include both "social science" and "philosophy of history." No wonder the decade of the 'nineties became a time of confusion. Was sociology a philosophy of history? or was it "social science"? or both? or neither?

One can scarcely read the early catalogues of the various universities and colleges without getting the impression that the administrators felt sociology to be a sort of catch-all course which should consider all the problems that could not find room in political science, economics, jurisprudence, history, or other disciplines. And one cannot escape the further inference that if these administrators had known the direction in which sociology was to develop, they would hardly have been so indulgent with the embryonic science then emerging. At any rate, the men who were appointed to fill the chairs of sociology were not called to teach the sort of thing that sociology eventually turned out to be.

Ross in his *Social Control* has an acute analysis of the method of fictions whereby social forms seem to remain the same while their contents are remodeled to adapt them to changing conditions, all the while maintaining the appearance of fixity. In the history of sociology a process very similar to this took place in the 'nineties. If we visualize that decade as a tunnel, and picture sociology entering, say in 1890, as a medley of philosophy of history, history of civilization, "social science," social problems,

[34] *Ibid.*

and then watch it emerge at the end of the century, we rub our eyes in astonishment. Clearly it is not the same sociology. It is recognizable, to be sure, for many of the old earmarks remain. The old philosophy of history now takes the form of various "interpretations of history," materialistic and non-materialistic. The old "social science" is now "practical" or "applied" sociology. But something more has been added, and sociology emerges from the decade of confusion vigorous and ready to jump two of its remaining hurdles, which were precisely to rid itself of philosophy of history and "social science" completely.

4. EARLY GROWTH: 1889-1901

Sociology had been growing steadily, if somewhat unevenly, during the 'nineties. This seems all the more remarkable when we consider how relatively inchoate it was at this time, and the antagonism it aroused in other academic disciplines. But the very fact that it did grow in spite of these handicaps illustrates the fact that it was supplying some need. As Bernard says:

> Sociology arose as a protest against . . . [the] spirit of classicism. It preached a crusade for the study of men and their affairs rather than merely the hypothetical men of books. Unfortunately at first it had arrayed against itself not only the classicists in literary culture but also the classicists in the older social sciences as well . . . but the way of thinking which led to the establishment of sociology in the universities was simply "in the air," so to speak. The various more or less sociological movements . . . already recorded, the growth and popularization of the great British scientific movement from about 1860 onward, the publications of Spencer, Ward, Morgan, and Fiske, and perhaps above all the spirit of the returning doctors from the German universities, who brought with them the ferment of the new social science humanism, made the adoption [and growth] of sociology inevitable.[35]

The numerical growth of sociology from 1889 to 1901 is indicated roughly in the accompanying chart. The ordinate rep-

[35] Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 265, 283.

CHART I.—ADDITION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE CURRICULUM OF INSTITUTIONS, 1889-1900.



resents the number of new institutions adding sociology courses in each year. The peak in 1894 probably represents the catching up of smaller institutions with the larger ones. Mr. Folkmar, reporting on the progress of sociology between 1889 and 1894, stated: "The number of courses in sociology proper has been quadrupled in the last five years. The institutions then teaching sociology were Yale, Williams, Cornell, Trinity, Tulane, and the University of Pennsylvania. Within the year just past the instruction has perhaps doubled; while as regards the immediate future, at least seven institutions have written me that they were planning to introduce the study soon." [36] Specifically, he found "twenty-nine colleges having regular courses in sociology, using the term in the looser sense to include charities and corrections, while twenty-four have sociology proper, defining the term as the study of society. These figures do not include the institutions that give instruction in charities and correction, or the science of society, incidentally to ethics, economics, etc. Of this sort there are six more in sociology, and twenty in charities and correction, some of which give quite extended instruction in these subjects. Five of eight women's colleges reporting give courses in sociology, some of them being well equipped, while four have courses in charities and correction." [37] These figures are incomplete, as Bernard's data show, but the fact that the report was made is interesting as indicative of the nascent consciousness of kind among sociologists. They were beginning to get sociology-conscious. The establishment of the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1895 was an important factor in this development. By 1905 this had so far proceeded that the American Sociological Society was organized.

Tolman's survey of sociology in 1902, although, like Folkmar's report of 1894, shown to be incomplete by the data collected by Bernard, is nevertheless interesting in its analysis of the

[36] Tolman, *op. cit.*, vol. vii., p. 826.
[37] *Ibid.*, vol. viii, pp. 85-86.

trends and direction of growth of sociology at the end of the nineteenth century. He says:

> One hundred sixty-nine different men's colleges give some attention to sociology, while one hundred fifty of these give the equivalent of one course or more in the subject. In the women's colleges, sixteen treat sociology. A total of forty-five colleges and universities give fairly adequate treatment of the subject, offering three or more different courses covering various subdivisions of the sociological field. There is, however, no university in the United States in which the whole field of sociology is adequately covered. The nearest approach to such treatment is at the University of Chicago, Yale University, and Columbia University. Besides the institutions mentioned above, sociology is gradually making its way into technological institutions, normal schools, and theological institutions. The growth of such study in normal schools is most marked, while theological institutions are not making as rapid progress as seemed probable a few years ago. The technical colleges are just awakening to the advisability of treating a subject apparently so remote from a purely technical curriculum.[38]

The general trends at this time were summarized by Tolman and presented as (1) differentiation of the field, (2) decrease in size of classes, (3) passing of dilettanteism and superficiality, and (4) recognition that the postgraduate school of sociology is "the only adequate institution for such study."[39] Sociology had stormed the citadels of classicism with a vengeance and established itself firmly in academic circles, with the thunder of its critics still raging.

5. Criticisms of sociology in 1902

Tolman summarizes the arguments of the critics of sociology up to 1902 as follows: "Sociology must define itself either as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. It has tried to define itself as a body of doctrine, and it has failed in the attempt. If it is merely a point of view, it cannot be sep-

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

arated from the matter in discussion and must subordinate itself to the various social sciences. It has as yet made no serious attempt to develop itself as a method of research, and must develop itself on these lines and show its fruitfulness before it can demand consideration at the bar of science." [40] He then advises sociologists "to develop sociology as a method of research as rapidly as possible."

To be quite accurate, sociology at this time was little more than a point of view, but the composite critic's conclusion that it must therefore subordinate itself to the various social sciences by no means follows. All pure sciences are merely points of view. The scientist, from the vantage point of his particular field, looks a body of data into order and perspective. Another scientist, from his point of view, may look the same body of data into a different order and perspective. The catalogue of doctoral theses of the University of Chicago is interesting in this connection. There is nothing, for instance, in the subject matter of "Transportation on the Great Lakes of North America" and "Lake Traffic of Chicago," to indicate that the first was a dissertation in economics (1897) and the second one in geography (1924). Further, no one could tell from the titles that "State Governments of the American Revolution" was written in the Political Science department (1905), and "Development of State Constitutions, 1776-1851" was done in the History department (1916). One studies the "Establishment of the National Banking System" in the Economics department (1908), but he studies "The Second United States Bank" in the History department (1902). "The Poor Law System of the United States" is a thesis in economics (1894), whereas "Pauper Law and Institutions in Illinois" is a thesis in sociology (1921). "The Mennonites in Pennsylvania" are studied in history (1907), but a "Social Study of the Mennonite Settlement in . . . Kansas" is made in the Sociology department (1926). And so one might continue giving instances to show that not the subject matter but the point of view differen-

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

tiates the sciences, but these are sufficient to illustrate the argument.

6. EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

We stated above that sociology emerged from the last decade of the nineteenth century with something new in its make-up. This new element was the sociological point of view.

The philosophers of history had been interested in the present, to be sure, but they looked to the past, to history, for data and principles by which to understand the present. They were also very much interested in the future. They wanted to find the laws of progress in order to predict the future. They had invented all sorts of such formal laws—spiral, cyclical, linear, and later economic, ideological, geographical, and racial. Their generalizations, however, were based on past data. Vico, perhaps the greatest of the classical philosophers of history, studied ancient history intensively. The immediate followers of Vico were likewise learned in classical history, while the followers of Hegel drew from a wider, though still historical, source.

It remained for Auguste Comte to see the importance of contemporaneous social facts for generalization. That is one reason why he is called the father of sociology. Of course he was not the first to see contemporaneous social facts. The Sophists [41] had gotten themselves into a great deal of trouble by their persistent questionings about Nature versus Convention. Other thinkers and philosophers had likewise seen contemporaneous social facts, but Comte was the first one to make explicit the existence of social facts as distinguished logically from physical or biological facts, and, what is more, he was the first to see that the positive, or scientific, method could be applied to the study of them as it had been to physical and biological data. It is now a commonplace that Comte wrote about sociology but that he did not actually write sociology itself. What he contributed to sociology besides

[41] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, April, 1928, pp. 292-295.

the name was the delineation of its field, the sociological viewpoint.

But this was a very great achievement. It is relatively easy to see social facts in the past or in a Utopia. It is extremely difficult to see them in the present. To confirmed sociologists it seems simple to see contemporary cultural or sociological data because it is habitual with them to see such facts. But it is not simple. Most people even today never get the sociological viewpoint. The psychologists, for example, with rare exceptions, do not get it at all. Thus Allport denies the validity of many sociological concepts and pronounces them fallacious. Most undergraduate courses in sociology are well-nigh over before the student sees what it is all about, just as the beginner in any new science fails to grasp the conceptual significance of the field as a whole. The whole subject sounds vague and incoherent to him. He cannot see what connection there is between the various lines of thought presented to him as "sociology." It is only after he has acquired the sociological viewpoint that his newly gained knowledge falls into intelligible categories of order. This is the same sort of intellectual experience that the student of any other collegiate subject has until he becomes familiar with its frame of reference and makes his intellectual adjustments to it.

In the United States, although, as we have seen, courses and departments of sociology began to become fairly numerous in the 'nineties, we must promptly agree with the criticism that there was not much real sociology, but only the sociological viewpoint. The men who called themselves sociologists saw the existence of social or cultural facts and they proposed to make these facts the objects of their study. As Small intimates, the sociologists started out with the conviction that there was something for them to study, then went about to find it. They believed there was more than the older social scientists taught. But what? They did not know exactly but they meant to find out.[42] The literature of sociology during the 'nineties is filled with discussions about the

[42] *Op. cit.*, pp. 802-803.

province, scope, data, field, problems, etc., of sociology. The writers were trying to point out to the rest of the world, particularly to the other social scientists, that the realm of the superorganic as such did exist and should be studied, and that they proposed to do so.

7. THE PROBLEM OF METHOD WITH EARLY AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS

Tolman's advice "to develop sociology as a method of research as rapidly as possible" was unquestionably sound, but it was quite superfluous. It was like telling a conscientious man to do his duty. The sociologists were certainly not averse to developing a technique of research, but it is one thing to perceive abstractly the existence of cultural or social facts and quite another to devise concrete methods of studying them. For, contrary to the popular notion, facts do not exist in nature in a form ready to be utilized; they must be extracted from their natural environment and standardized and, to borrow a metaphor from biology, they must be "mounted." Historical facts are already mounted ready for the historians' discovery and, with due respect to the difficulties of historical research as pointed out by historiographers, it is relatively simple to discover historical facts. But to study social facts scientifically in the fluid, dynamic present is extremely difficult. The sociologist must work out a system of isolating and abstracting facts out of a most confusing jumble. He has to map out his problem and then invent ways of extracting the associated factors from their milieu in order to solve the problem. He must have his documents made to order, so to speak. The whole field is unstandardized and amorphous.[43]

In spite of all the difficulties involved, however, the early sociologists tackled their problem with great insight and, considering the lack of models, with notable success. They began to build a methodological structure out of the fragments of their

[43] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, April, 1928.

heritage. From "social science" sociology inherited the statistical method. From the philosophy of history, the historical method. And from Spencer, the ethnological approach. In a more or less cognate field, under the leadership chiefly of G. Stanley Hall and James Mark Baldwin, it was the height of fashion at this time to make detailed and meticulous studies of the development of infants, and case records more or less like the classical Shinn biography began to appear in the journals of child study, and in book form. This method proved suggestive to sociologists. With this background the sociologists of the late 'nineties and early years of this century began to forge methods which would be adequate for the study of the subtlest and most illusive type of data, namely, social phenomena.

Each of the major sociologists solved his methodological problems according to his own interests. Giddings, true to the tradition of his predecessor, Mayo-Smith, who had written a book called *Statistics and Sociology* (1895), became one of the most outstanding advocates of the statistical method in sociological research. This did not, however, preclude a deep interest in the historical and anthropological approach to the study of sociological phenomena. It is interesting to note that these two lines of method have always predominated in the Columbia department, and that Columbia doctors in sociology are usually specialists in either one or both of these types of method.

The method used by Ross might be called the general observational method. It has been criticized, especially by Small and his followers, and the importance of his results minimized. Small says, in effect, that although Ross' results may be all right, he does not tell us how we could get similar results.[44] This is, of course, a valid criticism, since ideally every scientific generalization should be verifiable by competent workers in the field. But as yet there are not enough standardized data in sociology to afford a basis for many generalizations. In the meantime, how-

[44] *History of the Sociological Movement in the United States* (Syllabus for Sociology 317, University of Chicago, 1923), p. 73.

ever, we need some sort of generalizations to give us perspective on our world, and the generalizations of a trained observer with insight, even though they prove later to be wrong, are nevertheless better than none at all.[45]

There are also logical grounds to justify the observational method of Ross. In the case of reliable monographs in anthropology, the writers live among the tribes under study and record the daily life about them. With primitive peoples, as Bernard points out, it is relatively easy to get perspective on cultural facts.[46] It is far more difficult to do this in one's own culture. One doesn't see his own culture, just as he doesn't see air, because it is the very matrix in which he is formed, and everything in it seems "natural." If, however, a man attempts to use the observational method of the anthropologist on his own culture, we should judge not his method so much as the success with which he eliminates bias and prejudice and selects his observations.

This vindication of Ross' method by no means implies that it should be encouraged in the future. On the contrary, its usefulness decreases in proportion as specific and concrete studies are made which furnish a basis for generalization. It is the purpose here merely to point out that this method served a useful function in the early stages of sociology in the United States.

Sumner's *Folkways* was, as Burgess points out, "perhaps the first disinterested arrangement of anthropological materials for sociological purposes." [47] Cooley, however, questions its disinterestedness. He says, "Its objectivity is open to question. There is reason to think that Sumner was by no means an unbiased man, but was . . . noted for a somewhat dogmatic individualism and pessimism that were not without influence upon his treatment of the folkways." [48] As to method, Cooley remarks that "It is not

[45] L. L. Bernard, "The Function of Generalization," *The Monist,* October, 1920.

[46] *The Monist,* April, 1928.

[47] "Statistics and Case Studies," *Sociology and Social Research,* vol. xii, p. 116.

[48] "Sumner and Methodology," *Sociology and Social Research,* vol. xii, pp. 303-304.

quantitative; it is not made up of *case studies;* it is not *psychoanalytic,* nor yet *behavioristic.* . . . Moreover, it is not in any great measure a work of direct observation." [49] It is, however, certainly inductive, since it is based on vast quantities of concrete data. In spite of changes in viewpoint and outlook which have taken place in sociology since 1906, this work still stands as a monument in patient research. Its greatest sales, according to Keller, occurred twenty years after its publication.[50] Despite its lack of preoccupation with method, it was a marvelous contribution to sociology.

Cooley himself solved the problem of method by the use of cases, in the manner of the genetic psychologists, but with greater insight and success. Small says of *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), that "it was a swing away from the almost universal practice of wholesale generalization, whether of subjective or objective material, to the other extreme of close scrutiny of cases. This in itself was a novelty within the American sociological movement, and it would be impossible to estimate the ratio of its influence in turning the procedure of American sociologists away from the method of speculation towards adoption of case study techniques." [51] Cooley was himself a trained statistician, but his most memorable works are those in which he uses the method which he characterizes as "sympathetic introspection."

Whether or not it was Cooley's book that precipitated the use of the case method in social research, it is a fact that by 1906 we find a thesis at the University of Chicago entitled "A Case Study of Delinquent Boys in the Juvenile Court of Chicago." This may have been the result of Healy's influence, who himself has become one of the staunchest advocates of the case method technique.

At the University of Chicago another method was gradually taking shape also, namely, the local survey method. Thomas, who, perhaps more than any other single individual, is responsible

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Statement in a letter to L. L. Bernard.

[1] *History of the Sociological Movement in the United States,* p. 27.

for the so-called "Chicago school" of sociology, was experimenting with a number of methods. He used the anthropological method to good advantage. But he was also interested in exploring the city of Chicago. He studied, for instance, "gaming in Chicago," and included it in his courses of instruction. Perhaps it was Henderson, however, who did most to set the stamp of Chicago on the local survey and to make it so characteristic of that university. Theses like "A Study of the Stock Yards Community at Chicago . . . ," "A Study of the Higher Life of Chicago," and "Some Phases of the Production and Consumption of Literature in Chicago," began to appear, establishing the tradition of local surveys which in its more recent manifestation has become one of the most important elements in the development of sociology in the United States.

One of the most interesting items in the history of methods in American sociology is the great interest evinced in abstract "methodology" and the relative, though by no means complete, inattention given to the detailed procedure of research in the early years. With Small, says Bernard, "Methodology apparently meant two things: (1) Dividing up the field of social science among the several social sciences for working purposes, and (2) collecting a vast number of sociological concepts to serve as pigeonholes for the storage of facts. . . . Small's notion of methodology was, therefore, logical rather than technological." [52] Bernard states further, "I doubt if Small ever had any very adequate notion of how to go about gathering the facts that were to be pigeonholed, unless indeed it was to take them from the books of other writers." In his own research, Small used the historical method. The method of logical concepts was also espoused by Giddings in his *Inductive Sociology* (1901), but "its failure to secure a considerable following was in keeping with the trends away from this type of methodology." [53]

Apparently the only self-conscious methods were those of

[52] *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, p. 288.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

statistics and history. There was no discussion of the theory and logic of the case method, very little of Cooley's "sympathetic introspection," of the local survey, of the anthropological method, or of any other. Great things were hoped for from the statistical method, yet relatively little concrete application of statistics to sociological phenomena (as distinguished from "social science") took place.

It was in connection with the use of historical data for purposes of the generalization of laws that sociology overcame one of the two great obstacles in its progress mentioned above. During the 'nineties there had been a great many efforts to discover a single law which would apply universally and eternally to social evolution, such as geographic, economic, ideological, racial, and similar "interpretations of history."[54] In 1903, when the sociologists met with the historians in New Orleans, the whole problem of the possibility of generalizing history was thrashed out. The statement of the organic interpretation of history by Cooley presented at that meeting is truly classic in its catholic common sense. The incorporation of this viewpoint into sociology may be said to mark the beginning of the end of the philosophy of history trend in American sociology, for an organic interpretation of history has none of the metaphysical implications that a particularistic or unilateral interpretation has, and its advent marks the elimination of metaphysics from history. If every element basic to the evolution of culture is dependent upon every other, the fatalism and inevitability of the old philosophy of history must disappear.[55]

8. SOCIOLOGY, 1901-1909

The advent of Cooley's *Social Organization* in 1909 is taken by Ellwood to mark the beginning of the modern period in sociol-

[54] A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxi, pp. 790-795.

[55] L. L. Bernard, "The Interdependence of Factors Basic to the Evolution of Culture," *American Journal of Sociology,* September, 1926.

ogy.[56] In more ways than one, the period around 1909 may be said to be a dividing point in the history of American sociology. The years from 1909 to about 1917 might well be called the barren years, for although books were produced and articles were written, there seems nevertheless to have been a lull in sociological activity. There is nothing like the great flowering which produced in one decade such a series of works as *Social Control, Human Nature and the Social Order, Applied Sociology, Folkways, Social Psychology, Social Organization.* The vigor and zest of the earlier years seem to have died out for the time being.

In another sense 1909 may be taken as a milestone. Reporting on the results of a questionnaire sent out by the Committee on Teaching of the American Sociological Society in 1910, Professor Chapin says, "In conclusion, it may be said that assuming the 145 answers as fairly representative of the institutions teaching sociology in the United States, the classification of these replies shows a majority laying emphasis upon theoretical subject matter including the historical and psychological, as opposed to the practical subject matter specified by Charity, Poor Relief, Philanthropy, etc."[57] In other words, sociology was making headway toward overcoming the second obstacle in its path, namely, the "social science" strain in its ancestry, just as earlier the philosophy of history had been eliminated and replaced by the organic view of history. This process was by no means completed by 1910—it is not even yet completed—but at least enough of a beginning had been made so that it could be noted in a survey of current teaching.

As to the contents of the courses in sociology at the beginning and end of this period in the history of sociology, it is interesting to compare the results of Tolman's study (1902) with those of Bernard's (1909) and Chapin's (1910). The following tables are not altogether comparable, but they are very suggestive.

[56] "Recent Developments in Sociology," in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (E. C. Hayes, ed.), p. 4.

[57] "Report on Questionnaire of Committee on Teaching," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xvi, p. 784.

TABLE I[58]

NUMBER OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OFFERING COURSES IN THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF SOCIOLOGY IN 1902

Subject	*Number of Schools*
Social geography:	
Physico-social; the environment	3
Racial demography	5
Social statistics and demography	15
Problems of population; race problems	4
Colonization	3
Sociology of the domestic group	4
Sociology of the municipal group	8
Sociology of the rural group	1
Sociology of the national group	
General descriptive treatment	6
Sphere of state activity; the state and industry; socialism	20
Social legislation	4
Democracy, social philosophy of	4
Sociology of the dependent classes; charities	34
Sociology of the delinquent classes; criminology	28
Sociology of the industrial group; social economics	44
Social reform, practical sociology; social problems	51
Genetic sociology	14
Animal and primitive human society; anthropo-sociology	13
Development of society in historic times; social history	11
Social psychology	15
Social ethics	20
Social philosophy	34
History of social theory	11
Methodology and classification	3
Sociology of religion	17
Sociology of education	6
Sociology of art and amusement	4
General sociology; descriptive sociology	
General elementary courses	90
Advanced courses in general sociology	12

Perhaps the first point of interest is the heterogeneous nature of the subject matter treated in 1902. But the numerical volume of the various types of subject is even more interesting. The order of numerical importance of the most popular courses is: general elementary sociology (90), social reform (51), social economics (44), social philosophy (34), sociology of the dependent classes

[58] Adapted from Tolman, *op. cit.*, vol. viii, pp. 88-104.

(34), sociology of the delinquent classes (28), the sphere of state activity, the state and industry, socialism (20), and social ethics (20). Apparently most institutions were teaching under the name of sociology a composite of "social science," and a sociological treatment of economics and political science and ethics.

By 1907-08 the general complexion had changed somewhat. Bernard's analysis of the courses offered in 337 schools, using different categories, shows the order of importance of various subjects to be as follows: [59]

TABLE II

NUMBER OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OFFERING COURSES IN THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF SOCIOLOGY BY 1907–08

Subject	*Number of Schools*
General sociology	242
Descriptive sociology	170
Social technology (including social problems)	117
Social psychology	96
History of sociology	78
Methodology	75
Urban sociology	59
Rural sociology	58
Ecclesiastical sociology	29
Anthropology and ethnology	26
Biblical sociology	21
Family and ethical problems	21
Socialism	7
Biological sociology	4

The difference in categories makes comparison of these two tables difficult. Perhaps the most striking change that stands out is the almost complete reversal of rating of social psychology and of socialism which took place between 1902 and 1907-08. Social ethics has dropped in importance, as has biological sociology. There are no categories to indicate economics or political science. Presumably sociology was beginning to leave these disciplines to economists and to political scientists.

Chapin's categories, however, do include "economic subject

[59] "The Teaching of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xv, p. 191. (By permission of the Univ. of Chicago Press.)

matter." His figures were based on 126 colleges and universities, 5 theological seminaries, and 14 state normal schools—145 institutions in all. His data are presented in Table III.

TABLE III[60]

NUMBER OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OFFERING COURSES IN THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF SOCIOLOGY IN 1910

Subject	*Number of Schools*
Historical	84
Anthropology	40
Ethnology	37
Social institutions	52
Social evolution	56
Psychological	80
Social psychology	56
Association	29
Imitation	31
Biological	16
Eugenics	5
Population (statistics)	6
Descriptive and analytic	21
Specific social groups	9
Physical factors	10
Economic subject matter	22
Industrial conditions	10
Labor problems	14
Practical unspecified problems	8
Socialism	8
Practical	56
Social problems of congestion and housing	23
American social problems	19
Social problems (not specified)	15
Visits to institutions	9
Poor relief and pauperism	5
Charity	23
Philanthropy	14
Crime and criminology	20
Education	11
Overlapping above six	
Sociological theory	40
Social pathology	13

The order of predominance of the larger categories of subject matter is now: historical (84), psychological (80), practical

[60] Chapin, *op. cit.*, p. 782.

(56), economic (22), descriptive and analytic (21), and biological (16). The first ten, in order, of the more specific categories are: social evolution and social psychology (each 56), social institutions (52), anthropology (40), ethnology (37), imitation (31), association (29), poor relief and pauperism (25), charity (23), crime and criminology (20). The difference in rating of anthropology and ethnology in Tables II and III is a curious inconsistency, as are also the relative positions of descriptive and biological sociology.

One consistent trend is noticeable. The decline in the relative importance of practical or applied sociology has already been commented upon. It can be more clearly brought out if we weight the categories. If we use the largest category in each of the three tables as the basis for measuring the data of that table, we find that in Tolman's study practical sociology has approximately 56.4 per cent of the importance of general elementary sociology. Social technology in Bernard's table has the value of 48 per cent of general sociology. In Chapin's study, subtracting the value assigned to education in order to make it comparable with the other tables which do not call educational sociology practical sociology, we find that practical sociology has a rating of 53 per cent with reference to historical sociology.

As indicative of the opinion of the leading sociologists of the time as to what should constitute the subject matter of a fundamental beginning course in sociology, the suggestions of 86 men, as reported by Chapin, are given here. The order of importance assigned to different divisions according to their suggestions is: historical, (28); psychological, (25); practical, (16); biological, (7); descriptive and analytic, (7); economic, (3).

It is very significant to note that sociology was gradually dropping economics, political science, and ethics as well as "social science" from its courses and building up its own field. This leads, then, to a consideration of the relations of sociology to the other social sciences.

II. Relations of Sociology to the Other Social Sciences

Some sociologists seem to have the idea that sociology "is" or should be something different from what it actually seems to be—like a platonic ideal—which they must or should study. The methodological disputes of the 'nineties were an outgrowth of this viewpoint. A witty psychologist once replied, when asked to define psychology, that it was what a group of men who called themselves psychologists studied. That was quite accurate. But it would be impossible to define sociology that way because we would have as much trouble deciding who was a sociologist as in deciding what was sociology. Ward denied the title of sociologist to Small and Hayes.[61] And Small in turn denied it to Sumner.[62] One sociologist calls another a quack when he disagrees with him. And so on. The only final test as to whether or not a man is a sociologist, it would seem, is whether or not he agrees with our own particular sociological predilections!

There is, to be sure, a logical definition or scope of sociology, but administratively and historically sociology has not always and does not now always coincide with such formal and logical definition. As Bernard says, its "scope or field is a matter of historical growth and determination and has been fixed by such accidents as the interests of the promoters, administrative convenience or necessity, the neglect of other departments, the existence of problems unsolved, and the like. All of the social sciences now overlap, and there is constant interflow and interchange of subject matter between them. What is sociology in one department may be economics, history, political science, philosophy, or ethics in another. The belief that the sciences have natural and absolute domains of their own is a relic of the old metaphysical theory of natural law, which held that the universe had a ready-made code which the scientist merely deciphered, and that this code was

[61] A. W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxi, p. 752.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 733, footnote.

divided into certain subdivisions or chapters, each of which must be deciphered by a specialist in a particular science." [63] Fortunately this view is passing, and attempts to strait-jacket sociology by means of formal and logical delimitation of its "field" are less significant than frank and realistic recognition of sociology as it actually exists and functions. The methodological disputes were important and necessary in the early days when sociology was struggling for academic standing and trying to prove that there was something for it to study; but nowadays, with comparative academic security, we can afford to be more accurate in our definition of what sociology is, and less logical. The discussion in this chapter, therefore, will not consider the logical relations of the social sciences, but rather their administrative and historical relations.

I. CONFLICTS

Although the administrative relations between sociology and the other social sciences have always been close, they have by no means been always cordial. A glance at the contents of courses in sociology in 1902, as presented by Tolman,[64] indicates that sociology was almost everything else as well as (or perhaps except?) sociology. It was political science, social geography, social ethics, and especially it was social economics. This was quite natural since many of the early American sociologists came to the field from economics, more than from any other field, according to Small.[65] In fact, the return of a large number of German trained social economists to teach in American universities was largely influential in the introduction of sociology into the curricula about 1890.[66]

But this close affiliation in subject matter did not at all indicate close affiliation in practice. There was a strong antagonism be-

[63] *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* vol. ix, pp. 285-286.
[64] See above, p. 29.
[65] *History of the Sociological Movement in the United States,* p. 46.
[66] L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* vol. iv, p. 283.

tween sociologists and economists throughout the 'nineties. Small explains this feeling on the ground that the economists were not at all certain of their own foothold in the universities. The classics were still powerfully intrenched. "It is not surprising, therefore," says Small, "that the historians and the economists were jealous of interlopers in what they regarded as their preserve, or of any dividing of forces that would weaken the morale of social science." [67]

The feeling of antagonism between economists and sociologists received a check in 1903—still according to Small—when the sociologists met with the historians in New Orleans. Since the only account of this process is that by Small, which has not been published except in syllabus form, excerpts describing the re-alignment of the social scientists subsequent to the 1903 meeting with the historians, are here inserted:

> Up to the New Orleans meeting, the sociologists had counted as economic sectaries. They had been so regarded by the economists, and had themselves accepted the assignment, in the sense that they felt themselves more antagonistic to the economists than to any other academic group. . . . The economists regarded them as troublers in Israel, and the sociologists in turn felt bound to be contentious toward the economists. . . . From the New Orleans meeting, however, the relations between the three groups began to change.
>
> The discussion led the sociologists to the perception that between themselves and the economists, as represented by the *American Economic Association,* the differences were matters of method, and division of labor, rather than of fundamental purpose. There has resulted ever since a growing tendency first toward more sympathetic toleration, then toward mutual understanding and coöperation between the economic and sociological types of American scholars.
>
> The sociologists came away from the New Orleans meeting with the feeling, on the other hand, that the historians had voluntarily taken themselves out of the field of objective social science and had created for themselves an artificial preserve for the propagation of literary exotics. . . . They seemed to announce that history knows

[67] *History of the Sociological Movement in the United States,* p. 44.

nothing and will know nothing of a larger social science. They seemed to deny categorically that the historical factor in social science must learn to adapt itself, according to indicated function, to the inclusive task of social science. The relations between American historians and other social scientists have never recovered from that notification.[68]

Whether the increasing friendliness between sociologists and economists was cause or effect of the departmental relations, is difficult to say. By 1907-08, sociology was being taught in departments whose title included "Economics" in 78 out of 166 institutions. It was being taught in 39 departments whose title included "History." Thus we might say that the administrative relations between sociology and economics were about twice as strong as those between sociology and history. They were more than twice as strong as those between sociology and political science, for sociology was being taught in only 30 departments with titles including "Political Science." It should be borne in mind that there were probably more departments of history than of economics and of political science, so that the above figures represent conservative ratios.

In his study of sociology in southern colleges and universities in 1918, Bernard found sociology being taught in 20 departments called "Sociology," in 28 in whose title "Economics" appeared, and in no departments of history or of political science.[69]

In spite of Small's assertions of increasing friendliness between sociologists and economists, there still remained strong opposition to sociology from economists by 1909, for Bernard's study found that "the most opposition in the academic world comes from teachers of economics." [70]

The political scientists have not, as an organization, so far as the records indicate, had any official quarrel with the sociologists. However, as individuals, they occasionally express their irritation

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[69] "The Teaching of Sociology in Southern Colleges and Universities," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxiii, p. 495. (By permission of the Univ. of Chicago Press.)

[70] *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xv, p. 211.

at sociologists. Thus, in 1909, Henry Jones Ford of Princeton published in the *Nation* an article on "The Pretensions of Sociology," ending with the rather testy statement, "If anything is argued in the name of sociology the fit rejoinder is that there is no such science." [71] And as recently as February, 1928, Professor Munro expresses doubt as to the value for political science of much that passes as social psychology.[72]

2. COMPETITION

The process of competition as well as that of conflict has had its place in the relations of the social sciences. Clow tells of the normal school at Charleston, Wisconsin, in which economics replaced sociology because, in the words of the teacher, "Experience seemed to show that a course in economics was more valuable than a course in the more general subject of sociology." [73] In the Northwest, on the other hand, from Minnesota to the Pacific Coast, it appeared from his study that sociology was stronger than economics. This is corroborated by the results of a study by Bain on sociology in the high schools of Washington. From his findings, it appeared "that sociology is growing much faster than is economics, which is to be expected, since the former is a more recent addition to the curriculum. . . . The content of the former makes a greater appeal to high school pupils than does the content of the latter." [74]

These instances of the relatively superior strength of sociology over economics in the Northwest are, however, unique. The same relations do not exist in the East nor in the South. In 1918, Bernard's study disclosed that in southern schools, "Economics is better developed than is sociology in all types of institutions except those for the training of ministers, negroes, women, and

[71] *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xv, p. 101.
[72] *Political Science Review,* vol. xxii, p. 8.
[73] F. R. Clow, "Sociology in Normal Schools," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xvi, p. 256.
[74] "Sociology in Washington High Schools," *School Review,* vol. xxxiv, pp. 535-542.

Catholic young men. The best present-day development of economics as compared with that of sociology occurs in the agricultural and mechanical colleges, the colleges for men, the state universities, the white normal schools, and the white coeducational colleges." [75]

The same study also revealed the interesting fact that sociology had a lead over political science in southern colleges, but this was due to the backward development of political science in the smaller colleges. In the more important schools, sociology and political science were about equal in strength.[76]

History, he found, was the strongest social science, but this was in process of change. "The relative preponderance of emphasis given to history over sociology appears to be decreasing. . . . The same tendency is not so definitely apparent for economics and political science as compared with sociology."[77]

We may expect competition among the social sciences to continue, since usually the curriculum allows a choice of one subject in the social science group as an elective. In the conservative schools of the East the competition is not exciting, since sociology is not so firmly intrenched as are economics, political science, and history. In the Middle West, the Far West, and the Northwest, however, and more recently in the South, the subjects are more nearly on an equal basis, and here the competition is most interesting.

So far as official relations among the social sciences are concerned, an effective accommodation has been achieved in the form of the Social Science Research Council, organized in 1923 for the purpose of promoting coöperation in research. Further cooperation in *Social Science Abstracts* also indicates progress in the formal relations of the social sciences.

Perhaps this recent spirit of coöperation among the social sciences is the result of their secure and well-established position

[75] "Sociology in Southern Colleges," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxiii, p. 505.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 501.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 505-506.

in curricula. They no longer are fighting for their existence. And sociology no longer makes extravagant claims, but humbly and meekly goes about her business, without threatening to become economics or political science or history. She has, so to speak, found herself.

3. HISTORICAL RELATIONS IN SUBJECT MATTER

It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss sociological theory, but it is quite apropos at this point to sketch very briefly some of the doctrinal relationships which have at different times existed between sociology and the other social sciences. We have already seen that early sociology was largely economics, political science, and philosophy of history. In this respect, the relationship between sociology and the other social sciences was very intimate indeed.

There were two major fields in which the social sciences converged. These were the study of "scientific socialism," and of social problems and of social reform.

Socialism.—The early confusion in the lay mind with regard to sociology and socialism had more than merely a phonetic basis. As Flint points out, sociology, or positivism, grew up as a special kind of socialism.[78] Later on, to be sure, it became more of a rival than subsidiary, and in many of the denominational schools in this country it developed as a counterargument against the attacks of socialism. But the folk association of the two movements had certain validity. The early emphasis of sociology upon such concepts as conflict was clearly in line with socialistic theory.

"Scientific socialism" involved social and political theory as well as economic theory and a philosophy of history. All types of social scientists found common ground in attacking or defending, or in merely analyzing, the tenets of socialism.

The political implications of socialism involve the whole problem of control and *laissez faire* with respect to social phenomena. This problem has been important in sociology from the time of

[78] *The Philosophy of History in France,* pp. 584-585.

Comte and Spencer to the present. On the one hand there are theorists, like Comte himself, who believed in a reorganization of the state, which was to be the organ of control, very much after the manner of the Catholic Church hierarchy. On the other hand were the Spencerians, who denied the value or even possibility of human control of social affairs. This view had two aspects. Some held that control was vicious in that it interfered with natural forces; others held that it was merely futile. In the United States, Ward and Sumner typified these opposite poles of thought.[79] Marx, to be sure, when he was logically consistent, claimed that socialism was inevitable and that conscious human control was not necessarily involved in bringing it about. But even the socialists were not always consistent, and certainly the Christian socialists and the Christian sociologists believed in the efficacy of human effort in social change. The exact function of legal and political enactment in society, in spite of *Folkways* and the discussions of the economists with respect to state regulation, or of the lawyers with respect to codification and the common law, has not yet been thoroughly and impartially investigated. It is a problem calling for the combined efforts of political scientists, sociologists, and legal theorists. Legal theory has a great deal to teach us in this field.

The Marxian philosophy of history, the materialistic interpretation, was theoretically interesting to both historians and sociologists and was a point of contact between them.

Social Problems.—In connection with the study of poverty, unemployment, and the like, the early sociologists found themselves in a field marginal to economics. The study of philanthropy, charity, industrial relations, and a common interest in population problems further linked the two subjects. And, of course, the whole field of social reform and social problems is closely bound up with political science. Social reforms for the solution of social problems involve political and legal aspects as

[79] H. E. Barnes, "The Doctrines of William Graham Sumner and Lester Frank Ward," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxv, pp. 1-23, 150-170.

well as economic and social aspects. The political scientist must be consulted in determining what kind of social problems can be solved by political means, what kind cannot, and what kind of functions we may expect to be efficiently managed by political institutions, and what kind not.

It is a curious fact that popular thought almost always identifies the study of social problems with sociology. At first blush the logic underlying this seems obscure. Social problems are no more specifically sociological than they are specifically economic, or psychological, or biological, or political. And no one thinks of confusing the study of economics or psychology or biology or political science with social problems. Nor is social work applied sociology any more than it is applied economics or applied politics or applied psychology.

Yet there is a logical basis for the connection of sociology and social problems, as well as the historical connection through the old "social science" movement already described. This logical basis rests on the problem of control discussed above in connection with socialism. If control is possible, then naturally one of the first problems would be to attack certain "pathological" conditions which hinder progress. On the basis of the *Positive Polity* there is a logical relationship between sociology and the study of social problems.[80]

Sociology and History.—On the philosophy of history side, sociological and political theory were linked in their conception of the origin of the state and of its evolution. In fact, in the theory of the state, economics—through socialism—sociology, and political science all found common ground, for all felt the need of some theory of the state.

The philosophy of history was, of course, the mother of sociology, and the theoretical relationship between history and sociology has always been close. In fact, Small tried to trace the

[80] See W. B. Bodenhafer's article, "The Relations of Sociology to Social Work," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* June, 1928, pp. 38-56.

origins of sociology to the German historical school of social scientists of the early nineteenth century, but as one man wittily remarked, these were the origins of no one's sociology except Small's. Both the German school of historians and sociology itself were children of the old philosophy of history.[81] One attempted to refine a technique for the gathering of historical facts for social generalization, while the other attempted to find a way of generalizing contemporaneous social facts.

Sociology retained its philosophical and interpretative nature long after history proper had become merely a technique for the testing and measuring of evidence. It was no wonder then, as Small points out, that the historians were irritated by the sociologists who were still in the stages of thought which they themselves had long since left behind.[82]

But history as a technique and method of research (as distinguished from history as an art) cannot be cultivated *in vacuo*. It must be applied to something; and although historians have discarded attempts at interpretation and generalization, they have increasingly used their technique on sociological data. Thus, social history, institutional history, intellectual history, and the like have come more and more to occupy the historians' attention. As early as 1887, Francis Newton Thorpe recommended that the teaching of American history in the public schools "should be at first chiefly geographical and sociological." [83] The work of men like Turner and Beard need only be mentioned to show how far history has gone in the direction of becoming "socialized."

The sociologists, on their side, although they have given up attempts at philosophical interpretation of history, can never become completely independent of the findings of history, even though history becomes increasingly merely a secondary source of data. It would be impossible to state how much influence the sociological movement had in the socialization of history; it must

[81] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, April, 1928, p. 305.

[82] *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxi, p. 810.

[83] In Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

have been great. As a result, the historian as technician has turned the use of his research tools upon the kind of data which the sociologist needs and can use.

Sociology and Biology.—Although biology and psychology are not social sciences, their relations with sociology have been so intimate, and have had such profound influences, that it seems well to include them in the summary of the relations of sociology and the other social sciences.

One of the most interesting facts with regard to the relationship between sociology and biology is the fascination which biological analogies have always had for sociologists. Beginning with the organismic analogy, down through social Darwinism and genetics and the more recent concepts of symbiosis, natural areas, succession, invasion, human ecology, and Child's theory of gradients, biology has been the most fertile field for analogical reasoning in sociology. In many cases this has been extremely suggestive and helpful, while in others it has proved positively pernicious, as in the case of the genetic analogies, for example. Demographic and population problems have served as common ground for biologists and sociologists on a less analogical basis.

By far the deepest and most impressive influence which biology has had upon sociology was exerted through the theory of human nature and the nature of culture. The marvelous experiments of the geneticists on plants and animals fired biologists with so great enthusiasm for their discoveries that the whole genetic theory was foisted upon sociological phenomena. Human traits, like physical traits, were inherited. Personality was all in the genes. A new kind of biological determinism, this time in terms of personality, appeared.

A long succession of biologists, including Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Romanes, and Lubbock, had held similar views of human traits, but the most convincing and logical statement of this genetic determinism was that of McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908). Cooley, Vincent, and Sumner of American sociologists, and of course the whole French school,

had been expounding the sociological view of personality and human nature as acquired, and as logically on a different plane from physical traits. But the sociologists, along with the other social scientists, were stampeded into accepting the instinct doctrine which interpreted culture in terms of inherited nature, rather than human nature in terms of culture. An attack on the instinct theory at this time called forth an indignant protest from one of the leading sociologists, in which he pointed out that it was ruinous for a scientific sociology to undermine the theory of instincts upon which it must be firmly planted.[84]

It was a grievous error, one which set sociology back perhaps a decade, and from which it may be said only now to have recovered. The whole cultural approach to sociological phenomena had to await the demolishing of the genetic fallacy involved in the instinct theory.

The story of the revolt of the sociologists and of some of the psychologists against the concept of instinct as used in social science is too well known to bear repetition. Beginning at first rather timidly, but gaining momentum as the correctness of its logic became increasingly manifest, the attack on instinct reached striking proportions in the early 1920's. It culminated in the discarding of the concept of instinct by sociologists as adequate for sociological explanations.

The true significance of the instinct controversy seems not always to have been fully recognized. It was a revolt not only against the concept of instinct itself, but against the whole metaphysical theory of genetic determinism in sociology. A host of genetic preconceptions had to be cleared away before sociology could proceed on her way. It was a long detour. It is, of course, useless to speculate about the degree of positive harm wrought in sociology by McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, but the astonishing progress in sociology within the past few years seems to bear witness to the fact that the instinct theory was a real incubus to sociology. If the viewpoint which Comte had

[84] Personal letter to L. L. Bernard.

expounded, and which Cooley was developing, had continued to be the accepted one, the present flowering in sociology might have occurred earlier. It was a long time after *Folkways* and *Social Organization* that significant headway was made in sociology.

Sociology and Psychology.—Even though the psychologists, or many of them, have given up the concept of instinct as a tool for explaining human nature, they still hold that one can understand society best in terms of the individual, rather than *vice versa.* Some even go so far as to say that there are only individuals and that the concepts of institutions and of groups as explanations are fallacious.[85]

Sociologists themselves have not been wholly innocent of furthering this view. Small himself, following Ratzenhofer's lead, felt the necessity of setting up a system of individual interests. The fact that these interests were not necessarily inherited made them a degree less dangerous. But this whole orientation seems futile from the sociological point of view.

The attempt to classify human motives still continues in our day. Thomas and Park and Burgess have their wishes. Even Sumner and Keller, who are extremely suspicious of psychological concepts, and who state that "it is fatal to the genuine study of society further to become absorbed in the study of motives of individuals," [86] have contributed their four motives of love, ghost-fear, vanity, and hate.[87]

Between sociology and psychology, however, there has been effected a working adjustment or, to use a sociological concept, an accommodation, in the growing science of social psychology.[88] With those for whom psychology is fundamental to sociology,

[85] Floyd H. Allport, "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* vol. xix, No. 1, Apr.-June 1924; "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Culture," *ibid.,* vol. xix, July-Sept., 1924; "The Nature of Institutions," *Social Forces,* vol. vi, pp. 167-179.

[86] *Science of Society,* vol. iii, p. 2175.

[87] *Ibid.,* vol. i, chap. i, paragraphs 11-14; *Folkways,* pp. 18-19.

[88] L. L. Bernard, "Sociology and Psychology," in Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations,* p. 352.

social psychology emphasizes the individual. With those for whom sociology is basic to psychology, social psychology emphasizes the development of social personality under environmental pressures.

In recent years some sociologists have taken over certain concepts from psycho-analysis and dynamic psychology in general. These have provided powerful insights into certain sociological problems, especially those connected with personality problems, the effects of early contacts on personality, the impact of the psycho-social environment, the social mechanics of human motivation, etc. But the attempts of extreme psychoanalysts to explain anthropological and sociological structures, like totem and tabu, in terms of psychoanalytic concepts have not been taken seriously by sociologists.

Another aspect of psychology, almost the exact opposite of the psychoanalytic phase, has had profound influence upon sociology, namely, that which goes by the name of behaviorism. But since this influence has been exerted largely upon the theory of method, we shall discuss it in Part III of this chapter rather than here.

Sociology and Anthropology.—Between sociology and anthropology there have always existed very close relations. Beginning with Sumner, in this country, and continuing through Giddings, Thomas, Weatherly, Keller, and the recent exploiters of the culture concept, the influence of anthropology upon sociology has been profound and, on the whole, very helpful and stimulating. Perhaps one of the factors which has produced the recent close connection is that the cultural anthropologists joined with the sociologists in their attack upon the attempts to interpret cultural phenomena in terms of the individual. They saw that original human nature and individual psychology were not adequate to interpret their data.

Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man* was a fundamental contribution to sociology as well as to anthropology. A great deal of the theory presented in that book is only now entering the sociologist's

body of accepted data. If it, rather than McDougall's *Introduction,* had become Holy Writ to sociologists (as East claims it did become), many years might have been saved. Anthropology has also of course, served sociology by furnishing it vast bodies of concrete data, data toward which the sociologist could respond quite objectively since it was so remote from his own prejudices and biases.[89]

Some sociologists have expressed themselves as of the opinion that unless sociology exercised foresight, cultural anthropology would quite supersede it. But sociology has a way of incorporating from her rivals what is useful to her and stamping it with her seal. The present cordial relations between the sciences is a matter of congratulation.

Specializations within Sociology.—One of the most interesting relations among the social sciences is the tendency for amalgamations and specializations to take place along the margins. Social psychology, social biology, social geography, cultural sociology, educational sociology, sociology of religion, are illustrations of this trend. We might distinguish three types of specialties in sociology: (1) those which result from marginal contacts with other sciences, like social psychology, social geography, social biology, historical sociology, and cultural sociology; (2) those which result from the application of the sociological viewpoint to specific problems and institutions, like criminology, educational sociology, the sociology of the family, and of religion; (3) those which result from division of labor in research, like rural sociology and urban sociology. Categories number 2 and 3 overlap; they are merely logical.

In a certain sense, each one of these specialities is a separate social science in itself, with its own techniques, its own problems, its own viewpoint. This might be a corroboration of Small's thesis in *The Meaning of Social Science* that when sociology has fulfilled its function of forcing the sociological viewpoint upon

[89] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist,* April, 1928, pp. 316-317, 319.

other sciences, it may be destined itself to disappear as a separate science. However, General Sociology itself shows no signs of anemia, and the large number of general textbooks that have appeared in recent years indicates that specialization has not killed it off. Furthermore, the organization and institutionalization of sociology would tend to protect it as a separate science, even though it should become merely a name to cover a number of specialities.

This tendency toward the development of specialities has been carried to such lengths that now only very exceptional men have a firm grasp of the whole subject. A man who wants to keep up with the latest developments in all departments of sociology finds the task practically impossible. The result is that those working in rural sociology may know only incidentally what is being done in educational sociology, and the research technicians may know next to nothing of the sociology of religion, and so on. The danger of this departmentalization of the subject is, of course, recognized, and the movement for better and completer abstract service has developed in part to overcome it.

III. Prospects

One of the methods by which to determine what the prospects of sociology are is to examine the present situation, the institutional factors which are likely to influence these prospects, and the current trends in the subject.

1. The revival of 1918

About 1918, the barren years came to an end and the present efflorescence in sociology began. Mention need be made only of Cooley's *Social Process,* Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant,* Ross' *Principles of Sociology,* Park and Burgess' *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* Ogburn's *Social Change,* Bernard's *Instinct,* Giddings' *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* Sumner and Keller's *Science of Society,* the establishment of *Social Forces,* and the inauguration of the community

studies at the University of Chicago, to show how important the revival of 1918 actually was. Most if not all of the characteristic emphases of current sociology date from that time. All indications at the present point to a continuation of this vitality in sociology. There is no certainty of this, however. Unsuspected pitfalls in theory—such as the genetic fallacies of earlier times—are liable to arise at any time and lead sociology into blind alleys.

Without in any sense implying a causal relationship, it is suggestive to point out that the flowering of the "social science" movement came immediately after the Civil War; the brilliant period in sociology at the beginning of the present century came after the Spanish-American War, and the present efflorescence dates from the World War. The correlation between accelerated social thinking and social crises is in line with Hegel's theory that thought arises in problem situations, a theory elaborated in this country by Dewey, Thomas, and others, with such illuminating results.

2. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Tolman, it will be recalled, in his report of 1902, found that the three foremost departments of sociology in the country were those at Yale, Chicago, and Columbia. Of these, Yale soon lost its preëminence as a graduate department, and left Chicago and Columbia as the two great departments of sociology in the United States. As Small says, "It is hardly conceivable that sociological instruction in this country could have attained its actual rôle and dimensions of expansion without the pioneering of these two universities." [90] Their preëminence is traceable to a number of factors. Both were in large graduate universities and could therefore specialize in advanced work. Both had strong supporting departments in the other social sciences. Both were among the earliest departments of the country. Both had

[90] *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxi, p. 765.

outstanding men on their faculties, although Small modestly states that Chicago's influence on sociological development was due less to the intrinsic merit of its personnel than to the "galvanic effects of the University of Chicago itself upon the whole academic situation in the United States." [91]

Recently, however, sociology has suffered a serious setback in the decline of the department at Columbia University. This leaves Chicago as the foremost single department in the country. This department has always tended to dominate American sociology, but with a strong department at Columbia this was never possible. Exactly what will be the effect on sociology of the decline of the department at Columbia it is, of course, impossible as yet to estimate. Columbia has stood for the statistical method and it has emphasized cultural sociology very largely, taking its color, in part, from Giddings' interests. The emphasis on statistics was further due to the fact, perhaps, that statistics is more important in the East than in the West because accumulations of quantitative data and records are greater and older there than in the West, making the use of statistics more practicable. The great research organizations which have made such telling use of statistical method are located chiefly in the East also, thus influencing eastern sociology by proximity. The influence of Boas has also unquestionably played a part in the Columbia interest in anthropology.

Chicago, on the other hand, has tended to minimize the importance of statistics for sociology. Will the fact that it is now the most important single department of sociology in the United States, without a counteracting department at Columbia, influence the trends with respect to method? In other words, will the statistical method in sociology suffer from the decline of the department at Columbia which fostered it? At one time, perhaps, the answer might have been affirmative; but at present it seems safe to say that the Columbia-trained sociologists are

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 764.

TABLE IV

NUMBER OF GRADUATE THESES IN SOCIOLOGY 1916–1928

	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Chicago													
Ph.D.....	18	23		25	31	34	41	35	52			33	45
M.A.....	3	4		16	27	14	26	33	34			10	16
Total....	21	27		41	58	48	67	68	86			43	61
Columbia													
Ph.D.....	30	27		22	23	17	26	27	29			21	31
M.A.....	19	40		27	23	37	33	44	40			33	19
Total....	49	67		49	46	54	59	71	69			54	50
Total Ph.D.'s.	100	110		64	76	72	131	89	115			113	162
Chicago and Columbia Ph.D.'s..	48	50		47	54	51	67	62	81			54	76
Total M.A.'s..	64	111		61	102	92	121	144	173			170	176
Chicago and Columbia M.A.'s...	22	44		43	50	51	59	77	74			43	35
Total Graduate Students	164	221		125	178	164	252	233	288			283	338
Chicago and Columbia Graduate Students.	70	94		90	104	102	126	139	155			97	111

numerous and important enough so that even the decay of the Columbia department will not seriously affect the Columbia tradition in sociology. It will be continued through the work of Columbia doctors. Furthermore, the department at Chicago has come to recognize that it cannot counter the strong current toward statistical method in sociology, and it has secured Professor Ogburn, a Columbia doctor, to train its students in that field.

An exact quantitative statement of the importance of these two major departments is perhaps impossible, since it is difficult to measure their influence on their students in any such objective terms. The accompanying charts, based on the lists of doctoral and masters' theses published in the *American Journal of Soci-*

ology since 1916, are presented as merely rough approximations or indices of the influence of these departments.[92]

A number of valid objections might legitimately be urged against these figures. The census is made at Chicago, and the data with respect to its students are likely to be complete, whereas

CHART II.—NUMBER OF DOCTOR'S AND MASTER'S THESES IN SOCIOLOGY IN PREPARATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1916-1928. (ACCORDING TO ANNUAL CENSUS OF *American Journal of Sociology.*)



those from some other schools may be missing or incomplete. Furthermore, some departments have a higher rate of turnover, so to speak, than others, and this would tend to minimize their importance. In schools where a low turnover prevails,

[92] *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxi, pp. 679-685; vol. xxii, pp. 663-671; vol. xxv, pp. 63-69; vol. xxvi, pp. 96-104, 767-774; vol. xxviii, pp. 79-90; vol. xxix, pp. 85-95; vol. xxx, pp. 195-209; vol. xxxii, pp. 972-986; vol. xxxiii, pp. 348-363. Corrected figures for Columbia University, 1928, through the courtesy of Dr. Samuel McCune Lindsay and Dr. A. A. Tenney.

the same students reappear with every census, thus tending to over-emphasize the importance of those schools. Also, the wording of the request in the early years, at least, was such as to allow for some latitude in deciding what was a sociological thesis.[93] But in the absence of more suitable indices, these data are presented for what they are worth.

CHART III.—NUMBER OF DOCTOR'S AND MASTER'S THESES IN SOCIOLOGY IN PREPARATION AT COLUMBIA AND CHICAGO, 1916-1928.



From them it appears that there is a marked negative correlation between the increase in graduate work as a whole (Chart II) and the percentage of this work which is done at Columbia and Chicago (Charts III and IV). In other words, as graduate work

[93] The following legend appears at the head of the list for 1916: "Letters were addressed by the editors to about seventy-five colleges and universities in America, asking for the names of students who are candidates for the A. M. or Ph.D. degrees, and whose . . . dissertations fall within the field of sociology." (Vol. xxi, p. 679.)

is developed in other universities, these new departments take care of the increase in graduate students, leaving, naturally, a smaller percentage for Columbia and Chicago to handle. As a result, with the increase in graduate work in sociology since 1919 (Chart II), there has been a steady, though irregular, decline in the percentage of the whole amount done at Columbia and Chicago (Chart III and IV). There was a rise in the actual number of graduate theses at these universities, however, until 1924, and a decline thereafter (Chart III). Columbia and Chicago in the past have tended to train between one- and two-thirds

CHART IV.—PERCENTAGE OF ALL GRADUATE THESES IN SOCIOLOGY IN PREPARATION AT COLUMBIA AND CHICAGO.



of all graduate students, the proportion fluctuating with the total amount of graduate work being done throughout the country (Chart IV). Chicago has tended to train more Ph.D. students than Columbia (Chart V), but Columbia has trained more M.A. students than Chicago (Chart VI). There has been much speculation of late as to whether the loss of prestige of Columbia in recent years will be made up by a change of policy with respect to sociology at that university. At present Chicago has eclipsed it, but whether this is merely a temporary state of affairs or not cannot yet be determined.

Aside from the universities, there are other institutional factors that are likely to influence the prospects of sociology.

The organization of the Social Science Research Council will perhaps influence sociology by bringing it into closer functional contacts with the other social sciences, thereby enriching and broadening its viewpoint. The Purnell Funds will unquestionably continue to stimulate rural sociologists to productive work. The

CHART V.—COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF PH.D. THESES IN SOCIOLOGY IN PREPARATION AT COLUMBIA AND CHICAGO.



various publishers' series tend to promote the writing of many works of a sociological nature which, without the encouragement thus afforded, might never be written.[94] And, finally, the eco-

[94] See, for example, Steiner's "grateful acknowledgment . . . to Dr. Howard W. Odum, the editor of the series in which the volume appears, who from the first insisted that these community studies should be prepared for publication and gave me no rest until the manuscript was completed," in *The American Community in Action,* p. vii.

nomic support for research offered by the various foundations is without doubt an important factor to be considered in estimating the prospects of sociology in this country.

Ogg has summarized very completely the factors which tend to influence the prospects of the humanistic and social studies,

CHART VI.—COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF M.A. THESES IN SOCIOLOGY IN PREPARATION AT COLUMBIA AND CHICAGO.



and his treatment of the influence of foundations is well worth repeating. He presents the criticisms which have been made of the influence of foundations on research as follows:[95]

The most trenchant and significant criticism of the foundations . . . is . . . the charge that their system of subventions operates

[95] F. A. Ogg, *Research in the Humanistic and Social Sciences,* (American Council of Learned Societies, Century Co., 1928.) pp. 330-331.

now, and will operate even more powerfully in the future, to place restriction on the spontaneity, independence, and variety of productive scholarship. Large sums of money are known to be available for research and other closely allied educational purposes. But before an investigator, or a group of investigators, can draw upon them, they must satisfy a board of trustees that the project is not only feasible but desirable. In favoring some and disfavoring others—in manifesting interest in certain subjects or directions of inquiry and holding aloof from others—the foundations (so it is argued) intentionally or unintentionally give slant or bent to the entire forward movement of research. Furthermore, it is alleged, gifts of foundations frequently have "strings" attached which practically predetermine not only the subjects of inquiry but also, at least within general bounds, the results that are to be arrived at. . . . The temptation is strong to accept money, even at the risk of opinions; and even though the foundations may emphatically disavow any intention or desire to impose their own views, and notwithstanding that the research agencies protest their devotion to absolute independence of thought and speech, the very relationship set up prejudices the freedom of inquiry. Acceptance of money and expectation, if all goes well, of receiving more, in the nature of things subjects the beneficiary to potential control.

These two criticisms, that by selection foundations can control the direction of research and that they prejudice the impartiality of the findings, are extremely serious. Ogg answers them by showing that for the most part the directors of the foundations are themselves aware of the dangers inherent in this situation and are consciously trying to overcome them by various devices such as choosing young men to fill vacancies, especially men who disagree with them in many respects, and by conscientiously distinguishing between the function of the advancement of knowledge and that of the control of opinion.

With respect to the selective influence of foundations, there seems to me to be a more cogent and fundamental reply. It must, of course, be granted at the outset that research which is adequately financed will tend always to prevail in quantity over

research that can find no support. Sociology, then, in the future will perhaps tend to follow the lines which are most generously supported by foundations, as the critics say. But, it is quite logical to argue, the very men who dispense the funds and thus select the fields of research are themselves products of the current fashions in research. In a very real sense they merely follow and do not direct the course which research will take. The direction of study would, according to such a viewpoint, be the same regardless of the selective influence of the foundations, and the only important result is to encourage (rather than to lead) research.

In the second place, even supposing the men who passed upon research projects were aiming to direct the course of research by their grants, could they succeed in their purpose? Could they lead scientific interest into the channels in which they wanted it to go? Could they make unpopular fields of study popular? In the absence of experimental evidence, the answer to such questions as these must necessarily be in the nature of an opinion. But it seems quite consistent with what we know of fashions in dress—the best-known field of fashion—that the answer to these questions is logically a negative. For many years Paris "has decreed" longer skirts; and yet when longer skirts come, it will probably not be because any fashion magnate has "decreed" them, but because of other as yet obscure factors. Similarly, a large number of studies might be prosecuted on foundation grants and yet remain dead so far as their influence was concerned. No foundation, according to this viewpoint, could force sociologists as a whole to read or be deeply influenced by studies in an unpopular field.

It might even be argued that it would be a valuable thing if foundations could guide the course of research, provided they were in the hands of men with insight and vision. The subsidization of unpopular lines of research might be a good thing, tiding them over their period of unpopularity until interest once more shifted toward them, as it probably would. The contribu-

tions thus made would be available as a beginning for further researches, and save a great deal of preliminary work. A more even course of development in all lines of interest would thus be secured, instead of sporadic and irregular development, as is now the case.

The criticism that the results and findings of subsidized research are likely to be determined by the fact of their subsidization is far more serious. One might reply that the extreme unpopularity of normative judgments in present-day sociological research would tend to overcome this difficulty. But if it should ever become fashionable to apply scientifically determined norms (traditionally determined ones have perhaps passed for good in scientific sociology), to social forms—and this is not altogether unlikely—then the temptation to make the conclusions of research conform to those of the dispensers of funds would be great. This is indeed a most important problem.

These are, however, merely theoretical considerations. How important in actual practice is subsidization of research in sociology? Of the twelve fellowships and prizes listed by Ogg as restricted to sociology, only four may be said to be sociological, the other eight being for social work. Of the four sociological awards, two are for the study of the American Negro, one incumbent must "secure a practical acquaintance with some sociological problems in connection with the unprivileged classes," and the other is "for study in social science." Of the major foundations, there is only one which might have important influence on sociology, and that is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Fund. A glance at the awards of the Guggenheim Foundation is sufficient to indicate that sociology has little place in the policy of its awards committee. It is doubtful if any sociologist would be willing to model his research interests to satisfy a committee which finds it desirable to extend a fellowship for the study of the authorship of *A Tale of a Tub,* but which in making its seventy-three awards, finds place for no specifically sociological study.

The extent and nature of subsidization in sociology are indicated in the following quotation from a study by Carter:[96]

> Less than 40 per cent of those making returns received financial assistance specifically for research. . . . Of the 100 in the group receiving assistance, not more than ten or fifteen indicated that the financing was adequate. The bulk of those assisted received a small sum for local travel, for a limited amount of clerical assistance or for other contingencies. There are many scholars who make clear their belief that their work is well-nigh fatally hampered through lack of funds.

Unfortunately, Carter's results do not specify the source of financial assistance. But perhaps the questions raised with respect to subsidization by foundations would apply, with slight modification, to all types of subsidization as well.

3. TRENDS

Since we have already pointed out a number of trends in sociology, and since this book deals with significant trends in the major fields of the subject, the present discussion will be in the nature of a summary rather than of a detailed presentation.

As an Academic Discipline.—As an academic discipline, sociology reveals a number of important tendencies. One of these is the extension of instruction downward in the curriculum. Tolman, it will be remembered, pointed out in 1902 that at that time one of the major trends was toward the recognition that the postgraduate school of sociology was "the only adequate institution for such study." And Bernard, in his study of 1909, found that sociology was still primarily a graduate subject. He accounts for this as follows: "The reasons why sociology remains so predominantly a graduate subject in most large institutions are mainly two. In the first place, there is a widespread prejudice against permitting immature minds to think about all kinds of social questions. . . . A further cause is the lack of suitable text-

[96] "Research Interests of American Sociologists," *Social Forces,* vol. vi, p. 212.

books and techniques for bringing facts concretely and comprehensively to the young students. As yet we have not enough teachers suitably trained to present the facts that are socially valuable with due insight and discrimination." [97]

Within the past decade, however, there has been a notable tendency to introduce sociology in some form or other into high schools and even into grade schools. By 1917, Freese found that "many secondary schools have introduced courses in elementary sociology or social problems into their curricula." [98] Between 1920 and 1924, Read Bain found that in the State of Washington, "the number of [high] schools offering sociology increased more than 90 per cent, while the number of pupils taking sociology increased almost 160 per cent." [99]

The geography of this movement toward the extension of sociology is interesting. Freese noted that "though most of these new courses [in sociology] are found in the Central and Western states, many educators in the Eastern and Southern states are heartily in sympathy with the movement." [100] While Bain's figures are, therefore, not at all representative of the United States as a whole, they nevertheless indicate a trend which is by no means insignificant. In the older and more conservative schools of the East, where the curriculum is determined by the exigencies of the College Entrance Examination Board, we may not expect to find courses in sociology until the colleges themselves recognize it as an entrance subject.

Sociology is also extending into more and more institutions of collegiate rank. Practically all of the newer schools make provision for instruction in sociology as such. In the older schools, especially those in the East, the subject matter of sociology is usually taught under some other name and in various departments. We might in fact mention the tendency toward the

[97] *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xv, pp. 211-212.
[98] Cited by R. L. Finney, "Report of the Committee on Sociology," *School Review,* vol. xxviii, p. 256.
[99] *Op. cit.,* p. 538.
[100] *Op. cit.*

smuggling of sociology into the curriculum under cover of respectable names like Social Biology, Social Ethics, Practical Ethics, and the like, as a sort of sub-tendency. In all events, there is a trend toward the recognition that no college curriculum is complete without some provision for what we ordinarily call sociology.

We have already noted the growth of sociology as a graduate subject in our discussion of the importance of the departments at Columbia and Chicago. The data there presented seem to indicate that more and more universities are becoming adequately equipped to train graduate students in sociology. But the case of Columbia should serve as a reminder to sociologists that there is nothing irreversible in this trend.

As both cause and consequence of these tendencies, there is a marked improvement in the training of teachers of sociology. Formerly, interest in the subject matter was considered enough to justify a man in undertaking to teach sociology. Thus ministers, ex-ministers, professors of English, of philosophy, of history, of mathematics or of Greek or theology, used to feel equipped to fill chairs of sociology even in larger colleges and universities. Now we require men with specific training in sociology to teach the subject. Although there still are important sociologists who have never had any specific training in sociology, it seems that as sociology develops in complexity, those who can make important contributions to the field without training will tend to decrease and presumably to disappear. This does not imply, of course, that biologists, geographers, historians, and other thinkers will not continue to enrich sociology, but that the men who make available for sociology the results of research in other fields will tend increasingly to be trained sociologists.

There is another extension of sociology which is not so frequently commented upon, but which is at least as important if not so extensive, as the tendencies already noted. I refer to the extension of sociology into the other sciences, into the professions, and into popular thought. More and more sciences tend to

become "social" sciences.[101] Geography, biology, and psychology are perhaps the most outstanding examples. But even such subjects as economics and political science have tended to become increasingly sociological. And the *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1927* even contains a paper on "Paleontology and Human Relations," by Stuart Weller.

The extension of sociology into the various professions is interesting as a case of the application of sociology. Although we hear a great deal about "applied" sociology in the sense of social problems or social pathology, or even of social work, the most significant application of sociology has perhaps not been of this type. In the early university catalogues, sociology was usually recommended for those preparing for civil positions, for journalism, for the ministry, for law, or for teaching. This was in recognition of the important bearing which sociology had upon these professions. In recent times this recognition has become intensified, and it seems reasonable that the trend will continue.

It is impossible to estimate just what has been the influence of sociology on business, on law, on medicine, on religion, on education, and similar professions. It has probably been different in kind and in degree in each case. It is at least true that an increasing number of students in universities who are preparing for these professions come in contact with sociology. Thus Bossard points out that at the Wharton School of Commerce and Finance, sociology has been an important part of the curriculum for many years.[102] The same is unquestionably true of similar schools in other universities. At Harvard, law students have been given a sociological orientation by Dean Roscoe Pound, and his influence extends far beyond Harvard University. The movement toward the socialization of religion and of education may almost certainly be traced, in part at least, to the influence of sociology in the curricula of schools of education and of theology. The movement toward the socialization of medicine, especially

[101] L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology,* chap. i.
[102] In document furnished to L. L. Bernard.

the public health movement, has also been unquestionably influenced by sociology. It seems probable that several generations of business men, of lawyers, of doctors, of ministers, of educators, of journalists, trained even incidentally in sociology, might have considerable influence on their professions. It is perhaps not yet possible to express a normative judgment as to the value of this influence at the present time.

The extension of sociological knowledge into popular thought has had interesting results. With many, the recognition that social controls are products neither of reason nor revelation nor of natural law, that they are highly relative and frequently irrational, and that they have merely traditional or customary sanctions, has led to a disavowal of such controls entirely. The further sociological knowledge that social controls of some kind are inevitable and that the scrapping of one set of such controls merely leads to the automatic setting up of another set, frequently equally irrational, has not been generally recognized. And the sociologist's reply to the condemnation of traditional standards, namely, that they should be replaced by scientifically determined ones, has scarcely extended beyond academic confines.[103]

In Research.—Ogg considers the following two trends in research in the social sciences as the most noteworthy in the past fifteen or twenty years: "(1) the growth of organized cooperative, large-scale research, as contrasted with the individual, isolated, limited, piecemeal investigations of earlier times, and (2) the drift of research away from the universities."[104] Of these he says further that "the first gives every sign of continuing indefinitely, very likely with increased momentum and proportionately heightened effects. The second is still strongly in evidence, but not so certain of permanence." More specifically of sociology, however, after pointing out the tendencies toward coordination and correlation of research in sociology with that in

[103] See F. H. Allport, "Social Psychology and Human Values," *The International Journal of Ethics,* vol. xxxviii, pp. 369-388, for an interesting discussion of controls.

[104] *Op. cit.,* p. 155.

the other social sciences, he says, "sociological research is still in an amorphous condition and lacking proper support." [105]

The movement toward large-scale, coöperative, organized research has, according to Laski, brought with it a trend toward what might be called formalism or ossification in research. He says, "that we are in danger of becoming over-interested in the collection of material for its own sake and under-interested in the problem of the philosophy the material implies." [106] This is a point which many modern sociologists, in their enthusiasm for research, are likely to dismiss as untrue; but if so keen an observer as Laski perceives such a tendency, it behooves thoughtful students of the subject to give it serious consideration.

The problem of method in research has been one of the most important bones of contention among sociologists during the past decade. The publication of Watson's *Behavior* in 1914 did not stir sociologists profoundly. A few years later, however, Ellwood wrote an article in reply to one written by a young Russian, Zeliony, in 1909, on objectivism in sociology. Zeliony was an ardent behaviorist, and Ellwood's article was a defense of the older subjective techniques of research. Bernard replied, in turn, to Ellwood's article in 1919, defending the objective method. In the meanwhile, *Social Process* and *The Polish Peasant* had appeared, and behaviorism, in defending itself as a method, had become a cult. The stage was set for a royal battle and a royal battle ensued. It has assumed various guises and forms and new terminology from time to time, but the essential conflict of viewpoint has manifested itself throughout. The most recent form for this controversy to take is that of a discussion as to the relative merits of the statistical as opposed to the case method of research, or of the behavioristic technique as opposed to that of "sympathetic introspection," or of analysis of subjective motives.

These discussions on method have been illuminating and extremely valuable, if sometimes acrimonious and emotional.

[105] *Ibid.*

[106] "Foundations, Universities, and Research," *Harper's Magazine,* August, 1928, p. 300.

They have forced sociologists to become critical of the logic of various methods of research. And while seemingly it has been all give and no take with most protagonists, in fact each has actually admitted in part the contentions of the other side. The Chicago school still minimizes the value of statistics—but they have brought an extreme advocate of statistical method into their department. Statisticians may still find much to criticize in case technique—but they are working hard to fit it into statistical categories.

There is some reason to believe that a reaction against abstract formulations of method is now setting in. Bernard,[107] Thomas,[108] and Cooley,[109] among others, have pointed out the futility of dogmatic and inflexible rules of method. The burden of their argument is that every research project in science presents its own peculiar problems of method, and that to approach it with a preconceived bias or prejudice in favor of some specific type of method is harmful to the best results.

Mention should also be made of the large number of books on method which have appeared in the last decade. Chapin, Bogardus, Schluter, Odum and Jocher, Lundberg, Gee, and Elmer have written or projected such manuals dealing with methods of research.

In Subject Matter.—We have already discussed a number of important trends in the contents of sociology, namely, the elimination of "social science," of philosophy of history, and of biological metaphysics from its subject matter. Another interesting trend is that toward the reintroduction of geographical factors into sociological theory. A generation ago Turner and his followers stood at Cumberland Pass and watched the succession of explorer, pioneer, hunter, farmer, and trader, or of English, Scotch, Irish, Dutch, and the like, cross the mountains; and other geographical historians, such as Miss Semple and H. B. George, pointed out the social consequences of natural features

[107] *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,* 1926, p. 259.
[108] In a letter to R. E. Park, from the files of L. L. Bernard.
[109] "Sumner and Methodology," *op. cit.*

like mountains, passes, and the like in American history.[110] At present, the sociologist stands in certain urban districts or regional areas and watches the succession of cultural groups—native American, German, Scotch, Irish, Pole, Jew, or Negro—as residents or as occupational units, or what not. He points out the relation to social organization of such physico-social features as railroad tracks, transportation facilities, industrial plants, playgrounds, and similar items. In brief, he is reintroducing on a local scale an appreciation of the fundamental conditioners of social life which were previously applied only on a national and universal scale.

This important trend may be traced to a number of sources, and chiefly to four. To the rural sociologists, perhaps, belongs the first recognition of the importance of geographical and spatial relations for social organization on a community scale. Galpin's *Social Anatomy of a Community* was a brilliant contribution to this field, a contribution which the rural sociologists were quick to assimilate. In the field of cultural anthropology also, the discovery that there were definite "culture areas" gave impetus to the trend toward the recognition of the importance of space units. The social survey, of course, has always recognized local units, and only a slight shift of emphasis was necessary to transform it into a tool for the study of "human ecology." These three movements were in the air, and it required merely the application of a suggestive name and the personal prestige of Professor Park's backing to precipitate and formulate this trend definitely. The influence of Simmel, working chiefly through Park and his followers, was the fourth source of the reintroduction of spatial relationships into American sociology.

Another interesting trend in the subject matter of sociology is that toward a renewed interest in the concepts and findings of cultural anthropology. For a long time the sociologists took a

[110] F. J. Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin,* Dec., 1893, pp. 79-112, reprinted in *The Frontier in American History;* Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions.*

more or less negative attitude toward anthropology, finding great satisfaction in pointing out the errors of Spencer and the classical school. To be sure, there were always some sociologists, notably Keller, Giddings, Weatherly, and Thomas, who found the anthropological method valuable; but the general and widespread interest in anthropology now current in sociological circles is relatively recent. This renewal of interest in cultural phenomena is the result of the recent flowering in anthropology itself. For many years the American anthropologists, under Boas, were busy with their field studies and shunned any attempts at synthetic and generalized presentation of their results. Thus their discoveries were not available for application to sociology until the beginning of the present decade when a series of brilliant books began to appear which gave to the rest of the world the fruits of two decades of monographic researches. Books by Wissler, Goldenweiser, Lowie, Kroeber, Tozzer, Wallis, to mention only the more outstanding, produced a sort of ferment in sociology which has found expression in a widespread application of anthropological concepts to sociology, especially those pertaining to culture. In fact, "culture" bids well to supersede "society," and "cultural," "social," in the sociologist's vocabulary. And, incidentally, whatever remnants of a philosophy of history might have remained lurking under cover of "social evolution" have tended to disappear, for the most recent trend is in the direction of discarding the term "evolution" and of speaking simply of "change."

Ellwood finds that "the most pronounced tendencies of present-day sociology are: (1) to stress the importance of the mental side of social life and so the close interdependence of psychology and sociology; (2) to overcome "particularism" by an organic synthetic view of the social life; (3) to develop a composite method which shall synthesize all minor methods of social research and investigation." [111] He adds a fourth with reservations. "Perhaps we should also add that there is a pronounced

[111] *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

tendency to develop sociology at the present day in the interest of ethical ideals and of social reconstruction. This tendency is, however, not shared by all the sociologists of the day. A minority protests vigorously, not only against ethical sociology, but against any connection of sociology with practical social movements." [112]

The order of interest in sociological subjects as manifested in research projects of 259 sociologists in 1927 and as set forth by Carter are: Social Psychology (44), Education (30), Religion —the Church (21), Community Surveys (18), Race and Nationality (18), Technique of Social Work (16), Rural Welfare (14), Immigration and Movement of Peoples (14), Conditions in Industry (14), Criminology (13), Population (12), General Social Theory (11), Economics (8), Social Processes (7), Social Institutions (5), Anthropological (4), Methodological (4), and Miscellaneous (6).[113]

From an examination of the titles of graduate theses, and of the contents of the *American Journal of Sociology* and of *Social Forces,* Bain found that "interest in Family is declining . . . , Methods of Investigation occupies a low place both in research and in the literature, Institutions ranked first in research in 1920 and 1924 . . . , Social Process ranks second . . . in research and second in the literature, both research and publications show a preponderant and increasing interest in practical subjects." [114]

A more detailed analysis of the contents of the *American Journal of Sociology,* made by Howard Becker, indicates some rather interesting features about trends.[115] His data point to cyclical recurrences of interest in various phases of sociology. Thus, for example, if one plots the percentage of space devoted to general sociology in the *American Journal of Sociology* from 1895 to 1927 he finds that two curves appear. They are extremely jagged, to be sure, but if they were smoothed, it would be found that one cycle, beginning in 1898 with a minimum of

[112] *Ibid.*
[113] *Op. cit.,* p. 209.
[114] "Trends in American Sociology," *Social Forces,* vol. v, p. 422.
[115] To be published in *The American Journal of Sociology.*

interest in general sociology, reaches its apex in 1904 and thereafter declines until 1912. Then begins a second upward trend, culminating in 1919, and a gradual decline since that time. The curve of interest in personality is of a different nature. If it were smoothed, it would resemble a U-shaped curve, with relatively great interest about 1906, a fall until 1913, and then a decided increase in interest until 1925. The curve of interest in social pathology shows peaks in the years 1900 and 1911, but the general trend is downward, especially since 1918. The peaks of interest in community and territorial groups are in 1901, 1905-06, and 1922. A very interesting study in sociology fashions could be made by applying statistical analyses to these data in detail. One might find correlations or "affinities" between interest in various phases of the subject that would throw considerable light on the workings of the scientific mind.

One trend which has not so far been mentioned is rather interesting. It will be recalled that in the 'nineties the sociologists were very busy differentiating their field from that of the other social sciences. The sociological movement was centrifugal. In more recent years, however, the very opposite trend seems to be apparent. Books like Barnes' *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* like Hayes' *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences,* and like Ogburn and Goldenweiser's *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations,* indicate a movement toward integration rather than separatism. The Social Science Research Council is another manifestation of this centripetal movement.

And finally should be mentioned the noticeable revival of interest in progress which has recently taken place.[116] When Spencerian evolution and the philosophy of history went overboard, it became unfashionable to discuss progress, and this tabu lasted almost two decades. Within the past few years, however, with the almost complete annihilation of evolution in its classical formulation in terms of a necessary sequence of stages, there bobs

[116] See L. L. Bernard, "Interest in Social Progress Revives," *Social Forces,* December, 1928.

up once more the long-discarded interest in progress. Books on progress have been written, or are being written, by Weatherly, Tenney, Hertzler, Folsom, Hart, and Wallis. In some cases this may merely be a concrete manifestation of Ellwood's fourth trend, quoted above, toward the development of sociology "in the interest . . . of social reconstruction." In others it is also a theoretical and disinterested examination of the limits and possibilities of scientific method and control.

CHAPTER II

TRENDS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

By Read Bain

I. Purpose and Scope

This chapter will discuss briefly some of the outstanding trends in American sociological theory since 1900.

"Theory" is a vague word, much abused. Etymologically, it merely means a "beholding," but good and ill usage makes it refer to all kinds of speculative inferences and generalizations derived from sense-experience. Often the sense-experiences giving rise to the theories are meager or even non-existent. The "theories" may be spun out of the thin air of imagination and wishful thinking. This is doubtless the origin of the contrast between "theory" and "fact." How often we hear it!—"It may be all right in theory, but it won't work in practice"; "he is only a theorist; his ideas are too vague to be of any use."

This sounds much like the popular contrast between "science and common sense." But the true scientist, since Huxley's time certainly, and possibly since Aristotle, looks upon his method merely as a more logical and accurate way of arriving at generalizations than that employed by common sense. He takes his stand with the man of common sense. No data not observable by the senses are data for science. The scientist knows his unaided senses are often liars, and so he checks, extends, and improves them by instruments and by comparing his own observations and inferences with those of his like-minded fellows. So the conflict between science and common sense is resolved.[1] Common sense wins. The same is true of the controversy over "fact and

[1] F. Barry, *The Scientific Habit of Thought* (1927), pp. 28-49. By "sense-experience" I mean total organic response. The whole organism is of course involved in "seeing," "hearing," "touching," etc. Atomistic, particularistic concepts of sense-experience are as unsound as similar views of social behavior.

theory." Common sense, rightly defined, wins this argument as it wins all others. Theory that is not based upon logical inferences from sense-experience is not sound theory. It must do what it claims to do, *viz.*, give a logical explanation, or summarization, of sense-experience. If it fails to do this, it does not "work," and hence is fallacious. It is clear that the generalizations of theory will have to be modified whenever new sense-experience is obtained, whether these data are the result of more accurate, more numerous, or new kinds of observations made possible by new or better instruments. Theory, like all human behavior, must pass the pragmatic test.

Hence, sociological theory makes no claims to finality. Its function is to give a comprehensive description, or conceptualization, of the sense-experience with which it deals. It is a way of ordering and unifying the vast number of observations of human behavior, of transforming the multiverse into a universe. The validity of these generalizations depends upon accuracy of observation which depends upon logical definition of units and instruments of precision. It is also conditioned by the perception of relations between the defined and classified phenomena. This involves hypotheses, logic, mathematics, experimentation, and that indefinite quality we call synthetic imagination, or creative intelligence. So all theory is relative, tentative, partial, for the senses are fallible even when aided by instruments of precision, the symbols of record are never exact, and the data themselves are all incomplete, inexact, and continually changing. The world itself is a flux. All scientific "facts" are mere generalizations of sense-experience. Therefore, theories derived from "scientific facts" are necessarily marked with the taint of mortality.

It is unnecessary to justify theorizing, although candor compels the admissions just made. Most theory is unsound, is too partial to be useful, is too far removed from scientific and common-sense experience to be convincing, is too illogical and vague to stand the acid test of critical analysis and pragmatic sanction. But these strictures have not and will not prevent man from

theorizing. He is the generalizing animal. He has a natural impulse to reflect, abstract and generalize.[2] He cannot be content until he has "explained," *i.e.*, generalized, his behavior. This is the only means he has of injecting order and meaning into the buzzing chaotic confusion of the perceived world; it is his way of unifying his universe, of adjusting himself to the terrifying diversity of experience.

Theory is also used to mean a verified hypothesis. Probably theorem, law, or principle would be a better term. At any rate, most sociological "theory" is more nearly on the level of conjecture and valuation than of scientific verification.

In the following pages, I shall use sociological theory to mean those generalizations that have been formulated after a more intensive and extensive study of human group phenomena than is true of similar common-sense generalizations. I have used "sociological" rather than the more common "social" theory as a logical excuse for ignoring the generalizations of the other social sciences except as they may refer to general group behavior.

It must be admitted that much current sociological theory goes little beyond common sense in either the accuracy or critical analysis of the data generalized, or in the logical integration of its generalizations with other scientific knowledge. While science and common sense both depend upon sense-experience for their generalizations, science to a much greater extent relies upon instrumentally objectified, logically defined, mathematically recorded and manipulated observations. Science can thus perceive and classify a wider range of data much more accurately and for a longer time than is possible for common sense, and the generalizations of science are correspondingly more comprehensive and accurate.

It requires very little comparison of generally accepted (by sociologists, at least) sociological theories with common-sense opinions to show conclusively that sociology has accumulated a

[2] See G. Wallas, *The Great Society* (1914), chaps. iii and x for a similar view.

vast fund of fairly well systematized and verified knowledge which is more accurate, extensive and logically integrated than the layman's theories. It is often contended that this seems true only because sociologists conceal their "scientific facts" in a wilderness of words which the layman cannot understand. It is charged that much so-called sociological knowledge is merely vain verbosity. We may grant some truth to this charge, but the fact remains that many sociological theories expressed in the simplest terms are truly revolutionary revisions of the layman's ideas. For example: "You can't change human nature"; "A man naturally knows what's right and wrong"; "Man is a rational being"; the whole category of instinct myths, race myths, religious myths, *ad nauseam;* the fanciful ideas about pre-literate peoples; almost all exact data about any phase of human behavior. The list could be indefinitely extended. Furthermore, much of the technique of investigating and recording the facts of group life, even when it involves only the most elementary logic and statistics, is almost entirely incomprehensible to the untrained man.

This chapter is limited to the trends in sociological theory in the United States since about 1900. Two methods were considered. The first was to summarize and criticize the more important views of the more important men. The other was to deal with such shifts of emphasis and agreements in theory as seem most significant. The first was rejected because of limitation of space and because practically all of the recent essays have taken this approach.[8]

[8] The best and most comprehensive essay of this kind is by P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928). See also, L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation* (1915); J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923); E. S. Bogardus, *History of Social Thought* (1922), completely revised (1928); H. E. Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (1925); H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory* (1924); F. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (1929); *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (H. E. Barnes, ed.) (1925); *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (E. C. Hayes, ed.) (1927); *The Social Sciences,* (W. F. Ogburn and A. A. Goldenweiser, ed.) (1927). The following books are interesting for sociological theory, though they are not systematic treatises: F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory*

The second was chosen because it made greater brevity possible and would enable the writer to discuss certain theories without repeating too much of the material found in other chapters of this volume. No attempt will be made to give a comprehensive criticism of the theories of particular men. For this, the reader is referred to the books noted in footnote 3. My interest is in the theories themselves, together with their background, present status, and probable future.

There is no presumption that this is a scientific essay. It is merely the opinions of one who has been interested in sociological theories for some years. From the nature of the case, the criticisms and conclusions are largely subjective. Their sole purpose is to give the curious reader one man's idea of the main tendencies of present sociological theory in the United States. I have no doubt that many men probably better informed than I will be in sharp disagreement with some of the views herein expressed. Only time can decide who are the better prophets. He who predicts in the absence of definite scientific knowledge gives hostages to fortune. But false prophecies (and prophets) are soon destroyed by the inexorable logic of events. So we may proceed with a clear conscience and, I hope, with a clear mind.

II. Theoretical Sociology About 1900

By the dawn of the century, sociology had won a distinctive place in popular and academic thought. It is not contended that sociology was very scientific. It was long on "principles" and short on facts. The term itself, however, perhaps because of its very vagueness, was becoming familiar. History, economics, politics, law, and literature were beginning to revise their materials and theories in the light of these so-called "sociological

of Human Society (1922); W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); A. G. A. Balz, *Basis of Social Theory* (1924); C. H. Cooley, *Social Process* (1918); F. H. Giddings, *Scientific Study of Human Society* (1924); E. C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery* (1924); R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1921); J. H. Robinson, *The Ordeal of Civilization* (1926); F. J. Teggart, *The Process of History* (1918); Veblen's works and other citations given in this article, especially in connection with "Progress."

principles." This restatement was largely influenced by the reforming, uplifting, muckracking, charity-giving activities which characterized the last quarter of the old and the first decade of the new century. This was what sociology connoted to the layman. To most people it still suggests a crusading spirit dedicated to "doing good in general," coddling the down-and-outer, condemning "things as they are," promoting "progress," and prophesying, if not producing, millennial dawn. The sociologist is often looked upon both as a visionary and a radical.[4]

By 1900, sociology was fairly well established in the colleges,[5] but the above-described idea of sociology was, and still is, for that matter, extremely current in academic circles. When sociology teachers do not hold it, many of their colleagues do. However, by 1900, there were several theoretical points of view that were sufficiently well established to exert considerable influence.

Perhaps the most important was the synthetic evolution of Spencer as applied to social behavior. The evolutionary ethnology of Lubbock, Tyler, and Morgan also tinctured sociological theory. *Laissez-faire* economics, combined with Darwinian evolution, gave rise to the so-called social Darwinism which threatened to make sociology as dismal as Malthus, Ricardo, and Senior had made economics. These views were perhaps best represented by Sumner of Yale, although all early American writers were more or less influenced by them. The Germanic sociologists, especially Ratzenhofer and Simmel, together with the historical economists, Roscher and Schmoller, and the "sociological" economists, Knies, A. Wagner, and A. Schäffle, and the philosophers of history, Savigny and Eichhorn, were represented by Small of Chicago.[6]

[4] Albion Small in the first issue of the *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1895, spoke of "The Era of Sociology," but the content of the *Journal* was largely reform and welfare articles up to about 1912.

[5] See chap. i, this volume, for the development of sociology in the United States; also L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly,* December, 1928, pp. 264-293.

[6] See his *Origins of Sociology,* (1924), especially chaps. ii, iii, xiii, xiv, xvii, and xix, "The Emergence of Sociology in the United States."

Columbia, with Giddings in the chair, was the third important academic center of sociology. It is difficult to assign to him any specific European antecedents, but the fact that he has always stressed the statistical approach would point to a possible influence from Quetelet, Schmoller, and the historical economists. Doubtless his early study of engineering was the most important influence in this direction. His years of journalism gave him a realistic and hardheaded respect for facts. The genius of Giddings has such a broad sweep that it would be quite erroneous to suppose that he was unduly influenced by any single set of factors or groups of men. He has never been in intellectual bondage.[7] Ross at Nebraska, seems to have been greatly indebted to von Ihering, Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, and other French social and suggestion psychologists. Bristol says he is really an eclectic,[8] his greatest contribution being the theory of social control. I think it is safe to say that by his dynamic teaching and readable writing, Ross has probably done more than any other single man in America to familiarize the public with the sociological viewpoint and to interest students in the study of the subject.

It should not be thought that these men were merely propagators of the ideas of Europeans. All of them have made distinctive contributions to sociological theory which are well discussed in the treatises referred to at the beginning of this chapter. I have mentioned what seem to me the four chief academic seats of sociology in the United States about 1900. Columbia and Chicago were by far the most important because they began very early to do graduate work in sociology. Probably eighty or ninety per cent of the "leading sociologists" of today studied at these two schools.

Another influence, although non-academic, the importance of

[7] Small says he was greatly influenced by Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 329. This is true, but so all of us have been. L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation* (1915), says Giddings accepts some of the major theories of Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Tarde, Novicow, Ward, Baldwin, Bagehot, and Darwin, pp. 201-202. But so do we all.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

which it would be difficult to over-estimate, was the work of Lester F. Ward. By 1900, most American and many European scholars were familiar with *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), and *Psychic Factors in Civilization* (1893). His work was a synthesis of Comte, Spencer, and Darwin, interpreted from the viewpoint of a frontier egalitarian. He struck at the narrow individualism of Spencer by emphasizing the socializing and talent-releasing power of education. He glorified the capacity of the common man; he pointed out the fallacies of *laissez-faire* economics, and presented a brief for governmental regulation of private enterprise and the extension of governmental services; he transmuted Comte's peculiar combination of positivism and semi-mystical worship of humanity into a kind of "materialistic idealism" in which man is only an incident in cosmic evolution; he transformed the pessimism of social Darwinism into an optimistic, if somewhat esoteric, intellectualism. He believed that by utilizing the principle of creative synthesis, the sociological application of which is individual and social telesis, man could win his own salvation. He faced the universe as the pioneers faced the frontier, and he had a profound faith that man would be able to solve his social problems by his scientifically guided intelligence as the pioneer solved his survival problems by common sense and hard work.

It is probable that the reform wing in American sociology was greatly strengthened by Ward's doctrines of education and social telesis. Although he specifically warned against the evils of hasty and ill-advised reform, this admonition is a minor chord in his symphony of active material and spiritual adaptation (Bristol's phrase).[9] He was much more certain that his "principles" were adequate bases for reform than modern sociologists are. He was much surer than we are that man is a "rational being." His "scientific principles" were largely *a priori* philosophic deductions. He did not demand factual *social* data as we do, nor did

[9] *Dynamic Sociology,* vol. i, p. 18, "The reform demanded must come through knowledge"; vol. ii, p. 447, "Reforms based upon prohibition are mostly inoperative." Also in *Psychic Factors,* pp. 283 ff.

he devise any technique for getting them. His intellectualism largely vitiated his theory, as was the case with Spencer, Comte, and all the rest of the armchair theorists.

His doctrine of desire and will was a powerful influence on theories of "social forces," to be discussed later. His terminology was largely that of zoölogy, botany, chemistry, and physics, the net result of which was to give an analogical conception of social phenomena from which we have not yet recovered. This is one of the important reasons that sociology is often charged with being a bastard science or parasitic discipline which lives upon what it steals from the other sciences. This is an inevitable result of a monistic materialism and its consequent "explanation from below," to which reference will be made later.

This, then, is a brief sketch of the status of sociological theory in the United States at about 1900: the reform movement, the Spencerian-Darwinian evolutionary doctrines, the ethnological application of them, economic determinism, the German philosophers of history and historical economists, the French School of Comte, Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, the statistical approach of Quetelet, and, finally, the remarkable synthesis of these (and other) influences by Ward.

III. Rubbish Burnt and Burning

It has often been remarked that one of the greatest faults of sociological theory, as of all science in its early stages, is its over-simplification, premature generalization or, as Cooley calls it, particularism.[10] This means the postulation of single, fundamental, all-inclusive "causes" to account for all kinds of social phenomena. The examples of Spencer and his general theory of evolution, Marx and economic determinism, Tarde and imitation, Ward and desire, Durkheim and collective representations, Huntington and climate, Giddings and gregarity, Ammon-Lapouge,

[10] C. H. Cooley, *Social Process* (1918), pp. 1-51; P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), pp. 42-44, 538-539, *passim;* E. Rignano, "Sociology, Its Methods and Laws," *American Journal of Sociology,* Nov., 1928, pp. 434-436; Jan., 1929. pp. 605-616.

et al., and race, Graebner and diffusion, Kidd and religion, Hegel and the state, and many others come readily to mind. The findings of actual research in all fields soon knocked the props from under most of this armchair theorizing. In America, the anthropologists, led by Boas and ably aided by his students, have perhaps done more than any other group to modify these views, particularly that of Spencerian chronological, unilateral social evolution. It is strange that Spencer fell into the very error his principle of multiple effects should have prevented.[11]

Although proceeding from a very different source, *viz.*, the observation of the development in children of human nature as opposed to original nature, Cooley's organic concept of society was one of the most important influences in saving American sociologists from the fallacy of particularism. As early as 1902, in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, we find him stating, "self and other do not exist as mutually exclusive social facts" (p. 92). The first four chapters are chiefly an elaboration of this thesis. Although I cannot find a definite statement of the organic theory in this first book, it was expressed in 1903 when Cooley discussed Giddings' "Theory of Social Causation."[12] The suggestion for Cooley's idea was probably suggested by the work of James Mark Baldwin and William James, as he states on page 90 of *Human Nature.*

Professor Ellwood regards the publication of *Social Organization*, 1909, as a very significant event in American sociological theory. He places great stress upon the concept of primary and

[11] Perhaps R. H. Lowrie, *Primitive Society* (1920), and *Primitive Religion* (1924) are the best refutations of these particularistic views in ethnology. See also A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (1922); C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911); A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923); C. A. Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution* (1927); W. Koppers, *Die Anfänge des menschlichen Gemeinschaftslebens im Spiegel der neuern Völkerkunde* (1921).

[12] A. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1916, pp. 811-814. Giddings' paper is found in *Publications of American Economic Association*, vol. v, pp. 383-418. Cooley said, (p. 430) ". . . all is alike cause and effect, there is no logical primacy, no independent variable, no place where the thread begins. . . . You must see the whole, or you do not truly see anything."

secondary groups and the process of communication.[13] Probably most sociologists consider this as Cooley's major contribution; but he himself and, I think, correctly, regards the "organic theory" as far more important.

It is one of the outstanding characteristics of American sociological theory that single-factor explanations have never been very popular. Cooley is merely the symbol of this anti-particularism. I imagine the intensive researches in various fields which brought out the multiplicity of factors, the rapidity of communication, with consequent criticism, have been instrumental in preventing this, as well as in preventing the crystallization of sociological "schools." We have never had anything in American sociology comparable to the schools of Le Play, Ammon-Lapouge, Durkheim, Tarde, Spencer, or Ratzenhofer-Gumplowicz.

Giddings has sometimes been cited as an example of the particularistic fallacy in connection with his concept of consciousness of kind. But one has only to read the record to see that this concept bears no such dominant relation to the rest of his thinking as imitation does to Tarde's, race to Ammon's, class struggle to Marx's, family to Le Play's, or collective representations to Durkheim's. This is especially evident in his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* especially in the chapters on "A Theory of History," "Order and Possibility," "A Theory of Social Causation," "Pluralistic Behavior," and finally, in the last chapter on "Further Inquiries of Sociology." The final statement, "If I can be said to have a system," with its emphasis on stimulus-response, singularistic and pluralistic; gregariousness; social pressure; collective behavior; individual differences and division of labor; selection and perpetuation of the adequate; together with the thirty "inquiries," ought to still forever the charge that Giddings put all his theoretical eggs in the gregarity basket.

Similarly, the "interests" of Small, the "wishes" of Thomas, and the "primary groups and ideals" of Cooley seem to have

[13] *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (1927), chap. i, p. 509.

been taken much more seriously and treated much more particularistically by some of their students than by these men themselves. All three would probably name something else as their major ideas. I suspect they would agree that all particularistic, "fundamental," and "final" theories are likely to be false. They would probably agree that all social processes are pluralistic and that all formulations of them are tentative and incomplete.

Cooley once said that Herbert Spencer "raked up and burned much theological and other rubbish and did it extremely well." [14] We may safely say that the American sociologists (and anthropologists) have done the same for a great deal of particularistic, metaphysical, pseudo-scientific, reformitarian, ethico-religious trash. Some of the ideas that have been criticized and minimized are: The "soul of humanity," social consciousness, social mind, "spirits" of races and cultures, and almost all other metaphysical concepts of society; unilateral, chronological, mechanistic social evolution; geographic, economic, ethnic, religious, and all other determinisms; social Darwinism; Austinian sovereignty and Hegelian-Treitschkeian stateism; sociology as the basic or cap-sheaf science, in the Comtean sense; imitation, instinct, "social instinct," suggestion, gregarity, prolonged infancy, recapitulation, "social forces," biological heredity, and all other single factor "explanations" of societal phenomena; reformism, Utopianism, Christian sociology and socialism (57 varieties), Great-man-ism, and all other -isms as adequate causes, means, and explanations of social change. The list might be almost indefinitely expanded. Space prohibits discussion of all these views, but my impression is that most of them and similar ones are "rubbish that has been raked up and burned" by American sociologists and their fellow social scientists at home and abroad. I do not want to appear to claim undue credit for American scholars in this yard-cleaning, but I think it is characteristic of American sociology, at least, that it has not been particularis-

[14] "Reflections on the Sociology of Spencer," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxvi, p. 145.

tic, but has been, since 1900, increasingly critical of all simple and nonfactual "explanations."

However, this should not be taken to mean that many of these views are not still being propagated by people who call themselves sociologists and who are called "eminent" on the book-blurbs. There are still racialists, reformists, imitationists, instinctivists, religionists, and all the other -ists, but the vast majority of the sociologists in prominent academic positions would accept very few of these ideas without sufficient reservations to destroy their particularistic nature. Most sociologists would probably admit *partial* validity to many of these views; but this partiality is an expression of the "organic view" which I have contended is characteristic of American sociological theory. A sociological "fact" is observable only when some defined unit, influenced by all antecedent and coexistent factors, is made the center of attention. This is a kind of sociological "Gestalt" and is not incompatible with the sociological behaviorism which is now developing.[15]

I shall select three of four general concepts from the above list for brief discussion. This will serve two purposes: (1) Show how some of them have been more or less reduced to rubbish, and are either burnt or burning; (2) Prepare for the statement of some of the more-significant (to the writer) trends in American sociological theory. Most of the theories mentioned are still in the stage of destructive criticism. The factual data to verify or refute them are as yet largely lacking or are inconclusive. Hence, the logical analysis and research being done in these fields may be regarded as trends in theory, since the research hypotheses are generally posited on the doubt of the validity of the old statements. These are usually questioned as being too general and in-

[15] See M. P. Follett's two books, *The New State* (1918), and *Creative Experience* (1924), and an able review and discussion of her ideas by A. E. Wood, "The Social Philosophy of Mary P. Follett," *Social Forces,* June, 1926, pp. 759-769. For a negative view of Miss Follett's work, see R. G. Smith's review of *Creative Experience, Social Forces,* March, 1925, pp. 540-542.

accurate, only partially true, or wholly false. The other chapters in this volume furnish many examples of this point of view.

I. BIOLOGICAL DOGMAS

The nineteenth century witnessed many revolutionary discoveries in biology. Some of these were hastily and uncritically applied to social phenomena and resulted in much sociological theory which has not stood the acid test of critical analysis and research. Some of the more important of these biological theories were the doctrine of evolution, especially the natural selection ideas of Darwin, the non-inheritance of acquired characters (Weissmann), the laws of heredity (Galton and Pearson and, later, Mendel), and the instinct explanation of animal behavior. These ideas, often based upon a monistic philosophy of mechanical materialism, were quickly imported into sociological theory and became dogmas from which we are now just beginning to escape. This escape is being made by two exits: first, through the modification of the biological theories themselves, and second, by the intensive study of *human, i.e.,* cultural behavior.

Biologists themselves are far less prone than many sociologists to accept uncritically the theories and implications of ninteenth-century biology. It is obvious at once that natural selection through struggle for survival is not a sufficient explanation of organic evolution. Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid, or co-operation, is now generally admitted. "Nature red in tooth and claw," which so shocked mid-Victorian sensibility, has been replaced by a nature which not only fosters both conscious and unconscious coöperation, but also supplies instances of self-destruction for the benefit of others.[16] Likewise, the Spencerian formula of "survival of the fittest" (which Darwin mentioned only once or twice, if at all, and certainly did not emphasize) was rapidly attenuated into "survival of the survivors," with no

[16] This does not imply a "conscious purpose" to serve others by suicide or martyrdom. It merely means that some organisms do sometimes perish to preserve others, *i.e.,* characteristically respond in this manner because of hereditary or psycho-social conditioning.

ethical, or value, import, whatsoever. This was a deadly blow to the Spencerian theory of inevitable progress and the fundamentally rational and moral character of nature.

The theory of inheritance of acquired characters also soon suffered blows from which it has not recovered. Spencer took the position in the famous controversy with Weissmann that there could be no evolution without it. While Darwin's theory of evolution was not dependent upon inheritance of acquired characters, his theory of pangenesis offered at once the possibility of it, and also an explanation of variation. The work of Mendel, Galton, Pearson, and Weissmann established the negation of the theory. It is now a generally accepted dogma that acquired characters are not specifically inherited. However, there is some evidence showing that acquired characters may exert a *non-specific* influence upon offspring. This has been called Neo-Lamarckianism. The whole question has been reopened by the recent discoveries in endocrinology and organic plasticity mentioned below.

While it is true that most biologists agree that organic evolution and natural selection are facts, there is also almost universal agreement that all the processes of the former are not satisfactorily explained by the latter. Natural selection became a very definite type of biological particularism. The objection of Nägeli that it did not explain the development of certain organs to the point where they became significant for survival has never been satisfactorily answered. Other theories, such as orthogenesis, heterogenesis, modified Lamarckianism, and mutual aid, have their adherents, and there are numerous phenomena which are better accounted for by these theories than by natural selection. It must be borne in mind, however, that natural selection operates as a negative factor in all theories of evolution. Whenever an organism from whatever complex of causes becomes sufficiently maladjusted to its environment, natural selection cuts it off. It is the great eliminator and fixer of organic types. It does not explain why certain forms continue to develop in unadaptive directions, nor why variations occur, but it does explain why or-

ganic types are selected for extinction or survival. Neither orthogenesis nor heterogenesis explains the puzzle of variation. Orthogenesis points out that some forms develop in a persistently unadaptive manner, even to extinction; but it does not explain why this should be so other than to posit the more or less metaphysical principle of entelechies and "bathmic urges."

I shall mention only three other discoveries which have done much to modify the nineteenth-century biological dogmas, and then proceed to discuss some sociological theories that have been largely based upon the former and modified by the latter. These, with the concept of culture, are largely the means by which sociological theory is emancipating itself from biological dogmas.

The first in time, and perhaps also in importance thus far, was Pavlov's discovery of the conditioned response, or conditioned reflex, about 1900. This has done more to explain impulsive, compulsive, and automatic behavior without recourse to instincts than perhaps any other one thing. Particularly is this true of human behavior, because of prolonged infancy, organic plasticity and unspecificity in the nervous system, especially in the cerebral cortex. A great deal of the responses to suggestion stimuli, and other forms of "unconscious" human behavior, are readily explainable in terms of conditioned responses. The remarkable accumulation of cultural material stored in "external symbols" (Bernard), makes human conditioning almost unbelievably extensive. This has done much to modify the old instinctivist explanations and to shift the emphasis from human heredity to socialization. Watson and his followers have applied Pavlov's discovery to human behavior experimentally with astonishing results.[17]

The second epoch-making event was the discovery of the importance of the endocrine glands in the development and functioning of organisms. Until recently, very little was known about the ductless glands. They were variously regarded as vestigial

[17] See Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology* (1927), chap. xiii, for a good selected bibliography and ten or eleven articles on "Personality and Social Conditioning."

remains or anatomical trivia, functionless or even harmful. The principal organs of this group in men are the pituitary body, the thymus, thyroid and parathyroid, supradrenal capsules of the kidneys, and the interstitial glands of the gonads. Many baffling problems have been partially solved in the last twenty years by the developing science of endocrinology.

All reputable students agree that we have, as yet, very little scientific knowledge about the ductless glands, but enough is known to warrant the belief that endocrinology will revolutionize many of our old biological ideas. We know, for instance, that the pituitary body is intimately connected with the balanced growth of the body. Giantism, dwarfism, adiposity, and metabolic processes, including muscle-tonus, are apparently partially controlled by it. Cretinism, formerly regarded as hereditary, or endemic, regulation of pigmentation and hair growth, and possibly regulation of the cardio-vascular system are attributed to the thyroids and parathyroids. Fear and rage, and other emotional behavior, especially the regulation of the tonicity of the unstriped muscles and the functioning of the sympathetic nervous system, are closely correlated with the adrenals. From much experimental evidence, it is now well known that the secondary sex characters are largely determined by hormones of the interstitial glands. The above remarks should not be taken to imply that these are specific relations. It is probable that the endocrine glands comprise a nicely balanced and functionally integrated system so that malfunctioning of one may derange the action of all the rest.[18]

The association of endocrine disturbances with emotional and temperamental behavior and the relation they bear to organic growth and functioning have done much to modify instinctivist and hereditarian explanations and to restate the question of the relation of the organism to its environment, particularly from

[18] See W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (1915); G. W. Crile, *The Origin and Nature of the Emotions* (1915); B. Harrow, *Glands in Health and Disease* (1922); L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality* (1922).

the dietary standpoint, (*cf.* absence of iodine in thyroid imbalance, vitamines in nutrition, and possibly a close relationship between certain vitamines and endocrine balance), the question of function and structure, and the general modifiability of the organism. In the presence of the evidence from castration, sex reversal, and gonadic grafts, etc., in modifying secondary sex characters, it is evident that a doctrinaire statement of the germplasm specificity of sex determination is doubtful. Likewise, the end-product of development is obviously a complex of hereditary and other functional and environmental factors.

This leads to the third new biological concept I have chosen for discussion. It may be called, following Hankins, the theory of "organic plasticity." By this is meant the possibility of a variety of structural forms being developed from the same germplasm constituents. The recognition of this fact is, and has long been, widespread among biologists. Identical twins, or two seeds from a pod, may develop into very different adults under extremes of nurture. Offspring of these adults, with reversed environments, will regain the original ancestral characteristics. It would seem the germ plasm is relatively stable, but, so far as actual development is concerned, there is a kind of biological elasticity. There are limits to this elasticity, of course. It varies as between species as well as between the members of a species. This concept tends to diminish the specificity of heredity, and to cast serious doubts upon many of the conclusions of the protagonist of "nature" as against "nurture." In the most general terms, an organism has certain limits of biological elasticity, or organic plasticity, beyond which environmental factors cannot go; but within those limits, anything is possible.

In the case of human beings, it is clear that the general somatic types are fairly well determined by heredity. Disease, glandular imbalance, trauma, occupation, malnutrition, weather influences, etc., may modify height, weight, coloration, energy, longevity, etc., to a considerable extent; but on the whole, the limits are narrow. The somatic characters are fairly fixed and unalterable.

In the case of neuro-muscular responses, however, the range of plasticity is very great. If the cerebrum is not a complete *tabula rasa,* it is at least very unspecialized, so that tremendous differences in the acquisition of conditioned responses and cultural patterns are possible. Since by definition, these latter are peculiarly *human,* we may say that human nature is almost entirely indeterminate. Of course, everyone will grant that there are vast differences in the neuro-muscular plasticity of various men; but when we find a man who is by general consent a "sow's ear," we cannot be sure that he was not a potential silk purse. He may be a hothouse primula, white-flowered and white-livered; whereas an outdoor culture might have made him a vigorous, red-flowered, self-reliant individual. An eminent American neurologist recently said, "Brains do not grow old." [19]

It is probable that this concept of organic plasticity is merely a restatement of the doctrines of conditioned responses, endocrinology, neo-Lamarckianism, and the other modifications of the mechanistic biology referred to above. It is a kind of synthesis of all the factors that has tended to release sociological theory from the apron strings of biology. As biology and sociology have become more mature they have both become less doctrinaire.

Perhaps no man has done more to emphasize the organic relation of "nature and nurture," "structure and function," "environment and heredity," than Charles Manning Child. His work of the past twenty years, summarized in *Physiological Foundations of Behavior,* 1924, impresses the writer as a revolutionary contribution to biological theory on a par with that of Darwin, Mendel, Weissmann, Pavlov, and the endocrinologists. The old controversy, "heredity *versus* environment," seems destined to go the way of the "individual *versus* society" concept, *i.e.,* to be fused into an organic concept. Separation may be made for the purpose of intensive study but, like all delimitations of natural phenomena, it is more or less arbitrary and fictional. The kinds of behavior patterns (structure-function relations) that are more

[19] Dr. F. Tilney, *Mental Hygiene Bulletin,* Nov., 1928, p. 6.

stable, stereotyped, and have narrower limits of biological elasticity, will probably be called "hereditary." The ones that are less so will be called non-hereditary. Thus, heredity-plasticity distinctions will be made on the basis of differences of degree rather than of kind in explaining the total development-adjustment behavior.[20]

The reader may wonder what this biological excursion has to do with sociological theory. In the first place, perhaps the major part of sociological rubbish has been implicitly or explicitly postulated on primitive, false, or inadequate biology, analogically interpreted. Secondly, this discussion of the biological background and recent developments in this field will make clear the theoretical bases of the trends in bio-sociological theory. It will also simplify and shorten the discussion of the five aspects of the problem I have chosen. These are: (1) Hereditarianism, (2) uncritical instinctivism, (3) race mythology, (4) rampant mental testing, (5) dysgenicism.

I have ignored organismic theories of society, the concept of social mind as an entity, and social Darwinism, as rubbish already pretty well destroyed. Needless to say, there is an enormous literature on these subjects [21] which is still being elaborated, although without any startling additions to the older views.

[20] Child's other publications are listed in the volume referred to, published by Holt. His first research in this field was published about 1907. See also F. H. Hankins, "Organic Plasticity versus Organic Response," *Social Forces*, June, 1928, pp. 331-344; C. J. Herrick, "Behavior and Mechanism," *idem.*, Sept., 1928, pp. 1-11; L. K. Frank, "The Management of Tensions," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1928, pp. 705-736; C. M. Child, "Biological Foundations of Social Integration," *Publications of the American Sociological Society* (1927), pp. 26-42.

[21] For the curious, if any, reference is made to chapter iv, "Bio-Organismic School," in P. Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories* for an excellent list of the literature and an incisive criticism of the theory. Perhaps F. G. Coker's *Organismic Theories of the State* (1910) is the best discussion of this concept. Theories of social mind are closely related to organismic doctrines, although many of them deal with what must be called "psychic organism." The French School referred to, including Fouillée, William McDougall, some of the psycho-analysts, especially Jung, are good examples of these views. For criticisms, see M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, (1909), and R. B. Perry, "Is There a Social Mind?" *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1922, pp. 561-572; May, pp. 721-736. Organismic theories appear to be reviving in a somewhat different form as a result of recent philosophical

We have already disposed of the heredity versus environment doctrines by pointing out the intimate organic relationship between the two concepts. There is little disposition on the part of most sociologists to take such an extreme anti-heredity view as they are sometimes accused of doing. However, they are very generally agreed, as the later discussion will show, that hereditarian explanations of *human* behavior generally ignore cultural conditioning and so are far too simple to be convincing. Lundberg contends that the popularity of hereditarian explanations is based primarily upon the *penchant* of most people to engage in wishful thinking and thus to escape individual and social responsibility. If a man finds himself in a position of power and prestige, he can justify any and all his behavior by claiming a superior "heredity." If, on the other hand, a man is a failure, he can conveniently blame his ancestors. It results in a type of mind which tends to applaud and preserve the *status quo*. It "explains" everything and hence explains nothing.[22]

Furthermore, if the hereditarian doctrines based upon Weissmannian theory are really sound, the result is inevitably a mechanistic view of human behavior. Choice and intelligence count for nothing. Pragmatically, this is contrary to human experience. So the sociologists generally hold that while heredity fixes practical limits of adjustment, within the range of what I have called "biological elasticity," heredity does not determine culture. The environment is much more easily manipulated than the genes, and the cultural accumulation, due to the hereditarily unspecialized mechanisms of men, is a fruitful field for such modification.

Leaving this, we are upon much more concrete ground in re-

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and biological theory. For the former, see H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (1911), and A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1925), *passim;* for the latter see W. M. Wheeler, "The Ant Colony as an Organism," *Journal of Morphology* (1911), vol. xxii, pp. 307-325, and C. M. Child, *op. cit.,* closing chapters. Romanes, Novicow, Ward, Giddings, Ross, and almost all the American sociologists have criticized social Darwinism.

[22] G. A. Lundberg, "The Demographic and Economic Basis of Political Radicalism and Conservatism," *American Journal of Sociology,* March, 1927, pp. 719-721.

viewing the sociological criticisms of instinct, the most powerful of the genii in the magic cabinet of the hereditarians. The reader is referred to Markey's discussion of instinct in Chapter III of this volume. The literature is enormous, so I have given only a few references to serve the double purpose of guiding the interested reader, and presenting what I regard as the trends of sociological theory in this field.[23]

The triumphs of nineteenth-century biology are probably responsible for the dominant rôle of instincts in sociological theory. Man and culture were both treated as phases of the evolutionary process. Instincts were thought of as mechanisms laid down in organisms by natural selection and were thus responsible for the social behavior of men. The embryological evidence that "ontogeny repeats phylogeny" was introduced from Germany by Stanley Hall as a psycho-social principle. It is practically extinct at present, except as it survives in the semi-mystical archetype doctrine of Jung.

The instinct theory "explains" everything, and hence has wide vogue, except for those critical persons who demand a rigid definition of the term and then insist that the behavior "explained" by it must not contradict the definition. If we take such a rigid definition, "instinctive behavior is universal in the species, unlearned, relatively unmodifiable, and always appears upon the presentation of a definite type of stimuli," we find that very little *human* behavior can be said to be instinctive. However, there are numerous animal behavior-patterns of men which conform very closely to this definition, *e. g.,* such responses are grasping, suckling, eye-winking, yawning, pupillary adjustments to

[23] See L. L. Bernard, *Instinct* (1924), and *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926), chaps. vii-ix, for the most extensive and critical study; see also C. C. Josey, *The Social Philosophy of Instinct* (1922); J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), especially pp. 149-168; P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), pp. 603-636; and Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology* (1928), chap. vii, for a good discussion, bibliography and ten carefully selected readings. J. B. Watson is probably the most extreme anti-instinctivist. See his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1925), chaps. vii, viii. See also A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretic Basis of Human Behavior* (1925).

light, and a great many vegetative processes. But even these responses are much more modifiable and subject to conditioning than was formerly believed to be true. If we take such instinctive responses as those of fear, rage, and love described by Watson as characteristic of unconditioned infants, we find that all of them can be reconditioned in a most bewildering fashion. While the motor response pattern remains much the same, the types of stimuli producing the characteristic responses are widely variable.

For instance, infantile rage may be produced by inhibiting freedom of movement. Cannon has shown that the motor response is largely concerned with the release of adrenalin which releases glycogen which increases the energy potential, heightens heart action, increases muscle-tonus, and prepares the organism for dynamic action. But adult rage may be produced by innumerable situations, symbolic or overt, and the response may be observable only through verbal or gestural signs of a very subtle sort. However, the general pattern remains much the same. The type-stimulus is one that interferes with the free functioning of the person as he conceives his rôle, and the type-response is a heightened energy potential which may enable him to remove the obstacle.

The same sort of analysis might be applied to fear, love (sex), food, ego, "self-abasement," and all so-called complex-instinctive behavior. It is obvious that the socially acquired conditionings, rather than inherited action-patterns, are the significant factors in these responses when we are attempting to understand *human* behavior. It is our conception of our own rôle and the rôles of others, dependent upon our past experiences, that determines whether our response to a given social stimulus will be rage, fear, affection, or what not. A slap in the face may cause me to desire to punish the slapper, save his soul, flee from his presence, caress him (if I am a masochistic female), or perhaps to study him. To explain my social adjustment on the basis of instinct is meaningless. However, in the case cited, no matter what my human response may be, I will probably wink my eyes,

draw in my breath, and tense my muscles. These are instinctive responses.

There are certain general biological sets which are extremely significant as conditioning factors in human behavior. Among these are sex, food, and manipulation of objects and ideas (curiosity-reflection). To these some would add such behavior as ego-satisfaction, (will-to-power, domination), herd "instinct" (conformity, gregarity, imitation, subordination, and so on), and many others, such as interests (Small), wishes (Thomas-Znaniecki), prepotent reflexes (Allport), the eight or fifteen "instincts" of McDougall, and so on endlessly. But the types of human behavior which may be classified under these rubrics are so variable and different that sociologists are well agreed that such statements do not "explain" but rather formulate problems for investigation. Whether a particular adjustment act shall be ascribed to one or another "instinct" depends to a great extent upon the classifier. These too general terms invite subjective, unscientific particularism.

This seems to be the implication of Faris' brilliant article, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" [24] We may justly speak of various types of social behavior which depend upon sex, food, or manipulative innate dispositions, but the fact that men have these organic predispositions gives us but little clue to the behavior that actually transpires. We have to study the cultural setting and base our predictions upon that. The concept of instinct gives us little aid, if any. We are driven by sex, food, and other vegetative requirements; but within the limits of organic plasticity and cultural accumulation, any and all kinds of adjustment behavior may occur. This non-specific, easily conditioned, vague, organic restlessness is about all that remains of the biological concept of instinct, so far as human behavior is concerned. For scientific sociological research, social patterning is much more significant than the old idea of specific stimulus-response instincts. Even the so-called "hormic drives" (Woodworth-Young, in

[24] *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1921, pp. 184-198.

Young's chapter cited, pp. 147-151), when made equivalent to behavior mechanisms, largely eliminate the specificity of instincts. A conditioned response is as much a "drive" as infantile rage.

The third type of disappearing biological dogmas is that concerned with race. Having its origin, perhaps, in the philological researches of Max Müller and his followers, it was developed scientifically by the anthropometric work of Ammon-Lapouge. It is still with us in the Nordic myths of Stoddard, McDougall, Brigham, *et al.* Since W. I. Thomas' essay on "The Psychology of Race Prejudice," sociologists have taken very little stock in the doctrine of instinctive racial antagonism.[25]

In the first place, ethnology has shown us conclusively that there are no "pure" races, and that miscegenation is still going on apace wherever "races" are in contact; that even when mental differences are revealed by the tests, the overlapping is very great; that individual differences, both mental and physical, are much greater within "races" than between them; that "race" prejudice is really due to cultural differences; that the rôle of dominance between races has shifted often in the past and very probably will do so in the future; that statements of superiority are much more easily made than demonstrated. Each cultural group, whether correlated with race or not, tends to regard itself as superior to all others. It is not to be inferred that sociologists contend that there are no "differences" between "ethnic" stocks, but just what the significance of these may be when and if clearly demonstrated, is a big and open question.

It is safe to say that most American sociologists place little importance upon the race factor as such in their attempts to study human behavior. Race "problems" almost always dissolve into cultural problems when they are approached scientifically. Race itself is largely a classificatory term rather than a biological datum, and is no more satisfactory at present than instinct concepts as a basis for generalizing human behavior. The literature

[25] *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. ix, 1903-04, pp. 593-611.

on the subject is enormous. The interested reader is referred to the books below.[26]

By rampant mental testers, I mean those who regard intelligence as a unitary, hereditary, biological trait and who hold that the I. Q., or other measure of it, is relatively stationary. Often the tester believes he can tell just what the subject is capable of doing, what he ought to do, or what should be done with him. It is true that most students of mental testing hold no such views, but the prevalence of similar ideas cannot be doubted if one is at all familiar with the literature of invidious comparison between immigrant groups, races, families and individuals. Many teachers and social workers place great reliance on mental tests.

There is no disposition on the part of sociologists to minimize the importance of mental testing, but they deplore the particularistic school of testers who are inclined to make a magical ritual out of it. Sociologists grant the usefulness of the tests as a means of classifying various types, both mental, and perhaps eventually, temperamental, but they deny the unitary, hereditary nature of intelligence. This view does not run counter to the fact of individual differences, but it does contend that culture is a tremendously important factor in determining intelligence scores. In most general intelligence tests, the emotional factors, personality traits, and other socially acquired behavior-patterns are blithely ignored. The language factor plays a predominant part in most tests, but even the so-called "performance tests," while not so heavily weighted by cultural factors, are also influenced thereby. Murchison has shown conclusively that intelligence scores are not at all correlated with adequate social adjustment in criminals, and Lippmann has given a sound sociological criticism of the whole problem.[27]

[26] P. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, chap. v, for literature and incisive analysis; F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (1926), is perhaps the most comprehensive recent study by an American sociologist; see also F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911); E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem* (1927).

[27] C. Murchison, *Criminal Intelligence* (1926). See W. Lippmann, six articles on mental testing, *New Republic,* Oct. 25 to Nov. 29, 1922; L. M. Terman's facetious reply, "The Great Conspiracy," Dec. 27, 1922, pp. 116-120;

It is not quite correct to speak of mental testing as "rubbish burnt or burning." It is a thoroughly scientific method of measuring the adjustment responses of persons, which is exceedingly useful for diagnostic and classifying purposes, and will doubtless become much more valuable. But the sociologist insists that the tests measure personality traits, *i. e.*, the whole complex of innate and culturally acquired differences. He deplores only the particularistic biological and hereditarian interpretations of the tests. He does not deny that certain occupations, religions, ethnic groups, etc., are different and probably selective as measured by the tests, but he does deny that any sweeping generalizations as to superiority and innate capacity are warranted by such findings. He insists that testers should speak of "intelligences" rather than "intelligence," and that social as well as biological heredity should be given due interpretative weight.

The final biological dogma I have called dysgenicism. By this I mean those views which hold that cultural elaborations are often counter-selective and threaten the welfare, if not the existence, of mankind. The particular phobias that exercise the imagination of these men are almost all dependent upon the hereditary views already criticized. There is also implicit in them certain valuational points of view which are merely matters of opinion and taste. I shall mention a few of the outstanding cries of "Wolf! Wolf!" with a minimum of discussion. The implications of the foregoing pages suggest the negative arguments that might be given. In most cases, we have a paucity of verified scientific facts, and if we had the facts, it is not at all clear what generalizations regarding the "future of the race" would be warranted. Nor is it correct to say that these dogmas are "rubbish burnt and burning." A great many eminent sociologists subscribe to some of them, usually with reservations, however.

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and Lippmann's reply, "The Great Confusion," Jan. 3, 1923, pp. 145-146. Also, C. T. Pihlblad, "Mental Tests and Social Theory," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, July, 1926, pp. 27-32.

Some of these are: the "menace of the moron," the increase of crime and mental diseases, differential birth rates, the revolt of the under-man, the physical degeneration produced by modern medicine, sedentary life, drugs and improper food habits, race mixture, counter-selection from war, race suicide, and many others closely allied to these.

There is no evidence that any of these phenomena is any more common to our civilization than to previous ones. In fact, the reasonable inference is that there is nothing new or startling about any of them. Of course it is quite probable that mankind will some day disappear, that our civilization will "fall," as others have done; but it is also quite probable that our knowledges and techniques may preserve us for a longer time than we might enjoy in their absence. Most of the pessimism is probably due to our increasing knowledge of these phenomena. Crimes "increase" when we define new acts as crimes. "Crime waves" are largely mythical. Mental defect and disease also "increase" as our definitions, techniques for detecting, and institutions for caring, improve. The moron, imbecile, and idiot, have less chance of being a social menace now than at any time in the history of the world. They have always tended to biological extinction and to this we have added sociological elimination. It is probably now more difficult than ever before for morons and dull normals to make the social adjustments necessary for maximum propagation. All peoples in all places have had differential birth rates, birth control, miscegenation, and war. It may be that the rising tide of opposition to war has resulted partially from an elimination of the warlike and because we have developed new and more effective techniques of getting power and pelf. As for physical degeneration, comparative data are lacking, but such as we have would indicate that modern men are at least the physical equals of ancient men. There is no conclusive evidence that high death rates, especially infant rates, are dysgenically selective. All peoples have used drugs. If our life is sedentary, it is also true that we have developed a compensating mechanism in our recrea-

tional facilities. Our food habits are probably more rational than those of any previous people. There is no evidence that differential birth rates are dysgenic, and it is a well-known fact that they tend to equalize as standards of living approximate one another.

This is mere opinion, but I am of the impression that the dysgenicists are largely doctrinaire eugenicists, rampant mental testers, extreme hereditarians and other biological particularists. I believe most sociologists would agree that we have more reason for optimism than for pessimism.[28]

2. THE SOCIAL FORCES ERROR

Sociologists formerly gave a great deal of attention to the "forces" that produce societal phenomena. This was probably a direct inheritance of Spencer's idea of Force, which was derived from the physicists. The idea of "causes" and "forces" is closely allied. Physicists, chemists, and biologists departed from this way of reasoning long before the sociologists, if we have yet done so. The "force" of gravity is little more than a figure of speech with physicists. Most scientists are content to look for relatively uniform repetitive phenomena and to waive the question of cause and force.[29]

But many sociologists are still looking for them. In 1904, Ross said, "The cornerstone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces,"[30] and Small, in 1907, thought sociologists would agree that "the analysis of societary forces is the ultimate process of pure sociology."[31] One man, at least, disagreed. E. C. Hayes denied the social forces method of explain-

[28] See J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress* (1928), chap. xxvi; U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress* (1926), chaps. xxi-xxii; C. A. Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution* (1927), chap. xix. Also, *Whither Mankind*, C. A. Beard, Ed. (1928)—a score of opinions by eminent scholars in various fields; "Social Changes of 1927," *American Journal of Sociology*, June, 1928, for articles by leading social scientists evaluating the social gains and losses of the year.

[29] See M. Verworn, *Irritability* (1913), chap. ii.

[30] "Moot Points in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. ix, p. 548.

[31] "Points of Agreement among Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xii, p. 645.

ing social phenomena. He contended that "sociology has nothing to do with any social force any more than biology has to do with a vital force." He held that sociological explanation merely involved the statement of "regular relation between recurrent phenomena, (the study) of prevalent modes of human behavior."[32] In his "The 'Social Forces' Error," he elaborated these views, paying especial attention to Ward's idea of social forces. Hayes says he had expressed this view as early as 1904.[33]

The whole doctrine of social instincts, wishes, interests, desires, hormic drives, attitudes, influence of great men, and so on, is fraught with this concept of more or less definite, isolated, atomistic motives. It leads to what I have elsewhere called the "fallacy of explanation from below," *i. e.,* the attempt to explain social phenomena by appealing to biological, chemical, physical, and finally, to metaphysical principles.[34] John Dewey has stated this view in an excellent manner: "The only thing which imports obscurity and mystery into the influence of association upon what individual persons want and act for is the effort to discover alleged, special, original, society-making causal forces, whether instincts, fiats of will, personal, or an immanent, universal, practical reason, or an indwelling, metaphysical, social essence and nature. These things do not explain, for they are more mysterious than are the facts they are evoked to account for." [35]

So we may sum up the trend with reference to social forces by saying that modern students are inclined to ignore the older views. They are concerned with observation and generalization of clearly defined human behavior and are satisfied if relatively stable uniformities can be found. Such generalizations constitute the only "explanations" with which they deal. They are

[32] Discussion of Small's paper cited above, p. 654.

[33] *American Journal of Sociology,* March, 1911, pp. 613-625. For Hayes' reply to discussion of his paper, see *idem.,* pp. 642-644.

[34] See Goldenweiser's discussion of F. Allport's paper, "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1924, pp. 688-706.

[35] *The Public and its Problems,* (1927), p. 25. This view runs through his *Experience and Nature,* (1925), which all sociologists should read.

factual, not philosophical. They assume an innumerable host of factors antecedent to the observed datum. Some of these may be observed and generalized; but that is always another problem. These separate uniformities may be integrated by inference and synthesis, but sociological generalizations tend increasingly to be kept on the same factual level, *i. e.*, the observable responses of persons in social situations. The cosmic sweep so characteristic of earlier theory is conspicuously lacking today. Hayes' paper was a clear statement of what might be called behavioristic sociology and, in my opinion, is one of the major methodological contributions to sociological theory since 1900.[36]

3. SOCIOLOGY, SOCIAL WORK, AND ETHICS

This subject need detain us only for a moment. It was pointed out above that sociology and social work were closely identified at the beginning of the century. Along about 1910 they began to go their separate ways. Ward's distinctions between "pure" and "applied" sociology are still sound. At the present time, sociology is very definitely emancipated from reformitarian interests.[37]

Sociologists are generally agreed that they must pursue their studies with an eye single to the facts, with all practical and valuational interests held severely in check. Hence, sociologists

[36] For an excellent short summary of the views criticized here, see E. E. Eubank, "The Concept of Social Forces," *Sociology and Social Research,* July, 1928, pp. 26-34; for an extensive discussion, F. House, "The Concept Social Forces in American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1925, pp. 145-172; Nov., 1925, pp. 347-365; Jan., 1926, pp. 507-525; May, 1926, pp. 763-799. His conclusion is that the concept has no justification except as a tool for research, diagnosis, and possibly for social valuation. The common ground of all writers is emphasis upon the cultural definition of the "forces," however conceived. One should also read chapter vii, "Social Forces," in Park and Burgess, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* second edition (1924). See also E. Faris, "The Subjective Aspect of Culture," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* 1925, pp. 37-46; "The Concept of Social Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* July, 1925, pp. 404-409, and "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1928, pp. 271-281.

[37] *Cf.* Bruno Lasker, "What Has Become of Social Reform?" *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1922, pp. 129-159.

deny that social work and applied sociology are sociology at all. They believe that the techniques of these arts must be more or less dependent upon sociological as upon all other scientific knowledge, and they are agreed that the activities of welfare agencies may furnish valuable data for sociology, although on the whole they do not. Sociologists as scientists are not concerned with what uses may be made of their findings. They are like chemists in this respect. Mechanisms of human behavior may be used to poison the public mind in war time, as poison gas and explosives may be used to destroy life and property.

However, since about 1921, when a section on sociology and social work appeared in the program of the American Sociological Society, there has been an increasing rapport between the two groups. At present, social workers are not so prone to regard sociologists as contemptuous and impractical theorists, and sociologists are not so inclined to look upon social workers as irrational reformers and queer people seeking expression for balked impulses. Sociologists, having acquired some status among scientists, are not so fearful of being regarded as sentimental dreamers, and social workers have developed definite professional techniques and standards. Both groups have begun to realize that they have many interests in common. The chapters on social work and applied sociology make this more explicit.[38]

The above remarks apply equally well to the relation between sociology and ethics, since social work goals and methods are always more or less determined by ethical considerations. However, sociology, and especially social anthropology, have made a revolutionary contribution to ethical theory in the discovery of the relativity, ethnocentrism, and irrationality of the mores. I suppose Sumner's *Folkways* is the greatest single contribution in

[38] See H. N. Shenton, *The Practical Application of Sociology* (1928); S. Queen, "Some Possible Sociological Uses of the Case Work Method," *Sociology and Social Research,* March, 1927, p. 322-326; C. C. Vollstedt, "Trends of Social Work in the United States," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Sept., 1925, pp. 25-40; M. J. Karpf, "The Relation of Sociology to Social Work," *Social Forces,* March, 1925, pp. 419-427, and the whole issue of the same journal for June, 1928.

this field. Likewise, the study of culture traits, culture patterns, and acculturation has thrown floods of light upon what is "right," and the relation of technological, geographical, and biotic factors to ethical standards, their formulation and redefinition.

So we may conclude that while sociology, as a science, is non-ethical, in effect it tends, by its comparative methods and factual generalizations, to rationalize and universalize ethical concepts.[39]

A specific ethical idea which has engaged almost all sociologists to some degree is the concept of progress. Few men have considered a sociological treatise complete without one chapter at least, usually the last one, devoted to "Progress," and how to get it. With the decline of the Spencerian doctrine of inevitable evolutionary progress (but with its concomitant concept of dissolution), the view of most sociologists has been that there is no such thing as "progress in general." If we are to speak of progress, we must first clearly define our goals, and then devise measures to record movement toward or away from them. These proximate goals, of course, imply valuations of what is good. So ideas of progress merge into philosophies of life and supreme values. Sociology as a science may derive valid generalizations regarding human behavior, but has no final word as to what is progress. When the group decides upon its goals, the sociologist may offer some evidence as to whether these are attainable, and if so, how to attain them; but further than this he cannot go.[40]

[39] See H. E. Barnes, "Sociology and Ethics," *Social Forces,* Jan., 1925, pp. 212-231; E. C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics,* 1921; in *The Social Sciences and their Interrelations* (1927), edited by Ogburn and Goldenweiser, see "Anthropology and Ethics," John Dewey, chap. iii, and "Sociology and Ethics," P. Sorokin, chap. xxv.

[40] Since the war, a considerable literature on progress has appeared. Practically all of it expresses the view stated in this chapter, although some is merely the expression of hopes and fears. There is a suggestion of inevitable progress in Ellwood's graphs with the captions "animality to humanity," "nothing to perfection," etc., see *Cultural Evolution* (1927), pp. 254, 261, but his discussion, pp. 252-256, leaves the impression that it is up to man. See L. L. Bernard, "The Conditions of Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1922, pp. 21-48; "The Concept of Social Progress," *Social Forces,* Jan., 1925, pp. 207-212; May, 1925, pp. 617-622; Sept., 1925, pp. 36-43; "Scientific Method and Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1925, pp. 1-18; "Invention and Social Progress," *idem.,* July, 1923, pp. 1-33; C. A.

Sociologists are generally agreed that if man is to be saved, he must save himself. Man must learn what the limits of his internal and external resources are and then devote himself to making what seem the most desirable long-run adjustments in view of these limitations. Man tends to regard the actual and possible as the desirable. In this sense, perhaps Spencer's idea of inevitable progress and regress was not entirely wrong. Chapin (*cit. supra*) has some very interesting data on the cyclical nature of change. Every organic growth tends to proliferate until it exhausts its resources or meets with insurmountable obstacles. If cultures are organic growths, cycles or ecological successions would be the normal expectation. In the case of cultures, however, many culture products are transmitted to the succeeding cultures. But in plant and animal successions the soil is often made more fertile and friable. So the difference is one of degree in both cases. The concept of progress is at once the most fascinating and most elusive so far as actual scientific data and inference are concerned.

IV. Summary of Trends in American Sociology

The foregoing section has been chiefly concerned with negative criticisms of sociological theory; and yet, in so far as general agreements among American sociologists have been indicated, we have really been discussing trends in theory. Over twenty years ago, Small tried to state the agreements then existing among sociologists. There was considerable disagreement at the time.[41] Today I should not agree with more than four or five of his twenty points. I have little faith that even a majority of sociologists will agree with my propositions. The amount of agreement with them in twenty years may well be less than my present

Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution* (1927); F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (1928); J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress* (1927); U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress* (1926); A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (1918); J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress* (1928); chap. xiv in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*

[41] "Points of Agreement Among Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1907, pp. 633-655. Discussed by J. E. Hagerty, J. O. Dealey, E. C. Hayes. See section on "The Social Forces' Error."

agreement with Small, but I shall venture to state, as briefly as I can, what seem to me the outstanding lines of development in American sociology.

1. Sociology is a natural science. As such it is non-utilitarian, non-normative, and no more "important" than any other natural science. It is not the final science in the Comtean sense, nor the centralizer of the other sciences. Its data are no more complex or difficult to observe and generalize than those of other sciences. Its methods are not uniquely different from those of other sciences. The only data with which it deals are those that are observable by the senses aided by the objectifying devices of logic, mathematics and instrumentation. These data are the activities of men in groups as conditioned by culture. Sociology will become increasingly behavioristic, with a corresponding decrease of emphasis upon subjective, unobservable "forces," "drives," "wishes," "instincts," and the like.

2. Sociology will become increasingly statistical. Case studies and other qualitative methods will tend to be subordinated to quantitative approaches. The two methods will probably always be complementary and supplementary as they are in the other sciences, but validation of hypotheses will depend upon mathematical manipulation of carefully defined, observed, and recorded objective units. "The center of attention and principle of synthesis" will not be personality, as Small contended in 1907, but rather the repetitive uniformities in the behavior of persons, *i. e.*, group phenomena. The units are not significant; the uniformities are. As chemists are not concerned with the uniqueness of atoms and electrons, so sociologists will not be concerned with the behavior of individuals, or persons, as such; social artists and ethicists will. That is their business, as the business of sociologists is to generalize human behavior. But adequate generalization is a *sine qua non* of particularization. This is the only way in which the behavior of units gains any scientific meaning.[42]

[42] For good examples of the application of statistical method to the analysis of typical social behavior, see F. S. Chapin, "Measuring the Volume of Social Stimuli," March, 1926, pp. 479-495, and "Dependency Indexes for Minneapolis,"

3. Sociology will be increasingly monographic. The day of glittering generalities and cosmic theories is about past in sociological theory. The angels of science fear to tread upon this dangerous ground. Cooley well expressed it when he said, ". . . Original work is likely to take the direction of more limited but thorough studies. This work will be theoretical . . . but the theory will spring from a more circumscribed and penetrating study of fact. . . . The new generation will not tolerate 'arm-chair sociology.'" [43]

Sociologists have been much more prolific of theories than of facts. They have written about methods more than they have used them. The present trend is quite in the opposite direction. Theories are becoming much more specific and less final; conclusions are more modest and tentative and tend to be based upon carefully conducted factual researches which must be amenable to repetition and verification by other workers. A man gains status in the profession by actual research rather than by brilliant literary efforts. Most men agree that the time for valid scientific sociological "laws" and "principles" is far distant. Sociologists are going to school with the anthropologists and psychologists in this respect. We have a considerable number of apparently valid sociological generalizations, but most of them do not differ much from common-sense observations of long standing. Many of them may be false. Only careful, tedious, specialized investigations can furnish the factual data from which real scientific generalizations can be made. For the present, valid sociological generalizations are very limited, both in scope and number.

4. Sociology is rapidly becoming specialized. This is a corol-

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Dec., 1926, pp. 215-224, both in *Social Forces;* E. W. Burgess, "The Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City," *Publication of the American Sociological Society,* pp. 178-184; S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928); G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research, A Study in Methods of Gathering Data* (1929). For case study method, E. W. Burgess, "Statistics and Case Studies," *Sociology and Social Research,* Nov., 1927, pp. 103-120; G. A. Lundberg, "Case Work and Statistical Method," *Social Forces,* Sept., 1926, pp. 61-64.

[43] C. H. Cooley, "Then and Now," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* May, 1924, pp. 259-262.

lary of the above and needs no elaboration. Rural, urban, and educational sociology, human ecology, human geography, social psychology, cultural ethnology, community organization and planning, social work, "applied" sociology (criminology, poverty, immigration, recreation, family and child problems, public health, mental hygiene, etc.), social legislation and sociological jurisprudence, social statistics, population, social theory, social economics, social ethics and religion, are examples of this. Within each group, further specialization is to be noted.

Likewise, there is a marked vagueness and overlapping in the activities and interests of the various groups. It is unnecessary to develop this point. It is possible that sociology will eventually become merely a general term for describing these related fields of investigation. They are all more or less barking up the same tree, *viz.*, attempting to formulate repetitive uniformities in human group behavior. They deal with culture rather than with other types of natural phenomena. Perhaps some such compromise term as "culturology" will be born. Each of the academic groups tries to swallow the others, but with small success. It makes no difference under what banner the work is done, although waste of time and energy and much internecine warfare results from men's (even professors'!) bondage to names.

It is a hazardous enterprise to designate from the list above the types of study which are likely to contribute most to the sociology of the future, or even to name those that show present trends in the direction of dominance. However, I shall mention a few that seem to me most promising. This does not imply that research in the other fields will cease or diminish. There is little doubt that all phases of the scientific study of human associational phenomena will command an increasing amount of money and talent in the future.

5. Human ecology is likely to be one of the most fruitful, as it is one of the most recent, modes of sociological analysis. There is a lively and increasing interest in it among some of the most promising sociologists. Human ecology studies man, or groups

of men in their temporal, spatial, sustenance, and cultural relations, and the processes of interaction between these factors.[44] This approach enables the investigator to deal with concrete, objective, measurable data and to arrange them in a time-series. It is concerned more with what men do, as evidenced by their behavior in time and space, than with what they say, feel, dream, and wish. It lends itself especially well to the behavioristic trend in sociology, already mentioned as one of the outstanding characteristics of recent sociological theory. It has conceptual tools already clearly defined by studies in plant and animal ecology —such as symbiosis, succession, segregation, invasion, dominance, mobility, emigration, competition, barriers—which can be applied to the behavior of human groups as true descriptive terms, thus avoiding the analogical pitfalls which have characterized so many biological concepts when applied to cultural phenomena. It is obvious, of course, that this approach is not particularly new. The works of many geographers, ethnologists and some philosophers of history contain its intellectual antecedents. Montesquieu, Buckle, Reclus, Peschel, Ratzel, Vallaux, L. Metchnikoff, Demolins, Huntington, Semple, Bruhnes, and the American anthropologists should be mentioned in this connection. However, it remained for Robert E. Park and his students to make human ecology a distinctive sociological concept.

6. Another very promising approach is the ethnological, concerned as it is with culture traits, culture complexes, culture areas, and culture patterns, their origin, diffusion and integration. It is easy to point out similarities between these concepts and those of ecology. They both have the advantage of dealing with group adjustments and group behavior in an objective descriptive manner. As I have pointed out earlier, cultural anthropology has already made invaluable contributions to sociological theory. I think its work is only now getting well under way. About the only distinction I can see between sociology and ethnology is that

[44] See R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxxii, pp. 141-154 (1926); and Nels Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (1928), chap. ii.

the latter has largely concerned itself with the culture of prehistoric and pre-literate peoples, while the former has been more concerned with historic and present cultures. Both are phases of sociology or culturology. I think ethnological methods will be increasingly applied to the study of contemporary culture.[45]

7. Another marked trend is the development of social psychology. It is very difficult to distinguish much of what is commonly called sociological research from social psychology. If we think of sociology proper as formulating the repetitive uniformities of group behavior with no concern for the behavior of persons as such, we may conceive of social psychology as formulating the repetitive uniformities in the behavior of persons through conformity or non-conformity to the culture patterns defined by the intercommunication of group members. This is not wholly satisfactory, however, because all culture patterns are resident in the organisms of persons. There is an organic relationship between persons and the common behavior patterns observable in the numerous groups of which each person is a member. But if we think of groupal adjustments as abstractions of these common, personal, culturally defined actions, with no attention paid to the behavior of persons as such, we may have a logical basis for a division of labor.

The social psychologist is interested in the processes by which these groupal patterns are elaborated, maintained and modified. The human ecologist, or culturologist, is interested in the observation and generalization of them. There is a very intimate and complementary relation between the points of view. It follows, then, that the psychologist proper must be an animal psychologist, interested in the neuro-muscular behavior of man the animal, while the social psychologist is interested in the social behavior of man the human being who is the maker and acquirer of culture. Most of the so-called psychology of today, advertising, business, educational, psycho-analytic, abnormal, etc., is thus

[45] See M. J. Herskovits and M. M. Willey, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept., 1923, pp. 129-157.

really social psychology. The rest of it is largely the anatomy, physiology and pathology of the nervous systems of men and other animals. Traditional psychology has thus fallen between two stools, biology and sociology.

Social psychology is flourishing these days and will continue to flourish. It has made and will continue to make great contributions to the definition and solution of personality problems and the whole mental hygiene movement. It will take the mysticism out of psycho-analysis and formulate in scientific sociological terms the remarkable contributions of that over-praised and much condemned school. The writings of Dewey, Cooley, Thomas, Faris, Bogardus, Watson, W. A. White, J. J. B. Morgan, J. M. Williams, Lowie, Bernard, K. Young, and many others, including the Freudians and psychiatrists, demonstrate the close kinship between social psychology and culturology.

8. Community study will probably increase in importance, but it will become more similar to the human ecology already described. The National Community Center Association is now concerning itself increasingly with community and regional planning, since a wise community plan must integrate urban communities with the rural and primary supply hinterland. This sort of planning will necessarily involve an anthropogeographic or ecological approach. With the growth of urbanization and modern industrial techniques, it is obvious that increasing attention must be given to these problems.[46]

We may look for increased activity in rural sociology as a result of the Purnell Funds, recently made available to the land-grant agricultural colleges. Rural sociology is not a distinctive study, of course, except as it is devoted to the study of group behavior in rural areas. It will be characterized by the ecological, social psychological, statistical, and community planning ap-

[46] The National Community Center Association at its Chicago meeting, December 26-30, 1928, appointed a committee to consider changing the name. Its original purposes were to create community consciousness through the promotion of "centers," recreation facilities, housing and other sanitary projects, and the coördination of all the agencies of communal welfare. See R. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology,* (1926), for the newer trend mentioned above.

proaches already referred to. I mention it specifically only because of the recent extreme activity in this field. And it will doubtless continue—so long as research money is available.[47]

9. Social work will increase in importance and become more and more dependent upon sociology and social psychology both for its techniques and objectives. While the distinctions between social work as an art, and sociology as a science, and the difference between social problems, social work problems, and sociological problems made in Chapter IX of this volume are and will remain logically sound, I believe that the interrelations and interdependence of the art and science of social relations are bound to increase to their mutual benefit. This has been true of all arts and sciences. There is an inescapable organic relation between them. It is impossible to say whether "flesh helps soul more than soul helps flesh."

10. Finally, I believe the now almost non-existent, or negative interest of sociologists in religion and ethics will be replaced by a very vital and fruitful revival. This will sound like scientific heresy to many, but I trust the future will justify it. In the last analysis, men are governed by their valuations and judgments of what they think is fundamentally and externally worth while. These are the things for which they strive, sacrifice, live, and die. This is their religion—those purposes for which they work religiously, those wishful objectives which stimulate their imaginations and release their best energies. Now, in general, these value-judgments tend to conform to what collective experience shows to be possible. With due regard for irrational inertia and cultural lags, the possible and actual become the desirable. Religious ideas and ideals are reflections of cultural behavior.

If sociology is to be a science of human group behavior, it is obvious that it cannot long neglect this most important field. And it is also evident that supernaturalistic, other-worldly conceptions of religion are being and will increasingly be replaced

[47] See C. J. Galpin, *et al., Rural Sociological Research in the United States,* mimeographed by the Social Science Research Council. Over eighty research projects under way are reported for 1926-27.

by naturalistic, this-worldly conceptions. Ideals that "strike fire in our consciousness" will be dependent on the facts of human and other natural phenomena as determined by scientific research. The church will become a social institution which defines and criticizes these fundamental values. If it is to be functional, it must depend upon what men do and are capable of doing as revealed by scientific research. The values that were formerly related to hypothetical gods and heavens and hells and supernatural agencies must be integrated with the validated findings of science. We know enough about the social psychology of conversions, visions, intuitions, morals, suggestions, and repressions, to interpret "religious experience" in naturalistic terms. So the relation of sociology to religion will be in the nature of a redefinition and revaluation of values. Sociology and the other sciences will furnish the materials which must be integrated in the art of living. From this point of view, all men are "religious," *i. e.*, they have life-integrating (or dis-integrating) values. This field of psycho-sociological research, at present woefully unworked, will become very fertile in the future.

V. Conclusions

Space prohibits further discussion, but I trust that I have given the reader some understanding of the road traveled by American sociology since 1900, as well as some hints of what I think the future journey holds. Small was essentially correct, I think, when he spoke of the "Era of Sociology" at the dawn of the present century. Sociology has now become a sturdy youngster, perhaps still somewhat post-adolescent, but it gives good promise of a fruitful maturity. It has been adopted (with reservations by some of the "elders") in the household of science. It has raked up and burned much rubbish and still has much to do in this respect; but in America, at least, it has largely emancipated itself from philosophical, metaphysical, ethico-religious, economic, geographic, biological, analogical, historical, metaphorical, and other non-naturalistic dogmas and preconceptions. It

conceives of itself as a natural science, using the methods and suffering the limitations of all science. It realizes the mutual interdependence of all the sciences; it does not try to arrogate to itself any position of dominance or "greater importance." It is committed to the accumulation of a valid body of sociological facts through slow, careful, laborious research. It is extremely chary of making wide generalizations. Such as are ventured are put forth in the most tentative manner and must be tested by repeated factual investigations.

In closing, it should be recalled that any attempt to set forth the trends in sociological theories is by the nature of the case an intellectual or imaginative *tour de force* more akin to prophecy than to science. It is possible to make a factual study of the interests of sociologists as revealed by publications, theses, and courses, and possibly to deduce some implications of "trends" therefrom. A few such studies are cited elsewhere in this volume, but the paucity and subjective nature of these investigations makes them practically useless for the purposes of this chapter. No one can be more conscious than the writer of the inadequacies of the method used in this chapter. Its net result is "one man's opinion"—a series of more or less informed guesses.

So far sociological theory and research have been less productive of scientific facts than they have of hypotheses, speculation, and wishful thinking; yet I think we may conclude that they have brought into existence a more realistic way of regarding human phenomena than formerly obtained. The behavior of men, singly and in groups, has been largely removed from the realm of mystery and magic. We have learned at least how to approach the scientific study of human behavior. "We study social habits now as phenomena no longer charged with dread, and thus learn how wisely to adjust and control them to our betterment." [48] We have not yet thoroughly realized the implications of the statement that "social phenomena are natural phenomena—sociology is a natural science," but we are learning. The trends of sociological theory are all keyed to this note.

[48] F. Barry, *The Scientific Habit of Thought* (1927), p. 76.

CHAPTER III

TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

By John F. Markey

1. Background and Scope of the Chapter

A noted social scientist who recently wrote, "He who writes controversy digs his own grave," uttered a pointed truth concerning controversy for its own sake. One might add that he who avoids controversial questions does little digging of any kind, for new facts have iconoclastic tendencies. The advance of knowledge has seldom been won without contest, and the proponents of new views usually cannot escape serious criticism. Of course it is too bad, although sometimes amusing, to see a person caught in his own bear trap, but if one would catch the game he must be willing to take some risk. So, notwithstanding the danger therein, some controversial subjects must be discussed in this chapter. But the plan is to avoid futile debate.

It is not the intention to gave an historical treatment of the subject, nor to discuss the theories of various authors.[1] The purpose is to give a clear and critical statement concerning recent significant developments in social psychology. The amount of attention given to some persons and the lack of attention to others may seem arbitrary, but this is subsidiary to the purpose of elucidating these trends.

While there are many different angles from which this study is approached, a fair degree of consensus is arising that social psychology studies the responses of individuals to social influences, such as cultural heritage, institutions, groups, persons, and social situations. In its beginnings, two distinct emphases appeared. One gave main consideration to the similarity of re-

[1] Summaries will be found elsewhere: Kimball Young, chap. iv in the *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, H. E. Barnes, Ed. (1925); L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926); and J. W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted* (1927).

sponses running throughout the group, and the other gave special attention to a genetic study of individual social responses. The science was started on its infant career with the first emphasis, as a cross-sectional study of the social behavior of interacting persons. Comparatively less attention was given to the genetic aspects of the response itself. In order for the cross-sectional approach to give a functional[2] and sequential explanation, it may go in two directions: into sociology proper or a study of the group as such, or into a genetic study of the responses themselves. The cross-sectionalist took, largely, the first course. Somewhat independently of this cross-sectional approach, we have the development of social psychology which pushed forward the genetic aspects by taking the individual as a starting point. In general perspective, one notes two contrasting attitudes as to the degree to which the individual was and is regarded as a separate entity: the view that he is the dominant cause, on account of instinct, or otherwise, of social phenomena, hence relatively independent of it; and the conception that he is an integral part of various social groupings, one link in a causal or sequential social chain—a social being. Thus, society and the individual are regarded as two aspects of common phenomena. Increased knowledge of the processes involved has thrown the trend decidedly toward this latter view.

At present, the most fruitful development comes from a union of the study of social groups and social situations, *i.e.,* social stimuli, with the study of the social individual, *i.e.,* the responses of the individual to these social stimuli, as made, for instance, by C. H. Cooley or G. H. Mead. Two recent texts by L. L. Bernard and Kimball Young have especially emphasized this tendency.[3] The social or group approach methodologically gives a much more satisfactory basis than the individual, for marking

[2] Functional is used to mean dependent processes and not, as some biopsychologists still use it, to mean the operation of metaphysical entities which they posit.

[3] Bernard, *op. cit.;* Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology* (1927). See F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924), for a treatment of the subject which gives little attention to group factors. His treatment is fine as far as it goes.

out and limiting problems for study, since social responses tend to be arranged and differentiated by the groups in which persons function.

The purpose of the present chapter will be to examine first the tendencies in the cross-sectional approach. Secondly, we shall consider the social response approach, tracing its development away from the conception of the asocial individual to that of the social individual and toward a more behavioristic and mechanistic [4] explanation of social behavior. Of special importance in this connection is the emphasis upon objective social analysis. Social psychology reminds one of an ostrich with its head in the "subjective." If it ever comes up to look around, the "subjective" may be found to be objective, similar to the sky and the rest of the surroundings. But in any case, social psychology is digging more seriously into the study of the social conditioning of the individual, his social mechanisms, his habits and habit constellations, his desire, wish, motive and symbolic complexes, his selves, personality, and the like, and into a study of the manner in which social processes, social situations, the environment, groupings and group acts are functionally connected with the responses of individuals. In this work the so-called subjective is being brought to light and found to be observable and amenable to objective study.

Along with the influence of sociological development, including the study of culture,[5] a constant source of reorientation has come from advances in psychological, psychiatric, neurological and physiological knowledge. Some of the more outstanding of these trends will be indicated. The next task will be to indicate a

[4] Mechanistic is used throughout this discussion merely as indicating functional and dependent relationships.

[5] The cultural anthropologists have made significant contributions in this respect, especially Boas and his associates. Malinowski has done some good writing on the relation of action to thought among pre-literates. See B. Malinowski, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Language," pp. 452-510, in Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923). The slight influence of folk psychologists, such as Wundt, Lazarus and Steinthal, upon American social psychology has perhaps come somewhat indirectly through anthropology and psychology.

scientific framework for social psychology, discussing some neglected phases, and finally to make an estimate of the outlook for this discipline.

The history of social psychology is marked by conceptions tracking into blind alleys, explanations which do not enlighten, and theories which, if accepted, would lead one hopelessly away from reality. An urgent need is for more and more concrete investigation. But this investigation must have behind it intelligent insight and theory in order for it to be most fruitful. For this reason, and since they are pivots for important trends in social psychology, it will be our task to examine as we go along some of these "horrible" examples—skeletons which in most cases social psychology has not yet been able to get into the closet, to say nothing of keeping them there. Of course the purpose is to give main attention to the more positive contributions.

II. The Cross-Sectional Approach

This approach is illustrated by those writers who regard social psychology as a study of social planes and uniformities among persons. Such writers as E. A. Ross, F. H. Giddings and, to a certain degree, E. S. Bogardus and C. A. Ellwood, illustrate this type. This goes back, of course, to Bagehot and Continental writers. As studies in social psychology in distinction from sociology, they represent attempts to see the responses of the individuals of a society or group in a cross-section, partially in time, but mainly in space, In general, they give a more or less static picture of the responses of persons.

An outstanding weakness of this approach in its simple form consists in the lack of explanation of how and why these responses are what they are. Since the responses are treated separately, their genetic and functional character may not be at all clearly shown. The sociologists mentioned have enhanced the value of their work by going in varying degrees to sociology, or less frequently into a genetic study of particular social responses. However, they have not obtained as much help from these sources as

they might have, for frequently they have accepted or directly assumed explanations which were too simple or inadequate and which showed too little familiarity with the social factors which were operative. As an example of this may be cited briefly the imitation theory which has been widely used by this type of approach, and is still used, although to a much lesser degree.

Although some have regarded imitation as one of a pair of Siamese twins, the connection with suggestion is not so close that imitation may not be discussed separately. In general, writers have felt the need of analyzing conditions of suggestibility so that this category has not been the bugbear that the imitation part of the theory has been. It is quite true that some persons have assumed some abstract or general quality of suggestibility, but more careful students are examining specific conditions of susceptibility to stimuli called suggestions. This is a most fruitful type of study. The powerful response connections conditioned to stimuli called suggestions are dynamic agencies in social processes, particularly in the symbolic processes of persons. But the connection of the imitation twin with suggestion has sometimes vitiated the explanation of suggestion, since imitation was given as a reason for suggestibility, and the reason for imitation was that we copy the actions and ideas of others, a quite unsatisfactory statement. It is imitation that has become the dark region.

The above-mentioned writers, including J. M. Baldwin, will call to mind the rôle and emphasis which imitation has been given in early social psychological works. Such uniformities as fashions, customs, and conventions early forced their attention upon students of society. What was the explanation of them? Imitation—and we know as much as we did before.

The great difficulty with so much of the discussion of imitation is that it becomes a resting place, stopping far short of a clear statement of *how* people *learn* to imitate and of the social interactions involved in the process of acquiring the skill to imitate. It is now generally recognized that one cannot imitate unless

he knows how to do so. A quite obvious statement when it is said, but one which a number of social psychologists have ignored. It is clear that one cannot imitate Caruso unless he is a singer, or Tilden unless he is a tennis player. Also the work of Thorndike, Watson, Porter, Köhler, Berry, Bird, and Shephard should warn one against placing much confidence in an instinct of imitation. Further, the degree or amount of imitation is a relative thing. Most writers on the subject do not seem to feel the necessity of explaining how exact must be the copy before it is legitimate to call the result imitation. It still remains for someone to give imitation a thoroughly genetic treatment. Perhaps the category is not worth salvaging, but if it is, some more thorough analysis of it must be made. The present decided tendency away from the use of the imitation theory type of explanation will continue unless a different line of attack appears more fruitful.[6]

Another and equally defective characteristic of the imitation theory is its too broad generalization. Many things have been explained by imitation which were not imitation, nor the result of learning to copy. The similarity may be due to conditioning, to quite different stimuli, or to different response mechanisms altogether. Since imitation was often an *a priori* explanation, it was quite easily applied to uniformities regardless of their genetic or functional relationship. Studies of the group have shown well how important are group integrations, *division* of labor, cooperation, and conflict, in explaining uniformities and regularities.[7] Bernard suggests that the concept may still be useful to the social psychologist and the social sciences generally. This may be true for those sciences which attempt to explain group behavior rather than individual responses, but the social psychologist

[6] Ellsworth Faris' critical paper on the subject is suggestive. "The Concept of Imitation," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1926, vol. xxxii, pp. 367-378.

[7] W. B. Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology and Contemporary American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1920-21, vol. xxvi, and Miss M. P. Follett, *The New State* (1918), have given some telling criticisms of the imitation theory from a social standpoint.

must explain imitation. He cannot take it as a datum. For him at best it is the name for a process which he must describe and analyze. An example in point is the work of Cooley as contrasted with that of Baldwin.[8] The latter's use of imitation in explaining the social rôle of individuals shows thin places, in marked contrast to Cooley's more complete and developed explanation by a functional description of social processes. The present attention to these social factors and upon learning, conditioning, and habit formation is quite healthy.

We will not discuss the social mind incubus which is so closely connected with the cross-sectional study, being a part of its inheritance. It is better not to disturb it for, due to neglect, it seems in a fair way of passing out. In the main, it is in reality a type of group explanation, and as such perhaps more properly belongs in a discussion of sociology than in the present discussion of social psychology. I do not intend a mere terminological point here. Although the study of group behavior might well be called social psychology, it actually represents a different frame of generalization than that ordinarily accepted by social psychologists. The social mind theory from this standpoint falls outside of the purview of social psychology.[9]

The literature on crowd psychology has been closely connected with the cross-sectional approach, and the study has attracted much attention. A great deal of the discussion has been concerned with the group as such. Its contribution from the standpoint of social psychology has been in the description of crowd situations and in the determination of typical responses of individuals under these circumstances. The material of crowd psychology needs a critical survey, both from the standpoint of methodology and of fact. Martin,[10] for instance, illustrates a peculiar mixture in frames of references as well as an apparent

[8] See C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1922), and J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (1906).

[9] In passing, it may be indicated that at present the tendency is to regard social unity in terms of the integration and functional unity of group processes.

[10] E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds* (1920).

tendency to call social action which he does not like "crowd psychology."

The real value of this cross-sectional approach is to point out, summarize, and compare typical responses to particular situations. A definite trend has been toward more precise and statistical treatment of materials gathered for such study. Its most exact treatment has been at the hands of psychologists who have been more ready to tabulate responses in frequency series from which may be computed averages, measures of dispersion, and correlations. An example of this is such studies as those made by F. H. Allport on group facilitation, which are of such a nature that others can check on the methods of analysis. Also a great number of psychological tests fall under this type of study. For instance, Hartshorne and May, with their tests on knowledge of right and wrong, believe they have also demonstrated in certain measurements the existence of a group differential.[11] However, a growing body of studies by sociologists demonstrates the more exact and statistical use of this approach, and they have also generally avoided some of its weaknesses by going into a more or less thorough sociological or group and social situational analysis.[12]

In analyzing the group as a phenomenon, however, as was noted, one changes his frame of reference, *i.e.,* his point of view or his basis of observation and measurement. The group becomes his locus or unit of uniformity and regularity. If this be accepted as the province of sociology, he has for the time being left the field of social psychology. This, of course, is quite legitimate and useful. But it is to be observed that often investigators, in their attempt to get a functional and causal explanation of cross-section response material, do change their frame of reference without seemingly being aware of the fact. They some-

[11] See the later articles in the *Journal of Religious Education.*

[12] For example, those of Jessie Ravitch (Bernard), on responses to customs among Jews; C. C. Zimmerman, on farmer's attitudes; Dorothy P. Gary, on behavior integrations of southern textile workers; Stuart Rice, on political responses; also some articles by F. S. Chapin.

times fall into unnecessary confusion in their analysis, which a recognition of the shift in point of view would have prevented. When one is generalizing in regard to the *responses* of individuals to social stimuli, he has one frame of reference for the establishment of laws and regularities. When he is generalizing in regard to group processes, responses of groups, the *mass* or total response, he has another basis of generalization. Thus, while a large part of Ross' *Social Psychology* attempts to outline typical responses, a great deal of the book is given over to group responses and social processes considered as group phenomena. Sumner's work [13] is in large part generalized on a group phenomena framework, and is a study in sociology proper. Since we are interested here with the social psychological point of view, we shall continue our analysis from the standpoint of the social responses of individuals rather than that of group responses. The study of group responses is not to be confused methodologically with an approach to the study of individual responses from the standpoint of the group, for the latter is a highly advantageous approach in social psychology.

III. Genetic and Functional Study of Individual Social Responses

Some students still regard the individual as a distinctively independent unit. Although a genetic study of the individual response mitigates the artificial character of such a view, it is not until these genetic data are seen as integral or organic parts of a social process that the functional and genetic relationships get a statement which approaches a satisfactory one. The discussion immediately following will deal with the trend in this latter direction. The increased attention to mechanistic and behavioristic social study and emphasis upon social conditioning, habit mechanisms, personality complexes, reflective behavior and the like, in relation to social processes and group situations, will be indicated.

[13] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (1906).

I. THE SOCIAL INSTINCTS DOGMA

There has been much raging about the validity of instincts. This dogma popularized by William McDougall [14] received early and widespread acceptance. But while it is quite obvious that there are inherited mechanisms, attempts to explain the individual's social action or the group's action, *i.e.,* sociology, by instincts, is undoubtedly a lazy way of avoiding thought on these subjects. The attack by Dunlap, Kantor, Josey, Bernard, Faris, Kuo, Watson and others [15] has led to a much saner attitude in regard to instincts. In spite of this, one frequently sees social scientists explaining the family by the sex instinct, the church by the religious instinct, play by the play instinct, or the group by the gregarious instinct. The social world is thus set out in order, ready-made and diagramed. The thing is simple; why worry about the complex system of social interaction involved in these institutions when they can be so easily taken care of by putting instincts into people? But psychologists are recognizing that our heredity is quite plastic and rudimentary, and that any explanation of social behavior must bring into reckoning social conditioning and training before we can understand social life.

It is also apropos to say that much of the structure of the body is not instinct, even though it may be inherited. Neither are physiological needs, rates of metabolism and organic states, instincts. There are many irritability traits of protoplasm lying back of and conditioning human behavior which cannot be called instinct, but which many social psychologists and sociologists have failed to distinguish therefrom. A thorough study of protoplasmic irritability traits is highly enlightening and makes some of the claims of a thundering instinctivist sound rather hollow.[16] A terminological matter has caused considerable confusion in this

[14] In his *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1909).

[15] See literature summaries cited elsewhere in this chapter.

[16] For a summary of recent work on excitability, see C. A. L. Evans, *Recent Advances in Physiology* (1928).

connection. Instinct is sometimes used to apply to an inherited complex coördination of reflexes and is sometimes used to designate an inherited reflex itself. Thus, when one person denies the inheritance of complex coördinations which he calls instincts, other persons take it to mean that he denies all inherited reflexes. And another may argue for the existence of instincts, meaning only reflexes. The consensus is growing that we inherit a large number of reflexes and few complex coördinations of reflexes.

In some cases the attackers of instinct have headed into another flight from reality. They have opposed the environment to instincts. This has gone so far in the hands of some as to make social psychology and sociology a study of environment. Now environment is a very useful conception but of itself is not a sufficiently complete framework for a social science. A most pertinent question here is, What is the center around which this environment revolves? It often leads to a highly fictitious situation, to chop our social world up into environment on one side and something else on the other. Where the individual plant or animal is taken as an organic unit of study, its environment becomes a quite useful conception. In sociology, where the group is taken as a unit, it may also be a useful concept at times. But the analysis of processes between groups and within groups seems to have been a much more fruitful method of analysis than the separation of social phenomena into groups and their environment. In social psychology, where the responses of individuals to social influence is the unit of analysis rather than the individual as such, the division of all these phenomena into environment and something environed introduces a quite structuralistic classification, as well as terms less satisfactory than the statements generalizing the actual character of the influences and the responses to them. Social psychology is a study which cuts across the individual and his environment. Further, in regard to heredity, it cannot be rightly regarded as antithetical to the environ-

ment. These terms are both supplementary. since heredity involves environment in its very definition.[17]

Although there is a rather definite movement toward the "environmental" conception of social life, it seems doubtful whether this will become so widely spread or distorted as to lead social psychology too far into the wilderness; for those who adhere to the idea often go much beyond it in concrete analysis, to a more organic treatment. A leavening approach, especially in relation to instinct versus environment, is that concerned with habit mechanisms, the social situation, and the total act. For instance, John Dewey in *Human Nature and Conduct,* has elaborated a very suggestive philosophy of social psychology based upon habit mechanisms. Instead of instinct, he uses the conception of impulse indicating a much more plastic condition. Impulses form pivots around which new habits may be built up, old habits broken down and redirected or reintegrated. But impulse, except for its emphasis upon plasticity, is also quite indefinite and unsatisfactory as a tool of analysis.

2. WISHES, DESIRES, MOTIVES, NEEDS

We next come to the concept of wishes, desires, wants, needs, etc. There is a great deal of attention given to them by numerous writers and, according to some, social psychology mainly consists of a study of one or another of them. One quite obvious reason why these clinging vines still choke the study of social psychology is the appealing character of them. They are intense, vivid heart-throb experiences, and some students are unwilling to have them generalized by counting on abstract analysis—each one must be studied and felt individually. Of course a graphic picture of a pungent desire is more impressive to one's emotions, perhaps, than $100x$ *desires* or an xy relationship. But science has found it necessary to classify and abstract common traits, and to ignore unique and non-repetitive phenomena. An apple falling

[17] L. Carmichael has touched upon this point in "Heredity and Environment: Are they Antithetical?" *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 1925, vol. xx, pp. 245-260.

on Newton's head is much more graphic than the law of gravitation. Salt on the tongue is much more tasty than a chemical analysis of NaCl. The young forlorn is quite comic compared to a discussion of social recognition or social status. Social psychology is at present mainly in the stage where the apples are falling too fast to allow time to formulate a law of gravity; or, more concretely, where desires, wishes, longings, interests—the vague subjective—are so enticing and real that the social psychologist does not want to leave this elementary stage. Of course concrete events furnish the content for the formulation of general laws. There obviously is more in desires, wishes, etc., than infantile toys of the social psychologists. There is material ready for scientific analysis, but we need more fruitful methods of attack.

Perhaps the most serious blank wall that these categories have run into is the treatment of such conceptions as metaphysical entities and "elements," and the view that they are something intangible—unobservable affairs. They have too often been looked upon as "the" cause or as "the" social forces. They have been accepted as explanations rather than as something to be explained. For instance, Thomas proposes his four wishes to explain human behavior. H. Hart proposes as fundamental the desire to function, as an explanation, called an hypothesis, of why we do certain things that we do. Bushee proposes his set of desires, Small and Ross their sets of interests, Allport his biological need, and so on through the list. It is quite easy. Here is something we do not understand. It is easy to posit a desire or wish or what not as its cause or explanation, just as the instinctivists and even the reflexologists have sometimes done. For instance, Pavlov's "reflex of freedom" or his "reflex of purpose" has the earmarks. And he, according to Sorokin, is a "pure" behaviorist.

The use of desires and the like as "the" causes is similar to the practice of a chemist who would posit certain metaphysical "forces" resident in the valences of different chemical substances. But chemists do not think, except in a mechanistic sense, of a

force making two atoms of hydrogen pounce upon a lone atom of oxygen to produce water. This of course would be more picturesque to our anthropomorphic way of seeing things, but it is not of great help to us in understanding these phenomena. Similarly, in social psychology we cease to look for *the* forces in terms of desires, or wishes. An important task is the reverse, to show how desires, wishes, etc., are the results of social interaction, as well as to see them as parts in a functional sequence, or correlation of relationships. In a later section on the subjective we shall return to a further consideration of these categories from a slightly different angle.

3. ATTITUDES

We next come to attitudes. This category has recently been sharply criticized,[18] especially by Read Bain, on the grounds of the methodological difficulties which current definitions present to one carrying on concrete research. Attitude has been used to apply to tendencies and impulses to act, inhibited impulses, drives and motor sets, feelings, wishes, desires and vegetative processes, opinions, positive and negative verbal responses, and habits, or a mixture of some of these. If the difficulties of the definitions found in the literature are not obvious immediately, an attempt to employ them as tools of research will soon convince one of their inadequacy. They do not clearly differentiate attitude from other associated or related processes. Often also, attitudes are made unduly vague by a "now-it-is-and-now-it-isn't" type of definition.

The conception of attitudes is thus in such a state that some would discard the term altogether. But a more constructive procedure is to define attitude more clearly, for it is a very useful social conception. Bain's attempt at a behavioristic definition is a step in the right direction. He defines attitude as "the relatively stable overt behavior of a person which affects his status." Since

[18] Read Bain, "An Attitude on Attitude Research," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1928, vol. xxxiii, pp. 940-957. Also see P. M. Symonds, "What is an Attitude?" *Psychological Bulletin,* March, 1927, pp. 200-201.

attitude is to be a social category and must be differentiated from habits and vegetative processes as such, the "status-fixing" element is introduced.[19] He would throw out of consideration unobservable "hypothetical" subjective states. That this emphasis upon behavior and action adds much to the methodological utility of the concept attitude may be readily conceded. This can be done without committing oneself to numerous statements used by Bain to support and elucidate his view.

Ellsworth Faris in an opposing article [20] has rightly criticized these statements by Bain, but he has put forward no valid objection to Bain's major point. It is probable also that most of the criticisms are based upon verbal differences. For example, Bain makes such indefensible denials as the following: "It is immaterial to the scientist what so-called 'subjective' motives, or wishes or desires induce people to wear shoes to banquets. . . . It may be pride in small feet, to please wives, to keep feet dry, or what not. The scientist is concerned only with the fact that they do it." [21] But such statements do an injustice to Bain's view on the subject. He would make overt synonymous with the observed. He actually would take account of all of these wishes, desires, or motives, whenever they were observable, in behavior, either by verbation or other action. It is difficult to see how so-called subjective experience can be taken account of by science or "courts" or even "lovers," unless they do become in some manner observable through speech or other action.

Faris, on the other hand, makes a case for subjective experience and for the definition of attitude as a "tendency to act." [22] His view may be summarized as follows: Actions are temporal sequences. They have beginnings in which "motives," "desires," "objectives," etc., enter; they have endings in which satisfac-

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 940.

[20] E. Faris, "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, vol. xxxiv, pp. 271-281.

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 951.

[22] *Cf.* W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki's conception in the "Introduction," and "Methodological Note" in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1927).

tion or dissatisfaction is felt; and some of them have a middle or mediating phase in which all important subjective experiences occur. Reflective action is particularly important, where takes place planning, deliberation and reasoning to meet a situation. In view of the temporal character of actions, we are interested in what men "are about to do, in what they can be induced to do." Therefore the necessity of considering attitudes "as tendencies to action," designating proclivity, or bent, or predisposition to a certain type of action. Attitude, according to Faris, cannot be limited to designate muscular set when behavior is immanent, for attitudes exist when no behavior is immanent, latent but real.[23]

Bernard, who has written a good discussion of attitudes, places more emphasis upon the beginning phase of attitude, his view being that attitudes are incomplete or potential adjustment behavior involving the set of the organism toward the situation calling for adjustment. As "adjustment proceeds, the behavior is transformed from attitudinal or preparatory into true or successful adjustment."[24] This behavior which follows is not identical with attitude, and "when the adjustment is made the attitude disappears, except in so far as it is retained in memory or in the habitual set of the organism." The attitude is strong or weak in inverse proportion to the amount of the adjustment unexecuted, and directly proportional to the strength of the drives behind the adjustment behavior. This differs from Faris' view, in that the latter puts greater emphasis upon the more constant and habitual set involved in attitude. Bain, however, holds that the attitude is also the action indicated by these partial preparatory responses and would call the total response the attitude.

Bernard and Faris are apparently agreed on the inclusion of desires and subjective experience, although Bernard is more behavioristic in his exposition. He would advocate a behavioristic explanation of these phases. But Faris also would evidently re-

[23] Also see his "The Concept of Social Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1925, vol. ix, pp. 404-409.

[24] *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 246.

gard them as some kind of action, and the difference between "behavior" and the action of organisms is perhaps arbitrary. Their different emphasis regarding the stable or transient character of attitude helps to clarify the issue. It would seem quite obvious that attitudes remain with us as Faris suggests. Bernard apparently also agrees to attitudes remaining in the habitual set of the organism. Further, the strength or force of the expression of the attitude will vary with the situation which stimulates it. Bernard and Faris have simply emphasized certain characteristics and slighted others in this connection. The issue between Bain and Faris, and between Bain and Bernard, too, is, however, quite real. Shall attitude be applied to the complete overt act of the organism, or is it to designate only the beginning sets and predispositions (including the so-called subjective) to specific behavior? A second question is raised by Bain. Is attitude to be used as a social category or a more inclusive one, as the definition of Faris and Bernard would indicate? While it is recognized that in any case most of our attitudes would be social, still the discussions of the latter do not so limit them.

These questions raise a real problem, especially a methodological one. How are we to study "tendencies to act" as peculiar to attitudes?[25] Tendencies to act, if used in a scientific sense, apply to all behavior. And, as Bain suggests, to divide preparatory behavior from the rest of behavior as distinctive of attitudes presents an inadequate basis for concrete investigation. The division seems bound to be arbitrary. Further, all habitual action is in a real sense preparation for action.

It is possible to formulate a more constructive statement. The study of attitudes is first of all primarily a study in prediction. In a sense this is true of all scientific study, but in most cases the attention is upon what does occur. In prediction, the attention

[25] Faris does not outline a technique for research based upon this definition, but suggests the possibility of a subsequent discussion on research. It remains to be seen whether or not concrete research projects can be worked out which really depend upon this conception and which could not be more effectively handled by a more clear-cut behavioristic definition. In this way we will get a chance to taste the pudding.

is upon what is likely to occur. Now in order to predict, we study not only one factor but all factors which will enable us to predict. In attitudinal study we are interested in all signs, conditions, or habits which point out the attitude. One may use opinions, speech reactions, past behavior, habitual behavior, etc.[26] Of course it is desirable to get a single measure, if possible, and, failing this, to get a single variable which will be sufficiently accurate to use as a basis for judgment and prediction. Hence it is well to discover how closely speech reactions and other criteria correspond to the other reactions of the person, and how closely these may be taken as a guide to probable future action. For we often want to know beforehand what a person's reaction will be in situations in which he never has been—situations which are absent or even hypothetical. Such information is a necessary part of our social life. The term "attitude" has in general come to designate such habits, sets, verbalizations, and experience which will influence and give a cue to the probable behavior of a person toward the object or particular situation under consideration. It is, perhaps, necessary to emphasize that since attitudes do refer to such particular objects or situations, a careful and clear definition of these, regarding which we wish to learn the attitudes, is quite necessary in attitudinal study.

Second, attitude is thus a term to designate a more or less thorough integration or complex of behavior toward an object or situation. Park and Burgess' expression, a "mobilization of the will," has this idea in it, although the expression itself in terms of will is quite loose.[27] To regard attitude, as Bernard does, as always implying lack of adjustment—unless this term is stretched to a meaningless extent—does not seem valid. Two partners, or "boon companions," for instance, who are thoroughly adjusted nevertheless have attitudes toward each other.

[26] Zimmerman correlates opinion with past experience; Gary compares "speech" with other phenomena; Chapin, in *Cultural Change* (1928), has schematically proposed a correlation of "opinions" with past history and with overt behavior.

[27] *An Introduction to the Science of Society* (1924).

It is necessary to include facilitation, summation, and supplementation as factors in attitudes. Of course, in many cases a blocking of some kind is present, and often there are opposing or conflicting elements in an attitude. Another methodological difficulty with Bernard's conception is that when behavior is most evident, most actively in progress and supposedly most open to study, the attitude disappears. It makes of attitude a sort of will-o'-the-wisp. When it really gets into operation it fades away.

Third, attitude also generally implies, as suggested by Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion,[28] some sort of reflective or, as suggested by Bernard's writing, anticipatory behavior. There is a mobilization or organization around some object, social value, or motif, in which reflective or anticipatory behavior is involved. To limit attitude only to the habitual would not allow sufficiently for "thinking" in attitude, since reflective behavior occurs when some habits are interrupted or additionally facilitated. Nor does habit allow sufficiently for situations in which the person may never have been. This does not deny the great importance of habit in attitudes, however. But it does mean that ideas, motives, desires, wishes, ideals may enter into an attitudinal integration. These, however, are to be explained in terms of behavior. When speaking of reflective behavior as a factor in attitude, it also must be remembered that an attitude may become so habitual that we are practically unaware of it.

A way of approaching an understanding of attitudes which may be helpful is to regard them as behavior integrations in association with a more or less complex sign or symbol situation. A sign or symbol stimulus or response refers to something else of which it is a substitute or representative, and the attitudinal response in this connection would be action indicative of past and probable future behavior in regard to the object or situation signified or symbolized; or, if the situation were actually present, more specifically conditioned behavior might be noted. In order that these sign and symbol stimuli be effective, there must be

[28] *The Polish Peasant.*

some previously formed habit adjustments, experience and integration in relation to them and the actual situation. If the symbols become confused, the attitude or responses also become indefinite or confused. The integration of new symbols involves more or less new attitudes toward the situation, object, act or social value. Symbol situations thus allow for some sort of reflective behavior in attitude. The sign situation, while not necessarily involving reflective behavior, involves responses in connection with potential future behavior and is quite similar to the symbol-situational response. We have numerous cases of sign situations among animals, and humans as well, which are associated with attitudinal behavior quite similar to those attitudinal integrations in humans which involve reflection. The dog gives us particularly good examples of this type of action. The sex calls and danger cries of animals are other specific examples which involve the attitudinal type of behavior.

If the sign or symbol situations were taken as indicative of attitudes, this would not necessarily limit attitude to a social category, although in general these stimuli would involve social situations. And of course these would be the ones in which the social psychologist would be interested. However, should other than social behavior fall under this attitudinal category, there would seem to be no good reason for not considering it as such. Of course, a limitation of attitude to behavior integrations around a social object, value, or motif, would make it an exclusively social category. Some would wish further to limit attitudes to the integrations concerning the major social objects or functions. This is a matter for agreement by investigators, but the present practice seems to favor a wider use of the term. In regard to such a limit as "status fixing," it is difficult to see why it should be introduced. Although attitudinal behavior often affects status, still there are quite obviously attitudes which do not appreciably affect our status except in the sense that any behavior conditions the rest of behavior. Also, status is affected by considerably more than attitudinal behavior.

By way of summary, attitudes may be regarded as behavior integrations ordinarily around social situations, social objects, or social motifs, and values. It does not follow that attitudes are elementary for sociology or social psychology, although they would be of much social importance. They have in them, in general, some reflective or anticipatory processes. They are complexes of *behavior* which in humans may include tendencies, habits, experiences, desires, motives, ideas, associated or organized around the object of the attitude. Our behavior toward an object is the attitude in expression, in action. The more fully we get into action, the more completely is attitude disclosed. The study and analysis is primarily a study in prediction, based upon the study of such action data, which includes the total acts, as we can secure for purposes of prediction. A particular characteristic of such prediction often is the fact that a person has never been in such a situation before, and we must judge of his attitude toward an hypothetical or proposed situation by actions in similar past situations and by other criteria which help show what his attitude is or is likely to be. If, the predicted response is different from our prediction of it from his attitude, then we have misjudged his attitude or it has been changed or inhibited. Park and Burgess [29] have in a suggestive manner discussed the mutations of attitudes, particularly in relation to the positive or negative approaching or withdrawing behavior which generally seems to characterize attitude.

4. TENDENCIES TO SUBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Since our discussion of attitude has brought further into the foreground the problem of "subjective" experience, we may now turn to an analysis of this question. When it comes to a final analysis, most of the social psychologists have a place in their system for a subjective category. There are several different tendencies in regard to the subjective.

(1) It is denied existence, at least as a subject of scientific

[29] *Op. cit.*, pp. 439 ff.

investigation. Since this view denies the existence of the problem, we can hardly look in this direction for much help in its solution. It will be unnecessary to discuss this view. There are few who hold this extreme position, and the tendency seems unlikely to get much headway. Experience has carried much heavier denials than this one.

(2) There are those who take a dualistic position of one kind or another. This group contains the major portion of the present-day social psychologists. The particular brand of dualism varies from interpreter to interpreter. At one extreme are those who regard the subjective as distinctly separate from and unconnected with the trans-subjective, at least from a methodological and scientific standpoint. And back of any method is a metaphysical assumption. Recognized, denied or unrecognized, it is there. This does allow for some study of the subjective, but since it is such a disconnected thing the position is nearest to that of denial. At the other extreme are those who merely regard the subjective as a special field of phenomena isolated from objective observation but nevertheless a part and parcel of our universe and subject to causal relations as is the rest of our world.

(3) There is a third tendency closely related to the last, which attempts to bring the "subjective" under the rubrics of natural science and to study it as objective phenomena, not as isolated from observation. It approaches the problem as a study of action or behavior.

Pitirim Sorokin [30] has taken up the cudgels for the extreme dualistic position. Since his exposition of this conception is so clear-cut and so neatly contains at least a part of its own refutation, his conception may well be used to illustrate the main points of this tendency. He regards the subjective—ideas, motives, emotions, desires, wishes, etc.—as the field of the psychic. This subjective is to be regarded as causally disconnected from the trans-subjective. "We may try to study a parallelism . . . but without claiming to make one series the cause or effect of the

[30] *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928).

other." [31] The subjective is to be studied by introspection, and the trans-subjective by the method of natural science. But, "The intrusion of either of the parties into the field of the other one is scientifically fruitless."

It is interesting to speculate on what sort of an entity or process this disembodied subjective is. Desires are to be studied, but not as causally related to the things desired. It is scientifically fruitless to claim a causal relation between an orange and my desire for it, my idea of an automobile and overt behavior. If I attend a banquet the social scientist is not to see any causal relation between my thoughts and this overt activity. To anyone accustomed to regard our knowledge as a result of sequential and recurrent relations between phenomena, such a position will seem a curious one, to say the least. One might be tempted to think that he had misinterpreted, if the position were not so definitely and insistently stated. But Professor Sorokin takes a deliberate position.

However, in his zeal as apologist for introspection he counters his own position, for "Even when we study some trans-subjective phenomena, for instance a writing, a book, speech-reactions, paintings, music, ceremonies, and other 'symbolical' stimuli and reactions, we must be introspectivists to understand their meaning and, to some extent, even their relationship." [32] But if there are no causal relations between these phenomena and thought, why introspect? And how can one get a meaning without some sort of connection between the things and the thoughts about them? And later he says: "What, from a behaviorist standpoint, is described as a certain change in the movement of our muscles and secretion of glands, from the inner standpoint is described as 'lust,' or 'fear,' or 'jealousy.'" This is a curious statement, if there is no connection. This seems much the same as saying that what from an objective standpoint is wood, stone, glass, paint and nails arranged in a certain way is from the inner standpoint

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 656.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 656.

called a "house." Taking such a position puts us into great difficulty because cells of a particular quality and arranged in a particular way are from an inner standpoint called "muscles," protoplasms of particular constituency and arrangements are from an inner standpoint called "cells," and so on, until all of our so-called objective and trans-subjective phenomena turn into the subjective and all of science is one grand introspective spree.

There are few social psychologists who take such an extreme position as the one just described, nor does it seem to have much to support it. As a matter of fact, most social psychologists who accept the subjective are mainly concerned in showing causal relations between thoughts, desires and wishes, etc., and more overt behavior. In fact, one of the most serious objections to the use of these categories has been the use of them as too efficient causal processes, whereas they are more properly regarded as results and as links in a causal chain rather than as "the" causes.

Another group of subjectivists regard social psychology as a subjective study. Thomas and Znaniecki define it as a study of attitudes or the subjective side of culture. Faris' position is similar—he regards introspection as an important method of study.[33] One could continue citations. The question arises, What is involved in the phenomena of social psychology which has induced so many of the leading social psychologists to adhere to this interpretation of it and to rely upon introspection as such an important method of social psychology?

It is thought that the desires, wishes, motives go on inside individuals and that they are unobservable except to the individual in whom they occur. Thus, reliance must be placed upon introspection to disclose these phenomena. At best only some outward signs of these subjective experiences can be objectively checked.

[33] Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*, "methodological note"; Faris, "The Subjective Aspect of Culture," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1925, vol. xix, pp. 37-46, and "The Nature of Human Nature," *ibid.*, 1926, vol. xx, pp. 15-29. See also C. A. Ellwood, "Objectivism in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1916-17, vol. xxii, pp. 289-305, and "Scientific Method of Studying Human Society," *Journal of Social Forces*, 1923-24, vol. ii, pp. 328-332. Each of these emphasizes the subjective category.

Since one important tenet of the scientific method is the check and agreement of different observers, they are thus out of the range of natural science—they are subjective, not objective. Behavior "ism" also has helped to force social scientists into this anomalous position. Some have advocated definitions of behavior which do not allow a consideration of such phenomena. Others by treatment or by definition give an inadequate basis for the consideration of them.[34] It should be quite clear that a denial of, or even an hypothesis which arbitrarily ignores, certain phases of experience will never be satisfactory except as a one-sided explanation of behavior.

Are such phenomena as desires, motives, and the like unobservable, not subject to check and verification by observers and hence out of the range of the method of natural science? The view that they are rests upon the epistomological assumption that we know things immediately and directly, and further that we observe directly with our senses. Observation is not a direct response of the eye or ear or hand, but is based upon the responses also of a great mass of previous habits, bodily responses, movements, etc. We observe with our whole past of psychological experience, with all of our responses, including muscles, glands, viscera and other responding mechanisms of the body. Were not this great mass of responding apparatus at hand, with its previously acquired residual and auxiliary responses, we would not see or hear or observe what we do. In this connection it is well to emphasize that always we see from some standpoint, some frame of reference or base of observation. A key, then, to how we "know" and observe lies in an analysis of the manner in which our observing or knowing responses have been built up, and how they operate. Since it will be pertinent here and will clarify an important trend in social psychology, the third trend mentioned above, toward social behavioristic study, it will be well worth a short consideration. Some writers, such as Mead, Dewey,

[34] *Cf.* Watson's recent book, *The Ways of Behaviorism.* While theoretically Watson would claim a behavioristic explanation, his treatment is not satisfactory.

Markey, Holt, Watson, Lashley and Dashiell,[35] have particularly emphasized in one way or another the objective character of such so-called subjective processes as ideas, desires, motives, and reasoning. The following explanation will place some of the essential features of the processes involved before us. The explanation, as will be seen, is a social behavioristic one; but behavior is not limited to the overt, it includes all action of social organisms.

Social psychologists are beginning to recognize some of the importance of one individual playing or taking the rôle of another person. This has been emphasized particularly by some of the previously mentioned writers; also by Cooley and Faris, and by Weiss in a somewhat different manner.[36] However, it seems clear that some of the perhaps most significant facts in this connection have not been realized by many social students. The point is, that it is in this process that meaning and knowing, or *reflective observation,* arise in human behavior. The reason for this lies in the possibility for the "meaning" of a stimulus, or an act, or an object, to appear in relation to what has followed or preceded, or what does consistently follow or precede it in sequential connection with it. Were it not for the fact that events occur in sequential and recurrent order, we would be unable to know. This proposition should be quite evident. The meaning of a pen is the processes and acts which have culminated in it, as well as the consequences, acts, etc., which follow in connection with it. The meaning of paper is similarly given, as is the meaning of acts and gestures.

[35] G. H. Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy,* 1922, vol. xix, pp. 157-163; "The Social Self," *ibid.,* 1913, vol. x, pp. 274-280; "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *Psychological Bulletin,* 1910, vol. vii, pp. 397-405; John Dewey, "Knowledge and Speech Reaction," *Journal of Philosophy,* 1922, vol. xix, pp. 561-570; *Experience and Nature* (1925); John F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process and its Integration in Children* (1928); E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish* (1915); J. F. Dashiell, "A Physiological-Behavioristic Description of Thinking," *Psychological Review,* 1925, vol. xxxii, pp. 54-73; K. S. Lashley, "The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness," *ibid.,* 1923, vol. xxx, pp. 237-272; 329-353.

[36] A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (1925). Also see his articles in the *Psychological Review* and the *Psychological Bulletin.*

Now the crucial point is how "meaning," reflective observation, or knowing, arises in behavior. It is on account of the fact that people are and have been in social interaction in which sequential actions are involved, one person responding to another and completing the other's actions. Since the human being has been able to develop interchangeable stimuli, he can by this means perform in a substitute manner the act of the other person, particularly those acts most closely associated with his own responses and which represent a completion of his own responses. The vocal act probably was the first act which was interchanged. Such substitution and interchange gives representatives of both sides of the action and potential meaning sequence, within the behavior system of the person. He is able to indicate to himself the meaning of his own act by using a stimulus which stands for the action of the other person, which action is also a completion of his own act. His own act similarly explains the other's behavior. In other words—and this is the point to which we have been leading—he is reflectively observing what is going on in his world.

A word of caution must be interpolated at this point. There is no intention to give the impression that the person clearly sees what the process is that he is going through when he thus reflectively observes his social and physical world. As a matter of fact, we have in general been quite unaware of the process whereby we are able to know.[37] It has been only in more recent years, after the study of the social sciences was well under way, that we have begun to see more clearly these social relationships involved in the development of knowledge, ideas, and reflective observation.

All observation apparently is through this framework which in its essence consists in the employment of interchangeable social stimuli, symbols, words, and gestures, in response to acts and things. We get to know what a chemical or an apple or an idea

[37] J. Piaget has done some interesting research in this connection, although he quite inadequately takes social relations into account. See his *Language and Thought of the Child* (1926).

or thinking is by exactly this same method of observation. We observe a desire, a wish, or a motive either in ourselves or in others by the same method that we use to observe a tree or a rock or a mountain. Thinking is a process that develops between people. We observe it by the same process as that by which we observe, for example, a stream in a river bed. With proper technique we can examine another person's thinking just as we can examine the contents of a river.

The fact that we may not know what a man is thinking at a certain time is not a valid objection to the proposition that we can know and observe his thinking. It would also be impossible to observe every drop of water in a river—we analyze it in samples. For instance, we never yet have analyzed and observed satisfactorily the composition of the blood as it travels in the veins. Whenever we get it under analysis it is in an unnatural state; yet we do not think of the circulation as a subjective but as an objective and observable fact, even though we have not as yet examined all of its details. We do observe thinking and ideas, and observers will agree, but this does not mean that we can observe every thought, or at any time. We must have proper conditions here, as anywhere. This is not a problem peculiar to the observation of thinking. For instance, such a simple thing as analyzing soil has many of the same difficulties as the analysis of thinking. The soils expert gets his sample. But before analysis can be carried out, temperature cannot be held constant, moisture changes occur, bacterial changes may take place, chemical compounds may change form. When it is analyzed, it is not the "same" soil which he took from the ground, but a soil which has gone through those changes which the soils analyst was unable to stop or control. The observation of physical phenomena often requires very exact and careful preparation for observation to be even partially successful. Likewise, to observe thinking we must obtain favorable conditions. If a social psychologist were to live with a person from birth, observe all of the person's experiences, etc., there hardly could be doubt that he would know

the ideas, thoughts, the process of thinking of this person like a book. He could predict the person's thought process—would know the person so well that he would be able, as it were, to read the other person's mind. In actual practice this is done right along by people well acquainted with another person. Likewise, thinking is observed under ordinary circumstances, especially by persons more skilled in observation. And competent observers do agree. The fact that *thinking, desires* and *wishes* are *social processes* which go on *between* persons and acts and objects is reiterating a proposition which particularly emphasizes its objective and observable nature. It seems never to have occurred to some social psychologists that desires, wishes and thinking are a function of the situation as a whole.

Such an analysis of the development of knowledge and reflective observation makes of it an essentially behavioristic process, notwithstanding some contrary "ism" definitions of behavior. An examination of the evidence points to the social-vocal-auditory situation as the situation in which the first "meaningful" interchange genetically takes place.[38]

But what of the fact that individuals are part of this social process called thinking, and on this account are in a position advantageously to observe in themselves such processes as desires, motives, wishes, and the like? This is quite true, but it must be emphasized again that this method of observation is exactly the same kind of observation that the individual uses in observing airplanes, thunderstorms, sunsets, or what not.

Let us take this type of self-observation and briefly see what it may contain for social psychology. We are not using the word introspection here because of its historical implication of "direct" knowing and "direct" observation. When a person has observed wishes or desires or some part of his thinking process, then, since knowledge and observation rest upon social confirmation and corroboration (and it is no mere accident that the scientific method which has grown up out of experience also requires the corrobora-

[38] This is more completely discussed in *The Symbolic Process.*

tion of different observers), the person seeks through symbolization a social medium, and through talk with persons to "see" exactly what is in his observation. This interchange is a part of his process of observation, not something *ab extra.* This social interchange, all would agree, is something that competent observers can observe. The verbal report and speech reactions can thus be accepted by all parties as "objective."

But what of the report itself? There are two means of attack. It may be regarded as responses to be analyzed in causal and functional relations with other behavior. We may attempt to discover how it checks up with other action and experience. We are still on so-called "objective" ground. Or the verbal report may be accepted at "face value," the symbols being taken as evidence that the events which they symbolize have actually occurred to the person verbalizing. The next step, then, is for other persons to repeat the condition and observe the results. For no matter how positive the self-observer is, no one accepts even the "face value" unless other self-observers obtain or have obtained a similar result. In this sense all so-called subjective observation must become objective before science or even common sense can deal with it.

What are we doing in this procedure but following the exact method which is used in so-called objective observation? If we are observing a tree, each observes the tree through his own eyes and his "social" apperceptive mass. When people are observing an event which occurs in the behavior system of each, it is also by each observing through his own responses and his "social" apperceptive mass. There is one difference. This is in the event, not in the method of observation. The tree event is theoretically one event observed by several observers, while the self-observed events are theoretically several similar events observed by several observers. But the degree of check and certainty is similarly arrived at and similarly observed in both cases. "Natural" scientists perform separate observations of separate similar events right along. But even after this procedure has either denied or

corroborated the possible face value of the event, we must make some sort of analysis of the functional and causal relations. This is the same kind of analysis that was mentioned as the first means of attack. For, after all, in order to understand the event, its functional and sequential relationships must be gone into as in all branches of knowledge.

If someone wishes to call some of the above introspection, he may do so, but it deserves a more accurate name. Also it is a type of study which is useful in social psychology. It probably is some such process of self-observation that Cooley[39] and Faris

[39] Cooley's apparent view in "Roots of Social Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1926, vol. xxxii, pp. 59-79, that there are two generically different kinds of knowledge, one material and the other social, can hardly be accepted. The position seems well refuted in Mead's article, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *op. cit.,* and Dewey's "Knowledge and Speech Reaction," *op. cit.,* and "Experience and Nature," *op. cit.,* as well as implicity by materials presented in his own *Human Nature and the Social Order.* Of course people know the difference between a human and an automobile, and there are special bodies of knowledge about them; but this does not prove that we know one by sympathetic "imagination" and the other by the "senses." Permitting for the time being the use of these terms, both of which are very vague and much misunderstood symbols, it may be said that we know both these objects by "imagination" as well as by the "senses." The fact that we may become more "emotional" in one case than in the other does not therefore mean a generically different method of knowing. The emotional factor is only a matter of degree. Or to use sympathetic imagination in Cooley's sense of putting one's self in the place of another, leaves no more secure foundation for such a fundamental separation. For we get to know *people* through the senses (rather, all our responses, including those of the sense organs) and socially interchangeable stimuli, and we get to know *things* through the senses, responses, and socially interchangeable stimuli. In other words, we come to know things and the differences between people and things in the same manner that we come to know people and the differences between people. Cooley's division probably traces back to his apparently too sharp separation of the human from the rest of the animal world. And surely to claim that we know objects by "senses" savors of the introspectionist's fallacy of "direct" knowing which we already have discussed. To dichotomize knowing into knowing by "senses" and by "imagination" seems an even more unjustified division. For apparently we know through our whole responding mechanism—visceral, muscular, etc.—including responses of the so-called "sense" organs *and* our interconnections with other persons. So-called imaginative responses are an aspect of this integration. Nor is such a generic division necessary in order to emphasize the efficacy of just as abstract and imaginative thinking as possible.

Cooley is so cogent a thinker that on this account his unsound thinking is

have in mind. But this type of observation must be clearly differentiated from the traditional introspection which assumed "direct" knowledge and direct observation, as if we observed except through the previously acquired basis and framework. I am speaking of something more fundamental than the "training" of the introspectionist. This traditional assumption has led psychologists to believe that they could discover psychological processes by "directly" looking inward, rather than by indirect examination and by attention to the causal, sequential and mechanical relationships involved. Of course we do not wish to discourage persons from trying to discover new or direct methods of knowing, for they would be a boon if discovered; but for the present we must put reliance upon the method described above.

Assuming that we consider this type of self-observation legitimate, the manner in which it may serve scientific investigation becomes an important consideration. While the method of observation may be the same, the event lies so close to personal interests, emotions, and sentiments that we have found it necessary to apply careful methods of checking and to be especially on guard against these biases. The assumption of "direct" observation leads us at once unguarded into these snares. W. F. Ogburn has pointed out the tendencies to rationalize, compensate, and build defense mechanisms in the field of social study.[40] The way in which such self-observational study may have a modicum of value, as was pointed out, is to place the emphasis upon a functional and causal study of the factors sequentially associated with these phenomena, and upon check by other observers. It

sugar-coated, but should perhaps for this reason be more carefully analyzed. A poor thinker points out his own weaknesses. Cooley has spent time polishing diamonds, but he has polished some glass as well. His "Roots of Social Knowledge" seems to a large degree a matter of glass-polishing, for he could very well have made the point that there is a difference between regarding people as human and regarding other animals, things, and sometimes people as non-human, just as one can regard a pea as food and as a bio-chemical compound, without assuming two different methods of knowing.

[40] "Bias, Psychoanalysis and the Subjective in Relation to the Social Sciences," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1923, vol. xvii, pp. 62-74.

seems that at best such self-observational study must necessarily play a subsidiary and quite tentative rôle. For it must be said that there is much more to the process of knowing these phenomena than this method alone reveals. After all, the way we come to know what desires, motives, wishes, and such phenomena, are —their strength, characteristics, and relations—is by observing people in action, by being in action ourselves and by developing observing responses in experience with others.

Of course, some of this is self-observation. But many social psychologists have only half realized the proposition so cogently expounded by Cooley, that we see even ourselves in the actions of those around us, those responding to us. We literally see through other eyes. It is in these social relationships and people's social behavior that we learn to know what desires, motives, etc., are. It is quite naïve to assume that one is going to understand them simply by "introspecting." A social psychology written by this kind of "self-observation" would be a curious production. But if one may judge by their product, some sociologists and psychologists, as well as social psychologists, have used this method with little check quite extensively. To be sure, one must think, but verbal and symbolic activity is not to be confused with self-observation in its ordinary meaning. Some one may object that if a person were unable to feel and have emotions, he would be unable to understand other people. This is quite true, but neither would he "know" anything else. The statement holds with full force for our physical world as well as for social events.

What are our conclusions regarding subjective tendencies? The so-called subjective is observable by competent observers. It is to be studied as any other natural science is to be studied. Desires, motives, wishes are capable of the same kind of objective treatment. We get to know and observe feelings, desires, etc., literally in the actions of other people. The so-called subjective is rather non-subjective, a social process between people, and is understood only in these relations. One will apparently come to

know social psychology not by looking within, although this may help, but by looking without at the behavior of others and the behavior of oneself in relation to others. Desires, motives, wishes, and ideas are not processes merely inferred into persons' behavior, but objective realities. There is no objective to the word "subjective" when properly used, but in this connection it is misleading and erroneous on account of the implication of things unobservable and not amenable to objective check.

As social psychologists come to realize the objective, observable and behavioristic nature of these phenomena, then this study may hope to become more of a science of objection material and less like a literature where one man's opinion is as good as another's, with the lack of agreement that always prevails when information comes unchecked from the student's "subjective" experience. The above point of view is in direct contradiction to the tendency previously mentioned which arbitrarily separates trans-subjective behavior in a disconnected fashion from desires, wishes, ideas, etc. It is a method of studying experience as a whole and not as a disjointed universe.

5. THE FALLACY OF THE "GROUP FALLACY"

We have been tracing trends away from individualistic and subjective to social and behavioristic interpretations of the responses of persons and personalities. There is, however, another phase running counter to this general trend which requires consideration. It is a direct broadside against the group and other conceptions of the sociologists which are taken by them as units of analysis. This view would have the individual gobble up the group, the institution, and other collective forms of response. All we have, according to it, is an aggregate of individuals—but they are a remarkably stuffed and over-fat collection. However, in this shape they are taken to show that the group is a fallacy. It is only the individuals that are the units of scientific investigation.

There are not many who hold such an extreme view; but

there are considerably more who may verbally agree that a group is something more than the sum of the individuals but who, nevertheless, ignore this fact in their writings and discussions. So, while losing weight, the conception still has considerable influence. Floyd H. Allport, at a recent meeting of the American Sociological Society, has maintained that the conceptions of "group" and "institution" are incompatible with a natural science approach to social phenomena, if we take them as denoting objects to be studied.[41]

Those who have found the preceding sections convincing will need no further discussion of the points developed there in order to realize that the group unity is a fact and that the group exists as an object of study by the natural scientific method. However, it may be useful to summarize some of the main points indicative of the validity of the group as a unit of study. No special attempt is made to go into detail in taking up the points against the group concept proposed by specific papers, such as Allport's, since it is assumed that these objections will be taken care of in a straightforward discussion of the positive aspects of the conception.

(1) The group is a reality. Wilson D. Wallis in a short paper has set forth this position clearly and convincingly.[42] But even Allport does not deny that the group is real,[43] so this point need not detain us.

(2) Groups are integrations of social interaction. The unity of the group must be looked for in interconnected and interdependent systems of social action. At no place in his paper does Allport, for example, define what he means by the group or the group concept. It is quite evident that he does not understand by the term what most sociologists understand by it. How-

[41] "'Group' and 'Institution' as Concepts in a Natural Science of Social Phenomena," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1928, vol. xxii, pp. 83-99; also "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1924, vol, xxix, pp. 688-706.

[42] "The Independence of Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1925, vol. xx, pp. 147-150.

[43] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

ever, those sociologists who describe sociology as a study of the group and of culture are also prone, almost unwittingly on account of this division, to think of the group as a collection of biological organisms rather than to think of groups as existing in the interactions and inter-relations which go to make up culture. Such a division represents a most crude conception of the group. It is not the biological organisms as such, but their interconnected action which makes a group in the sociological sense of the term. Culture is a function of the group's existence, and culture exists at least in an elementary form in all groups. How much or what part of this culture is passed on is another problem. On the other hand, culture does not exist outside of a group formulation. A full study of group behavior must include the study of culture. If some arbitrarily limit the term cultural to the "man made" or the human social heritage, this would not alter the above statement.

(3) The group or institution represents a distinct level of objects in our universe. The action composing the group does not exist outside the group, it does not exist in the individuals as such, but only in individuals *as part of a group.* Conversely, the individual gets his existence as a person *only* as a member of a group. It should not take a great deal of study to disclose the fact that if groups were destroyed the individuals would perish also; I mean much more than physical destruction—I refer to the "person," the self, personality, and all other *human* characteristics in human groups, and the corresponding relations in other animal groups. Perhaps Allport's most serious error is transferring group phenomena into isolated individuals. The individuals of whom he writes are fictitious outside of a group formulation. (His position is similar to one which maintains that water exists in separate H and O atoms.)

(4) We respond explicitly to the group. To show this we could give illustration after illustration. A child responds to his play group. He will respond to his family group. He responds differently to a person when alone than when in a group.

A person will respond to his social group by the customary and conventional acts. To say that all he is responding to is individuals is to miss the essential nature of the stimulus.

(5) We observe a group explicitly and implicitly just as all scientists observe all phenomena. None observe totally explicitly or implicitly, but by an admixture of the two.

(6) Laws and formulations of group behavior are to be found in such studies as those of Sumner, Cooley, Thomas, Park, Burgess, Ross, Ellwood, Ogburn, and others. These are formulations which are characteristic of group phenomena and which do not characterize individuals as such.

(7) The study of the group as a natural object requires its own frame of reference which is different from that ordinarily employed by the social psychologist and still further removed from that of the psychologist. It is not surprising that psychologists, when looking for the group with an inadequate frame of reference or basis of observation, should fail to find a very satisfactory formulation of the group and group phenomena. Allport, for instance, in his discussion employs the psychologists' frame of reference, which is a basis for the observation of the individual as an individual unit and not one for the observation of the group. It is something like looking for an elephant with a microscope.

IV. Some Influence from Related Fields

In the previous sections there have been discussed some significant aspects of the current emphasis upon the social interdependence of the responses of individuals. In addition to important sociological and anthropological influences, the trend toward a more objective and natural scientific method of analysis[44] in social psychology has been influenced markedly by developments in various closely allied studies, some of which, if not in name,

[44] Natural science as opposed to some other sort of science seems an unwarranted distinction to me. However, common usage has emphasized this term as indicative of objective scientific procedure, and it is so used here. Mechanistic is used to indicate functional or dependent relations.

are in fact, studies in social psychology. Some of these developments will be pointed out.

We already have pointed out one of the most serious weaknesses of behaviorism, its inadequate treatment of reflective behavior and the social relations connected with it. However, behaviorism [45] and the behavioristic method have had a remarkable influence upon social psychology and the social sciences. If this approach can be shorn of its "ism" or clique characteristics and adopted as a method of study, it may continue to be of immense value. Particularly will it be valuable to state desires, wishes, motives, and the so-called subjective, in terms of behavior. The trend in this direction seems due for a large expansion. Watson's position in his *Ways of Behaviorism* is in many respects the same as that of scientific social psychology. The study of the social behavior of individuals and of personality is giving increasing attention to the behavioristic approach.

Associated with this approach, a conception which has proved most useful is that of the conditioned reflex and conditioned response contributed by the Russian school of objective and behavioristic psychology, by Pavlov [46] in particular. This already has had a remarkable influence upon American behaviorists, psychologists, social psychologists and sociologists. It has proved its worth. We undoubtedly will make much more use of it in the future. It has furnished further mechanistic basis for learning and for psychological processes.

There has, however, been a tendency to take conditioned response in too absolute and complete a manner. While we know that conditioning goes on, it is still our problem to discover how it takes place, particularly in the more complex type of learning. We also must be cautious about the too complete acceptance of conditioned response as an explanation of learning. Configura-

[45] J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1928); Weiss, *op. cit.*, and various articles by K. Lashley, and I. P. Pavlov, *Lectures on Conditional Reflexes* (1928).

[46] See Pavlov, *op. cit.; Hulsey Cason,* "General Aspects of Conditional Response," *Psychological Review,* 1925, vol. xxxii, pp. 298-316; and W. H. Burnham *The Normal Mind* (1924), for material on conditioned response.

tionists, integrationists, and other workers have given us warning here. Also, conditioning has too often carried the implication of only a mechanical substitution when conditioning occurs. In behavior and in the process of conditioning we must allow for integration of a more complex nature. But even quite complex and "meaningful" behavior must be regarded as taking place within dynamic constellations of conditioned reflex and response mechanisms.

The Gestalt theorists [47] up to the present have had much less influence upon social psychology. They are insisting upon a consideration of the total action, the relation of the stimulus to its background and to the form or configuration of the response. In general, the sociologist has been insisting for some time upon a consideration of the total situation and the relation of the configurational arrangement—for instance, Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of social attitudes, social values and the social situation. In other words, it seems that social psychologists have previously cashed in on much that Gestalt might have contributed.[48] However, the Gestalt popularity should give new strength and impetus to this type of study.

The Gestalt theorists have brought pertinent criticisms against some of the behaviorists. They claim that it is not valid to think of a person's habits and integrations as necessarily being built up by "piecing" together previously-formed sections of behavior. Their thesis is that new configurations occur which are not found in isolated parts. It seems necessary to modify our conception in this respect in order to allow for integrations which are more than a mere summation of parts of previous behavior but which

[47] See H. Helson, "The Psychology of Gestalt," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1925, vol. xxxvi, pp. 342-370, 494-526; 1926, vol. xxxvii, pp. 25-62, 189-223; K. Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind* (1924); W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes* (1925), and other writings by the last two for material on Gestalt psychology. A new book on Gestalt by Köhler has been announced.

[48] Thomas' recent paper, "The Behavior Pattern and the Situation," *Publications American Sociological Society*, 1928, vol. xxii, pp. 1-13, emphasizes again the situational approach, as does F. Znaniecki's more recent book, *The Laws of Social Psychology* (1925).

are "new" integrations. The work of neurologists also tends to support the idea that everything is not given at birth. Of course the potentialities exist at that time. Further, it is made clearer that a stimulus is not to be taken as existing in isolation but must be determined by experimentation and in association with related conditions.

In the work of physiological psychologists, neurologists, and gland physiologists,[49] we find very important support for a mechanistic conception of human behavior. Such work as that of Loeb, Jennings, Verworn, and others have shown the importance of trophisms, chemical reactions, and irritability traits. Herrick, Child, Sherrington, and Pavlov have developed the mechanistic aspects of highly integrated behavior in a very suggestive manner. Lashley, Watson, Thorndike, and other experimental psychologists have given particular attention to the learning processes. The work of Cannon, Kempf, Crile, and others has served to bring to the foreground the importance of glands and visceral functions in human behavior. Social psychology has benefited tremendously from the work of those not even primarily interested in social behavior.

The advances in this knowledge of the working of the nervous system, its irritability traits, the place of chemical reactions in behavior, the influence of the glands and viscera, all have gone to show us the irrational man, one who acts not from reason and logic but from reflexes, glandular activity, etc. The system of psychology which bounced this irrational character into the forefront of discussion was that resulting from the work of Freud and his followers, along with the work of other psycho-analysts,

[49] See especially Jacques Loeb, *Mechanistic Conception of Life,* or his *Organism as a Whole;* H. S. Jennings on the behavior of lower organisms; C. J. Herrick, *The Brains of Rats and Men* (1926); C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundation of Behavior* (1924); M. Verworn, *Irritability* (1913); C. S. Sherrington, "Some Aspects of Animal Mechanism," *Science* n. s., 1922, vol. lvi, pp. 345-541; *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System* (1906); W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (1920); E. J. Kempf, *The Autonomic Functions and the Personality* (1918). Also see Lashley's writings in various periodicals.

psychiatrists, alienists, and abnormal psychologists.[50] These studies are highly social psychological. Instead of the "rational man," or the "economic man," who reasons out what is best for everybody and then acts accordingly, we find persons acting from reasons often unknown or unrecognized and giving themselves and others clever "rationalizations" of why they did this or that. Of course this does not mean that man never acts rationally.

One of the healthiest influences upon social psychology has been the study of abnormal psychology. Here we discover that the traits which appear in exaggerated form in the abnormal are of the same kind that appear in normal beings. We find that all people are somewhat crazy or abnormal. While abnormality often is caused by organic disorders, it also is often the result of a social maladjustment. This study emphasizes, too, that there always are deterministic reasons for a person's behavior being what it is. However, in this connection the psycho-analysts have put themselves under heavy liability for their auto-egoistic and individualistic interpretations of social phenomena, and also for their great emphasis upon such mysterious entities as the libido. Nevertheless, although psycho-analysis must be classed as highly subjective in some respects, it has contributed to a greater functional and causal insight into behavior. Even the instinctivist school, to which many psycho-analysts would belong, reinforces in certain ways a mechanistic and functional conception of human behavior. Social psychology seems to be due for much growth in connection with abnormal psychology and psychiatry.

The whole effect of mechanistic and objective tendencies is to give us a causal and functional conception of human behavior, to see in it the working out of functional sequences and dependent relationships and not of caprice, chance and accident. It leads the social scientist to a personal attitude not of blaming or calling

[50] For example, such works as those of Freud, Jung, Adler, Frink. See also E. E. Southard and M. C. Jarrett, *The Kingdom of Evils* (1922); R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology* (1918); and W. F. Ogburn, "The Contributions of Psychiatry to Social Psychology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* 1927, vol. xxi, pp. 82-91.

things "good" or "bad," but of understanding and discovering the causes and reasons for human behavior, rational and irrational.

Two other important influences upon social psychology should be indicated. One is that of child study, and the other is that of psychological tests. Child study is so intimately tied up with psychology and social psychology that we already have indicated many influences which can be traced to this source. Space is too limited to give it the additional special treatment that it deserves.[51] Only some points regarding psychological tests will be mentioned.

In order to determine behavior, actual and potential, a large number of such tests have been devised. These tests are all special tests, although some do attempt general testing by covering various types of skill. Some are accepted purely as special performance tests, but a large number are used to generalize upon skill or ability not tested directly; especially is this true in regard to heredity. The so-called intelligence tests often are considered as testing innate intelligence. In so far as the tests are used for the purpose of testing innate intelligence, their results would not be primarily social but psychological. But in so far as they measure the acquirement of skills and influences which are a function of social interaction, their results would be primarily social psychological.

Now it has never been proved that these tests do test innate intelligence, since they measure at least two variables—one, hereditary mechanisms, and two, acquired mechanisms. No test so far has been devised which will test with one of these variables held constant, although it is often assumed that environmental factors are constant. The persons making such assumptions often have made only a most casual and general study of the environment and are not specialists in the influence of environment, as one would naturally expect of them before they made such an

[51] Such names as Preyer, Hall, Stern, Blanton, Shinn, Nice, Binet, Baldwin, Piaget, Gesell, Koffka, Goodenough, Anderson, Marston, Wooley, Blanchard, Sayles, *et al.*, indicate something of the length of time and present prominence of child study.

assumption. On the contrary, we find that, as a rule, the more familiar one becomes with the environmental influence, the more critical he becomes of making the assumption of a common environment even in its quite elementary aspects. The influences in early childhood which numerous writers and investigators have emphasized as being very potent in determining later tendencies often are lost sight of. Watson, in his investigations concerning child behavior, has placed particular importance upon the determination of character by early habits and influences. Not only do we have persons ignoring these environmental factors, but we find them correlating intelligence tests with such powerful advantages and disadvantages as are given by economic status; and because they naturally find a correlation, they assume it to be due to heredity even after thus stacking or "fixing" their variables. The comparison is quite legitimate, but the conclusions cannot be decisive for heredity. Such a conclusion goes beyond the data. What the correlation gives is that the higher score goes with the higher economic advantage, and *vice versa,* and not necessarily that the higher score goes with higher heredity. This is yet to be determined. Even giving subsequent tests to the same person does not hold heredity strictly constant, although it does eliminate some variable factors. In this connection, Frank Freeman has reported some very interesting studies on foster children, showing the increase in intelligence scores when children were placed in a more favorable home environment.[52]

Besides hereditary influences, there are also organic influences which are measured by these tests, in addition to social influences and social training. However, when intelligently and critically used, these tests furnish us with some very valuable information concerning group and social influences, concerning types of personalities and responses to particular social stimuli and situations.

We will turn now to a consideration of the specific field of phenomena with which social psychology is concerned.

[52] Discussions on both sides of this question are to be found in the *Twenty-Sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.* See F. N. Freeman *Mental Tests* (1926), and Terman's works.

V. A Scientific Basis for Social Psychology

There has been some dispute as to whether social psychology properly belongs with sociology or psychology. The psychologists often have regarded the sociologist as too unfamiliar with psychological information and technique, which they have regarded as essential to an understanding of social psychology. If we look at the contribution of psychologists to our knowledge of the results of social influences upon the individual, their claim as represented by this is a very impressive one. The contributions in personality study, the study of the "self," abnormal behavior, and of other social responses are truly imposing. Such names as James, Angell, Dewey, Watson, Calkins, Wundt, Münsterburg, Woodworth, etc., those of the mental testers, psychiatrists, Freudians, abnormal psychologists, and child psychologists call to mind some of their contributions. Some psychologists go even further and state that the psychologists could study the responses of one after another of the individuals of a group; therefore sociology itself is only an extended study of individual psychology. In any case, they would say the study of social psychology is merely the study of the individual under social influences.

Sociologists, on the other hand, charge the psychologist with not being sufficiently familiar with social influences, group behavior and social situations; further, that the habitual bent of the psychologist is toward uncovering individual uniformities rather than the effect of social influences, and that this attitude is often inimical to a rounded study of the social behavior of individuals. Some sociologists [53] state that all the individual psychologists can give us is the *form* of the response of individuals to social situations; that it remains for the social psychologist to study the particular responses (attitudes) in relation to social situations (values). Their point is that psychology attempts to formulate laws which are valid for all individuals everywhere, whereas social psychology studies the responses of individuals as

[53] *E.g.,* Thomas and Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant.*

controlled by social situations, and generalizations for these would not be valid for all individuals but only for those having certain relations to these social situations. Other sociologists go further and claim complete independence from psychology. For instance, Wallis [54] recently put forward what has been regarded by some as a convincing statement of the view. His main contention is that it is legitimate to select any part of reality as a unit of study; he holds also that "individual psychology is not a guide to the behavior of the group" and particularly not a guide to cultural traits.

While different fields of scientific knowledge seem to be moving closer together, still for methodological purposes a division of labor seems essential. Perhaps the most satisfactory differentiation between sciences is to be found in the frames of reference through which they view phenomena. Without a consistent frame of reference, uniformities are not accurately observed and laws generalized. At best, one gets only a running descriptive account. Since all three—psychology, social psychology, and sociology—aim to be nomological sciences, an examination of their respective frames of reference may be helpful.

One frame of reference takes the individual organism as its unit and studies its behavior. This is the generally accepted frame of reference of psychology. The neurologist studies the behavior of nerves as such, but this is a still different frame of generalization. Psychology takes the total nervous system and endeavors to study its behavior as an organic unit. It is interested in establishing universally valid laws of the behavior of organisms in general, and for particular species—the human, the rat, etc. This might adequately be called physiological psychology.

Another frame of reference is to take as a unit of analysis the response of the individual as a functional part of a social situation. Here the attempt is no longer to generalize for all persons, but to generalize for certain relationships between responses and situations. Psychology can tell us that all humans

[54] Paper on "Independence of Social Psychology," *op. cit.*

vocalize, but social psychology tells us that in a certain situation one will vocalize Chinese; in another, Spanish; in another, German; in another, "baby talk"; in another, a combination. Individual psychology as such could only generalize regarding the *form* of the behavior; social psychology gives the more specific functional relationship and content.

Thomas and Znaniecki, as previously mentioned, have discussed some phases of these two viewpoints. Weiss makes a division into the bio-physical response and the bio-social response. The bio-physical response determines the typical behavior of the individual as an organism. Weiss emphasizes that the bio-social response, however, is to be understood only in its social setting.[55] Kimball Young points out that social psychology studies the content of social responses.

It is quite evident that the psychologist who is used to taking the individual as a unit is likely to have some difficulty in becoming a social psychologist. Often he never makes a shift in his frame of reference. Allport, as we have noticed, looking through these spectacles, never has been able adequately to grasp the fact that there is a group or an institution. It is doubtful whether many social psychologists have clearly thought out their basis of generalization and the fact that a change in frame of reference is required. Watson has changed his emphasis so that he sees no difference between psychology, social psychology, and sociology. This lands him rather close to the social psychologist's position, although I have nowhere seen him recognize this clearly.

There is another difficulty into which the psychologist gets. Since he generalizes for the individual, he tends continually to attribute to the individual organism, hereditary and other influences which the social psychologist finds to be due to the social situation. This is quite natural, since some phenomena, when abstracted from social life, are inexplicable. The psychologist

[55] See also G. H. Mead, "Social Psychology as a Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin,* 1909, vol. vi, pp. 401-408.

does the easy thing and calls these the result of heredity. For example, some even see morality or criminality as inherited traits.

The sociologist, on the other hand, takes the group as an integration, not of mere organisms, as some psychologists seem to think, but as an integration of parts of behavior into groups or complex social action. The group, as we have said, is a phenomenon which exists in the behavior of individuals in mutual interrelation, but not in individuals separate from this interrelation, *i.e.,* we can never cut the group up into pieces and still have left the group. Sociology generalizes the laws of the processes of collective or group behavior, the formation, change and interaction of social groups and group acts. It studies these processes in both time and space. This includes the study of culture.[56]

If these three frames of reference be accepted as those of the three disciplines under discussion, Wallis' plea for the independence of social psychology turns out to be one for the independence of sociology. Here it has much more validity than it would for social psychology, accepting as the latter's basis of reference the responses of individuals to social situations. Since in this case individuals do the responding, a knowledge of psychology appears essential to an adequate understanding of these processes. Of course one might study some limited aspect with slight psychological knowledge, but one has a limited knowledge when finished. While this may be legitimate, for the social psychologist to get an adequate picture it is necessary to draw upon psychology and even neurology and physiology. In fact, psychology might be regarded as divided into physiological psychology and social psychology. Balz[57] goes further and calls all psychology, social psychology. He thus has ignored the frames of reference involved so that his position is not strictly

[56] Of course it is possible in some cases to study the individual response as typical of the group response, but one must be very careful if he attempts such an analysis. He is likely to make the group a glorified individual or turn the individual into a super-organism. Quite obviously one can study the group response as such and this is the safer method.

[57] A. G. Balz *Basis of Social Theory* (1924).

valid, although he does well to emphasize the dominant influence of social life. To go to the other extreme with K. Young, and call group study the main field of social psychology, does not agree with sound methodology or prevalent practice.

Does it seem likely that social psychology will become a division of general psychology as it might logically? There are at least two difficulties in the way. First, a knowledge of sociology is just as essential as is a knowledge of psychology; and an approach from the group viewpoint has considerable advantage. Second, the psychologists have in general shown a lack of understanding of sociology. In order to become first-rate social psychologists, they must be well oriented in sociology. On the other hand, sociologists who are social psychologists have demonstrated a greater mastery of psychology. For example, some of the best-informed social psychologists in the country, such as L. L. Bernard, Ellsworth Faris, and Kimball Young, are sociologists.

A further question may be raised at this point. Is social psychology limited to a study of the human animal? Theoretically, there seems to be no valid reason for so limiting it.[58] Such students as Allport, Ellwood, Gault, and Giddings would extend it to the wider study. Comparative study of animals is a profitable enterprise, as the work of Köhler, Wheeler, Alverdes, McGee, Kropotkin, Espinas, and others well demonstrates. But since the field is so broad and since the human aspects appeal to our anthropocentric interests, it is probable that human social psychology will continue to obtain the lion's share of attention. However, comparative study is bound to receive more consideration.

If the preceding discussion is convincing, social psychology may take its place as a natural science. In the discussion on subjectivity, introspection, and the fallacy of the group fallacy, we have set forth propositions showing it to meet the tests of a natural science. Its phenomena are observable and objective, in

[58] *Cf.* Markey, "A Redefinition of Social Phenomena, Giving a Basis for Comparative Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1926, vol. xxxi, pp. 733-743.

common with all sciences. It is true that we still lack a technique as well developed as some of the other sciences have acquired. We still have persons who are naïve enough to believe they can write social psychology by random observation, anecdotes, and a little logic—a thing that one cannot do in physics, for instance. Nevertheless, sufficient pseudo-science is written in the "natural" sciences to remind one of glass houses, and there is a sufficiently large body of careful work in social psychology to make us hopeful for the future.

It will be possible for social psychology to make some salvage from instinctive traits, desires, wishes, attitudes, and even the "sacred subjective," along the lines that have already been indicated. The task is that of observing the functional, sequential, and mechanistic relationship of these phenomena, rather than taking them as something upon which to rely as explanations. This I think will lead to a study of what Mead has called the complex social act. The social act depends for its existence upon individuals in interaction. The task of the social psychologist is to study the responses in these complex social acts. Znaniecki's proposition that the social act may represent a relatively closed system, therefore a more satisfactory process in which to formulate social psychological laws, is well worth careful consideration. One may accept this conception, however, without agreeing with his extraordinarily rationalistic definition and analysis of social acts themselves. This goes so far in his treatment that he at times seems to deny that social acts may be regarded as closed systems. While some behavior may be of the intellectualistic and rationalistic type which he assumes, social psychology would be quite incomplete and inadequate if it did not include much more than this, for social acts are certainly not so limited. With human beings, such study quite clearly will concern itself with such complexes of social responses as the "self," "selves," "persons," "personalities," [59] as well as with the study of "desire" and

[59] The study of personality bids fair to become a quite specialized study. See K. Young, "Personality Studies," under "Topical Summaries of Current Litera-

"wish" complexes, social habit mechanisms, and symbols. All of these are at present receiving a great deal of attention.

The study of responses as parts of complex social acts is a methodological principle of immense importance, once its significance is clearly grasped. The social person may be regarded as beginning, mediating, or ending social acts. Few acts of a person are complete in themselves. Some acts may set in motion a train of consequences running over the world. We are constantly beginning actions which we expect to be completed in this way or that. A thorough student of the situation calculates quite accurately on the result. The less careful student is more often disappointed. The practical organizer or the politician is often a keen judge of social responses to him and to other social influences. Of course, in speaking of actions which are calculated or planned, it must be emphasized that much of our behavior is uncalculated, irrational, emotional, poorly verbalized or unverbalized, traditional, conventional, and habitual.

When we think of the persons' acts as part of a larger group-act, some very interesting problems for investigation are suggested. How do these uncompleted acts fit into different groupings? What is the effect, in transplanting them, upon habit organization or disorganization? A whole series of other questions pertinent for social control and social organization readily come to mind. In this connection, there is a large field, almost untouched, concerning the making and changing of habits by social means. Our habit clinics should be of greater use in this respect. Also there is the field of child training and the social control of the child. With the rapidly growing number of institutes, something more may be expected along this line.

In regard to changing habits, putting special attention upon the "means whereby" the "end" may be obtained seems a very suggestive attack. Since the "end" stimulus may tend to produce the customary action, it often is quite difficult to achieve another

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ture," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1927; vol. xxxii, pp. 953-971. Also see Allport's *Social Psychology,* and his other work dealing with personality.

type of action in the situation; whereas attention upon "means" or intermediate steps can bring one out at a different "end" without so much difficulty. F. M. Alexander, in *Man's Supreme Inheritance,*[60] has given some suggestive material along this line. But a social psychological analysis is needed to show the relation of social influences to the achievement of the "means whereby."

Also, since symbolic mechanisms make possible an intelligent and planned control of people and situations, it is of great importance to get as much insight into their operation as possible. A stimulating question to ask, as Todd does,[61] is how far we may be carried by this means. It is evident that symbolic mechanisms built up in the process of natural evolution will become of much greater significance in social organization and social life generally. A study of responses to sign and symbol situations will repay greater consideration.[62] In this connection there are rich findings in store for the investigator of the rôle of ideals, ambitions, fixed ideas, stereotypes, and such integrations. Of particular interest are the materials of psychiatry dealing with compulsions, fears, complexes, symbolization, and similar phenomena. The genetic aspects deserve especial consideration in this connection.

The great advantage of approaching the study of social psychology from the group angle has been mentioned several times. This opens up immediately a wide field of special social psychologies, as, for instance, political psychology or the social psychology of institutions, established groups and classes. This phase of study has been poorly developed in America.[63] It will

[60] New York: Dutton, 1918.

[61] A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (1918).

[62] *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards (1923), a significant effort to free men from the tyranny of words, gives a suggestive statement concerning signs and symbols, without, however, much emphasis upon the social factors involved. In *The Symbolic Process* I have stressed these.

[63] This type of study is suggested by such writings as: T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1922); J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology* (1925); Nels Anderson, *The Hobo* (1923); C. H. Parker, *The Casual Laborer* (1920); J. R. Kantor, "An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1922, vol. xxvii, pp. 611-679. Bernard and Young have already been mentioned in this connection. Although there exist materials and research, little has been done in a thorough

also be clear from previous analysis that such special studies, to be fundamentally sound, will regard individual social responses as functions of the social situation. In this connection, the social situations involved in the basic economic classes and groups are of particularly deterministic and wide importance. A study of responses in class "consciousness," race "consciousness," occupational reactions, occupational types, labor psychology, capitalistic psychology, radical and conservative reactions, and conditions which give rise to these, the effect of mechanization upon social responses, etc., will yield very valuable scientific information on social behavior. The responses of persons in other social processes and forms of interaction, such as coöperation, conflict, and competition, need much more detailed analysis. In regard to the group orientation, we may well give greater attention to the normal or usual behavior and to conditioning that occurs under these more ordinary influences and group situations. It is as necessary to uncover the regular responses as it is the abnormal or unusual. Such study is of especial importance in the infant period.

In addition to the above, there is also the comparison of responses between individuals, giving us distributions and statistical curves of various sorts—the many psychological tests, for example—or, for instance, such work as Thurstone's attempt at measuring attitudes.[64] It seems to me that frequency scatter

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and systematic way in these phases by our social psychologists. For instance, Dunlap, who attempts a social psychology of institutions, has performed only a partial analysis. His is primarily an individual explanation. He locates desires in individuals. These play a rôle similar to that of "instinct." With them as a basis, he goes on to explain institutional behavior. Social psychologists, however, will pay increasing attention to institutions as group rather than as individual products and will regard the science's major task as that of analyzing responses of the individual as a function of such groupal or institutional situations. Of course it is important to show whatever influence the individual as a biological organism may have upon institutions, but the manner in which instincts and desires are surreptitiously smuggled into individuals, then disclosed upon occasion to explain this or that institution, is quite remarkable.

[64] "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, **vol. xxxiii**, pp. 529-554.

diagrams allowing for at least two dimensional scales, or variables, are more hopeful for an analytical study of attitude than a one-scale chart, for attitudes often have opposing or conflicting elements in them. Even several frequency charts and multiple correlations should be helpful to allow for numerous attitudinal components. Special attention should be paid to the possibility of curvilinear regression. Besides this, there are other interesting beginnings in the study of typical responses and social distance.

VI. The Outlook for Social Psychology

It seems, in general, that sciences have grown out of the problems of social life. This is also true of social psychology, which has developed out of the ever-insistent problem of understanding and controlling the behavior of persons in a world growing constantly more complex and difficult to manage. How will social psychology continue to develop under these conditions?

That the central tendency of social psychology in its more practical and applied aspects is around the problem of social control is readily seen in the many uses to which its principles are put. The applications of social psychology of course ramify throughout all social life, but one may mention a few phases which seem more closely related to this study as a discipline. Modern advertising methods have made an especially wide use of the psychology of suggestion. Salesmen, particularly of the high-pressure type, have employed its principles extensively. Industry, in dealing with workers, labor unions, customers and "the public," has made considerable use of it. Its utilization by community fund drives, by religious organizations, by civic associations in agitation for legislation, by coöperative associations, unions, and clubs, is also familiar. Under modern governmental operation the principles of social psychology have been of great political interest. Examples may be drawn from such activities as the manipulation of people by popular demagogues, and immense drive campaigns, as illustrated in the mobilization of the

martial spirit at the entrance into the last war. Its principles in press and propaganda have been employed to organize and maintain those things which are "right," "to be respected," and "proper," and to get rid of troublesome ideas and movements, to stimulate heresy hunts, to sanction trade conquest, and to aid in many other ways by which the path of political enterprise is made smoother.

The needs of education and child training have had a pronounced influence upon the growth of social psychology and closely allied studies. The vogue of tests, sporadic experimental methods and similar efforts exemplify the interest here. Experimental schools are usually based in one way or another upon social psychological theories or principles. In the treatment of children in habit clinics, in juvenile delinquency cases, and in other corrective work, its principles have been employed more or less, but much remains to be done in this connection, especially in reëducative treatment, court and legal procedure, and the broad field of criminal justice. The fields of abnormal behavior and psychiatric treatment are further interesting and rather popular illustrations of the practical use and encouragement of social psychological development.

Social work, since so much of its treatment deals with individuals, being practically limited to them and smaller groups, has made use of social psychology, as has been partially indicated above. Many personality conflicts, kinks, and maladjustments can be adequately handled by the social worker with an understanding of its laws. However, the social worker has made less use both of social psychology and sociology than one might expect. This lack is perhaps due to the nature of social work. For in order to eliminate or change the stimuli and conditions causing maladjustment, to furnish the corrective social stimuli and take care of the causes properly, the social worker would, in most cases, have to change the social conditions which produced the maladjustments. Here he is likely to get into difficulty. Not only is he faced with the concrete task of reorganization, but

when he tries to change social conditions he often runs into the opposition of those vested interests which profit thereby. These same interests may be those which furnish funds for his work. Such a person is likely to be made short shift of as a meddler because, after all, the social worker by his very function is an administrator of the mores and standards of the dominant groups, and these often sanction the condition which he would eliminate. Hence, the ones who last are usually those who do little in a large sense to take care of the fundamental causes of maladjustment, but who often merely anæsthetize or chloroform the patient in order that the fundamental causes of maladjustment may continue to operate unmolested. As long as the social worker is under such control, he will undoubtedly continue to perform this function; and the principles of social psychology will be of less use to him than they otherwise would be in such situations. At present, his main reliance is upon those principles which enable him to pacify persons in uncomfortable positions. That part of social psychology dealing with the psychology of religion may be of help to the social worker in this connection.

On account of the many practical phases of social psychology, the science has had a rapid growth, although it is only in the beginnings of its contribution to the technique of social control. Social psychology also is taking a noticeably more important place in school curricula. Courses in political psychology have recently been added to social psychology. Perhaps one significant difficulty in teaching social, and particularly political, psychology is that it may analyze too clearly the methods of "democratic" control. While this may be useful to the future politician, it may be dangerous for too many laymen to understand all of the methods whereby people are manipulated. It is probable that for the present the attempt at a rounded teaching of political psychology especially will be rather lopsided. Social psychological research is being encouraged, but the facilities after all are very meager.[65]

[65] Help comes through such sources as, for example, the Social Science Research Council, foundations, bureaus, charitable organizations, fellowships, habit clinics, and child study institutes. Child psychology with its present popu-

Professor Ogg's report on opportunities for research in the humanistic sciences, presented to the American Council of Learned Societies, may be discouraging and perhaps helpful. Much of the research under way is not directly in social psychology but only goes into this aspect "by the way" or "on the side." Much more than this is necessary. When complaints are made of the lack of experimental and other exact research, one must consider the lack of proper resources, along with the fact that a large part of the present research is supported for special purposes and special interests rather than for the development of a science. Too little of the work being done is research and too little of the research is of a high type, and still less of it is experimental work.[66] As Ogburn remarks, this undoubtedly is due to the state of the science, at least in part. It also is partially due to some of the limitations inherent in social experimentation. These handicaps to experimental work in my opinion have been overrated. Numerous ones are due to social censorship, tabu, and prohibition. Especially is this true in the realm of personal experimentation if it happens to go counter to the mores and standards of the group. Experimentation in institutional changes is greatly restricted where results may be contradictory to already established organizations or when it is concerned with institutions well embedded in the mores. In spite of the fact that they are meager, we need

lar and healthy growth gives special opportunity for social psychological research.

[66] There is an ever-increasing volume of literature appearing on the subject of social psychology. It is not the task of this chapter to summarize it. Summaries of the literature and research are to be found readily. Kimball Young has written several recent summaries, that in the *Psychological Bulletin* containing 279 titles: "The Field of Social Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin,* 1927, vol. xxiv, pp. 661-691. Ellsworth Faris also has summarized current literature in a recent number of the *American Journal of Sociology,* "Social Psychology in America," under "Topical Summaries of Current Literature," 1927, vol. xxxii, pp. 623-630. Bernard's *Introduction* has extensive summaries. The Social Science Research Council is publishing case study summaries on methods. Bogardus' volume on *The New Social Research* (1926), is a useful one. Lundberg has treated methods of social research in a stimulating manner in his recent volume, *Social Research, A Study in Methods of Gathering Data* (1929). There are various other sources of information of this nature.

a comparative summary and analysis of the results of the experimentation and research which already have been completed. From such a study, conclusions and generalizations could be formulated, not because they fit a previously-made system, but because they appear from the findings themselves. This type of summary is neglected, perhaps because it is a time-consuming and difficult task, but it is vital.

As a science grows out of conditions, it is also conditioned by them. The problem of controlling social affairs is ever present. Hence the prospects seem fairly bright for the development of social psychology along those lines which help one person to control another, some groups to exploit other groups, and vested interests to maintain themselves. Research, teaching, and practical application concerning the development, rather than the control, of persons and personalities seem destined to lag behind or remain more of an academic interest until we are organized to run social and economic life rather than to be run by it. It is evident that a full development of social psychology waits upon a social organization for the purpose of creating and freeing persons rather than for exploiting them, but this is apparently true of social sciences generally.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPING STUDY OF CULTURE

By Dorothy P. Gary

With the gradual emergence of social anthropology, an interchange of influences between this science and sociology ensued. The results of earlier impacts between these two closely related disciplines do not here concern us, but rather the trends developing out of their contemporary cross-fertilization. The center of common interest has shifted somewhat from social origins. The present rendezvous is that of culture, its nature and dynamics.

Certainly attention to the much-needed research on culture and to comparative studies of culture is to be welcomed. But when in their fervor the self-styled "culturalists" promise or even threaten us with a new school and a new faith in the field of American sociology, it is another matter. Sociology, poor Job, has it not had sins enough visited upon its head? Apparently not, for even now the culturalists are enthusiastically acclaiming, "Here at last is the Moses to lead sociology out of its wilderness. . . . The study of Sociology is the study of culture." [1] Just what does this statement mean? Tylor defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capacities acquired by man as a member of society." [2] This definition has become a classic among anthropologists. Very good; but is this not just what sociologists in their innocence have thought that they were studying all along? Is it possible that this group has overlooked the best research and theory in the field of sociology?

Since, by this definition culture is limited to human beings,

[1] M. M. Willey and M. J. Herskovits, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1923, vol. xxix, pp. 189-199, furnishes a good example of this position.

[2] E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (1871), vol. i, p. 1.

the viewpoint that would define sociology as a science of culture is anthropocentric, and, what is scientifically more important, it would exclude valuable data on other animal groupings. In recent years there has been a trend toward broadening the definition of sociology to include not only human but all animal groupings, thus giving a basis for comparative sociology.[3] A similar trend is also observable in the writings of a few anthropologists, such as Boas and Rivers.[4] This more inclusive definition of the field of sociology seems to the present writer the only tenable one. However, the study of human civilizations and culture is not only a legitimate branch of sociology but probably its most important one.

In summarizing the trends in the study of culture we shall begin with an analysis of the various approaches to cultural phenomena, turning next to an examination of the various tendencies in the study of cultural change and the closely related question of social control; concluding with a brief summary of some of the developments in the field of cultural research. Before entering into a discussion of trends, it will be well to state that it is somewhat difficult to make absolutely clear-cut and consistent generalizations of such trends. Many students of culture exhibit in their writings and research rather contradictory elements, and quite a number concern themselves very little with the theoretical problems of their science, preferring to give their whole attention to concrete research problems. This latter is especially true of social anthropologists, the majority of whom Wissler calls "hard-headed empiricists who regard it as their job to record and describe the phenomena of culture and not be troubled with origins, processes and least of all, with laws." [5] Yet in spite of these qualifications, certain general trends in the study of culture can be observed.

[3] John Markey, "A Redefinition of Social Phenomena: Giving a Basis for Comparative Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1926, vol. xxxi, pp. 733-743; Charles Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution* (1928); L. L. Bernard, *Social Psychology* (1926); F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (1922).

[4] Franz Boas, *Anthropology,* (1908), p. 17; W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization,* (1914), p. 4.

[5] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923), p. 252.

In describing these tendencies the plan is to give attention to individual writers in the field only in so far as they represent or illustrate certain lines of development.

I. What Is Culture?

Tylor's definition of culture is not unlike Democracy—generally accepted "in principle," but in practice varying widely from interpreter to interpreter. To put it rather bluntly, the scientists studying culture are not agreed among themselves, except in a vague sort of way, as to the nature of the data they are studying. Since the theoretical approach to a problem largely determines methodology and therefore results (scientifically determined facts being a function of the method employed), this question is of paramount importance. In interpreting the nature of cultural phenomena, three major tendencies are discernible: a subjective, a pseudo-objective, and an objective.

1. The subjective interpretation of culture

The subjective approach to culture follows two different and yet somewhat related routes. The first is that of the metaphysician, and the second that of the individual psychologist who makes culture mainly an expression of man's desires, instincts, or prepotent reflexes.

Since the historians some twenty-five years ago decided "to leave God out of history," the students of civilizations and culture who would interpret social phenomena in terms of soul and other supernatural forces have been rapidly on the decline until at present they are almost negligible in influence. Spengler is perhaps the most noteworthy throw-back to this earlier school of thought. His *Decline of the West*[6] presents a queer hodge-podge of mathematical theory, historical fact and obscure metaphysical reasoning. The widespread attention which his work has received is due not to its soundness of treatment but rather to the fact that Spengler has voiced the mingled fears, hopes and

[6] Oswald Spengler, *Decline of the West,* vols. i-ii (1928).

apprehensions of western European civilization, demoralized by the World War and beset with internal contradictions. His book is a product of a civilization become sick and lacking faith in its ability to recover.

Another type of metaphysical treatment has expressed itself in the concepts of "the group mind" and "the crowd mind," as developed by McDougall, Le Bon and others.[7] Durkheim's treatment of social life also has metaphysical elements,[8] although his concept of "collective representations" is far more realistic than the two previously mentioned. The concept of social or group mind enjoyed a certain vogue among sociologists for a time, but it has been largely replaced by the more scientifically-grounded concept of collective behavior integrations.

A subjective treatment of cultural data which is at present of more significance is that which interprets these data in terms of individual psychology. This type of subjectivity exhibits an extensive and hardy character. Frazer, Freud, and the whole school of psycho-analysts attempt to explain culture in terms of unconscious mechanisms.[9] Floyd Allport, William McDougall, and numerous other psychologists would explain culture as an expression also of the individual's reactions and attempted adjustment to his environment,[10] although McDougall and his followers would place more emphasis on the significance of innate unconditioned mechanisms of behavior. Allport, in reviewing Ogburn's *Social Change,* states emphatically that scientists should concentrate on the interplay between biological and cultural factors and "cease trying to explain society in terms of the group as a whole,

[7] Wm. McDougall, *The Group Mind* (1921); G. Le Bon, *The Crowd,* English edition (1903).

[8] Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* English translation, (1915).

[9] S. Freud, *General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis* (1920); J. D. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (1913); also S. Freud, *Totemism and Taboo* (1918); J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910).

[10] Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924); Wm. McDougall, *Intro. to Social Psychology* (1908).

or culture wholly in terms of itself. . . . The individual should be considered as the unit of social change." [11]

Critics of this general position, as well as of its specific forms, are numerous and on the increase.[12] The Freudian interpretation of totem and tabu and other aspects of the simpler cultures has been attacked by Wissler, Malinowski, Goldenweiser and others, as not being compatible with the facts.[13] The position which Allport represents has been demolished from all sides. Since the salient points in this connection are treated in the chapter on Social Psychology in this volume, they will not be discussed here.

Within the field of scientific investigation of culture, the tide of present thought seems to be sweeping well beyond any individualistic basis and orienting itself more and more around collective principles. However, there are many remnants of the older individualistic approach in the writings of American and European students of culture. Strangely enough, this holds true for many of the critics of the individualistic interpretation of cultural data. A discussion of this point brings us to an analysis of the second conception of the nature of culture.

2. THE PSEUDO-OBJECTIVE AND PARTIAL INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE

The pseudo-objective tendencies in the handling of cultural data are a symptom of the quandary in which the majority of anthropologists and sociologists find themselves. They are caught

[11] F. H. Allport, "Social Change: An Analysis of Professor Ogburn's Culture Theory," *Journal of Social Forces,* 1924, vol. ii, pp. 671-676.

[12] In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, perhaps the writer should state that there is no intention of denying the reality of individual behavior nor its significance as data for scientific study. But since culture is a *collective* behavior phenomenon, the reference to individual behavior as an *explanation* of culture is not only an inadequate but an irrelevant procedure.

[13] B. Malinowski, "Anthropology," vol. i of Supplementary Volumes of XIIIth Edition, *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1926), pp. 131-140; F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1913); F. Boas, "Psychological Problems in Anthropology," *Amer. Journal of Psychology,* 1910, vol. xxi, pp. 371-384, C. A. Ellwood, "Theories of Cultural Evolution," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1918, vol. xxiii, pp. 799-800; W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology* (1916).

between the old and the new orientation, not being able to make the transition to a wholly objective conception of cultural phenomena. Their practice of dealing continually with cultural data, whether of early or modern life, has inevitably brought a break with the strictly individualistic approach and a dawning comprehension of the collective character of these social phenomena. Yet because this comprehension is incomplete, the trend toward objectivity is likewise so. In so far as culture is viewed as a group phenomena, there is objectivity; meanwhile, subjectivity continues to the extent that reference is made to supposed forces or tendencies in the individual as an explanation of culture. Also to the extent that culture is interpreted in terms of the interplay between the individual or the group and his or its cultural environment, the treatment is both incomplete and permeated by subjectivity. The partial character is inherent in the position itself while the subjectivity is due to these scientists' comprehension of psychology and behavior as subjective phenomena and not, of course, to the subjective character of the phenomena themselves. The objective quality of these data will be analyzed in the course of the following discussion.

A partial and pseudo-objective conception of culture, which is quite prevalent among American anthropologists and a number of sociologists, is the environmental-psychological conception. From this point of view, culture is seen in a general way to be a product of man's joint activities; but the basic implications of this fact are neglected, while major emphasis is placed upon culture as a man-created environment to which individuals and groups must actively or passively adjust.[14] In this connection, great attention is paid to psychological factors, and in many cases this includes the positing of mysterious tendencies, instincts, or qualities in man.[15] An environmental-psychological analysis of

[14] For a clear summary of this position, the reader is referred to M. M. Willey, "Society and its Cultural Heritage," in *An Introduction to Sociology*, by Davis, Barnes, and others (1927).

[15] As examples of this: A. A. Goldenweiser, in *Early Civilization* (1922), resorts to the universal-creativeness-of-man concept as a partial explanation of

culture may be legitimate, but it does not furnish an adequate basis for a science of culture. This approach is implicit in much of the writings of Goldenweiser, Dixon, Herskovits, Tozzer, Wundt, Ellwood, Wissler, Ogburn, and Willey.[16] Although Boas has given us little theoretical writing on which to base a judgment, his comprehension appears to be quite similar to these others.[17] From this standpoint, culture, "that part of the environment which man has himself created and to which he must adjust himself,"[18] is viewed as an adding or welding together of cultural traits into various complexes, patterns and civilizations.[19] The simplest unit of culture is the culture trait. In turn, a culture trait is defined as the simplest unit of culture. (This type of circular reasoning does not make for clarity in analysis or research.) Culture traits are of two general classes: material traits, such as steel rails, penknives, buildings and bridges; and non-material traits, such as folkways, attitudes, beliefs, and ceremonials. Culture traits tend to cluster and form a more complicated unity

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cultural development; W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology* (1916), presents the psychic-unity explanation; Chas. Ellwood, in "Theories of Cultural Evolution," *American Journal of Sociology,* 1918, vol. xxiii, pp. 779-800, offers man's ability to reason as a causal factor; Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923), resorts to instincts; Roland Dixon, *The Building of Cultures* (1928), thinks racial and other undetermined biological factors are part of the basic nature of culture; and W. I. Thomas, in *The Polish Peasant,* vol. i (1918), offers four basic desires which man seeks to express through his social life, as a fundamental aspect of culture.

[16] A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology and Culture," *Jour. Philos. Psychol. and Sci. Method,* 1918, vol. v, pp. 561-571, 589-607; *Early Civilization* (1922); "Cultural Anthropology," a chapter in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (H. E. Barnes, ed., 1925; R. Dixon, *op. cit.;* M. M. Willey and M. J. Herskovits "Psychology and Culture," *Psychol. Bulletin,* Vol. xxiv, No. 5, pp. 253-284; A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities,* (1925); Wundt, *op. cit.;* Chas. Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution;* W. I. Thomas, *op. cit.;* Wm. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture.* (1923); "The Psychological Aspects of the Culture-Environment Relation," *Amer. Anthro.,* n. s., 1912, vol. xiv, pp. 217-225; M. M. Willey, *op. cit.*

[17] F. Boas, *Anthropology* (1908); *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1913); *Anthropology and Modern Life.*

[18] M. M. Willey, "Society and its Cultural Heritage," *op. cit.,* p. 500.

[19] The best exposition of this general approach is to be found in Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture,* and M. M. Willey, "Society and its Cultural Heritage," *op. cit.*

known as a culture complex. In turn complexes tend to integrate into a still more complicated unit, the culture pattern. The sum of the culture patterns equals a civilization; and according to some writers, as Wissler, a civilization can be completely understood only when all of its culture traits have been enumerated. Others, —Goldenweiser, for example,—object to this emphasis on complete enumeration. The sum total of a society's culture traits constitute its cultural base, while the geographical distribution of its cultural traits, complexes and patterns constitute a cultural area. Much of this sounds like an exercise in arithmetic. The mechanical and structural nature of this analysis of cultural phenomena, which has been severely criticized by Malinowski and others,[20] is well illustrated by the following quotations from a well-known text on cultural sociology: "Civilization may somewhat aptly be compared to a beautiful rug. . . . Each trait is a thread; these threads combine into complexes which are minor designs in the fabric, and these lesser complexes are then balanced and adjusted to give the major impression that one gains with the first hasty glance at a rug." [21] Again, world civilization is likened to "grandmother's patch-work quilt, put together from a vast number of culture sections or areas." [22] Comment seems unnecessary. One wonders that the analogy of nursery blocks was overlooked. The structural character of this approach is also exemplified by "The Universal Culture Pattern" which Wissler proposes as the schematic basis upon which research on civilizations be carried on.[23] It is difficult to discover any functional basis for the method which Wissler proposes. He seems to shift his basis of topical grouping from that of material traits to that of social activities and back again. Wissler states that the universal pattern is largely due to man's innate characteristics, while the content of the pattern is due to his acquired modes of behavior.[24]

Perhaps the clearest indictment of this series of culture units

[20] B. Malinowski, *Anthropology,* vol. i of Supplementary Vols. of the XIIIth Edition, *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1926), pp. 131-140.

[21] M. M. Willey, *op. cit.,* p. 533.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 547.

[23] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture,* p. 74.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 272.

is to be found in the writings of those utilizing them. The social fact listed by one writer as a trait will be termed a complex by another. Even more frequently, what one terms a complex, to another will appear to be a pattern. Even the same author may be guilty of such contradictory usage.[25] It remains to be seen if this confusion can be cleared up and these units standardized, or whether the confusion is inherent in the general approach itself. Certainly the concepts of culture trait and cultural base should be discarded,[26] as these are purely mechanical and non-realistic conceptions and therefore of no practical usefulness either in research or illuminating description. While there exist such social integrations as those which the concepts complex, (unique) pattern and universal pattern attempt to describe, these concepts, to be really useful, must be more specifically and less mechanically defined. Their true sociological and functional character must be given adequate attention.

Other more useful units of investigation have been developed, as those of the economic, control and other cultural processes, the folkway and the *mos;* and, from a somewhat different standpoint, the various forms of interaction and types of social situations and social responses, both individual and group. While much further work needs to be done on the refining and standardizing of these units, their essential validity has already been demonstrated by the research findings resulting from their utilization.[27]

[25] As example of this tendency to use complex and pattern interchangeably, Memoir 29, *Amer. Anthro. Assn.,* 1923, pp. 25, 32, 37, 81; also see M. M. Willey, *op. cit.,* pp. 517, 532, 533, 534, and Wissler *op. cit., passim.*

[26] Clark Wissler, "Anthropology," *The Americana,* vol. ii, 1923, p. 22, criticizes the trait concept and proposes that the concept of complex replace that of trait.

[27] This partial list of studies is given as merely illustrative of the character of scientific results which have been accumulated: Nels Anderson, *The Hobo* (1923); Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization,* vols. i and ii (1928); Emile Durkheim, *The Suicide* (1912); E. C. Lindemann *Social Discovery* (1924); D. P. Gary, *Carolina Mill Hills and Mill Hands* (1929); Ernest Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (1928); John F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process and its Integration in Children* (1928); K. Marx, *Capital,* vols. i-iii; W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (1907); Robert Park,

Let us continue our analysis of this pseudo-objective interpretation of cultural data. This rather crude attempt to define and analyze culture objectively has been coupled with various subjective tendencies. For example, the supposed cultural environment has been set off into a material and a non-material environment, and those objects composing the material environment are considered objective or tangible, while those composing the non-material, such as customs, mores, attitudes and values, are subjective and intangible.[28] Furthermore, various students, as Goldenweiser, Ellwood, Ogburn, Tozzer, Boas and Dixon, refer to factors in this "subjective" grouping, such as individual psychology and reactions and group conduct, for partial explanations of cultural phenomena. According to this classification, only in so far as explanations are presented in terms of the supposedly material environment are we dealing with objective, verifiable phenomena. Such subjective handling of really objective phenomena renders the treatment quite unsatisfactory. Fortunately, no such predicament as this is inherent in cultural phenomena.

Let us analyze this general concept of the environment and its two subdivisions. It seems legitimate to ask: If customs, attitudes, institutions, and material objects are all part of our cultural environment, then what is left to be environed? Certainly not the group. Nor yet the individual, aside from his physical existence. Is social science to be reduced to a study of (1) shifting material and non-material environments and (2) the relating of physiological beings and groupings to these environments? If the implications of an environmental approach were followed through to its logical conclusions, its inherent fallacies would become so apparent that it would stand self-condemned. To anyone

The City (1925); F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (1927). Perhaps the best bibliography of studies utilizing one or more of these units of investigation is to be found in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), *passim.*

[28] M. M. Willey, "Society and its Cultural Heritage," *op. cit.*, pp. 518-519, and *passim.* This usage is to be found throughout the writings of Ogburn, Dixon, and the others. See previous citations.

who has made more than a superficial examination of the facts, it is apparent that neither in actual life nor in functional analysis is it possible to set off individuals or groups, except as biological organisms, from customs, habits, and institutions, or from so-called material culture, such as tools and buildings. In the most real sense, these are but different aspects of one unitary social process. Let us examine the so-called material environment or, to use a preferable term, material objects of culture. Such objects are neither more objective nor more tangible than attitudes or customs, nor have such material objects any meaning apart from these other aspects. A material object can only be defined and understood in terms of the social behavior of human groupings which have utilized it. The earliest cultures, for example, have been studied on the basis of the findings of material elements of these cultures, and it has proved possible to group these and all cultures on the basis of the tools and technology used in each case. Now what social significance or possible meaning would a neolithic stone implement have, or a paleolithic cave drawing, or prehistoric pottery, or a modern factory or railroad, except as they serve as symbols or indices to the social behavior of the people using them? So much for the greater objectivity of our material objects of culture! Only as these objects are treated as parts in a related social whole is it possible to understand them. While the above writers would agree, no doubt, with this statement, their theory and analyses do not sufficiently take this principle into account. There is too much of the mechanical and structural in their conception of the social unity of a culture.

The quandaries and contradictions now current in much of cultural analysis will disappear and a science of culture be built up only when the analysis of culture is approached from the standpoint that culture itself is a social process growing out of and consisting of collective human behavior, and that the units and social objects of interaction created in this process, such as folkways, attitudes, bridges, railroads, social personalities and institutions, are all equally objective and can be explained only in

terms of this collective behavior. Those writers who interpret culture in terms of social process have made a substantial beginning in this direction.

This first tendency to interpret culture in a pseudo-objective manner grows out of an attempt to integrate an environmental and structural with a group behavioristic approach. The resultant is a partial comprehension of the nature of culture. Another expression of this pseudo-objective tendency is to be found in the writings of Sumner, Keller, Small, Thomas and various other sociologists, and also in those of Malinowski and the functionalists.[29] This tendency is more objective than the other previously discussed, in that far more attention is given to collective activities and interrelationships in the explanation of culture. However, in another sense it is more subjective, in so far as culture is interpreted as an expression of man's attempts to satisfy his (supposed) instinctive or basic desires. Let us take the functionalists' theory as an example of this trend. As the name which they have adopted implies, the functionalists view culture as a process, and insist (in Malinowski's words) "that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea, and belief but fills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within a working whole. . . ."[30] The functionalists must always "keep in mind the biological basis of civilization, the correlation of culture to human wants, hence to human instincts and emotional disposition. Psychology, therefore, is indispensable for an understanding of culture. . . . Culture above all supplies primitive man with the means of supplying his wants."[31] Therefore the relations of culture to its physical environment and to man's biological needs are important. It is in

[29] W. G. Sumner *Folkways* (1907); W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution,* four volumes (1927); Albion Small, *General Sociology* (1905); W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (1905); W. I. Thomas and F. Zhaniecki, *The Polish Peasant,* five volumes (1918).

[30] Malinowski, *Anthropology,* vol. i of Supplementary Volumes of the XIIIth Edition, *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1926), p. 133.

[31] *Ibid.*

this emphasis on the biological basis of culture that the functionalists separate themselves from the social process approach. To continue the quotation: "However, the functionalists hold that man, in the very act of culture, transcends his biological outfit. Biology therefore is not enough to explain culture. . . . Neither is psychology sufficient, for man's most important business is done in common." [32]

Malinowski mentions as other consistent functionalists Richard Thurnwald, Radcliffe-Brown and Hoernle.[33] E. B. Tylor and Robertson Smith are also claimed as functionalists, while the best work of the American school of anthropologists is said to have been carried on with functionalist technique. This is perhaps true. Malinowski need not have stopped there, since most social scientists are interested in analyzing the functional interrelationships of culture or other social phenomena.

However, in so far as Malinowski and the functionalists interpret these functional interrelationships of culture in biological or innate psychological terms, they are using the concept of function in a metaphysical and discredited sense. More often Malinowski uses function in its more scientific sense, in terms of the social phenomena under observation. For example, in the study of primitive religion he finds that religion serves the functions of creating social cohesion in the group, and of controlling members' behavior. Except for this qualified criticism, the functionalist's approach offers much that is commendable, although hardly original. At the present time what the science of culture needs is not so much originality in theory as emphasis on the established principles of sociological analysis. The technique of research, on the other hand, offers full scope for all the scientific originality available, and here the functionalists have made a real contribution.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] B. Malinowski, *The Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922); *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (1926); "Useful and Useless Anthropology," *New Republic*, 1927, vol. i, pp. 109-111.

3. THE OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE

Another approach and technique which is steadily gaining ground is that which views culture as a living organic whole, a social process, to be understood in terms of interaction, through contact of group with group, civilization with civilization, group with social situation, group with geographic, economic and other sociological factors, of one phase of a civilization with other phases, etc. From this point of view, all social objects created and interacting in this process, such as tools, folkways and mores, social personality, attitudes, and science, are equally objective; that is, subject to scientific study in terms of social behavior. For the old sharp division between "subjective" and "objective" has disappeared here, since objectivity refers to the availability of data for scientific observation, analysis, and verification, while subjectivity refers to the non-availability of the phenomena. According to this approach, most, if not all, social phenomena are even now available for scientific study, when the behavioristic technique is applied; and with the perfection of this technique it is believed that all social phenomena will be found to be scientifically available.

The emphasis of this approach is necessarily on the dynamics of the cultural process, with prime interest in the sequences of social happenings. Social organization and structure are not neglected, but are always studied in relation to the processes involved. While there are elements of this approach in the writings of most sociologists as well as social anthropologists, both earlier and modern, for a consistent and comprehensive adherence to this conception one must turn to the writings of the Marxian school and to those of Charles and Mary Beard, Kroeber, Lowie, Cooley, Park, Burgess, and Wallis.[34] Although their conclusions differ

[34] Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization,* vols. i and ii, (1928); Chas. Beard, *Whither Mankind* (1928), introductory chapter; A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923); "The Super-Organic," *Amer. Anthro.* (n. s., 1917), vol. xix, pp. 163-213; R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917); *Primitive Society* (1920); Chas. Cooley, *Social Process* (1918); Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924); W. D. Wallis,

considerably, the fundamental approach to culture is similar. The handling of this conception in the writings of some of these is open to criticism, yet in general the development is clear and consistent. Sumner, Small, Durkheim, Chapin, Giddings, and Malinowski [35] exhibit a marked tendency to treat culture as a collective social process.[36] Of those making primarily an environmental and psychological analysis of the nature of culture, Ogburn and Thomas seem to have been most influenced by the social process approach.[37] In our discussion of the dynamics of culture and trends in research, this approach will be given further attention.

II. Declaration of Independence of Culture Phenomena

Regardless of the point of view from which the study of culture is approached, there is a growing tendency among culturalists to emphasize the relative independence of cultural phenomena. "Culture," it is stated, "is a thing *sui generis* which can be only explained in terms of itself," [38]—that is, in terms of social phenomena. The point of view is that we have here a realm of phenomena which is as relatively distinct and independent as that with which physics, biology, or any other natural science deals. Consequently, in any endeavor to analyze the interactions

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An Introduction to Sociology (1927); *An Introduction to Anthropology* (1926); K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* translation (1913); F. Engels, *Anti-Duehring* (1894); A. M. Simons, *Social Forces in American History* (1911); Thorstein Veblen, *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899); S. Nearing, *Where is Civilization Going?* (1927); A. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family,* vols. i, ii, iii, 1917-1919.

[35] But for Malinowski's acceptance of the theory of the instinctive basis of culture, his interpretation of culture would be entirely from the social process point of view.

[36] Wm. Sumner, *Folkways* (1907); Albion Small, *General Sociology* (1905); Durkheim, *op. cit.;* F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (1928); Franklin Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* (1922); *The Principles of Sociology* (1896).

[37] Wm. Ogburn, "The Historical Method in Social Phenomena," *Pub. Amer. Sociological Society,* 1921, vol. xvi, pp. 70-73; W. I. Thomas, *op. cit.*

[38] R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917), p. 66.

and interrelationships of cultural phenomena, that is, to discover natural laws governing their behavior, the social scientist, in accordance with generally accepted scientific procedure, must first study the phenomena themselves, rather than seek for explanation within another universe of phenomena.

This amounts to an open break with all biological, whether instinctivist, racial, or individual psychological, determinists of human social phenomena. While the earlier anthropologists and many sociologists started with a distinct bias toward the biological determinism of culture, the logic of the facts revealed by social and anthropological research has led a great majority of the modern group to an extended qualification of the earlier theory in this respect, and in recent years a significant number have made an outright repudiation of the significance of biological factors in the evolution of civilization.

There are, of course, critics of this position among the students of culture, notably Malinowski, Dixon, Keller, Boas, Goldenweiser, Sapir and Thomas, who represent the tendency in recent years to assign a more modified, though still fundamental, rôle to biological factors.[39]

Among the iconoclasts themselves, some would push the revolt further than others. Quite a number content themselves with being merely doubting Thomases of all biological theories of social phenomena. This attitude of straddling the issue is especially popular with certain sociologists. They do not deny that man has instincts, nor that man's instincts play a rôle in the determination of culture; but they prefer the flank attack, demonstrating how much of what was formerly interpreted as instinctive or innate behavior of human individuals and groups may be more adequately explained in terms of cultural differentiation and social conditioning. Ogburn and Chapin make this approach, while Kroeber, Lowie, Wallis, Sutherland, and the historical

[39] A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Autonomy of the Social," *Amer. Anthro.*, n.s., 1917, vol. xix, pp. 447-449; "Cultural Anthropology," *op. cit.;* E. Sapir, "Do We Need a Super-Organic?" *Amer. Anthro.*, n.s., vol. xix, pp 441-447; F. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928).

materialists, would go to the logical length of their position, and keep strictly within the field of social interaction, in analyzing and interpreting cultural phenomena.[40]

I. SOME ERRORS IN STATEMENT OF POSITION

A few occasionally even go beyond the logical limit, in their enthusiasm overstating their point, and so leaving themselves open to obvious criticism by psychologists and others. For example, Wallis, in his "Independence of Social Psychology,"[41] leaves the impression that he holds it is not necessary to know anything about individuals composing a group in order to understand the group. This, of course, is an untenable position, and one which Wallis himself does not actually hold. The true significance of the individual, however, in any group, lies in the fact that he is a locus of social stimuli and responses, customs, attitudes, and other habits acquired in former groupings. In other words, it is not the individual as such that is important, but the group-conditioned modes of social response and stimuli which have accumulated in, and form his social personality.

There is another type of going beyond the limit in declaring the independence of social phenomena. Kroeber, in his "Super-organic,"[42] the most widely known summary in support of this general position on the independence of social phenomena, has damaged an otherwise good argument by insisting on sharp breaks between man and other animals, and between organic and "super-organic" (*i.e.*, social) evolution. He unfortunately chooses as the basis of his argument a false position which can be easily demolished, and which is not really essential to his major proposition. Also his use of the metaphysical and anthropomorphic term, "super-organic," to designate cultural phenomena is indefensible.

[40] See previous citations of these authors' works.

[41] W. D. Wallis, "The Independence of Social Psychology," *Jour. Abnormal and Soc. Psychol.*, 1925, vol. xx, pp. 147-150.

[42] A. L. Kroeber, "The Super-Organic," *Amer. Anthropologist*, n.s., 1917, vol. xix, pp. 163-213.

Not only is there no sharp break between man and other animals biologically, but socially we find the beginnings of social heritage and social control, among other animals. While these are but small beginnings, limited by the other animals' seeming inability to develop symbols and therefore reflective thinking, research on the social side of animal groupings more and more indicates that the differences even socially between man and the other animals are of degree rather than of kind. Ellwood, Markey, Bernard, Giddings and various others have emphasized the continuity of social development existing among all animal life including man, and the research on the development of language habits in man gives further evidence in support of this position.[43]

There are other evidences that the differences between man and the other animals are of degree rather than of kind. We are discovering that animals, as we ascend the scale of biological evolution, grow less dependent on instinctive modes of response, and that socially acquired modes of response play a more important rôle. Also, as among human groupings, much of animal behavior formerly considered instinctive—as, for example, fears of certain other species—has been shown to be acquired through social conditioning.[44]

[43] See footnote 3, p. 173.

[44] C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* (1924); Wolfgang Kohler, *Mentality of Apes* (1925); Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (1895); sections dealing with experiments with animals, scientists' observations on animal groupings, as reported in P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution* (1904); C. J. Herrick, *Brains of Rats and Men* (1926); K. S. Lashley, "Studies of Cerebral Functioning in Learning," *Psychobiology,* vol. ii, pp. 55-135, W. S. Hunter, "The Delayed Reaction in Animals and Children," *Behavior Monographs,* 1913-15, vol. xi, pp. 5-86; J. F. Markey, "The Place of Language Habits in a Behavioristic Explanation of Consciousness," *Psychol. Rev.,* vol. xxxii, pp. 384-401; Jacques Loeb, *The Mechanistic Conception of Life* (1925); Ivan Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes-Behaviorism* (1928); J. B. Watson, *Behavior: an Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (1914); *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1924); *Behaviorism* (1925); R. M. Yerkes, "The Mental Life of Monkeys and Apes: a Study of Ideational Behavior," *Behavior Monograph,* No. 3 (1916); *Almost Human* (1925).

2. THE QUANDARY OVER THE GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT

Another weak point is the denial by some of these culturalists of any significant rôle to geographic factors. Certainly Semple, Huntington, Buckle, Ratzel and others have grossly exaggerated the effects of physical and geographic conditions upon social development.[45] However, it is one thing to deny a determining rôle to the geographic environment. It is quite another to deny any rôle whatever to the geographic environment, except that of a *limiting* factor, as Boas, Lowie, Wallis, Goldenweiser, Willey and others would do.[46] These are correct in pointing out that not only does the geographic environment fail to explain culture, but that this geographic environment must be interpreted always in terms of the culture of the people inhabiting a region. The truth of this latter point is demonstrated by the fact that history reveals peoples living in almost identical environments with diverse cultures, and other peoples with cultural similarities in unlike environments.[47] However, eco-geographic conditions exert dynamic as well as limiting effects on cultural development. Granting a social heritage which makes possible their utilization, the location of coal, iron, oil, or other essential deposits in a region definitely gives an impetus to economic and other social developments of that section. Wissler, for instance, calls attention to the relation existing between the centers of diffusion and distribution of the world's coal resources. Also, geographic factors are influential in determining trade routes and trading centers, and these latter have long been recognized as important mediums of contact and diffusion.

[45] H. T. Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, vol. i (1897); Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (1922); Ellen C. Semple, *The Influence of the Geographic Environment* (1911).

[46] F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man;* R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917); W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927); A. A. Goldenweiser, "Culture and Environment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1916, vol. xxi, pp. 628-633; M. M. Willey and M. J. Herskovits, "Psychology and Culture," *op. cit.*

[47] W. D. Wallis, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-98.

It is quite true, as various writers have pointed out, that geographic factors are never independent ones, nor all-determining nor invariable in their effects. Such factors must be studied in relationship to a group's culture, of which they are, in fact, a part. Natural resources and raw materials, such as eco-geographic elements, should be included as part of the socio-economic processes and their dynamics. Recently a trend somewhat in this direction has been developing, with a newer emphasis on the rôle of the geographic as an interacting part of the total social situation. According to the proponents of this position, such as McKenzie and other ecologists, Wissler, and Charles Beard, the rôle is positive as well as negative in character.

When the position on the relative independence of culture phenomena is dissociated from these errors, it stands out as theoretically sound. Further, as a principle of methodological procedure, it has justified itself again and again. For the acid test of any scientific theory lies in its applicability to concrete problems of research, and in its usefulness in revealing sequential relationships in the phenomena being studied. In other words, a scientific procedure must be judged by the accuracy of its predictions. This procedure, which for the want of a better term may be called sociological, has proved far more valuable in this respect than has the bio-social or any other hybrid technique. In methods of analyzing culture, the trend is clearly in this direction.

In presenting their brief against the instinctivists and racial determinists, the cultural independence group make out a much stronger case. It seems unnecessary to enter into any discussion of the instinct controversy here, as it is discussed at various points in other chapters in this book.

3. RACE AND CULTURE

A significant issue over which the culturalists as well as most of the other sociologists have locked horns, metaphorically speaking, with the biological determinists, is that of race as a factor in cultural evolution.

This controversial subject has occupied many pages of print, both in book and magazine form, and the interested reader is referred to the summaries of the culturalists' position as presented by Kroeber, Lowie, Wallis, Herskovits, Goldenweiser, and Boas.[48] For critical interpretation of the results of the mental testing of races, Bond and Wallis are recommended.[49] For the position of the racial determinists, the reader is referred to the writings of Wiggam, Brigham, Popenoe and Johnson, McDougall and Dixon.[50] The latter takes a more qualified stand, however, than the others.

The controversy centers around the relative merits or demerits of the colored peoples, as builders of culture. This is not to be wondered at in a country where the subjection of Indians, Negroes, and other colored peoples to white economic and imperialistic interests has played, and is playing, such a rôle. This is not primarily a dispute between psychologists and sociologists. It is a controversy between science and the mores of exploitation, with many scientists seemingly quite unaware of the basis and extent of their ethnocentric bias.

The culturalists, while not always presenting as adequate a case as they might, come off with the incomparably better part of the argument. They have been able to show that the racial determinists are quite ignorant of the complex scientific problems arising out of racial migrations and intermixture; also that they

[48] R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917); A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923); W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927); M. J. Herskovits, "What is a Race?" *Amer. Mercury,* 1924, vol. ii, pp. 207-210; "On the Relation Between Negro-White Mixture and Standing in the Intelligence Tests," *Ped. Sem. and Jour. Gen. Psychol.,* 1926, vol. xxxiii, pp. 30-42; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Race and Culture in the Modern World," *Jour. Soc. Forces,* 1924, vol. iii, pp. 127-136; *Early Civilization,* (1922); F. Boas, "Fallacies of Racial Inferiority," *Current History,* 1927, vol. xxv, pp. 677-682; *The Mind of Primitive Man,* (1913); *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928).

[49] W. D. Wallis, "Race and Culture," *Sci. Monthly,* 1926, vol. xxiii, pp. 313-321; R. Bond, "What Did the Army 'Intelligence' Tests Measure?" *Opportunity,* July, 1924; "The American Negro," *The Annals, Amer. Academy of Poli. and Soc. Science,* 1928.

[50] A. E. Wiggam, *The Fruit of the Family Tree* (1923); C. Brigham, *American Intelligence* (1923); Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (1918); W. McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* (1921).

not only use the popular unscientific definitions of race, but make the inexcusable error of identifying race with nationality. Further, the culturalists have demonstrated, through accumulation of a wealth of historical data on the subject, that race is but a chance carrier of culture. Various groupings of each race in the course of its history have varied in their position relative to other cultural groups, at one time ranking as "low," or more simple, at another as "high," or more complex, types of civilization. The results of the mental testing of racial groups within this country and of the psychological testing of groups in Australia have been subjected to such critical scrutiny and reinterpretation that only one with a closed mind could study the analyses and still hold that "the mental tests prove the Negro race inferior." Finally, the culturalists have pointed out the ethnocentric character of the white group's judgments and scale of values. Also, through their research they have brought to the attention of the western hemisphere the accomplishments and contributions to world culture of the so-called backward peoples.

However, considering the question as to whether race has a casual or a mere chance relation to the differences in cultural development existing in the world today, most writers in this country, DuBois and Nearing excepted, have given no or but scant attention to the most basic phase of the matter: the socio-economic foundation of these differences.[51] A combination of interacting social factors, mainly eco-geographic and technological in nature, such as the coming of the commercial and industrial revolutions and the invention of modern methods of warfare, first developed in parts of the world inhabited by peoples who happened to be white. Further, these developments, which can be shown to be due not to any innate superior abilities of these peoples but to a combination of social circumstances, laid the basis for the material and other cultural advances within these societies of which the Nordics are so proud. Furthermore, the

[51] W. E. B. DuBois, *Darkwater* (1920); "The Negro," *Home University Library*, n.d.; *The Negro in the South* (1907); *Souls of Black Folk* (1903); S. Nearing, *Black America* (1929).

business groups dominant within these societies, in their desire for ever greater profits, naturally became interested in the opportunities for exploitation of the labor power, natural resources, and undeveloped markets in non-industrialized sections of the earth, and utilized their superior economic and military techniques to subordinate these peoples living under simpler forms of economy and having less effective methods of warfare. These latter peoples happened to be colored.

In final analysis, it is industrialism coupled with imperialism, and not biological equipment, which has handicapped the development of the colored races. But with the coming of industrial revolution and its attendant social changes in these former non-industrialized parts of the world, a series of remarkably rapid developments are taking place. The new classes of native capitalists and wage-earners have emerged, and with them nationalistic agitation and strongly anti-imperialist labor movements. It seems probable that the so-called "backward peoples" of India, China and Africa, on the basis of this new technique and social organization, will succeed in freeing themselves from foreign domination and build cultures not only equal but possibly superior to those on which the western white man prides himself, because these new cultures will probably not be based on exploitation of one race or class by another. In such an event, the fallacies inherent in any theory of racial determinism of culture will be completely demonstrated. Incidentally, the psychologists and other scientists engaged in studying cultural phenomena can then concentrate their energies on the more real problems in their fields.

4. SUMMARY: GENERAL TREND TOWARD MORE STRICTLY SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE

This varied attack on the older theories of culture's dependence on biological, individual, or geographic factors represents, for American students of culture, a break with individualism, and a beginning orientation toward collective activity and the social situation as the actual units of culture. This trend is

by no means fully or clearly developed as yet, either in individual scientists or in the group as a whole. Some vacillate, some attempt to integrate the old with the new with a hodgepodge as a resultant, and a few achieve a relatively consistent, radical departure. Yet the trend is there.

The implications of this newer orientation for research, as well as theory, are significant, for it furnishes the basis for a different point of departure for scientific investigation than has usually been followed.

III. Trends in the Study of Cultural Change

Much research and writing is being devoted to social change.[52] This is natural, since the determination of the various sequences in cultural change constitute the central problem of the science. In seeking to discover these sequences, students of culture have developed many variations in point of view. There are the skeptics who question the existence of any repetitive sequences in cultural phenomena, as well as those who hold to a general social evolutionary position. Some hold, with Boas,[53] that only the most generalized type of sequence can be formulated; while others think that it is possible to formulate laws of change for only very narrow specific types of sequences. Quite a number conceive of these sequences within a society taking a cyclical form, and seek to generalize on this basis.[54] Throughout these variations, two outstanding and rather contradictory tendencies are observable.

[52] Some of the recent books dealing with cultural change which have appeared in this country are: Wm. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); F. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life;* F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (1928); Charles Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution* (1928); Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress;* S. Nearing, *Where is Civilization Going?* (1927); Chas. Beard, editor, *Whither Mankind;* W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927); Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* chap. xiv also deal with this question, and there are numerous books of lesser importance appearing.

[53] Boas, *op. cit.*

[54] Chapin, *op. cit.;* Kroeber, *Anthropology,* and Wissler, *Man and Culture.* The cyclical interpretation of social change is also implicit in the presentation of Ogburn, *op. cit.,* and also in the theory of the economic determinists and

I. DIFFUSION AND INVENTION, THE TWIN OPEN-SESAMES

By far the most popular procedure in America at the present time is that which virtually discards all hypotheses of general laws of social evolution, and places its emphasis rather on the uniqueness of each cultural group, and the necessity of studying each group in its historical and geographical setting in order to discover the sequences in its development. This genetic approach to a society's culture is, of course, sound, but the virtual denial of social evolution seems to the writer far less so. According to this approach, known as the historical school of American anthropology, all dynamics of social change can be summarized under the magic terms of Diffusion and Invention.[55] It is held that every change in the culture of a society is initiated either through an invention within the group or, as more frequently happens, through borrowing and the consequent diffusion of culture traits or complexes from one group to another. Since diffusion is the more common initiator of change, major attention has been given by most of this school to the discovery of the supposed laws of diffusion. However, there are few, if any, strict diffusionists in America, in theory. Ogburn has given more attention than most to the problems of invention.[56]

Certainly the generalization that new aspects of a civilization must be either invented or borrowed is too obvious to be challenged, except on the score of its inadequacy. For examination of the research findings and more detailed analyses of diffusion and invention processes reveal that these analyses on the whole

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historical materialists, although the latter would relate these cyclical changes within a society to trends in general cultural development.

[55] Boas and his followers, Goldenweiser, Ogburn, Kroeber, Tozzer, Willey, Wissler, Wallis and numerous others, take this position, although some more uncritically than others. The reader is referred to the previous citations of these authors' works. It is also to be noticed that some of these scientists were pointed out as making a pseudo-objective interpretation of culture, and others, an objective.

[56] Wm. Ogburn and D. Thomas, "Are Inventions Inevitable?" *Pol. Science Quarterly*, 1922, vol. xxxii, pp. 83-98; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*.

are valuable as far as they go, but that many fundamental aspects of the problems involved are not only unanswered but even untouched. This is in part due to the fact that most of the work has been done from the environmental-psychological point of view, and in part to the fact that the units of investigation, such as trait, complex and pattern, are theoretically unsound. There is also a dangerous tendency to treat these essentially functional processes in a purely mechanical way, and to think that, with the mapping of the geographic distribution of culture traits, all scientific questions involved have been answered. This has gone so far that some workers in this field have found it necessary to caution against such an attitude. In consequence, the treatment of cultural dynamics is rather fragmentary or piecemeal, and superficial in character. The organic unitary character of the whole in which change takes place is too often obscured.

The generalizations set forth regarding social change are briefly as follows: Social change is initiated through an invention within the group, only when the following prerequisites are present—the necessary level of cultural development, a certain need for or timeliness of the invention and, incidentally, an inventor or inventors. Factors inhibiting the adoption or spread of the invention are psychological in nature, as the inertia of habit, psychological difficulties of adjustment to the new, and fear of social displeasure, and sociological, such as weight of tradition, social pressure, and vested interests. Factors facilitating the adoption of an invention are the need for and obvious value of the new element to the group (or, more accurately, to those in control in that group or society). According to Ogburn and others, changes come first and more easily in the "material environment," and "social lags" accumulate in the "non-material environment," until the necessity of adjustment brings about the adoption of social changes here also.[57]

[57] Wm. Ogburn, *Social Change, passim.* Others, such as Wissler, Lowie and Kroeber, would agree with Ogburn, while a few, as Willey and Herskovits, ("Psychology and Culture," *op. cit.*) do not.

The material environment, then, is held to be an important factor in the dynamics of culture. As has been pointed out earlier in this discussion, it is impossible to set social life off into "material" and "non-material" environments and use these as efficient tools of analysis. In fact, Ogburn and others attempting this feat in concrete analysis do not accomplish it. Their efforts to do so, however, often lead them up blind alleys and into strange contradictions. Their predicament grows out of the indiscriminate grouping of all material social objects into a body, called an environment, and the making of this the main dynamics of social change. For the actual dynamics lie not in material objects as such, and a supposed necessity for adjustment to them, but in the technology and social organization of the economic process, including its inner contradictions, etc., and the interrelations of this process with the political and other phases of a society's life. Consequently, in specific analysis, these writers usually resolve "the material environment" and its dynamics into the technological basis of a group's economic life and changes therein, with a consequent series of changes set in motion first in economic activities and relations and then in other phases. However, the rôle of social groupings and classes in this series of events is usually underestimated. The full value of what is essentially sound in this procedure is lost, due to the confused setting in which the environmentalists place it. Indeed, the statement and to a less extent the handling of this method of analysis of cultural dynamics often comes close to an unintentional caricature of the historical materialistic technique.

As to social change which is initiated within a society through diffusion of borrowed elements, social contact between groups is naturally the first prerequisite, and such factors as the development of trade relations, trade centers, and routes, means of communication, wars, conquests, etc., are found to be some common promoters of social contact, and hence, diffusion. Trade as a diffuser of culture has been especially emphasized, and rightly so. However, trade is but one aspect of the larger economic

complex, stimulating diffusion of both the organized, or planned, and the unorganized, or non-deliberate, types. For example, the activities carried on by financial and industrial, as well as commercial, interests in their search for profits have today many ramifications, in promoting and inhibiting cultural diffusion, as well as invention; and the development of trade relations is but one of them. Dixon [58] mentions imperialism as one source of diffusion, and he is undoubtedly right; but he does not follow through an analysis of the content, method, or results of this type of engendered diffusion.

Major attention has been given to the "psychological" factors affecting the adoption and diffusion of a new culture trait or complex, but there is much deductive reasoning and little agreement as to what the factors are.[59] Factors furthering or hindering diffusion are largely the same as those mentioned as facilitating or inhibiting invention. Also it is held that elements of the material environment diffuse more easily than those of the non-material. Much of the superficial character of the earlier analysis is continued here. As an instance of this, great emphasis has been placed on the necessity of a new trait or complex fitting into the existing culture patterns of a group; otherwise it will not be adopted. The inadequate nature of this generalization is revealed when specific examples of diffusion or non-diffusion are studied. For example, the social innovations of the industrial revolution did not "fit into the existing culture patterns" of the Chinese, Indian and Japanese people, yet industrial revolution is well under way in these countries. There are, of course, vital interrelationships existing within a group's social activities, and the fact that a new folkway or social object can be easily integrated into the already existent collective life of a people naturally facilitates the adoption of the new activity. But this fact alone would not assure, nor its absence preclude, the adoption of the

[58] Roland Dixon, *The Building of Culture* (1928), final chapter.

[59] See W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927), chap. xxxii; Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); Roland Dixon, *op. cit.;* Wm. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923).

new activity. The danger of this rather mechanical formula is that it will be substituted for a thoroughgoing analysis of the problems involved.

In summary, this interpretation of cultural dynamics in terms of diffusion and invention (usually occurring in the material environment first, with consequent changes in the non-material), seems quite inadequate. Not only is the inadequacy evident in the treatment of the data of social change, but the various phases of the data which are neglected are quite significant. What of the recurrent phenomena of technological changes, business cycles, war, imperialistic aggressions, anti-imperialistic nationalist movements, coöperative movements, labor movements, racial and national minority movements, class struggles, revolutions, etc., both as sources of change and also as effects to be explained in turn by other factors setting these chains of events in motion? Aside from a certain amount of analysis of some of the social changes set in motion by the technological revolution occurring in western Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and Ogburn's work with Thomas on the social consequences of the business cycle in the United States, these most far-reaching phases of social change are practically untouched.[60]

The question naturally arises as to the reasons for this neglect. Do these culturalists consider them such unimportant phases of cultural change as not to merit attention? Also it seems almost incredible that any scientists of culture could be so unconcerned with an aspect of culture which has played and is playing such a vital rôle in its history—social conflict.[61] The emphasis on the uniqueness of each cultural group and the consequent necessity of studying each one in its historical setting does not account for this neglect, since no society is seemingly "unique" enough not to be characterized by at least some of these recurrent phenomena,

[60] W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); "The Fluctuations of Business as Social Forces," *Jour. Soc. Forces,* January 1923, pp. 73-78; Dorothy Thomas, *Social Consequences of the Business Cycle,* 1925.

[61] R. H. Lowie, *The Origins of the State* (1927), offers an outstanding exception to this statement.

though of course the specific form varies with the particular conditions in each case.

Some of the work of this school, especially the research relating to the genesis, history and geographic distribution of diffused social activities or objects is very valuable; but its theory is quite inadequate as an explanation of cultural dynamics.

2. THE METHOD OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

There is a trend toward a more comprehensive and fundamental treatment of cultural change. This is seen in the increasing utilization of the historical materialist approach by American, as well as by European and Oriental students of culture, although this tendency is less marked here than elsewhere. In America, Simons, Bimba, Olds, Calhoun, Dunn, Saposs, and Nearing use this technique more deliberately and consistently than others.[62] Charles and Mary Beard and Veblen are not quite so consistent in their usage, while Park, Burgess and Giddings are still less thoroughgoing in their utilization of this technique.[63] Numerous other writers, such as Seligman, Ogburn, Sumner, Commons, Chapin, Barnes, Douglas, and the institutional economists, attempt to utilize the aspect of the theory dealing with basic relations existing between the technological and economic foundations of a society and its other aspects, while minimizing or ignoring entirely the class struggle aspect of the theory.[64] Social developments since the industrial revolution have revealed so unmistak-

[62] A. M. Simons, *Social Forces in American History* (1911); Anthony Bimba, *History of the American Working Class,* (1927); A. Calhoun, *The Worker Looks at Government* (1928), and *op. cit;* Robert Dunn, *The Americanization of Labor* (1927); *American Foreign Investments* (1924); David Saposs, one of the authors of *History of Labor in the United States,* by John R. Commons and others, *Left-wing Unionism* (1925); S. Nearing, *The American Empire* (1921); *Whither China?* (1927); and *op. cit.*

[63] See previous citations of these authors' works.

[64] E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History,* second edition, (1924); Wm. Ogburn, *Social Change,* (1922); W. G. Sumner, *op. cit.;* John R. Commons (and others), *History of Labor in the United States;* F. S. Chapin, *Social Economy,* (1922); *Cultural Change,* (1928); H. E. Barnes, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* (1925), chap. i; *The Trend of Economics,* R. G. Tugwell, ed., (1924).

ably the technological and economic foundations of civilization and modern social change that this phase of the theory, three-quarters of a century after its formulation, has now gained rather wide acceptance. However this situation does not hold true for the other phase of the theory, although the rôle of classes and class conflicts in social change is equally as obvious as that of technological developments. Since these two aspects of the theory are so organically interrelated, any attempt to separate them leads to frustration. When the rôle of human groupings in social change is omitted, the theory loses its sociological value and is reduced to a mere economic determinism theory of cultural change.

Among other students of cultural dynamics who utilize this technique, at least in part, are Wissler, with his economic cycles, Wallis, Westermarck, Malinowski, Kroeber, and Lowie.[65] However, a partial employment of any technique is apt to be an unsatisfactory affair. To judge of a methodology's validity, the research and predictive value of the findings which have grown out of its deliberate and full use must be examined.

Simultaneously with this minor but significant trend toward the use of the historical materialist method of analysis of cultural change, there has been both a weighty indifference and a critical attack upon both its theoretical aspects and its body of research findings and predictions of cultural developments.[66] Strong emotional bias has often taken the place of scientific inquiry. Among the orthodox, the very fact that this conception of social change

[65] W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927); E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (1894); B. Malinowski, *op. cit.;* A. L. Kroeber, *op. cit.;* R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.,* and *Origin of the State* (1927).

[66] Charles Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1913); J. A. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (1918); P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928); F. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928); E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History* (1924); T. N. Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress* (1905); J. P. Lichtenburger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923). The American anthropologists, on the whole, have little to say regarding this particular theory, but in general they classify it as a "stage theory" of evolution, and so discard it. Some, as Goldenweiser, in his "Cultural Anthropology," *op. cit.,* make favorable as well as negative references to different aspects of the theory.

has always been associated with the names of Marx and Engels, and proletarian revolutionary movements, has been sufficient to condemn it without further acquaintance. In reading criticisms of the theory, the suspicion arises that second- and third-hand references, rather than recourse to original standard works, have been used in many cases by the critics. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how some of the conceptions credited to historical materialism, and duly refuted by the critics, have crept in. Also, as is always the case, the theory has suffered at the hands of some of its would-be friends. The "revisionists," and all "popularizers" of socialism, for instance, have transformed the theory almost beyond recognition.

As a result of these various factors, certain misconceptions concerning the theory of historical materialism have grown up. Some confuse this conception of history with that of the so-called "materialism" of the eighteenth century, yet the two could hardly offer a sharper contrast. Eighteenth-century materialism was a crude doctrine of the determinism of man's history by geographic and physiological phenomena. As Buckle stated it, history is a record of external forces, or nature, working on man. Historical materialism, on the other hand, is a distinctly sociological theory, giving no place to physiological factors, and none to geographical as such, but only as these are a phase of the economic situation. In fact, historical materialists have always been among the most severe critics of this earlier school of thought. The one thing which the two theories have in common is their radical departure from supernatural or semi-supernatural theories of social life, and their statement that an explanation of man's history is to be found rather within the realm of natural phenomena. In the first theory, the natural phenomena in question are largely physical and biological; in the second, entirely social.

Another misconception, quite at the other extreme, has arisen through the confusion of historical materialism with Utopian socialism or idealism. The latter's idea of the inevitable progress

of mankind toward a "just and true order" has been credited also to the materialists, although none familiar with this theory could make such an error. Utopian idealists base their theories of progress on certain *a priori* ethical convictions regarding human nature and conduct; while historical materialism purports to be a scientific theory of social change, in which attention is given to the sequences which may be expected under certain given social conditions. In these sequences one significant factor is the rôle of human groups and classes, motivated by ideas and ideals, which grow out of and are a reflection of their particular social experiences. In this statement is given the fundamental difference in approach to the rôle of ethics and ideas in the making of history. It also serves to indicate the basis from which the historical materialists criticized the Utopians: their neglect of the principle of relativity and the generally non-realistic and non-scientific character of their approach.[67]

One of the most common errors regarding historical materialism is that of interpreting the theory in terms of individual behavior. Rather it was the orthodox economists who invented the "economic man," equipped him with a set of rational and profit-motivated behavior-patterns, placed him in a series of imaginary situations, and then pulled the strings, using this puppet to explain the workings of the present economic system. The historical materialist theory, on the other hand, concerns itself with the sequences existing in collective or mass social phenomena, so much so that some critics have accused it of entirely neglecting the individual's rôle in social life. The reply given to this is, that from the standpoint of revealing general laws of social change, the individual as such is not important.

The chief objection of a number of scientists to the theory is the all-deterministic rôle which they say the theory gives to the economic process. It is quite legitimate, they state, to study social phenomena from any angle or approach. Since all phases

[67] For further discussion of the differences between the two, the reader is referred to F. Engels, *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism* (1907); *Feuerbach* (1906).

of social life are interdependent, it is possible to take religion, or the family, or the economic process, as the basic or causal factor, and study all other phases as effects. While they grant that economic factors play a very important part, it is inaccurate, they claim, to deny a rôle to other factors as well.

The materialist's reply would run somewhat as follows: We heartily agree that all phases of a society's life are interdependent and exert influences on one another; but some, such as the economic process and its concomitant, the political, exert more basic influences than the others. For fundamental social change originates in the economic process and is followed by changes in the other phases. Therefore, while it may be theoretically possible for a scientist to approach the study of social phenomena from various angles, these other approaches are not equally useful in revealing sequential relationships or in making possible predictions of major social developments. The materialistic technique has proved itself by the general accuracy of its predictions. They cite as examples, Marx's predictions as early as the fourth quarter of the last century regarding developments in India, China, and the Orient, resulting from the impacts of imperialistic industrialism upon these medieval economies; also his predictions regarding the concentration of capital; and Lenin's predictions on imperialist crises and struggles and colonial uprisings.

One final and quite widespread criticism leveled against the theory by some students of culture is that of its being in essence one of the "stage-theories of social evolution." In order to discuss this question, it is necessary to give a brief summary of the theory itself.

The theory of historical materialism [68] begins with the hypothesis that natural laws exist in the realm of social phenomena

[68] For a thorough theoretical exposition, one must turn to such European works as K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1913); *The Misery of Philosophy* (1910); *Capital,* vols. i-iii (Kerr edition, 1909-1913); F. Engels, *Feuerbach* (1906); *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism* (1907); N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (1925); N. Lenin, *Materialism and Critical Empiricism* (1926). Also see footnote 62.

as in all other phases of life, and that these laws or generalizations of sequential relationships, being a function of the interaction of social forces, can be comprehended by social scientists only through determination and analysis of these social forces and their characteristic interactions, under given conditions. Also from a study of social history it becomes evident that none of these social forces is biological or supernatural or individual in character. Hence, in order to understand the developments and trends in any civilization or social order, it is necessary to concentrate attention solely on that society's collective activities and functional interrelationships. Furthermore, research has revealed that while specific forms and content of societies vary, a basic dynamic complex of factors runs throughout them all. That is, the technology and social organization of production of society, including in the latter property and class relations especially, furnish the basis for and determine the major forms and content of the other phases of a society's collective life, especially its political structure and activities, and also its characteristic ideology and forms of family life, religion, art, etc. Furthermore, contradictions between the technological forces of production [69] and the existing property relations impeding production, together with class conflicts, furnish the primary impetus of social change within that society, until finally the point is reached where the old type of society gives way before the forces of a new social order. The class basis of social change is considered so much the crux of the situation that the theory has been summed up in these brief words, "History is a history of class struggles." For in each historical epoch there are to be found a class defending the status quo and opposing change, and a class whose interests and outlook make it the persistent champion of a new social order. The rôles of the developing bourgeoisie in the latter seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and of the working class in the modern era are pointed out as examples of this generalization.

[69] In this connection, the rôle of mechanical and other technological inventions is considered of great importance, as well as the diffusion of such inventions to new areas.

Since, given the relatively same social situation, the same general sequences will follow, and since in human cultural history certain basic similarities in forms of productive activity and organization have occurred repeatedly, either contemporaneously or otherwise, and have been succeeded by other forms, it is possible to classify these types of social orders, and also to generalize the broad sequences taking place under each type of specified conditions, into laws of social change. It is to be noted, however, that each generalization is relative to a specific set of conditions, and cannot be applied where these are lacking. Furthermore, the historical materialists hold that it is possible to trace out certain broad trends in historical development from a simple economy with its communal practices in regard to land, houses, and food, to an economy based primarily on agriculture and to a lesser extent on handicraft, with property and class relations, first of slavery and later of feudalism; through an era of commercial expansion, with its well-known characteristics; followed by the era of the industrial revolution, and the modern form of social order, known as industrial capitalist-imperialism.

Certain qualifying explanations made concerning these trends seem to have been overlooked by the critics. It is not held that every society must pass through all of these stages, nor that in any one period of history there is but one type of economic and social order. Rather, emphasis is placed upon the variations and contradictions existing among societies of a particular epoch, with special emphasis upon "the law of unequal development" of societies, even those of the same general type and same social epoch. These differences in rate of development are due to the integration of social forces within and surrounding each society, such as technology, general social heritage, social organization, and amount of contact with and economic position relative to the rest of the world.

However, certain general trends in cultural change can be observed. And with the development of trade and methods of communication bringing more and more parts of the world into

close contact and interdependence, has gone a strengthening and broadening of these general trends, until within the present era these have become world-wide in scope. Being mainly interested in the contemporary and immediately successive periods of history, Marxian materialists set themselves the primary task of discovering the laws of capitalistic society, its genesis, forces of growth, and the forces which the Marxians hold will finally lead to the replacement of capitalism, after a period of socialist transition, by a communist order of society. However, the materialistic technique is held to be equally applicable to any type of social order.

From the summary of the theory, it can be seen that historical materialism is not a mechanical "stage" theory of social evolution. At the same time, it does hold that there are general laws, or sequences of social development. This brings us to the topic around which so much controversy has been waging.

IV. Is Cultural Evolution a Fact?

For some years now the favorite sport among one section of American students of culture has been that of knocking the various so-called "stage" theories of social evolution into a cocked hat—at least to their own satisfaction. This reaction of the moderns is most natural, although hardly justified. In part, at least, it is based on false assumptions and leaves itself open to a most serious indictment—that of throwing out the baby with the bath. To put it more scientifically, these iconoclasts have not bothered to separate the essence of the theory from the untruths and misinterpretations which have clustered around it. They have made one long-drawn-out, grand gesture, and discarded the whole of it—scientifically valid hypotheses along with the rest. This is good dramatics, and may be good journalism, but it is certainly not good science.

There seem to be two radically different understandings or comprehensions of the theory, both in the statement of its hypothesis, and in methods and conclusions. It is the first and more

orthodox interpretation of social evolution, as expounded by Spencer, Tylor, Morgan,[70] and others, against which the modern culturalists in the main have revolted. This group took over the theory of evolution as worked out in relation to biological or geological data, and mechanically fitted it upon social phenomena. Every society was a part of the natural world and as such was supposed to have passed inevitably through certain stages of development. These stages were rather fixed, unvarying, and a product of some law of inner growth. There was an element of mysticism about the whole thing. Undoubtedly the conception of biological or instinctive factors as the basis of social life had much to do with this. Altogether, it was an *a priori,* mechanical theory, and quite unrelated facts were often pieced together and made to fit, willy-nilly, so as to prove its case.

Of course the errors in Morgan's treatment, as well as Spencer's, have long been demonstrated, and all mechanical theories of social evolution thoroughly discredited.[71] It is unfortunate that the concept of social evolution should be so closely identified in the thought of numerous modern writers on culture with the Spencerian formulation of it that they attack not only the latter but the theory of social evolution itself.

The other outstanding conception of social evolution is that of historical materialism, just previously discussed. This school, and other more recent exponents of the theory of social evolution, have generalized on two types of sequences, those which occur within civilizations of a similar order of development, and those which may be detected as general trends in culture as a whole. These two are usually considered as supplementary to one another, as indeed they are, although some writers have preferred to treat them as quite distinct and separate problems.[72]

[70] Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (1880) *Principles of Sociology* (1901); E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* 2 vols. (1871); L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1878).

[71] There is a more recent tendency to give Morgan's work its full due. See, for example, statements in R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), Preface; C. Wissler, "Anthropology," *op. cit.,* pp. 20-24.

[72] F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (1928); Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922).

The argument usually advanced against the first type of generalization is the unique character of each cultural group, and the failure, therefore, of sequences to repeat themselves. Those so arguing seem to have lost their perspective in the wealth of detail, and place so much emphasis on the many variations around the average that the average is itself entirely overlooked. For example, Tozzer, Lowie, and Goldenweiser stress the general lack of similar sequences in pre-literate societies; yet the careful student finds numerous instances of such sequences embodied in the material they present.[73] The classification of and generalizations on so-called primitive societies also go on apace, even at times by those who cry the loudest against them.

Some hold that the extent of diffusion between groups makes impossible prediction of sequential relationships within one group; but this is not true, provided the rôle of diffusion is understood and taken into account in formulating these sequences. For diffusion operates in certain determinable ways varying with conditions, so its rôle also may be predicted.

Critics of the second type of generalization, on sequences in cultural development as a whole, base their disagreement mainly on two premises: the non-existence of a main stream of culture and hence the improbability of stages of historical development.

Are these two premises valid? All students of culture emphasize the significance of the continuity of culture. As one author puts it, "Civilizations may come and go, but Culture goes on forever." In other words, there *is* a main stream or body of culture, and with the growth of commerce and means of intercommunication, and hence diffusion, there has been an increasing integration of the cultural life of various societies and an increasingly accessible common social heritage. The accumulation of culture is likewise stressed, as well as the fact of continuous social change. Now if culture has continuity and is forever undergoing changes and growth, what basis is there for assuming that there

[73] A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (1922); R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920); A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (1925).

are no general laws, that is, functional sequences, to these growths and changes? To deny the possibility of such natural laws is to make of these phenomena the one exception to what we know to be true of all realms of natural phenomena. Furthermore, when taken in conjunction with the idea of the uniqueness of each cultural group, this position involves the denial of the possibility of a science of culture. All that remains is a series of isolated descriptions. This offers a real dilemma—scientists without a science—although few of the critics of the social evolutionary theory have given evidence of recognizing it. Such a position is obviously unsound. Not only do general sequences in cultural development exist, but many important ones of these have been determined and knowledge of them has proved valuable not only to scientists but also to various groups engaged in practical affairs.

In recent years, a reaction to this general anti-evolutionary position seems to have set in. Wallis states that "anthropologists would not deny that there are laws of cultural development." [74] Tozzer says that his qualifications should not be interpreted as meaning that there is no evolution of culture, but only that there is not one single line of development.[75] Ogburn, in his review of *Ellwood's Cultural Evolution* (*Amer. Journ. Soc.*), gives rather guarded support to the general evolutionary hypothesis in his statement: "It is a question if there is much more in the idea of stages than a record of historical happenings." Would anyone say otherwise? Goldenweiser, an ardent critic of any theory of "stage evolution," points out that ethnology is now freeing itself from its methodological bondage and again renewing its interest in theory; and since elsewhere in the chapter he speaks of past evolution and the possibility in the future of directed evolution, one may infer that he would include a place in this developing theory for evolutionary hypotheses.[76] Wissler, Kroeber, and

[74] W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (1927), p. 7.

[75] *op. cit.*

[76] A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Evolution," a chapter in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences;* H. E. Barnes, ed. (1925), section vi, also pp. 227-228.

Chapin have advanced the concept of cyclical movements within a civilization's development.[77]

However, the majority of American students of culture, especially those known as sociologists and historians, have always held to the theory of social evolution. With some it is a continuance of the Spencer tradition; with others it seems to be identified with semi-religious convictions about "progress" and humanity's destiny, as, for instance, with Benjamin Kidd and Charles Ellwood.[78] With a third group, some of whom were mentioned earlier, it is an acceptance of the historical materialist theory of social evolution. Many combine elements of the various approaches, as, for instance, Sumner and Keller, who make the basis of evolution the necessity of man, with his biological needs adapting to ever-changing life conditions. Here biological and economic factors are combined as dynamic forces in evolution. Malinowski's evolutionary conception has a similar basis, although he makes of the family a more basic factor than do Sumner and Keller.[79]

Another interesting problem in relation to cultural evolution has been frequently discussed by American students of culture. This is the question of whether the process of cultural development includes normally both gradual and cataclysmic rates of change. In other words, whether revolutions—technological, social and political, artistic and ideological—are an integral part of evolution. Undoubtedly interest in this question has been greatly stimulated by the frequency of social revolutionary upheavals and the growth of avowedly revolutionary movements in western Europe and other parts of the world.

The vast majority hold the view that while technological revolution is to be expected, social revolution is an abnormal feature of cultural development. Others conceive of social revo-

[77] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture;* A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology;* F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change.*

[78] B. Kidd, *Social Evolution* (1895); Charles Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1913); *Cultural Evolution* (1928).

[79] See previous citations.

lutionary changes as practically inevitable in our present stage of social development, with powerful vested interests resisting any fundamental social change. Some, such as Ogburn, Barnes and Ellwood, have sounded warnings that social revolutions will come when social lags are allowed to accumulate to too vast proportions, as is happening in various parts of the world today. Goldenweiser has recently championed the view that "as soon as this prejudice is overcome it becomes obvious that relatively sudden change is at least as characteristic of the developmental process as is gradual transformation." [80] Further, revolutionary changes in culture "are not only common but necessary," although not necessarily desirable in all stages of culture. He concludes his discussion by expressing the hope that "the day may come when we shall achieve revolution, that is, revolutionary change, through directed evolution." [81] Such views as this are still uncommon, outside of the realm of the radical economists and sociologists.

To return to the general question of social evolution. It seems probable that the increasing attention being directed toward the theoretical basis underlying cultural research and analysis will mean a reinforcement of the interest in the natural laws underlying changes within a society and general cultural development.

V. The Science of Culture and Directed Social Change

It is inevitable that a science dealing with such subject matter as that of culture should concern itself with the problem of directed social change.

It has become almost a truism that the two tests of a science are its abilities to predict and to control phenomena. The term control is used here in its broader sense, referring both to directed control of phenomena, as in laboratory experiments, and to the utilization of natural laws for human purposes. These are tests

[80] *Op. cit.*, p. 228.
[81] *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

applied not only by scientists but by the work-a-day world as well. All sciences have developed in response to exigencies of the times, and are vitally related to human activities, some more directly than others. Hence, in order to survive, a science must in the long run meet the pragmatic test of practical usefulness. These requirements placed upon science by society are, of course, particularly true for the social sciences.

Today, however, one interesting aspect of the problem for cultural, as for any social, science arises out of the very fact that its data and conclusions are so closely interwoven with practical affairs and have such direct bearing upon them. For this science is developing not in a vacuum, but in a society divided by class and other group interests. Each of these has its own conception of "Progress," that is, the direction which social change should take. Furthermore, those groups in America financially and politically situated so as to be able to support the development of a science of culture are interested in findings and technique which will serve to stabilize the present economic and political regime and further their own advantage in it; while science, being no respecter of persons or classes, brings forth results to which these groups are often quite antagonistic.

The difficulty in this situation becomes especially acute in relation to the central problem of the science, that of social change. For, as Ogburn and others have pointed out, vested interests oppose all social changes which conflict with these interests; and America today offers no exception to this generalization. On the other hand, scientists of culture on the whole recognize that social change is inevitable, being in the nature of the social process, and that therefore the science's chief concern in its applied aspects is with the control and direction of this change.

Faced with these difficulties, it is not surprising that many of the scientists have become confused and divided among themselves. Some prefer to concern themselves entirely with remote or quite detailed aspects of culture, leaving these larger and more modern problems of social change to others. Yet the majority

of cultural scientists are working on phenomena directly related to current problems of social relations and cultural change. These must meet the issues involved. Some have used the findings as a justification of things as they are, or have pointed out the usefulness of some of the results to vested interests, as, for instance, in choosing personnel for industrial plants or armies, or in methods to be used in dealing with the simpler peoples, or in handling industrial, racial or colonial unrest. Far more of the recognized scientists dealing with these phenomena have come out with conclusions and programs of change more or less unorthodox. On such problems as race relations, war versus peace, imperialism versus internationalism, socialism versus capitalism, the conclusions and proposals for directed change range from mild liberalism to left-wing radicalism.

On the question of the possibility of directed social evolution on a national or international scale, the scientists are again divided. Some, as Lowie, decry the lack of scientific plan to present American society, terming it "a hodgepodge, a thing of shreds and patches," [82] and call for a more scientifically organized society. But they present little in the way of a concrete program for achieving it. Others feel, as Kroeber, that the whole problem is too stupendous, and that a society turned introspective about its relative achievements and shortcomings and possible future is on the verge of a pathological condition.[83]

Many more agree with Boas, Chapin, Ogburn, Goldenweiser and Wallis in their emphasis on the possibilities now opening up before the human race, of directed and planned social change and adjustment. Charles Beard stresses the fact that the mechanical and scientific basis for this rationally organized society is already laid, adding, "For the present the machine age is associated with capitalism . . . but machine civilization is by no means synonymous with capitalism—that ever-changing system of exploitation. . . . While socialism and capitalism stand face to face, the issue

[82] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), p. 441.

[83] A. L. Kroeber, "The Anthropological Attitude," *Amer. Mercury*, Apr., 1928.

of civilization will abide." [84] With this latter viewpoint Nearing and other radical students of culture are in substantial agreement, going a step further in pointing out that before this planned social change of which the others speak can be achieved, a revolutionary change in the control of society must take place. Russia, they add, is already demonstrating the possibilities of such a centrally planned, purposive organization of society by society, and as such furnishes an invaluable laboratory for the student of culture.

VI. Some Trends in Research

Trends in research are noticeable, both as regards subject matter and also as to methods employed. First, as to subject matter. There is a continuing interest in the disappearing cultures of our "contemporary ancestors," as they have been called. Research on American Indians, native Australian and African groups, Eskimos, etc., is under way, with greater emphasis on the securing of language data and more complete data on the group's social organization. America's social anthropologists are naturally concentrating their attention on the cultures to be found in the two Americas. The work of Boas and his group, and of Kroeber, Wissler, Lowie, Cooper-Cole, Sapir, Goldenweiser and others, is well known.[85] Excavation studies are also under way, in an

[84] Charles Beard, *Whither Mankind* (1928), pp. 4, 14, and *passim.*

[85] A partial list of these works follows: F. Boas, "The Central Eskimo," *Sixth Annual Report, Bur. of Amer. Ethnology* (1884-1885), pp. 409-667; "The Social Organization and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians," *Annual Report of the United States National Museum* (1895), pp. 311-738; "Handbook of American Indian Languages," 2 vols., (*Bur. of Amer. Ethnology,* 2 volumes (1913-1914), pp. 41-1475; *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911); "Ethnology of the Kwakiuth," *Thirty-Fifth Annual Report, Bur. of Amer. Ethnology* (1913); F. C. Cole, "The Wild Tribes of Davao District," *Anthro. Series, Field Museum of Natural History,* vol. vii, pp. 49-203; A. A. Goldenweiser, "Totemism: An Analytical Study" *Jour. Amer. Folklore* 1910, vol. xxiii, pp. 179-293; "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America," *Jour. Amer. Folklore,* 1914, vol. xxvii, pp. 411-436; *Early Civilization* (1922); M. J. Herskovits, "Some Effects of Social Selection on the American Negro," *Pub. Amer. Sociol. Society,* 1926, vol. xxxii, pp. 77-82; "The Cattle Complex in East Africa," *Amer. Anthrop.,* n.s., 1926, vol. xxviii, pp. 230-272, 361-388, 494-528, 633-664;

endeavor to complete as far as possible the reconstruction of the cultural history of the American continent. This field is a fertile one, and work has already yielded extensive results. Much more can be anticipated in proportion as funds are available for this field of research. Interest in social origins continues, with Lowie's *Origin of the State* as one of the recent valuable contributions in this field.

In recent years there has developed an interest in the study of the culture and culture groups of contemporary America. Most of these studies are being made by sociologists (who, on the whole, would not recognize themselves as "culturalists," and it is probably just as well). Some of the historians and institutional economists are also taking up this work, and a few of the social anthropologists. Some examples of this new trend are such studies as those made by the Chicago school of sociology, and The Commission for the Study of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast, and by the urban and rural sociologists; also studies of American imperialism, the family, the collective life of the gang, the hobo, the southern mill village group, the immigrant groups in America, the American Negro, and the southern mountaineers.[86] Also the more comprehensive type of study on North

A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923); *Handbook of the Indians of California, Bulletin 78* (*Bur. of Amer. Ethnology,* 1925); R. H. Lowe, "Ceremonialism in North America," *Amer. Anthrop.,* n.s., 1914, vol. xvi, pp. 602-629; *Primitive Society* (1920) *Primitive Religion* (1924); L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1878); P. Radin, *Crashing Thunder* (1926); E. Sapir, "Time Perspective in Aboriginal Culture, A Study in Method," *Memoir* 90 (No. 13, *Anthro. Series,* 1916); L. Spier, "The Sun-Dance of the Plains Indians: Its Development and Diffusion," *Anthropological Papers, Amer. Museum of Natural History,* 1921, vol. xiv; C. Wissler, *The American Indian* (1922); *Man and Culture* (1923); *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America* (1926).

[86] An illustrative list of these studies follows *The Pittsburgh Survey,* 1914; *The Negro in Chicago, The Chicago Commission on Race Relation* (1922); *The American Negro, (Amer. Academy of Polit. and Social Science* (1928); N. Anderson, *The Hobo* (1923); A. Calhoun, *History of the American Family,* vols. i-iii, 1917; D. P. Gary, *Carolina Mill Hill and Mill Hands* (1929); E. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (1928); J. C. Campbell, *The Southern Highlander and His Homeland* (1921); S. Nearing, *Black America* (1929); W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* five volumes (1927);

American civilization is being carried on. Perhaps the best example of this work to date is the two-volume study by Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization.*[87] The materialistic method is utilized with telling effect. While the study could be criticized in certain respects, it nevertheless stands as the most noteworthy contribution in this field. Other studies of American culture are cited in the footnote.[88]

In the space of this chapter, it is impossible to enter into a detailed treatment of the interesting topic of trends in methods of research. Various techniques and approaches have already been discussed briefly, as that of the American anthropologist and the historical materialist, so that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to them here.

The anthropologists have always given a strong and correct emphasis to field work. Those coming from sociology have been slower to develop field technique, but now that they are going more into this type of research they are exerting a theoretically helpful influence. In field work and analysis of data on the simpler cultures, quite a little attention has been given by some students to the geographic distribution of traits and complexes, on the theory that the age, genesis and history of these so-called traits and complexes might be determined thereby. There has been lately a critical reaction to this. Wissler, for example, proposed some rather sweeping generalizations as a result of his investigations; these have been sharply challenged by Dixon, and Wallis has challenged the making of dispersion a

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L. Davis, *The Russian Immigrant* (1922); F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (1927); E. B. Reuter, *The Mulatto in the United States* (1918); W. Mitchell, *Business Cycles* (1913); *Business Cycles and Unemployment* (1923); U. Sinclair, *The Brass Check* (1919).

[87] Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization,* in two volumes, (1928).

[88] A. M. Simons, *Social Forces in American History;* C. Beard, ed., *Whither Mankind* (1928); S. Nearing, *The American Empire* (1921); S. Nearing and J. Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy* (1926). Some attention is given to modern American culture in C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923). So far there have been few studies on contemporary American culture as a whole.

criterion of age.[89] Other weaknesses in studies of trait and complex distributions have been indicated earlier. While some rather useful findings have been secured, these are largely in spite of the theoretical assumptions underlying the research. When more adequate units of investigation are employed, studies of the diffusion of activity complexes will undoubtedly yield valuable results.

The so-called "historical method," as developed by Boas and his school, is largely a reëmphasis on the importance of a genetic and specific case study of each cultural group in its historical setting. This technique, largely followed by American students of pre-literate cultures, has on the whole proved very valuable, yet it has certain shortcomings. Besides the difficulties with units, the great interest in the unique characteristics of each group's culture has sometimes led to a partial neglect of other more ordinary phases of its culture and hence resulted in a non-rounded treatment. Also, the securing of language data and data on so-called material culture is very important, but there has been a tendency to give disproportional and rather mechanical attention to these phases and too little attention to securing of complete data on other equally important phases. These and other deficiencies are being partially met by further development of other techniques of collecting and handling data, such as the social-behavioristic (or social process) and the statistical method of analysis.[90] The functionalists, in their emphasis on the necessity of studying the life of each group as a whole, and its functional interrelationships, and on the importance also of participant ob-

[89] C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); R. Dixon, *The Building of Cultures* (1928); and Wilson D. Wallis, "Diffusion as a Criterion of Age," *Amer. Anthropologist,* n.s., 1925, vol. xxvii, pp. 91-99.

[90] Besides studies previously mentioned, these studies are illustrative of the trend: Ruth F. Benedict, "The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America," *Memoir 29, Amer. Anthro. Assn.*, 1923; Walter T. Watson, "A New Census and an Old Theory: Division of Labor in the Pre-Literate World," *Amer. Journal of Socio.*, vol. xxiv, No. 4, 1929, pp. 653-670; Vivien Palmer, *Field Studies in Sociology* (1928).

server technique, have influenced current methodology in a positive direction.[91]

The present problem seems to be primarily one of integration of the sound elements of the various techniques available, as well as the acquiring of new elements through critical experimentation with this integrated technique. Also more deliberate experimenting in culture building on a large and well-planned scale would yield valuable results; but at the present time in America and western Europe there are a considerable number of factors standing in the way of such experimentation.

[91] In this connection, see especially the introduction to B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922).

CHAPTER V

THE TREND OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY[1]

By Carle C. Zimmerman

THE logical approach to this subject would be to define, first of all, sociology, and then the rural community. After that, it would be possible to consider the development of rural sociology and to relate the changes to the supposed underlying causes. A few remarks might be made which would indicate merely the opinion of the writer concerning the proposed work in rural sociology of the future. But definitions are tiresome. And in the social sciences they are so complex, and in many cases so subjective, that each writer, and reader, may have his own likes and dislikes. Consequently, this chapter is limited to an analysis of the writings in rural sociology, a summary of some of the other material in the same field, and some analytical suggestions. With this viewpoint in mind, let us turn to a realistic discussion of some of the works in rural sociology.

As to the origin of rural sociology in America, the writer follows the earlier analysis of Dwight Sanderson.[2] Professor C. R. Henderson of the University of Chicago gave the first course in rural sociology at that university in 1894-95. It was announced in the catalog as follows:

> 31. Social conditions in American Rural Life. Some Problems of Amelioration, Presented by Life on American Farms and Villages will be considered. M. First term. Winter Quarter. Associate Prof. Henderson.

Sixteen students registered for the first class. Who they were and what has become of them, we do not know. Kenyon Butter-

[1] For suggestions and critical reading of this manuscript the writer is indebted to Pitirim Sorokin, Edmund deS. Brunner, Carl C. Taylor, and Dwight Sanderson.

[2] *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, 1916, vol. ii.

field was probably the first to give a course in a land grant college (Rhode Island Agricultural College, 1904). The University of Wisconsin may have had courses before that time. From this feeble start, rural sociology has grown until now there are about 600 teachers of the subject in the various normal schools, colleges and universities of the United States. More than a dozen textbooks and numerous research monographs are available for use in these courses.[3]

From the first to the last, rural sociologists have shown a bias toward the problem of ethical evaluation of rural behavior. This is illustrated at the beginning by Professor Henderson's course at Chicago, which uses the statement "problems of amelioration," and now by a recent text which gives as the primary characteristic of rural sociology the name "science of adequacy."[4] The first conclusion is, then, that rural sociology has not attempted to build primarily a nomographic science of society or a body of social laws, but has written about rural society with the idea of pointing out inadequate practices and suggesting social reforms. Without being specific, the statement may be made that the major part of the writings called rural sociology may be classified under "suggestions for improvement." The majority of the remainder of these books falls under what may be termed descriptions of rural communities and of rural people. Scarcely any portions are devoted to the establishment of principles or laws. In this sense these books differ from works in the natural sciences and in some other social sciences which attempt to give in each chapter, and sometimes in every few pages, a set of laws or corollaries to laws.[5]

[3] The works of C. J. Galpin, Carl C. Taylor, J. M. Gillette, Paul Vogt, N. L. Sims, James Phelan, Kenyon Butterfield, H. B. Hawthorne, G. A. Lundquist, T. N. Carver, J. H. Kolb, Dwight Sanderson, Macy Campbell, Edmund deS. Brunner, C. Luther Fry, A. W. Hayes, P. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and many others.

[4] N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology.*

[5] See C. L. Holmes, *Economics of Farm Organization and Management,* as an illustration of this attempt to develop and use social laws. This is a recent text in agricultural economics.

The term "law" is used in this discussion in the sense commonly accepted

This statement, that rural sociology has made few attempts to establish social laws, must not be taken as a criticism. Much of other sociology consists of description rather than statements of principles. Further, it does not deny that the authors state, consciously and unconsciously, numerous alleged principles throughout various sections of the volumes. Neither is it a denial that other workers in the same field, who have never thought of themselves as rural sociologists, have stated and established a few "laws" in many fields ordinarily covered in treatises on rural sociology.[6] Also, it is evident that these other social sciences are trying to promote reforms. The economists are trying to reform the "dollar" or the "business cycle." The point made here is that the sociologists often put the cart before the horse—they attempt to plan the reforms before they develop the principles.[7]

The tendency of rural sociology to establish and to maintain itself primarily as a system of suggested ethical procedure has been aided, no doubt, by the religious background of many of

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in experimental science, as an hypothesis which gives a *résumé* of the most general behavior of a large number of separate individual cases. It continues as an accepted explanation until a more adequate interpretation of the general trend of separate, but related, events is found. This is the meaning given to the term law in the social sciences generally. Alfred Marshall (*Principles of Economics,* 7th ed., p. 33) says: "Thus a law of social science, or a *Social Law,* is a statement of social tendencies; that is, a statement that a certain course of action may be expected under certain conditions from the members of a social group." V. Pareto repeatedly makes this same type of characterization for the "laws" of his "logico-experimental" sociology. (See *Traité de sociologie générale,* Tome 1, pp. 28ff., and numerous other places.) See Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 42ff., for an elaboration of this logical system of Pareto. See also Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* 2nd ed., p. 11, for a similar statement regarding the "natural laws" in sociology.

[6] See E. Durkheim's rural-urban correlations in *Le Suicide;* Raymond Pearl's correlations as established in various chapters of his *Studies in Human Biology;* Stuart Rice, *The Quantitative Method in Politics;* J. G. Thompson, *Urbanization;* Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant;* E. Engel, *Die Lebenskosten;* Slosse and Waxweiler, *Enquête sur le régime alimentaire;* A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century;* some of the works of Otto Ammon, G. V. de Lapouge, George Hansen, F. Maas, R. Thurnwald, and hundreds of others.

[7] See C. E. Ayres, *Science, the False Messiah,* for proof of this statement concerning social sciences generally and reform ideologies.

the leaders in the movement. This was true of many other branches of social science also. This ethical attitude has not only gone into the writings of the books, but it underlies their foundations. The philosophy of the ethical mind is to establish and maintain certain practices. Thus, the rural sociologists as a rule have not taken an exceptionally critical attitude regarding the backgrounds of the beliefs they have attempted to foster, but have put major emphasis on promotion. As a result, material based on critical investigation has often been subordinated to promotion of accepted theories. The primary demands of most past and present rural sociology, as previously established, were for a practical everyday living ethics and not for a nomographic science. There have of course been numerous exceptions to this tendency to make rural sociology "evaluative." But the general tendency has been as discussed. This type of procedure has been aided by the fact that many of the teachings of other social sciences are evaluative and subjective. Those of the rural sociologists who took graduate training in the universities of America were influenced by these evaluative courses. It is only lately, if even yet, that these universities have made any real progress in establishing and giving a truly scientific sociology—in the sense of principles of certain phases of human behavior.[8]

The net result of this procedure is that sociology has grown up as a sort of applied ethics. It is called science, but according to the categories of science it is in many ways unscientific. This raises one of the first and primary questions of this chapter—is a science of rural sociology or of sociology of rural life possible or desirable? If so, how may such a science be attained?

The writer is not competent to settle these philosophical and speculative questions. He can only discuss them and offer a few conclusions on the basis of his biases and personal opinions. In his opinion, then, such a science is desirable and has some prospects of attainment. The way has already been pointed out by

[8] See E. B. Reuter's analysis of the "lunatic fringe" in *Sociology and Social Research,* November, 1928.

the achievements of competent investigators who have made researches in numerous of the minor problems dealt with in rural sociology courses. But this does not mean that the writer believes that it will be possible to predict all social phenomena with great accuracy. We may find there are few if any relative uniformities in human behavior. Such a conclusion in itself would be valuable.

I. Is a Science of Rural Sociology Needed or Desirable?

Why is a science of rural sociology desirable? There are numerous reasons. One of these is that universities are created to develop and to impart scientific knowledge.[9] Thus far the popular demand for science has been sufficient to pay for scientific knowledge. Until the achievements of science, or the lack of achievement, kill the popular demand, we have a right to assume that one duty of our universities is to provide researches to formulate more and more scientific laws or principles.

A second reason is that this applied ethics which is taught as rural sociology is operating under a false name if it claims to be science. Since it has been given such a name, and has so far gained prestige as such, the first problem for the rural sociologists is to make good by developing a science.

A third reason is that the present state of rural sociology as an evaluative body of knowledge is a condition that places too much moral responsibility upon men working in this field. Suppose that the farmers and rural classes of America and Europe were to take the advice of the rural sociologists (and others) seriously. Many of them would unquestionably recommend birth control, for instance, as a means of controlling the number of the population. Already the two-child family has been recommended to the American farmer by serious writers. Following

[9] Some of the advisers who read this paper questioned this statement. It is merely an opinion of the writer. Numerous academic men and administrators hold to this idea. Others question its validity.

out this line of thought, let us picture a social condition in America and in Europe in which each farm family had only two children. This might be all right if no serious consequences followed. But what would be the reaction if the rural population followed the trend of the urban population, or the population of France or of ancient Rome, and kept on reducing the size of the family? Who could solve the problem under such circumstances?[10] A science of rural sociology should show the relations which exist between two or more functional variables. Others would use these established principles of human behavior to achieve the things they may desire. The case is similar to that of a lucky speculator who won steadily on the stock market. A less fortunate friend wished him to invest some money. The gambler refused. He did not wish the responsibility, yet he was willing to show his friend all the "buys" and "sells" he made on the market. Rural sociology, by making itself purely an evaluative discipline, is placed in the position of an unwise gambler. In many respects the position of the rural sociologist is worse, because the procedure he is suggesting for the rural community has not proved itself workable to the same extent that the buying and selling scheme of the successful market speculator has done. A science of functional relationships in human behavior is needed. Its creation can bring about little harm and may, perhaps, accomplish some good. An evaluative body of knowledge, based upon no firmer foundation than our present or probable knowledge of human behavior (for the next hundred years) is likely to be a real source of danger. What economist is willing to say for certainty that the American farmer would better himself and society as a whole by the adoption of the proposed export-bounty on farm crops? Yet the field of economic theory and functional

[10] This problem of the size of the rural family is not only of national significance, but to the farm family as well. E. A. Willson of North Dakota has shown that married farmers and those with large families weathered the agricultural crisis, 1920-26, best in western North Dakota. See *Quar. Jour. of the University of North Dakota,* July, 1928.

relationships in economics, at least in a theoretical sense, is much better worked out than much of the field of sociology.

This leads to a fourth important reason. In the opinion of the writer, the factual basis of most of this applied ethics called rural sociology *is* wrong. A corollary to this statement is that much now being taught in rural sociology, whether it be called principles or faiths, is wrong or inadequate.[11] These "facts," "principles," and "faiths" will not stand the light of scientific criticism. It often appears that the rural sociologists have approached rural life from the viewpoint of the urbanite and have merely attempted to reorganize farm life from this urban viewpoint. The only way to stop this iniquitous procedure is to bring scientific criticism and methods into sociology and to kill this contamination at its source.

To be rather specific about this matter, we shall take up a few problems and point out what seem to be invalid suggestions and procedures. Let us begin with the development of farm tenancy. Since 1880, when the United States Census began to record figures concerning this problem, there has been an increase of tenancy, but at a decreasing rate. Numbers of rural sociologists have taken up this matter as a sort of battle standard. Here is something which wins popular appeal, because it is a generally recognized fact that the redistribution of land has been an important political phenomenon as far back as records exist—at least to the Licinian laws in Rome. A few of the writers give references to the land question in Great Britain, and point to less than 10-per-cent ownership in England. This introduces another slogan —The American Farmer is Heading Toward Peasantry—whatever that means.

The writer is not maintaining that there are not several impor-

[11] Some of the advisers object violently to this statement. The writer takes the whole responsibility. A forthcoming *Rural Sociology* by Sorokin and Zimmerman will attempt to demonstrate this (to be published by Henry Holt & Company, 1929). The University of Minnesota Press has under preparation a three-volume *System of Rural Sociology* by Galpin, Sorokin and Zimmerman, which will attempt to show this in more detail.

tant land problems in America; but at the same time he is firm in his belief that this idea has been overworked considerably by the sociologists as well as by some economists. The recent report of the Business Men's Commission on Agriculture makes the same type of statements. Dr. Leon E. Truesdell has given some proof that this increase in tenancy is primarily a natural phenomenon—a reaction to the frontier. Between 1910 and 1920 and between 1920 and 1925, according to Truesdell, the increase in tenancy has been in the West, primarily at the frontier, while many of the eastern states and sections have shown a decline. In other words, the rate of farm tenancy is largely a natural phenomenon in society, and these writers working under the name of science have made it a social problem. A study of the land systems in Europe gives further basis for this belief.

During the days of the historical frontier in Europe (from the time of the development of the Roman Empire and the gradual traveling of settled agricultural systems northward), this same type of difference in status regarding land existed on the frontier as in the United States. The families on the frontier could win lands easily, and their tenure status was higher than in the settled regions. Serfdom and the manorial system did not reach northern and northeastern Europe until the modern age. Before 1550 the Danish peasants had representation in the Diet, similar to their present position after 1860. In between these dates the manorial system developed and expired in Denmark. The same general conclusions apply to the whole development of the European frontier and its correlation with fluctuations in land tenure.[12] The same conclusion also applies in general to the military *coloni* of the Roman Empire, where they were placed on the frontier lands taken from tribes having no settled agricultural economy. The so-called breaking up of the manorial system also

[12] See the works of Henri Sée, C. Dareste de la Chavanne, Victor Brants, P. Boissonade, W. E. Heitland, P. Vinogradoff, Tenney Frank, M. Rostovtzeff, and many others for the various fluctuations in social status of peasants and the forms of land holding. For a careful analysis and denial of the above catastrophic theory see H. D. Irvine, *The Making of Rural Europe* (1923).

came earlier in the older settled regions. Serfdom was gradually disappearing in France, Great Britain and the older settled countries, when it was just beginning to develop in the north and east. Further analysis of the land systems in many of these countries reveals no tendency for the small peasant to disappear—contrary to the predictions of the Marxian "scientific" socialists in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the socialists of Europe long ago recognized this fallacy in the predictions of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. At the Breslau Congress in 1895, they revised the socialist program in an attempt to gain peasant support. Instead of nationalization of land, they promised the peasants state crop insurance and the state ownership of mortgages, with low rates of interest. We need not go further in this analysis to show that some of these writers have taken one of the natural phenomena of rural society and made it into a form of social pathology. Such ideas can be exposed only by getting at the facts. Genuine social laws can not be drawn from partial data which represent only one or two countries or a limited number of years.

One reader asked for proof of the thesis that the rate of farm tenancy is a natural phenomenon in society rather than a form of social pathology.[13] He makes the statement in this text that "The question of whether American rural civilization will develop into a peasant civilization or even into a tenant and hired-man civilization depends upon whether we develop a 'rural life complex' which will work to the end of seeing that agricultural economic gains fruit in enhanced rural standards of living." [14] He earlier indicated [15] that the trend of society in other than countries of free land is toward a gradual debasement of the situation of the rural classes. The answer to this is that historical fluctuations in the status of the tillers of the soil do not prove the thesis. This thesis of a straight-line (or curvilinear) relationship between age of settlement of an agricultural territory and the debasement of

[13] See Carl C. Taylor, *Rural Sociology.*
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 498.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 494.

the rural classes, unless public measures be taken to prevent it, is obviously unsound. Such was by no means always or nearly always true in the earlier history of agriculture, during which time strong social classes were trying to secure land rights over the peasants because land was the basis of political power. The absence of such attempts to control land by the upper classes would make the theory less true today. If the theory were valid, ancient agricultural civilizations, such as those of China and India, would show few if any owner operators today. On the contrary, according to the Chinese government in 1920, there were about 25 million owners, 11 million part-owners, and only 14 million tenants in China at the time.[16]

The writer is not contending that public agencies should not be concerned about the fluctuations of social status of the agriculturalists as a class. On the other hand, he does contend that the agricultural ladder is an agency for social selection and social testing of the candidates for land rights and privileges. It operates harshly, but at the same time as efficiently, if not more efficiently, than most other agencies for social selection and testing. It is logical to believe that the decline of the frontier would be associated with increased rates of tenancy. But to assume from that increase a general correlation between age of settlement and the gradual debasement of the rural classes is carrying this correlation too far. Further, the rate of increase of farm tenancy is decreasing, which indicates a tendency toward stabilization. Dr. Truesdell's studies in Farm Economics (October, 1926) are convincing and are in line with the trend in Europe. This correlation between the development of our present civilization and the debasement of the rural classes is nothing but a repetition of the earlier theories of Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto.* As indicated earlier, it was recognized as invalid by the European socialists as early as 1895.[17]

[16] See To Chen, *Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,* No. 340, 1923, p. 6.

[17] See especially H. D. Irvine, *op. cit.,* and Henri Sée, *Historie du Régime Agraire en Europe aux* 18 *et* 19 *siècles.*

For a second illustration, take the discussions of the rural mind. Most of the texts contain either chapters or partial chapters attempting to make an analysis of the so-called mind of the farmer.[18] Several monographs have been written on the subject. The following statements concerning the analysis of this topic concern only the specific generalizations given without basis of facts. However, this applies to most of the conclusions since, with the exception of a few studies, not many facts or results of researches are given. In the various studies, the reader is warned at one place that the farmer is an introvert; at another, suggestible; and at others, emotional, grasping, selfish, individualistic, narrow-minded, bigoted, and possessing dozens of other characteristics, some valuable and others dangerous. The rural sociologists proper do not get all the discredit for this analysis, because much of it comes from writers who are now working in other fields. One writer believes that the instinct of pugnacity is overdeveloped on the farm because farm people deal primarily with dumb animals which cannot reason. That being the case, there should be no pugnacity in the wheat belt—yet this is the most militant of agrarian areas. He finally concludes that the instincts of country people will all be taken care of if sufficient numbers can be induced to play together under local leadership. Through this the rural people should learn to coöperate. At the same time, the United States Census reports tell us that the only real basic coöperative system in America is on the farms. By 1925 there were 12,000 coöperative associations on American farms, and they handled more than two and a half billion dollars of products.[19]

[18] Some of those who were so kind as to criticize this paper object to the use of the term "mind." We shall not quarrel over terminology, but define "mind" for purposes of this discussion as relatively constant psychical reactions common to a class of the population. For this chapter it makes no difference whether these constant characteristics are inherited or acquired.

[19] See E. R. Groves, *The Rural Mind.* This idea in essential details permeates much of rural sociology. For a clear refutation see the analysis of coöperation in H. D. Irvine, *op. cit.* Such economic coöperation is almost as prevalent now as it was in the early clans.

Many of these contradictions could be overlooked if there were no alternative to speculation in the study of the rural mind. But that is not so. Various social scientists have made careful analyses, from time to time, of specific traits that are more characteristic of the rural mind. Most of these appeared from ten to fifteen years before these various interpretations of the rural mind were written. Cushman's careful study of voting on the Ohio constitution in 1912 furnished the basis for some approximate generalizations nearer the truth than these subjective speculations. The works of William Ogburn and Delvin Peterson for Oregon in 1916, L. B. Shippee's study for Washington in 1915, earlier studies by Beard, Libby, Coulter, and later studies by Rice, have furnished a much broader basis for an analysis of the general traits of the rural mind. It is possible to get the vote in the rural and urban cantons of Switzerland on the 83 issues that have been decided by the referendum since 1872.[20] Rappard, writing from Switzerland for an American journal (*Political Science Quarterly,* 1923), has already called this matter to the attention of American scholars. Numbers of these studies have dealt with the same or similar issues in different states, different countries, and for different times. By combining their common characteristics, it is possible to outline the main features of the political thinking of farmers or peasants. The same applies to his religious thinking, his family mind, his business mind, etc. The constitution of various political parties in Europe is also a matter of public record (given in most of the annual yearbooks of the countries). It is known whether the farmer or rural dweller follows the socialist, communist, conservative, nationalist, or centralist parties for these countries. In spite of all this material, there is a plethora of speculation concerning the rural mind, much of which may not last when scientific criticism is applied to it. There may be traits of the rural mind which rise out of the environment of the country. Rural voters opposed the abolition of

[20] See the annual copies of *Statistisches Jahabuch der Schweiz.* Many of these will be analyzed in the work by Sorokin and Zimmerman already cited.

capital punishment in Oregon, Washington, and Ohio, and the abolition of military justice in Switzerland. From these data, it appears that farmers have a taste for capital punishment. The object of a scientific sociology is to explain that taste.[21] Thus far little progress has been made in scientific explanation.

No further illustrations need be given. If the birth rate, the death rate, the vital index ($\frac{100 \text{ births}}{\text{deaths}}$), the marriage rate, the divorce rate, the fluctuations in community morphology, or any real index of the social organization of farm life or of peasants and farmers as a social class, be analyzed thoroughly, many

[21] One of the advisers suggests that by giving these votes of farmers in favor of capital punishment, I have refuted a previous statement that the attribution of conservatism to farmers is questionable. The answer is that the term conservatism is not very well defined. But if the most common meaning for conservatism be taken, that the farmer holds himself in alliance with the capitalist and conservative elements in society, this theory is not true. How can the farmer-labor alliance in Minnesota be explained if the farmer is conservative? If the rural classes are always conservative, how may their alliance with the proletariat in the French Revolution of 1792 be explained? A scientific sociology would balk at an explanation such as this. Rather it would suggest that in economic characteristics the farmer-peasant class are similar to all urban social classes and different from all of them. That is, he receives wages, interest, rent, profits, and types of income similar to all city classes. In size of income and consumption of economic goods he is close to the lower urban classes. In entrepreneurship he is similar to the upper classes. As a result we should expect to find at times farmer-labor radical alliances, farmer-capitalist conservative alliances, and at others, rural-urban conflict. Historical studies show this to be the case. At times the farmer is radical, and at others conservative. According to the definition of a social law given earlier in this chapter, this correlation between ruralism and economic conservatism does not stand. The same applies more thoroughly to similar correlations in which the term conservatism is broadened to include other types of behavior rather than economic. But the correlation between ruralism and the votes on capital punishment, as far as the facts were given here, was relatively constant and permanent. The introduction of more facts would in all probability destroy the permanency of this correlation also. To give an illustration, the rural classes have generally voted for prohibition. The only important dry party in Europe (the liberal dry of Sweden) secures its support in the rural districts. But the rural and urban vote on the prohibition amendment in Minnesota in 1918 showed a negative and insignificant relationship of —.0704 between percentages of the population on farms and percentages favoring the Eighteenth Amendment. (This correlation with prohibition votes was worked out by William Gordon in a seminar in rural sociology conducted jointly by Pitirim Sorokin and the writer.)

speculations and questionable hypotheses are likely to be found. This is inevitable and to be expected. If rural sociology, or the sociology of rural life, is to be called a science, it must accept more of the dogmas, spirit, and methods of science. It must first humble itself into a series of principles or "systematics" before it may rise again as an applied science with real value.

II. The Essentials for a Science of Rural Sociology

The first and primary requisite for the development of a science of rural sociology is the recognition that there is little difference between rural sociology and any other sociology. Rural sociology merely attempts to explain rural life by the theories of sociology proper. However, in addition to this, it develops those correlations within the science of sociology which arise because some populations are rural and others urban. *Rural sociology uses sociology and at the same time is sociology.* This statement is placed in italics to emphasize the position of the writer in regard to the recent movements for an "independent" rural sociology. Logically and practically there appears very little basis for such an independent body of knowledge. The first suggestion is, then, that rural sociologists be trained as sociologists. In undergraduate study, in the advanced work, and in all other essentials, they should be trained in the same way. Furthermore, once their school work is finished, they should attend the same societies, read the same magazines, and be subject to the same phobias and dogmas as other sociologists. Of course it is necessary for the rural sociologist to know something about agriculture. He should know the essential details of the technical sciences of the agricultural business, such as, for illustration, the soil sciences. On the other hand, he should know cities and city life. He can know agriculture only by knowing urban life at the same time. As a matter of fact, this is what rural sociologists have been attempting to do for some time.

The second primary requisite for a science of rural sociology is the development of functional analysis to replace many of the

ethical judgments that first appeared in the field. This is no attack on ethics or social valuation. Each endeavor has its time and place. But society has paid men to develop science. It is paying men at present to develop a science of rural sociology. A functional analysis of rural social life will in no way hinder agrarian reforms. As a matter of fact, we have reasons to believe that it may aid in such work more than some of the reforming sociology. Only by such a movement may it regenerate itself.

A third requisite is the further development of a science in the field of general sociology. Much of the writings of general sociology are filled with an "ethics" of a sort more dangerous to social stability than those in the rural field. The rural sociologist is often an active partisan of certain reforms leading to the urbanization of society, whereas other sociologists are partisans of more radical reforms. Such items as birth control, freedom of women, freedom of the press, racial equality, the present political parties, progress, the labor movement—these and many others have been the object of the evaluative judgments of many sociologists. What do these have to do with a science of sociology and social organization? As the writer looks back and examines his own development in sociology, he finds that four-fifths of the impressions he received could be classified now under the general heads of Christian socialism and the least valid portions of institutional economics. Needless to say, the general sociologists should lead the way to a science of sociology. They are doing this to some extent, but not as rapidly as is desirable and possible.

The last and most important requisite for a science of rural sociology is a viewpoint or approach. This viewpoint may be used to replace much of the reformist concepts, and as the central core around which the principles may be built. The development of a science will be achieved only as a central viewpoint is developed. Of course, without this viewpoint many minor conclusions and principles will appear here and there, but the rounded advancement of the whole field is retarded. The furnishing of a viewpoint in sociology is dependent primarily on work in the

general field. In many respects this is achieved, but there is still considerable difference of opinion. Other social sciences are in the same condition. A certain geologist who was made chairman of a study involving the whole gamut of social sciences made the remark that if any one social science followed out the purposes which could be read into its definition, it would cover the whole work now being jointly attempted by all. It is not the purpose of this discussion to make definitions or give the viewpoints of rural sociology. It is inevitable that the science dealing with the most variable forms of the most variable phenomena should be split up into schools and viewpoints. At the same time, much can be done to generalize these approaches.

III. "Hodgepodge" Rural Sociology

One worker in sociology remarked that rural sociology was a "hodgepodge." "They introduce a little sanitation, a little geography, a little economics, and a little everything, but not much of anything." [22] The answer to that statement is two-fold. First, if this condition is true, it is due to this "reformism" and to the lack of development of scientific principles in general sociology; and second, it is the way to a science of rural sociology. We may say what we wish concerning the finding of an unexploited field for rural sociology, but there is none left. This, of course, does not mean that sociology has no functions or no original contribution to make. We cannot study man in his political behavior because that is the field of political science; his economic behavior is taken care of by economics, schooling by education, learning and intelligence by psychology, organization by law, etc. His culture, as far as the writer is acquainted with the general concepts of culture, is covered by all of these. If we are looking for a field of sociology or rural sociology, there is none, just as there is no field for history. Each separate field has its own historical approach. That which is original and valuable about sociology must come from a study of the entire behavior of the individual.

[22] In a personal letter to the writer.

The statement that rural sociology is a "hodgepodge" means that we are still looking for a neglected field of human endeavor. If sociology takes the whole of the behavior of the individual as a unit and attempts to relate it to all the fields of endeavor and to the physical and biological backgrounds, then such an endeavor has some value and originality.[23] All social sciences deal with group life, with organization, with culture, with interpretative history, with interaction, with morphology, with ecology, and with most of the other fields which some sociologists maintain as the unique and unexploited field of sociology.[24]

HOW DOES THE "HODGEPODGE" YIELD SOCIOLOGY?

A practical illustration will show what the writer means by developing sociology out of this "hodgepodge." Let us take farmers as a social class and investigate them carefully. According to geographic location, they are settled less densely than other classes. Economics tells us that they have low incomes, but large real property holdings. Education and psychology tell that they have limited school facilities, high rates of illiteracy, and low scores on intelligence tests. Demography tells that they pos-

[23] This is Sorokin's conception taken from his *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* chap. xiv. It agrees with what sociologists as a group have been doing. Such a sociology gives "purpose to history," to quote the historical sociologists who are followers of E. Durkheim and his school. See Henri Beer's introduction to Moret and Davy, *From Tribe to Empire.*

[24] Professor Dwight Sanderson takes issue with this point as follows: "You state that all social sciences deal with group life. This, of course, is quite obvious. Is it not true, however, that each one of the social sciences deals with a specific aspect of group life and that none of them but sociology attempts to study groups as phenomena." This would limit sociology to a codification of the purest principles developed in all the social sciences, and a later attempt to find the interrelations between these principles or laws. With this viewpoint the writer has no quarrel. Pareto uses this conception in the introductory paragraph to *Traité de sociologie générale,* Tome I. Numerous others have used the viewpoint that sociology is merely the abstraction and codification of the purest laws in all social sciences. But all of the social sciences and all of sociology have by no means been limited to the study of group phenomena. This does not affect the second point, to be made later, that no matter what limits be given to the field of sociology, the original contribution of rural sociology will be the correlations within that field which arise because of a rural environment.

sess less variability, whether it be of physical traits, (size of head, length of arm, etc.) incomes, psychical traits (intelligence quotients, school achievement, etc.). Further, their mobility is the lowest and their stability is the highest. Their death rates are lower, their birth rates higher, marriage rates lower and marital status (proportions married) higher. In addition, they furnish more of the recruits to the upper classes than any group except the upper classes themselves (proportionately to numbers). According to physical measurements, they are little different from the average of city populations. In political attitudes they represent all elements in society, but are not as conservative as the upper urban classes, nor as radical as the lower urban classes. Their political allegiances fluctuate from time to time and from country to country. In political activity (proportions of registered voters voting) they are not essentially different from urban populations (the variation is great from country to country, from time to time and from year to year). In their ethical and religious mind they represent the Old Testament. In wars and public issues they are very nationalistic. They are at times strongly opposed to socialism and communism. Their families are closely knit, integrated, and stable units.

The previous characterization of rural peoples as a class is a hodgepodge. But it may lead to the development of sociology. We see differences between two types of populations, if all urban be considered as one type for purposes of discussion. There are no evidences of physical or biological differences. The first general sociological conclusion to be drawn is that the major differences between rural and urban populations are matters of environment. A second is that the mobility and instability of city populations are an important factor in these environmental differences. The third is that the religious and family organization of rural life is an important factor. A fourth is that the natural processes in a rural and urban society provide for a town-country division of labor. The towns more or less assume the burden of consuming population, and the country those of pro-

ducing and rearing population.[25] Fifth, the process of urbanization is a continual transfer of one culture (rural) to a different set of circumstances and environment. This means the constant dilution of urban by rural cultures. A corollary to this is that the process is a continual breaking down of rural cultures. Sixth, urbanization is not a state or definite status in society but is a continuous social process. Many other laws of social organization may be drawn from a further study of this heterogeneous mass of facts, and the ones suggested here may be further conditioned and refined. Such a science, embodying such principles, may have real value in the understanding, prediction, and forecasting of human behavior. These explanations are offered by no other science. They are achieved by the utilization of data and methods used in other social sciences. Such, in essence, are some of the formulations derived by sound methods which the writer believes may and possibly will be used to arrive at a science of rural sociology. It will be based upon the total of human behavior, rather than any one field. This is practically the same concept as that developed by Professor Park in his *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (pp. 10 ff.). But in spite of its broadness, its methods, technique, and logic will be as involved and challenging as those of any other science. The above statements are only a suggestion. For more careful analysis of these ideas concerning rural sociology, see the text by Sorokin and Zimmerman cited elsewhere.

IV. The Development of a Science of Rural Sociology Outside of the Rural Sociology "Caste"

The previous sections of this chapter have dealt with the development of rural sociology by the workers defined under that name. Their achievements have included defining the body of knowledge, collecting and centralizing some of the details, and

[25] This statement was denied by A. F. Weber in 1899, but a further analysis seems to show that it is true. See *Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century,* for Weber's painstaking analysis.

making small contributions here and there. In this section let us sketch briefly the developments of similar materials by scientists not working under the name of rural sociology, and estimate the value of these studies in the development of rural sociology.

It must be said at the start that these studies are so numerous and so diverse that even an inadequate enumeration is impossible. Only the principal sources may be sketched hastily and inadequately. Some of these are the rural and urban correlations developed in the other sciences, including some of the older sciences like biology; rural and urban correlations in such works by the general sociologists as Rice's *Farmers and Workers in American Politics;* rural and urban correlations developed in the census materials and statistical yearbooks of many countries which collect and issue such materials; and rural and urban correlations in special monographs by various other scholars. A good illustration of this latter class are the chapters on rural and urban selectivity in Lapouge's *Les selections sociales.* But there are literally hundreds of others.[26]

Rural and urban correlations in other sciences are very numerous and valuable for the development of rural sociology. A great many studies in physical anthropology and biology give physical measurements of populations, classified as rural and urban. These must be considered, along with census and other governmental publications which deal with the same items. They range all the way from analyses of the weight and configurations of fœtuses to the military investigations in physical anthropology. The Mexican War of the United States, the Civil War, the Spanish War and the World War all left publications which give some data concerning physical measurements and physical equipment of the rural and urban populations. This statement applies as well to Europe. In addition to special investigations, such as those by the elder Livi in Italy and the two anthropological investigations in England, many nations publish each year the analysis

[26] See especially many of the works in the *History of Civilization series,* edited by C. K. Ogden.

of the condition of the annual class of recruits who are called to the colors. Several of these give correlations with urbanization or with density of the population. There are definite beliefs expressed from time to time that the superior elements are migrating to cities. If this is so, and it is registered in the physique of the population, whether it be size or configuration of the cephalic index, fœtuses, weight, chest measurements, or any other vital index, some material is at hand for a scientific investigation. As a matter of fact, such investigations have been going on since the middle of the last century. The two best known are the investigations of Otto Ammon for the Baden Anthropological Commission in 1886, and the military anthropology of the elder Livi at about the same time. Professor Sorokin has compiled results of most of these studies, and reached the conclusion that they show little if any evidences of a dysgenic urban selection.[27] The way to a descriptive science of rural sociology is through such investigations of the results of numerous careful minor studies.

What has just been said regarding physical measurements applies as well to mental measurements and to vital rates, such as those for births, deaths, diseases, and others. Several hundred studies of intelligence quotients, which give rural and urban analyses, have been made by the educators and psychologists since the development of these tests by Simon and Binet. The first student to introduce them in the United States, H. H. Goddard, made a rural-urban correlation in his introductory study. Of course there are many who believe that these tests are not primary measures of intelligence. But that does not prevent us from putting all the results together and searching for laws as to the rural and urban distribution of intelligence quotients and the factors antecedent to such a distribution. The writer has done this for studies covering several millions of the population, both here and abroad, and has found some interesting conclusions which are to be published elsewhere. The same applies to studies

[27] See also the series of migration studies by Zimmerman, *et al.*, in the *American Journal of Sociology* and the *Journal of Farm Economics.*

of school achievement in various subjects, and to the distribution of various social classes in the upper and lower schools. Numerous sociologists have suggested from time to time that urbanization has meant the attraction of various mental types. How may such a sociological theory be proved or disproved? An analysis of achievement in various school subjects ought to help. Do the achievements of rural and urban children in various types of school subjects, such as arithmetic, grammar, spelling, drawing, etc., indicate constant variations for one subject which are not typical of others? An analysis of about fifty such studies, ranging from the comparison of a few cases to all the children in some states, indicates no differentials which might not be readily explained by teaching ability in standard versus unstandardized subjects. In other words, they give no real proof of the urban selection of mental types. They do not prove the point. Neither do they prove the contrary. But by analyses of such investigations, we may hope eventually to establish a science of sociology. In the meantime, the old theories are being discussed pro and con without any adequate proof or investigation, and measures seeking the uplift of down-trodden farmers and the regeneration of a debilitated rural life are being seriously debated.

The same analysis may also be applied to the origin, circulation and distribution of gifted children, outstanding high school seniors, and men of genius. Some of the rural sociologies touch lightly upon these subjects. Often their conclusions are based on a few one-sided studies. Scientists dealing in the most stable material seldom reach conclusions based only upon one study. An illustration is the recent discovery concerning the effects of some sodium compounds upon seasickness. It was tried on several dozens of seasick passengers, and they recovered rapidly. Others not tried were sick until the end of the voyage. But the discoverer did not claim his discovery was a proved remedy. His suggestion was for further trial. Social phenomena are much more variable than those in most of the other sciences.

Serious conclusions cannot be based upon individual illustrations or on a few one-sided investigations.

An illustration of the dangers of fallacy may be taken from the investigations of the cephalic index in Europe by Otto Ammon which was referred to earlier in this chapter. The following statements must not be taken as a destructive criticism of Ammon and the other investigators. For their time and place they showed more originality and scientific ability than many investigators have since. Ammon was appointed investigator for the Baden Commission in 1886. He soon found remarkable rural and urban differences in the cephalic index, those in the rural districts having a tendency toward roundness of heads, and in the urban districts, longness. He immediately asked the commission to expand the examination to other cities and to a larger number of specimens. The results bore out the original investigation. At the same time Lapouge was making some similar investigations in France and found identical results. These two men worked together, and in collaboration with the thesis of Gobineau as to the supremacy of the long-headed blond, they developed the theories of urbanization as expressed in *Die Naturliche Auslese* and *Les selections sociales.* Their data also bore out the thesis of G. Hansen in *Die Drei Bevölkerungsstufen.* But later investigations by Oliriz in Spain, Beddoe in England, and Livi in Italy give different results. Livi investigated several hundred thousand cases for Italy, and developed the theories of rural and urban variability which have stood the test of time and are not disproved even today. Livi found that cities in round-headed populations had proportionately more long heads. On the other hand, cities in long-headed populations had more round heads. He developed the theory that cities are recruited from large territories and, as a result, vary more than the surrounding country. The same applies to height and to many other physical and social characteristics. Livi's theory is very valuable. It enables us to explain such phenomena as rural and urban variations in physical equipment, which otherwise are often used as proof of rural or urban de-

cadence. The 1922 class called to colors in the Netherlands showed progressive increases in average tallness as the size of the community increased from less than 5000 to more than 300,000. An investigation by an anthropological commission in Scotland for the same year gave just opposite results. R. Livi's laws will explain this. From such works as these, a science of rural sociology may be developed.

For another illustration of this same necessity for carefulness, let us take the chapter on urbanization and political activity from a recent book on urbanization.[28] In this chapter the author reaches the conclusion that urbanization had a positive correlation with political activity (proportions voting), and ruralization had a negative correlation with the same phenomenon. The author establishes his theory by use of particularistic logic mixed with a few historical references. This book, to judge from a few reviews, is generally accepted as a fair authority. Taking this as a representative correlation, let us examine its validity.

His own chapter gives some references to England which show urban voting more than rural but the large cities less than the small cities and the rural districts. He found no differences for the French and German elections of 1919. In Italy he found more rural voting, and in Spain the contrary. On the basis of his own data, one could not reach a conclusion as to a correlation between urbanization and political activity. However, let us examine a few other countries and see if they throw a majority one way or the other.

In the general elections of Belgium in 1921, urbanism was correlated negatively with the proportions of the registered electors voting. The opposite applied to Sweden in the general election of 1922. The local elections of Sweden from 1920 to 1926 bear out the results of the general election of 1922, except that large cities always exceeded small cities and rural districts sometimes exceeded small cities. Thus, the relationship between

[28] See J. G. Thompson, *Urbanization, Its Effect on Government and Society* (1927), chap. xiv.

small cities and large cities was different for England and Sweden. Denmark gives only small differences between the capital and the rural districts for 1925, but larger differences in favor of small cities. Thus, Denmark agrees with the results in England. Norway showed urban populations voting more regularly in all elections between 1910 and 1925. Bulgaria shows the opposite relationship in all elections since 1908, and the same relationships in all elections between 1901 and 1908. France showed no rural-urban difference in the general elections of 1909. In the vote for the Reichsrat in Austria in 1911, upper Austria voted more than lower Austria. However, the difference was only one per cent. In this case, upper Austria is rural (containing no city above 70,000) and lower Austria is urban (containing Vienna, a city of more than two millions). The two districts are similar in religion and in national background of the population. In Italy, there was little if any correlation between urbanization and voting in the general election of 1924. For Germany, in the two elections of 1924, the rural voted a higher per cent and in March, 1925, the urban. In Switzerland, 89 measures have been taken to the referendum since 1872. The yearbook groups them in ten-year periods, but in each and every period the rural vote was highest. For the whole 89 referendums, 63.3 per cent of the registered rural electors voted, and 46.6 of the urban.

It is useless to give further data. These are sufficient to suggest that there is no positive or negative correlation between urbanization or ruralization and political activity, as indicated by proportions of registered voters voting. Countries vary radically, even though they have the same general types of population. Within countries, the variations are just opposite from year to year and from time to time. There is no law of the relationship between urbanization and voting and, as far as this is an index, between urbanization and the gross amount of political behavior. But further investigations which concern the quality of that behavior show some relationships. These latter may in no sense be

taken as meaning less intelligence or less citizenship in the rural districts.

What has just been said concerning the developments of a science of a rural sociology in a few fields applies to numerous others. Whether it be in politics or crime, vital behavior or psychical behavior, morphology or culture, the elements of a science are springing up. One of the main trends of the rural sociology of the future should be to gather the results of these and similar studies and to consolidate them into statements of social laws.

V. Special Developments in Rural Organization

A number of monographs and studies have appeared which are called rural organization, and this field has been considered more or less a branch of rural sociology. Many students consider "social organization" the only *pure* sociology. A number of the workers in this field have come from sociology proper. What has already been said concerning the general field of rural sociology applies with equal force to this group of studies. The works fall into several definite types—those describing some national social work organizations, many of which only operate in towns and cities; those recommending methods for the development of community clubs, coöperative laundries, and the like; and those giving historical descriptions of communities and their development. A prevailing idea is that the isolated farm is developed primarily in America and for this present era. Many historians claim that such a conclusion is entirely wrong and furnish data in proof.[29] Other students (see especially Gillette's works) often question the commonly accepted generalizations as to the bad effects of isolated farms upon the rural personality. In studies of the ecology or morphology of the rural trade areas which have been fathered by Dr. Galpin, in some correlation studies by the

[29] Simkovitch's study, *Hay and History,* is one of numerous which contest this thesis. Henri Sée, Heitland, Boissonade, investigations by Tenney Frank, Rostovtzeff and others give occasional indications and data which show the contrary. The most competent and inclusive study yet made (A. Demangeon in *Annales de Géographie,* 1927) thoroughly disproves this thesis.

Institute of Social and Religious Research, and in an interesting analysis by J. L. Hypes of Connecticut, there is some attempt to establish scientific generalizations in this field.[30] The works of Galpin and his followers on the morphology of the trade area and the organization of rural classes geographically show real originality and are a sound beginning. Hypes attempted in his thesis at Columbia to measure some of the factors affecting attendance at various community affairs. He developed correlations between nationality, distance and other factors, and attendance. These and others are good attempts to make measurements of the actual geographic and social factors in organization.

Concerning the subjective and psychical features of rural organization, relatively little progress has been made. Some statistics are occasionally presented concerning over-churching, under-churching, size of family, pay of school teachers, etc.; but, as yet, little has been done in the way of interpreting the real organization of the rural community and the mind and personality of the farmer. The most general characteristics of rural institutions have not been stated as yet. The earlier works of Le Play concerning the various types of families (patriarchal, particularist, and disrupted) are a suggestive analysis. However, no student has followed out his suggestions for the analysis of the rural family. This may be made the subject of experimental sociology. We hear a great deal concerning the necessity for the freedom of the rural family, but very little concerning the influence of the rural family upon personality, or the forces bringing about the semi-patriarchal family in the rural districts. This topic ought to be investigated. Its significance has not yet been realized. In the field of religious organization, due to the fact that most of the rural sociologists have definite religious connections, the analyses have been numerous. One sometimes feels that there has been too much muckraking about the rural church and too few attempts to grasp the real significance of religious attitudes of

[30] See the studies by Galpin, Taylor, Kolb, Morgan, Nelson, Sanderson, Zimmerman and others in the appropriate Experiment Station Bulletins and works by these various authors.

rural people. Farmers continue to be the most moral and religious of any of the large population groups (in the sense of the historical religions of any country). A few have suggested that the farmer is essentially a religious man, and have tried seriously to give a natural interpretation of this behavior. Some little emphasis has been placed upon the main natural cause (transportation) and the present so-called disorganized state of the rural church.[31] But no one has suggested that there are natural factors in rural life which tend to give the farmer and the rural classes a bias toward the type of religion developed in the Hebrew Old Testament, and, on the contrary, some forces in cities which give the religion of urbanites a bias toward the so-called humanitarian and socialistic teachings of the New Testament. Compare the twenty-second and twenty-third chapters of Exodus with the vote of the modern farmer on many issues of the referendum, whether it be in Ohio, Oregon, or Switzerland. The introduction of Christianity into Rome gave us the present name of "peasant." There may be too many one-sided statistics about institutions and ministers, and too many biassed attempts to induce farmers to urbanize their religion. On the other hand, there are relatively few successful attempts to grasp the "inner core" and most general characteristics of the religious organization of farmers and peasants. These latter efforts are, in the viewpoint of the writer, a type of analysis very desirable for rural sociology.

This field of social organization illustrates, more than any other, the reasons why the rural sociologists have felt the need for an independent rural sociology, because they have secured little help in their construction of academic ideas and systems of thought from the general sociologists. Suppose that one attempts to write a book on rural organization. Theoretically, he should be able to turn to some general sociology and secure there a systematic development of theories and systems of social organization. With this system in mind, he could turn to the rural com-

[31] See the works of Brunner, Luther Fry, Warren Wilson, the Institute for Social and Religious Research, and many others.

munity and develop the working of these principles or ideas in rural life. However, this cannot be done. Why? Because there is no system of social organization developed among the sociologists for immediate reference as a beginning analysis. This is not a denial that some work has been done on primitive societies. It is not a denial that works like *Social Mobility, Social Differentiation,* and systematics of the formal school of sociologists have some value. But where may one find a systematic key to theories of social organization which will allow the student to proceed from simple to complex groups, or to analyze all the forms of social organization within a society? The writer has not been able to locate any such work in general sociology. This shows again that any great development of rural sociology is contingent upon considerable development in general sociology. If, according to W. H. R. Rivers, John D. Black, Dwight Sanderson, and many others, social organization, social structure, and such are *pure* sociology, then we need some systems of *pure* sociology from the general sociologists before we may or can have a *pure* rural sociology. Galpin's brilliant contribution in the theory of the "urban community" was made largely without help from the theories or work of the general sociologists.

VI. Purnell Research and a Science of Rural Sociology

In 1925, Congress passed a bill called the Purnell Act, which provided $20,000 the first year, and an increase of $10,000 each year until $60,000 was reached, for each agricultural experiment station. The purpose of this Act was to provide for the development and support of research in the social sciences of rural life, primarily economics, sociology, home economics, and farm management. Due to this incentive, many experiment stations added rural sociologists, and others expanded their work. However, no great strides were made because there was a tendency for much of the money to be used for other purposes. In spite of this fact, there is a steady progress in the development of rural

sociology, due to the influence of this Act.[32] In itself, it has two or three primary values. Some money is available for the support of research. The researchers are members of staffs of experiment stations that are made up primarily of natural scientists. These organizations have considerable influence in the inception and guidance of the work. Their research staffs know science and will, in the long run, give material support to a sociology which is science. Another important influence is that a considerable group of sociologists are placed on a laboratory or science basis. They have free time, some little funds, and some responsibility to do creative work. The great advances in rural sociology of the future ought to come from these Purnell workers.

At the same time, there are numerous handicaps which must be met. There were and are very few men trained for these positions. The bigger universities of the United States, outside of a few land-grant colleges, have paid relatively little attention to the development of rural sociology. It is true that the first course was developed at a large urban university, and that some of the real original students in the field came from these larger urban universities; but in the main, the larger universities have paid little attention to this matter. The last summer-school catalogue (1928) from one of the largest of these universities lists a half dozen courses in social work, but none in rural sociology. The attention of these universities has been turned to the city. At the same time, urban and rural life cannot be separated. A cause of this neglect of rural sociology has been the feeling that cities were becoming self-supporting for everything but food. In the early stages of this last spurt of urban development, practically all of the cities were not self-supporting as to population. Their birth rates were lower than their death rates. Then toward the middle of the past century, city vital indices ($\frac{100 \text{ births}}{\text{deaths}}$) began

[32] For further details of Purnell research, see *Rural Sociological Research in the United States,* by Galpin, Taylor, Sanderson, and Kolb, for the Social Science Research Council (1928).

to grow, until by the period from 1890 to 1910, they equaled and in some cases even surpassed rural vital indices for their surrounding countries. At that time, many students, including even the brilliant A. F. Weber, reached the conclusion that cities would soon be entirely self-supporting except for food and raw materials. But that seems to have been a passing hope. Since 1910, and especially since the war, the urban vital indices have taken a swing backward, and rural indices are gaining, both actually and relatively. That is the general trend in most of the countries of Europe and America. What really happened may be explained, partially at least, by the laws of imitation. Hygiene developed in cities. Before it spread to rural districts, it enabled cities to lower their death rates so they gained relatively on rural districts. Following about 1910, two changes came simultaneously. With the increase of communication, rural districts began to develop habits of hygiene, and city populations began to use means of birth control in a comprehensive manner. If the present trend continues, city populations relative to rural populations will soon be in the same situation as they were generally before 1830. Of course, there is some suggestion that birth control will spread to rural districts, but that does not seem probable, at least in its most malicious forms. The only country in which it has made serious inroads is France. There the urban population is in an even worse condition than the country population. If it were not for immigrants from Italy, Spain and Belgium, whose influence hides the effects within the real French population, the crisis would be more obvious and more serious for the French nation. At the present time, Berlin is not self-supporting, although Paris, London and New York are. But who can tell the probable trend for the next ten years, much less the next fifty?

But even if cities are self-supporting as far as population is concerned, that is no reason why the urban universities should not help in the development of a science of rural sociology. Its contributions to general sociology ought to be as valuable as any of the other specialized fields. It will help to understand the city

and the urban agglomerations. Further, science should have no allegiances other than those brought about through the desire for knowledge. It would be of great help to rural sociologists if all of them had considerable experience in large cities. If one side of a question is known, it automatically helps to know the other. The writer occasionally listens to some of the workers from the larger universities making numerous claims in the name of science. Then he is sure the general field of social science could not really suffer much by the introduction of competent specialists in rural sociology.

But money in itself will not make a science. Men are required, especially those of original ability and intuition, such as made the development of the older sciences possible. The writer feels that rural sociology cannot long compete for these types of men unless it faces about on the matter of the purpose of this body of knowledge.

There are other research and training agencies. Prior to the development of Purnell research, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics at Washington established a Division of Farm Population under the leadership of Dr. C. J. Galpin (about 1919). The establishment of this division, as far as the writer is informed, came about because of the interests of Dr. Henry C. Taylor, then Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, in the subject of rural sociology. The organization of this division, its growth, its participation in the development of rural sociological research, have been the work of Dr. Galpin. This work, and the earlier contributions to the morphology of the rural community and to the theories of rural organization, made by Dr. Galpin, have been the greatest additions to the history of sociology in the United States made by any one individual or organization. As a result of this development of the work, rural sociology was included as one of the research fields in the Purnell Act, mentioned earlier. If it had not been for the work of Dr. Galpin, the chances are that rural sociology would not yet have advanced above the sentimental stage of the first ten years of this century.

However, as a result of Dr. Galpin's work, we now see the world-wide spread of interest in this subject. Gillette's *Rural Sociology* has now been translated into several European languages; further, the European sociologists are now attempting to write their own rural sociologies.[33] The plan of this Division of Farm Population, is to promote research by two methods: first, to cooperate with workers in the different states by furnishing additional funds, a few suggestions and some guidance; and second, to carry out original researches supported mainly by the central office. Thus, many of Dr. Kirkpatrick's studies of rural standards of living represent work supported largely by the Bureau itself, and others are coöperative ventures with the separate states. Dr. Galpin's researches in the migrations of population are illustrations of the type of work supported largely by the Bureau and without coöperative funds.

A second force which has become a factor in the development of rural sociological research has been the interest of the agricultural economists. As has already been indicated, Dr. Henry C. Taylor was influential in establishing the work at the University of Wisconsin and later at Washington. Since that time, other economists have become interested in the need for development of research in rural sociology. The Social Science Research Council has established a series of scholarships for deserving graduate students who wish to train themselves for research in the combined subjects, Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. The feeling of the agricultural economists may be given best by a quotation from the recent study of agricultural economic research in the United States for the Social Science Research Council.

> Agricultural economics has close relationships to . . . sociology. The relationship . . . is best discussed when the term sociology is

[33] See *Das Dorf als Soziales Gebilde,* by Leopold Von Wiese. For England, see the works of A. W. Ashby and others. There are many other indications of the spread of this study to Europe, especially as a result of the recent "Green Rising." Professor Vlaclov Smetanka and others in Prague are paying considerable attention to this development.

defined rigorously so as to include only group analysis—group structure, group behavior and group functioning. It then becomes a basic science, like psychology, upon which applied economics draws for the solution of many of its problems. In turn, sociology is able to draw upon the principles of economics for an explanation of many things in the structure, behavior, and functioning of groups. . . . Much that is included under the term "rural life" is more largely economics than sociology. . . . The sociologists as yet have made little study of standard of living as a proper sociological concept. . . . Much of the confusion as to the sphere of sociology comes from an erroneous concept of certain values in living as being social, as distinguished from economic. Economics is a social science, and the values it contemplates as ends are social values, that is, *human welfare* values. Values in the purely sociological sense, if there are such, are values which relate to the functioning of the group, as such.[34]

VII. The Chief Correlation in a Science of Rural Sociology

What will be the keynote and central point of attack of this science about which we have been talking? There are many answers. The writer may only give his own opinions. But at the same time there are a number of logical reasons for his answer. *The central concept of this science will be the mechanisms and effects of urbanization and ruralization upon a population.* Certain effects and differences have already been established, and careful study finds other results hitherto unsuspected. The explanation of these results and differences may form the body of theory of the science. The probable behavior of the two groups, or of the combined groups mixed in various proportions, is the object of the predictions based upon the body of theory already developed. Many side lights and issues and other impor-

[34] See *Research Method and Procedure in Agricultural Economics,* a publication of the Advisory Committee on Economics and Social Research in Agriculture of the Social Science Research Council, vol. ii, August 1928, pp. 420-421. (The subcommittee consists of J. D. Black, L. C. Gray, E. G. Nourse, and H. R. Tolley, for the economists. The above quotation was from the work by Black.)

tant matters will be discussed, but this will be the "universe of discourse." It has its logical as well as its practical values. Already the idea is generally used, although more or less unconsciously.

Such a concept forms a guide to the researches. It has been an established field of inquiry before the days of the development of any science. Cato paused long enough in the introduction to his *De Rerum Agricultura* to make his contribution. And there were many others before him who did the same. Emperor Augustus and the Antonines felt that the urbanization of the army was the primary cause of discontent and of the military anarchy of the first century A.D. in Rome. Accordingly, they attempted to ruralize the Legion and the other branches of the service. Rostovtzeff believes this was the primary reason for the decline in power of the army during the second century A.D. The Byzantine emperors believed they would maintain a stable civilization best with "a strong agriculture and a strong army." Later researches, both in America and Europe, show that these two ideas are not incompatible. A strong agriculture gives the human basis for a strong army. Urbanization brought the movement for rural sociology. We cannot go far wrong if we make urbanization or ruralization, its social mechanisms, causes and effects, the central point of discovery for a science of rural sociology.

Some have suggested that this problem is but one of the problems of rural sociology. The writer agrees with this statement, and still maintains that ruralization of a population, and the mechanisms and effects of urbanization upon this group, will be the central original point of view in rural sociology. Any other problem will be merely the carrying out of principles developed within the field of general sociology. Rural sociology cannot be criminology, because the theories and principles of criminology will apply as well in rural districts as in urban. At the same time, rural sociology can develop and add to the science of criminology by giving details as to rural and urban correlations in crime, and

explaining these differences. The same applies to a science of social organization. Rural sociology will, in its creative aspects, explain the rural differences from the urban, with all their funtional relationships. The problem of rural sociology is not essentially different from that of agricultural economics. There is no agricultural economics apart from general economics. Yet we find texts in agricultural economics which present first of all the general theories of economics as they apply to agriculture. Later these texts elaborate principles which apply more specifically to agriculture, and at the same time to some urban problems, but in a lesser degree. A recent text by an agricultural economist is entitled *Production Economics*. Another takes many of the same theories and introduces them in a text called *Agricultural Economics,* stating that the author's idea of agricultural economics is the application of theories of economics to the problems of farmers. In a similar manner, the rural sociologist will not attempt to create new sociology but will take the principles of the other sociologists, where such exist. But the study will add to our knowledge of general sociology by introducing rural and urban variations and explaining them. This is the plan followed at Minnesota. The writer believes it has some logical reason and scientific validity. But after all, that is only his opinion.

VIII. The First Lines of Inquiry

These definitions of the field of rural sociology suggest that the first three general lines of inquiry are: (1) the nature of rural and urban differences in behavior; (2) the explanation of those differences in terms of environment or the selection of native abilities, rural and urban; and (3) the mechanisms of ruralization or urbanization, and their probable immediate effects. Of course, there will be numerous lines of inquiry other than these as stated above, but they come primarily under the subject matter of general sociology and may be studied without regard to rural and urban correlations. Rural sociologists will use them and will from time to time add to their description and

explanation. But their primary original work will, in the judgment of the writer, be in the three general fields mentioned.

As already indicated, much work has been done in all these fields. The books of Pitirim Sorokin and the writer have given no proof of a selection of a biological type, rural or urban. At the same time, the differences in outlook on life, in behavior, and even in the destinies of countries and nations seem to change with increased ruralization or urbanization. The isolation of these environmental differences, and the further investigation of proofs of, or lack of, rural-urban differences are challenging problems. A. B. Hill recently investigated this problem for England. He compared death rates by age periods for Essex (rural) and London (urban). His conclusion was that reverse migration (ruralization) had no definitely harmful effects, but that there was some evidence of the contrary for urbanization. The younger Livi (Livio Livi, University of Rome) made a similar investigation for Italy and reached somewhat opposite conclusions. Studies in Minnesota, on the one hand, and studies in Wales, on the other, reach still different conclusions. Other studies give indications that the Minnesota and Welsh studies may have some validity. However, who can answer the question definitely as to the selective influences?[35]

E. G. Ravenstein made a preliminary study, about 1885, of some of the mechanisms of urbanization and ruralization. His main laws, as given in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* for 1885, are as follows:

(1) The great body of migrants only proceed a short distance. Consequently, urbanization produces a universal shifting or displacement of population which produces "currents of migration" setting in the direction of the great centers of commerce and industry, which absorb the migrants.

[35] See Zimmerman, "Migration to Towns and Cities," *op. cit.* This last article summarizes and gives reference to the works of Ammon, Lapouge, the elder and younger Livi, A. B. Hill, A. W. Ashby, and J. Morgan Jones. The problem of selective migration has not yet been settled.

(2) The process of absorption proceeds as follows: The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of the rapidly growing cities makes itself felt, step by step, in remote corners of the kingdom. Migrants enumerated in a certain center of absorption will consequently grow less with the distance, proportionately to the native population which furnishes them.

(3) The process of dispersion (or ruralization) is inverse to that of absorption and exhibits similar features.

(4) Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter current.

(5) Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centers of commerce and industry.

(6) The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country.[36]

(7) Females are more migratory than males (except for long distances or abroad).

This chapter does not afford space for a discussion of the validity and merits of these principles. In the main they have not been overthrown and, with some qualifications, they still appear valid. They picture the urbanization and ruralization of a population as a process of proceeding to the center of a number of circles. This means increasing density of population and piling up in the center (skyscraper cities). This process is a series of jumps and counter jumps like an enormous game of leapfrog, such as those played in the army during the mass games of the last military mobilization. But the jumps forward are more numerous than the jumps backward, and there are more women playing the game than men. Further, the women show more tendencies to jump forward. In addition, each jump is a new experience to the individual, as there is little repetition.

[36] A more careful analysis shows that this theory is not true.

Neither is there any order to the jumping. This severe jolting of society may mean much in the explanation of the constant differences which are to be found in rural and urban populations.

In the judgment of the author, much of the basic understanding of many of the problems of sociology, whether it be in the field of criminology, cultural anthropology, social organization, or others, will be achieved through the careful investigation of these basic problems. The great prevalence of rural-urban correlations in many fields of social science and demography is ample proof of this.

It appears that those factors which make one type of behavior *rural* and another type *urban* are associated with certain other differences in behavior. Some of these are to be seen in the respective birth-rates, death-rates, disease-rates, suicide-rates, mental infirmities of all kinds, crimes, pauperism, occupational attitudes and logic, psycho-social cultures, material cultures, migrations and mobility, attitudes toward property, attitudes regarding nationalism and internationalism, rural and urban rôles in the initiation, dissemination and selection of a national culture, form and structure of social organizations, and responsibility of individuals to the controls of family, community and national groups. A study and explanation of these differences, and an attempt to find the *causes* is the field for rural sociology which the writer finds is most generally followed. This, in brief, is the writer's concept of the field and rôle of rural sociology. No other academic subject is trying to do this in detail or is trying to carve out the total configurations of the rural personality. Rural sociology arose when differences became evident in rural and urban communities. For thousands of years thinkers have been speculating as to the causes. Systematic rural sociology points out these differences in detail and attempts to explain them. What other field of sociology has a mass of phenomena richer, more evident, or more pressing for analysis?

IX. Summary and Conclusions

The writer has shown that there are certain causes bringing about the development of a science of rural sociology. These causes are the effects of urbanization or ruralization upon practically all fields of social behavior. The purpose of a rural sociology is to codify and extend the researches into these problems, in order to bring about a further understanding of society. The mania for reforms before analysis has caused us to lose much of the real spirit and value of the body of knowledge. The primary need for the future is a descriptive science of functional relationships in those forms of human behavior dealt with in sociology. This study of functional relationships is not a dramatic task. It requires the same types of individuals who have contributed and are contributing to the development of the natural sciences. These men will appear when the intellectual public discriminates between good intentions and creative ability. A part of this discrimination will be shown in public approval of individuals who seek to establish sociological principles by painstaking work and the use of rigid logic. Such men will be very skeptical of much that has passed, and is at present passing, as a science of social behavior.

CHAPTER VI

THE TREND OF URBAN SOCIOLOGY

By Nels Anderson

I. Introduction

What we label urban sociology in this chapter is little more than an impending departure from sociology in its more general aspects. It is the beginning of an attempt to put special emphasis on social origins, social interaction and the culture patterns of urban life. Urban sociology is focused on that segment of society dwelling in the city, and on other segments as they relate to the city. As a science, it is only approaching an identity, though in the process of becoming, its evolution has paralleled the development of the other social sciences. If we may call all those early attempts to understand the city and deal with its problems the antecedents of urban sociology, then we are able to distinguish at least three stages in its development: the reformatory, the descriptive and the scientific. These three stages represent so many methods of study or approaches to an understanding of the phenomena of the city.

The reformatory approach is essentially idealistic and rarely fails to reveal some inclination to manipulate the city or mold some phase of its life according to preconceived values. It may be either positive or negative, or both. The positive reformatory approach turns to exhortation and propaganda, or to movements for playgrounds, building codes, city planning and other humane legislation. Negative reform spends itself seeking out and denouncing evils, or in passing prohibitive legislation. In either case, the reformatory approach is emotional. Most early analyses of the city or of social problems in the city proceeded from the reform motive.

While it is not dead, the reformatory approach has been

giving ground to a descriptive method. It might be called the method of personal contact—of seeing a problem and teaching it so that one might have sympathy. Description would include anything from empirical sightseeing to block tabulations and census enumerations. Adherents of this method put to themselves the task of observing the city and of examining and describing its details. Much of this finds its way to the printed page in the form of narrative or "atmosphere" articles. Many of the early attempts at urban sociology resorted to this method of "knowing the city" or of learning "how the other half lives." In its morbid aspects this approach degenerates into forms of slumming.

What we call the scientific approach is not altogether divorced from the two that preceded it. While they are partial, it approximates completion. It involves description, but it goes after the meanings behind the observable. It seeks norms, ratios, and generalizations. In the analytic or scientific method, description is not so much an end as a means to an end. In its antecedent stages, urban sociology has been reformatory; it has been descriptive and, finally, it is becoming scientific. In this development there are no evidences of any straight-line evolution. A complete story of its growth would include an examination of the part played in this development by religion, philosophy and other influences.[1]

The term urban sociology, even when used with reservations, does carry the implication that the science is already abroad. Not only would it be difficult, but meaningless, to defend such a position. In a number of universities courses are given that

[1] Viewed from another angle, we may say that the emergence of urban sociology paralleling the growth of the social sciences in this country falls into four periods: (1) The philosophic period in the university which ended in the 'seventies. (2) The evangelistic period in the missions where the universities as arms of the churches found themselves involved. This period ended in the late 'eighties. (3) The philanthropic period beginning in the late 'eighties with the rise of settlements sponsored by the universities. (4) From 1910 on, we have the scientific period which we may identify with the increase of laboratories and clinics.

bear the name;[2] but in no sense could we say that there is any uniformity in the method or content of these courses. At the present stage of its development, it would be difficult for the partisan in the field to point to any accumulation of tested material sufficiently unique, or a realm of investigation sufficiently integrated, to merit the name of urban sociology. A mass of literature is emerging from the whole range of science, as well as the arts; but even that is nebulous, and the process of coördinating it is hesitant.

In view of the present state of urban sociology, it would be without point to discuss the subject in terms of trends. The data are too dispersed and the ends too scattered for any comprehensive tying together. Any attempt to present a bird's-eye view of the field would be so presumptuous and foolhardy that the present reviewer passes the task by. Instead of trying to take cognizance of and relating trends, he will content himself with calling attention to some of the subject matter that obviously falls within the scope of urban sociology.

II. The Development of Social Science

American sociology, according to Small,[3] dates back about half a century. Its beginning was so generally vague and amorphous and so involved with the development of social science in general that it would profit little to seek the relationships. Moreover, during those initial decades all the sciences were in difficulty. With no traditions of science in the universities to curb the theory groups, there sprang up a number of cults, each trying

[2] DeGraff collected data by a questionnaire from 32 colleges giving courses in urban sociology or related subjects. He found they had little in common, not even a textbook ("Urban Sociology in the Colleges," *Social Forces,* Dec., 1926). In 1925, R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess published *The City,* a collection of articles and papers on urban sociology with a detailed classified bibliography by Louis Wirth. In 1927, S. E. W. Bedford published his *Readings in Urban Sociology.* The first textbook on Urban Sociology, by Nels Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, appeared in 1928.

[3] A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of American Sociology," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology,* vol. xxi, 1916; A W. Small, *Origins of Sociology* (1924); E. S. Bogardus, *History of Social Thought* (1922).

to encompass in its scheme of things the whole universe of knowledge and to subjugate all the other cults. Most of the theory was a rehash of European thought, rather than a product of experience and the situation here.[4]

It has been the situation here that finally brought sociology down from the realm of philosophy to a plane of objective application to social problems. It would be difficult to think of that transition apart from the growth of the American city. But the American city itself has been a symphony in transitions, or transformations. Some of these may be listed briefly:

(1) The scholastic awakening of the university during the 'seventies and 'eighties, due to the invasion of a group of scholars trained abroad.

(2) Under their influence the university changed slowly from a center of theological and moral science and, as such, an auxiliary of the church, to a center of research.

(3) Following the Civil War, there was a rapid swing of the country to industrialism. Towns rooted in a puritan homestead culture suddenly became cities of heterogeneous hordes gathered in from every culture and every country.

(4) With the sudden shift from a rural to an urban base, the newly acquired fortunes began to concentrate in the cities, forming a moneyed aristocracy without aristocratic tradition.

(5) During the four decades preceding 1910, most of the railways were built, ushering in an era of unprecedented and undisciplined mobility. This, in turn, was followed by wasteful raids upon our natural resources and by a wholesale migration to western land.

(6) From 1890 to 1910, the automobile and other forms

[4] H. E. Barnes, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (1925); J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923); F. Thomas, *Environmental Basis of Society,* (1925); A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (1918).

of rapid transit came into use to increase mobility within the city and to project its life into the suburb.

(7) This outward spread of the city was supplemented by an increased use of vertical space (both up and down) when, through the aid of steel frames, elevators, electric light and scientific ventilation, the skyscraper came into vogue.

(8) Along with all these transformations are to be considered such phenomena as large-scale production and distribution, the increase of advertising, the standardization of commodities, and the social implications of such factors as the increased use of the printed page, telephone, radio, movies, etc.

That these developments influenced one another, or that singly and severally they have conditioned American culture, is not a matter of speculation. Taken together, they constitute the ingredients of a fluxing environment, making the last four or five decades of American city-building a period of riotous change. Everywhere the industrial revolution was a spur to city-building; but here, with no guiding traditions and no past to hinder, cities grew in a manner that was both rapid and incoherent. How much and in what manner all this tearing down and building up had to do with the growth of social science is problematic. At least this is certain; the contrasts of wealth and poverty, comfort and misery, as well as the increase of crime, vice and sickness, was a challenge that could not be ignored by social science. Nor was it ignored.[5] A cursory review of the literature reveals that even the most theoretical of sociologists who worked during this incubation period were cognizant of specific social problems and were proffering solutions.[6]

[5] H. N. Shenton, *The Practical Application of Sociology* (1928). A brief review of attempts to make sociology apply to problems.

[6] F. H. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology* (1901); W. G. Sumner, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (1920, new edition); A. W. Small, *Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy* (1913); L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology* (1906).

Out of contact with the social problems there was developing a group of sociologists who could not in any sense be called theorists. As they were short on theory, they were long on action. Shunning the study and the armchair for the field, they devoted themselves to details and specific maladjustments without attempting to relate details to the larger situation. By the methods of science, as they understood them, they sought "the ethical basis of charity, the ideals of philanthropy, and the social mechanism for attaining . . . what ought to be." [7] The "ought to be" was an *a priori* objective determined largely by what had been. The "ought to be" did not always grow out of research but was generally included in the premises of research.[8]

One significant fact of this struggle of sociology to become a science needs emphasis here, and that is the popular assumption that the name of sociology was synonymous with service and reform. More than political economy and as much as political science, sociology became the haven of any and all who wanted to do good. As a result, while sociology drew its share of outstanding scholars, it also attracted this fringe of well-meaning people and panacea-promoters with their "common-sense" solutions for social problems. It was a refuge for numerous thoughtful clergymen who were no longer comfortable in the church. Sociology offered them an opportunity to bring together the tools of science and the idealism of religion. This last-named group constituted the Christian branch of the applied sociologists. In the main they were militant. They saw the problems of the city;

[7] See C. R. Henderson, *Dependents, Defectives and Delinquents,* preface, (1901); also E. T. Devine, *Misery and its Causes* (1913); R. Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology* (1895); A. G. Warner, *American Charities* (1896); C. D. Wright, *Outline of Practical Sociology* (1899).

[8] H. Paul Douglass, who was kind enough to read this chapter in manuscript, suggests that while sociology has progressed much since the time when it was dominated by rescue motives, the spirit of the "ought to be" goes marching on. The pioneer reform sociologists were diligent in setting up agencies and organizations of welfare and guidance. Out of their energy there grew up numerous departments of public welfare in states and cities. As these have taken on institutional form, they have defined their programs and policies according to the philosophy of reform social science.

but more than most students of urban social maladjustment, they saw the city itself as a social problem.[9] Most of them, through personal contacts with poor people in urban churches, came to feel that evangelism was not enough. They set out to supplement evangelism with charity, neighborhood work and social legislation.[10] Among their number are many who still see the city as a venture in sin, and all social problems in terms of good and evil.

Any attempt to relate these early interests in the city and its problems, or to reconcile them one with another, would be both profitless and confusing. There were many and varied approaches. Often they were contradictory, but they had at least one thing in common, and that was their point of attack, the slum, which we now proceed to consider.

III. The Drive on the Slum

However doubtful the parentage of urban sociology may be, we do know that its cradle and the scene of its early nurture was the slum. As most economic Utopias and evangelistic drives were inspired by the concentration of misery in the slum, so the slum inspired welfare movements in social work and welfare interests in social science. With the sudden growth of cities, it was the great sore spot; and for all types of social students, social critics and social reformers, it was the avenue of approach to most ills of the city. It has not always been such a problem. We have had slums as long as we have been city-builders. It was the modern industrial city, reorganizing urban life generally, that forced them on our attention.

The steam-power factory and the crowding together of cheap

[9] L. Abbott, *Christianity and Social Problems* (1897); W. Gladden, *Social Facts and Forces* (1897), and *Social Salvation* (1901); E. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* (1900); W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (1910); C. Stelzle, *The Workingman and Social Problems* (1903); J. Strong, *The Challenge of the City* (1907).

[10] H. P. Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City* (1927); C. H. Sears, *Baptist City Planning* (1926).

labor around the factory contributed most to the creation of congested poor areas. Thus, in the reconstruction of the city and the reorganization of its life, the slum emerged, a sort of unexpected but baffling anomaly. Upon this, attention was first fixed emotionally and we had rescue moves such as those of the Salvation Army, or the protests of the artist, such as we find in the writings of Dickens. Slowly attention became more objective, and we had the beginning of painstaking study, such as the work of Charles Booth in London.[11] In American cities it was the humanitarian evangelist like Brace, or the humanitarian journalist like Riis,[12] who sounded the warning that our cities were also chaotic at the core. They had, as contemporaries and followers, a school of humanitarian statisticians, the pioneers among whom were Henderson, Mayo-Smith, Warner, and Wright. Yet their work, perhaps because it was too involved with appraisals and hasty conclusions, lacked the intensive qualities of the studies made by Booth.

Once social science turned from the university to the slum, it found no base for operations except, perhaps, the mission. There was need of a non-evangelistic point from which to work. Whether this need gave rise to the university settlement movement we cannot say; but once the settlement appeared, the university contributed much to its rapid rise. The movement started with Toynbee Hall in East London in 1875, a settlement initiated by students from Cambridge and Oxford. It was brought to New York in 1887 by Stanton Coit, a former resident at Toynbee. Hull House in Chicago was opened by Jane Addams two years later. During the next two decades dozens of such centers, many of them sponsored by the universities, were started in the slums of American cities. They bear witness to the fervent social

[11] C. Booth, *Life and Labour of the People of London,* 16 vols. (1890). Also P. G. Frédéric Le Play (monographic studies of family budgets in various industries) *Les ouvriers européens* (1855); *L'organization de la famille* (1871).

[12] C. L. Brace, *Dangerous Classes in New York* (1880); J. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives* (1890).

idealism then pervading the university. As social laboratories or, better still, observation posts, they were surpassed by no other institution at the time.[13]

Settlements set out to become the leaven that leavens the socially chaotic slum. They hoped through social programs to inspire slum classes to higher things and by coöperation to convert slums into neighborhoods. While settlements have rescued individuals like brands from the burning, their success in neighborhood reorganization has been meager.[14] But they did accomplish other things, at least three of which should be noted: (1) In so far as there has grown up any community organization in cities, the social settlement has been active in bringing it about.[15] In spite of the optimism in some quarters, community organization in our cities has never become more than an ideal. (2) The settlement has been mother or stepmother to a host of social agencies, organizations and movements that have become integral parts of urban life. Many agencies for child welfare, immigrant protection and education, adult education, labor legislation, food inspection, factory inspection, legal aid, music, art, recreation, etc., found shelter during their experimental stage in the settlement. (3) As a point of observation and contact center for budding scholars and social philosophers of the past generation, the social settlement rendered social science a great service. It was a forum and discussion circle, until social science passed from its empirical stage to a more mature stature and began to range abroad for more substantial diet than the inspiration of the round table. This was a form of warming-up period for social science.

[13] R. A. Woods, *The Neighborhood in Nation-Building* (1923), chap. ii, "University Settlements as Laboratories in Social Science."

[14] Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1923); Mrs. H. O. Barnett, *Canon Barnett, His Life, Letters and Friends* (1919); W. I. Cole, *Motives and Results of the Social Settlement Movement* (1909); R. A. Woods and A. J. Kennedy, *The Settlement Horizon* (1922). The Welfare Council of New York City has a survey of settlements in preparation.

[15] On the relation of the community center and settlement to community organization, see M. P. Follett, *The New State* (1918), p. 205. For a study of an attempt at community organization in a slum see H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and The Slum* (1929).

Social science left the dialectic laboratory of the settlement with the rise of research foundations. The point of departure might be put at 1909, which was the date of the publication of the first volume of the Pittsburgh Survey.[16] The transition from discourse and common sense to research has been gradual but consistent, acquiring momentum apace with the piling up of endowments for research. With increasing access to funded wealth, social science is shifting its emphasis from philosophy to objective study, from seeing "how the other half lives" to the methods of the clinic and the laboratory. The pursuit of truth has become a pursuit of specialties. Obviously this must relieve social science of its former burden as moral appraiser conceiving problems in terms of social evils and, after the thinking of the social reformer, following the social evils to the point of identifying them with persons. Social reform thinking characterized most early attempts to treat the city and its problems. The treatment of such social evils generally involved vindictive attacks on persons who were the symbols of the problems. In the days of housing reform the landlord was the symbol of the housing problem, just as the fat man with a silk hat and dollar signs on his vest is still the symbol of capitalism in the struggles of labor for justice. The saloon-keeper was the *bête noir* of the drink evil; the vice lord was blamed for the social evil, and the ward boss was the villain in all political corruption. We can get an urban sociology no faster than sociology is able to rise above such thinking. We have the beginnings of objectivity here and there, and the purpose of this paper is to take brief cognizance of these tendencies.

IV. The Slum and the City as a Whole

We cannot separate the beginnings of urban sociology from the perennial battle to wipe out the slum. This struggle with the slum, which is still going on, illustrates as well as anything

[16] E. B. Butler, *Women in the Trades* (1909). Compare with *Hull House Maps and Papers,* which represents the zenith reached by social science under the tutelage of the settlement.

how futile and segmented have been our attempts to understand the city. Boiled down, the slum problem has rarely been anything more than isolated attempts, according to preconceived notions, to improve the housing, to transfer the people from congested tenements to attractive dwellings, to move them out of the district. Most drives on the slum seem to assume single causal factors, and so we have attempts to build up community spirit, to build model houses, to condemn the worst houses, to move out the "good" people, to isolate the "dirty" tenant, and many other schemes.[17] The chief indictment of most of these efforts to relieve the city of the slum is that they have never defined the slum with reference to the spatial and functional patterns into which it fits, nor have they ever attempted to determine the interplay of forces that create the slum and make for its continuance.[18] The slum is no isolated phenomenon, and any approach to it must take into account other matters, including labor efficiency, income, population mobility, standards of living, race, nationality, and, by no means least, such apparently remote matters as comparative rents, land values and the future use of immediate and adjacent space. Colbert calls the slum in the American industrial city an investment area. Thrasher describes it an interstitial area.[19] It is an investment, because it tends to be used for lesser residential purposes pending a change in use for business, industrial or better residential purposes. Like interstitial tissue, it is filler-in. The slum in a changing city is generally a temporary and tolerated occupancy of space, its future being determined by the uses to which adjacent space is put. Thus the problems identified with the slum are problems in re-

[17] "Slums and Slummers," *Municipal Engineering and Sanitary Record*, Aug.-Oct., 1916. Compare with C. E. Morrow and Chas. Herrick, "Blighted Districts, Their Cause and Cure," *City Planning*, Oct., 1925.

[18] "The Slum Endures," *The Survey*, Mar. 15, 1927, and "The Slum: A Project for Study," *Social Forces*, Sept., 1928, both by the writer. Also see B. S. Townroe, *The Slum Problem* (1928), and E. D. Simon, *How to Abolish the Slum* (1929). Simon considers the economic possibilities of model housing.

[19] Correspondence with R. J. Colbert, Bureau of Economics and Sociology, University of Washington; F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (1926).

lationships. The slum itself is a relationship, most extensive in its ramifications. It is not a problem that will submit to simple local therapeutics.[20]

V. Urban Areas and the Spatial Pattern

Any problem involving any part or function of the city cannot help involving the city as a whole, though it may involve other parts or functions in varying degrees. Closer examination convinces us that the city is a complex of interdependent occupational units. According to use, areas are devoted to residence, commerce, industry, transportation, recreation, administration, etc. Each of these types may be subdivided into lesser related uses. Residence areas, for example, reflect a distribution of population according to racial and national type, group interests or purse capacity. An area receives its identity through its functional relations to other areas. It gets its status as it participates in the total life of the community, just as the city gets its status by its rôle in the larger situation to which it is coördinated. Thus, the city may be involved in a regional, a national, and also a world-wide economy.

The urban area is not so much the creature of design as of the hit-and-miss operation of expediency, economy, social preference and convenience. It is the natural product of the relatively unguided forces, of tendencies to segregation and mobility.[21] The urban area, artifact of urban life, becomes an object of sociological inquiry as it imprints its character upon its occupants, and as that character is impinged upon the rest of the city. This introduces us to a city which is a spatial pattern, and practically an unexplored field to sociology. Moreover, it has a related functional unity, of which sociology is only beginning to be aware.

The dynamic aspects of the urban entity are equally significant, especially the manner of urban growth—the tendency of areas to

[20] J. F. Steiner, *Community Organization* (1925); A. E. Wood, *Community Problems* (1928).

[21] E. W. Burgess, *The Urban Community* (1926); papers by R. D. McKenzie, N. S. B. Gras, W. C. Reckless, S. M. Harrison, and H. W. Zorbaugh.

spread in zonal array about the center of the city. There evolves from the interrelation of areas a balanced occupancy of space, the organization of which is constantly being disturbed by the dynamics of change.[22] The concentric (*Ringstrasse*) pattern reveals striking correlations between the occupation of space and the distribution of poverty, wealth, crime and vice, home-ownership and renting, rent levels, and other social phenomena, such as the distribution of age, sex, racial and other groups.

With reference to land values and rents, the uses of space tend to be dispersed in a manner consistent with other uses, both within the occupational area and adjacent to it. The clothing trade and kindred industries in New York City are packed together at the heart of Manhattan where rents would be prohibitive for textile mills or dye works that figure in the making of the cloth. Adjacent to the banking area where we find the highest-priced land in the world, we have the homeless-man district. Here men are crowded in, one to each four hundred cubic feet of air space. While these lodgings are low priced, also at the heart of the city we find the most expensive hotel lodgings. Tenements are often found near the heart of the city, but in areas of change or isolated areas. Apartment houses tend to be more remote from the center; and still more remote, where space is not so much in demand, are the zones of single homes. The concentrated uses seek the high-priced land toward the center of the city, while the uses requiring more space move toward the periphery.

To know the natural area and trace its bounds is imperative for administration and study. Once we are aware of spatial and functional patterns, and the trends of change affecting them, the problem of control becomes one of allocating functions and guiding development in some manner consistent with what is

[22] H. Bonnet, "La carte des pauvres à Paris," *Reveue des deux mondes,* vol. xxxv, 1906, pp. 380-420; E. W. Burgess, "The Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxi, 1927; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City* (1925); E. F. Young, "The Social Base Map," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Jan.-Feb., 1925.

practical and possible. We are beginning to recognize how vital to urban life the area is, and how important it is to know the vital facts that relate to it; hence movements are under way in a number of cities to collect census and other statistical data from areas coterminous with the natural divisions of the city. The obvious advantage of such a procedure, which has been adopted in Chicago, Pittsburgh, the cities of New York, St. Louis, and Cleveland, should be that figures on vital social phenomena would be made available for the natural local area rather than the political areas that often ignore natural divisions. This ought to facilitate community planning and administration.[23]

VI. Beyond the City Walls

Rarely has there been a time when the city has not been under indictment for being the great consumer and destroyer, as opposed to the country, the creator and giver of life. On the one hand, the city has ever been the disturber of culture; on the other hand, it has ever been the center of culture creation. For this more than anything else, it has been the object of protest.[24] Always changing, yet the city cannot change without becoming a menace to the countryside, where change is as much the essence of discomfort as it is the requisite of life in the city. These age-old rural-urban antipathies only bear witness to an age-old interdependence of the city and its hinterland. In the give and take of buying and selling they have always been supplementary segments of a single entity. They are markets, one to the other. In this market relationship the city gets its status, and thus the size of the city is determined by the size of its market. Once the market function was purely exchange or commercial, but gradually the city has added the industrial function

[23] *Proc. Natl. Conf. of Social Work,* Cleveland (1926), papers on the natural area as a unit for social work by J. K. Hart, E. W. Burgess, H. I. Clark, and B. Renard, pp. 369-374 and 500-515.

[24] L. W. Busbey, "Wicked Town, Moral Country," *Unpop. Rev.,* Oct., 1912, pp. 376-392; E. E. Miller, *Town and Country* (1928); J. G. Thompson, *Urbanization, Its Effect on Government and Society* (1928).

until a large part of the goods consumed by both city and country have been partly produced and finished by the urban worker. The reach of the city's social and economic influence is the metropolitan market area to which it distributes its services and from which it draws its supplies.[25]

The hinterland falls into at least two general zones: the suburb and the region of supply. The suburb is the immediate periphery of the city, and beyond that lie the zones of production or supply. Every community in the hinterland, be it near or far, is in the periphery of some city, or a number of cities. Its status and life is conditioned by the manner in which it functions in the periphery of this or that city. Besides its location and accessibility, the community in the hinterland is conditioned in its functions by its resources. Suburban communities differ from others in that they are more intimately related to the city, being often but overflow functions of the city. It is the commuter zone, the heavy factory belt, the region of warehouses, stables, stockyards, terminals and other accessory functions of the city. The life of the suburb is timed with the urban movements, and the occupation of its space tends to correlate with the spatial pattern of the city proper. The urban habit of mind dominates suburbia.[26]

No clear line marks what we have called the hinterland of supply from the suburb given over to non-productive uses. The two overlap, though as a rule the agricultural land near the city is put to intensive uses, whereas land more remotely situated is more apt to be extensively farmed—field crops, corn, wheat, hay, or used for pasture. An example of an inner zone of intensive agriculture is Long Island, where truck gardens and duck farms are interspersed between the expansive estates of the wealthy.

The interchange of services and goods between city and coun-

[25] N. S. B. Gras, "The Development of Metropolitan Economy in Europe and America," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vol. xxvii, 1921-22, pp. 695-708; also his *An Introduction to Economic History* (1922).

[26] H. Paul Douglass, *The Suburban Trends* (1924).

try is supplemented by human migrations. According to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1,978,000 persons moved from farms to towns and cities during 1927. During the same period, 1,374,000 persons moved from towns and cities to farms, giving the city a marginal advantage of 604,000. Other years the difference in favor of towns and cities has been larger, which has given students of the situation their cue for viewing the city as the consumer of surplus man power as it is the consumer of surplus food. It has often been charged that this man power comprises the best blood from the country. This viewpoint does not seem to be supported by the facts.[27] The truth seems to be that we know very little about the sociological implications of rural-urban migrations; yet such knowledge is imperative to any comprehensive urban sociology as well as rural sociology. It would involve inquiry along the whole line of impact of urbanism upon the hinterland. We would need to study the city as a center of stimulation and its influence upon the periphery through such agencies as the newspaper, the radio, the chain store, the mail-order house, the automobile, the movie and other factors.[28] A comprehensive urban sociology would include an inquiry into the rural reactions to urbanization, as, for example, the Ku Klux Klan, prohibition, farm "blocs," and numerous reform movements. On the urban side, the inquiry would have to include the emancipation movements and the various activities specifically urban that menace rural placidity.

VII. Geography, Ecology and the City

To the geographer the city has meaning because it reveals the extent and manner that man has been able to utilize the earth's

[27] See the chapter on Rural Sociology by Zimmerman.

[28] *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxxiv, July, 1928; E. W. Burgess, "Communication"; J. M. Gillette, "Rural Life"; W. S. Thompson, "Population," and other papers on "Social Changes in 1927."

surface, especially those parts of the earth that are available for human habitation and exploitation. Cities build where they can—where the food can be grown or procured, where topography, soil, climate and other cosmic factors permit. Thus, in geography the human community gets its meaning with reference to site, location and resources. The geographer sees man using parts of the earth productively for food and mineral resources, and other parts of the earth he uses for unproductive purposes, including houses, roads, parks, etc. This approach is called human geography.[29]

The geographer calls attention to the relation of the human community to roads, and the relation of roads to the facts of geography. This has long been a subject of interest among students of society.[30] Between the city and its hinterland, the road is the life-giving artery for both. In his theory of transportation Cooley points out how the community is essentially a point on the road,[31] that wealth and population gather at the breaks in transportation. We may say, then, that the size of the city is not only determined by the number of roads that lead to it and the quantity of goods moving over the roads, but by the interruption of the flow of such goods, the purpose of the interruption, and the length of the interruption. The community at the break in transportation gets its character and status with reference to the goods thus intercepted, whether to break bulk, to change form or to be consumed.

Economic geography is finding a profitable field of inquiry in its study of areas of production. This might be called regional geography. Smith, for instance, conceives North America

[29] J. Brunhes, *Human Geography* (1920); E. Demolins, *How the Route Creates the Social Type* (1923); L. Febvre and L. Batillion, *A Geographical Introduction to History* (1925); P. Vidal de la Blache, *Principles of Human Geography,* (tr.) M. T. Bingham (1926).

[30] C. H. Hartman, *The Story of the Roads* (1927).

[31] C. H. Cooley, *A Theory of Transportation* (1894). This was given further application by D. Ridgley, "Geographic Principles in the Study of Cities," *Jour. of Geography,* vol. xxv, 1925, pp. 66-78.

in terms of about eighteen major production areas.[32] The life and economic organization of each of these areas radiate about one or more key cities. Between the production hinterlands and the key cities a consistency in size, location and function is maintained. Though mechanized standardization tends to make them all alike, the diverse regional situations in which the key cities are found tend to make them different.

Students of the city sometimes run the risk of being caught in the toils of extreme geographical explanations of social phenomena. In their scrambles over what proves to be an interesting line of investigation, some geographers have attempted to become sociologists, interpreting human society generally in terms of some single phenomenon, such as climate, altitude, topography, moisture and soil fertility.[33] Within limits, however, the geographical approach is valid for the urban sociologist.

The problem of human geography, the relation of man to his environment, is also the problem of anthropology and biology. In biology the study of the relation of the organism to the environment is called ecology. Human ecology, according to McKenzie, is the "science of the changing spatial relations of human beings and human institutions." [34] With changes of the population, the state of the arts, or in the social organization, human spatial relations are also modified. Conversely, changed spatial relations will modify social habits and organization. The human community, like plant and animal communities, tends to maintain a balance of life, a tendency toward equilibrium which holds unless disturbed either by the removal of an occupant or species or by

[32] J. R. Smith, *North America: Its People and Resources, Development and Prospects of the Continent as an Agricultural, Industrial, and Commercial Area* (1925); M. Aurousseau, "Recent Contributions to Urban Geography," *Geog. Rev.*, vol. xiv, 1924, pp. 444-455; R. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology* (1926).

[33] E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (1915); and *Climatic Changes* (1922); P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), chapter on "The Geographical School."

[34] R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Jour. of Appl. Sociology*, Mar.-Apr., 1926; B. Moore, "The Scope of Ecology," *Ecology*, vol. i, 1920, p. 3.

some invasion. After such removal or invasion another equilibrium must be achieved.[35]

The plant or animal ecologist studies the organism in its relation to the environment, watching it behave and noting what affects its behavior. Finding so many parallels, the student of human communities has ventured to "lift" much of the vocabulary of plant and animal ecology. Some of these appropriated terms describe phenomena that are common to higher as well as lower forms of life. This is especially true of the laws of migration, invasion and succession. In the human community there are also cycles of occupation of space. The problem of adaptation is also present, and the same struggle for domination found in plant and animal communities has its analogue here. In a sense, the processes are somewhat negated by man's cultural heritage and by the control his arts give him over nature, but in no sense are they completely blocked. Such barriers to movement as height and distance, as well as swamps, deserts, forests, and areas of ice and water, tend to diminish in importance. But there are other barriers, some of them created by social differences in the population, or the uses to which space is put. Thus, in the great city the areas of occupation become barriers one to another.

Ecologically explained, the arrangement of urban society, the relation of segments to segments, and the coördination of functions begin to have meaning. It is more than a matter of personal orientation to the natural environment. It includes orientation to the artificial mechanized environment, especially in the city, and also to the social environment.[36] Ecology studies the orientation of individuals within their group relations, and such

[35] N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (1928), chapter on "The City: An Ecological Fact"; F. E. Clements, *Plant Succession* (1916); H. A. Gleason, "Further Views of the Succession-Concept," *Ecology*, July, 1927.

[36] L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926), chap. vi, "The Environmental Bases of Behavior."

group relations in so far as they involve environmental spatial adjustments.

VIII. The Problem of Space and Population

From the point of view of utility, the surface of the earth plays a two-fold rôle in man's life. It is his source of supply and his habitat. The first is a productive and the second an unproductive use of space. The principal value of space is derived from its food-producing capacity and other natural resources, but space also has site value derived from its availability to the market. Most space in the city, used for buildings, streets, parks, etc., is, in the sense used here, unproductively occupied. Its site value takes precedence over its value for food production.[37] While it is true that all land has to have site value even to have value for the production of food, yet with the demand for space the site value ultimately eliminates all other values. Thus we may say that rural values derive chiefly from the producing value of land, while urban land values derive wholly from location or site. The fertility of the soil loses its value in the city where the streams of traffic meet. Here space for the city man who trades or sells services gets its value from the number of people who pass. Yet to call such space unproductive is not altogether true, because for the market functions it performs the city does have claim on food-producing land remotely situated.

In its social aspects urban land is basically involved in the evolution of the dynamic city.[38] City land undergoes varied and numerous changes of use, and the uses of space in the city are highly competitive. Because of the changing uses of space, urban land becomes an attractive object of speculation; and land speculation, in turn, becomes one of the most potent factors in urban dynamics, which means that, however he operates, the function of the real estate man in the city is dynamic.

[37] J. Brunhes, *Human Geography* (1920), pp. 74-229, on the unproductive occupation of the soil.

[38] E. H. Doreau and A. G. Hinman, *Urban Land Economics* (1928); R. M. Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values*. (1924).

The social values of urban land are confined almost wholly to uses of space for residential purposes. There are social distinctions between residential sections of the city, and these are indicated by rent levels. Social distinctions may also be evidenced by the age of buildings or the up-to-dateness of improvements. Between the slum and the most select street there are many levels of rent and income, many grades of housing, and many degrees of cleanliness. These differences are matched by differences in the attitudes of the people in these sections toward themselves. In relative terms, as public sentiment dictates, areas tend to be more or less desirable for residence. Some areas, as Hobohemia, Bohemia, Chinatown, and others, tend to be unique for certain types of residents. Thus, there tends to be competition between areas for types of residential occupancy as well as between residential and non-residential uses. City planning and zoning are procedures where types of residential areas, as well as non-residential areas, are protected by law against undesirable and damaging occupational invasions.

In its earlier stages, city planning concerned itself mostly with garden city projects. In its later stages it is becoming a science of spatial manipulation in the growth of cities. As a method of guiding urban development according to some scientific program, instead of waiting on the old trial and error processes of unguided city-building, city planning may be a means not only of achieving urban beauty but economy and social harmony as well. Taking into account the lay of the land, the ecological laws of spatial adjustment, and the possibilities of the urban site, the city planner attempts to inject order into the city's development. In doing this he is beginning to discover certain principles of growth common to all cities.[39]

Just as the city as a functioning whole cannot stop with its political boundaries, so scientific city planning must reach out

[39] On the theory of city planning, see H. James, *Land Planning in the United States for City, State and Nation* (1927); P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution* (1915); L. Purdy, "Land Values and Social Values," *City Planning*, Oct., 1927.

to the periphery to manipulate the development of areas that may ultimately lie within the city proper. Even though the outlying areas are never incorporated into the city proper, to the degree that they are involved in the life of the city they should be involved in the planning of the city. Recognition of this need has given rise to regional planning movements. An outstanding example is the Regional Plan of New York.[40] The purpose of the regional plan as evidenced in two leading instances, New York and Chicago, is to coördinate the development of the metropolitan area, and it may reach out as much as fifty miles into the hinterland.

The problem of space and food supply is basically a problem of population. Demographically stated, it relates to people in numbers and food in quantities. Assuming that the Malthusian principle works, the population always presses against and tends to outstrip the food supply, but ultimately a final saturation point will be reached. For the usual available quantities of food, congestion in the city is relatively no greater than we generally find on farm land. Yet the sustenance situation in the city has always been more precarious. As a result (and perhaps for other reasons), the city has been more aware of the population problem. It is in the city where the futility of an unrestricted birth rate seems to have been most recognized. In modern times it is the city that manifests uneasiness about over-population, so that controversy about the problem is generally identified with the metropolitan centers.

However serious its nature as a problem for science, interest in the population problem has generally been too emotional for candid probing. State policies, church views, and science are usually and uncompromisingly at variance.[41]

[40] A point of view growing out of the Regional Plan of New York is found in R. M. Haig, "Toward an Understanding of the Metropolis," *Quarterly Jour. of Econ.*, May and August, 1927; also Publications of the Committee of the Regional Plan of New York and its Environs.

[41] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem* (1922); H. Cox, *The Problem of Population* (1923); E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (1923); R. Pearl, *The Biology of Population* (1925).

IX. The Selection and Limitation of Population

There are two approaches to population control: the quantitative and the qualitative. The first relates essentially to numbers and brings up the mooted question of birth control for limiting the population. The qualitative aspect relates also to birth control but with the primary interest in selecting the population. According to either viewpoint, population would or might be limited; but the advocate of qualitative control holds for the increase of certain preferred classes. The selectivist may be against birth control but very strong for a careful selection of population increase through immigration. Behind the idea of selection is the assumption of fit and unfit or superior and inferior classes. Whether they determine fitness by cultural or biological appraisals, the selective protective protagonists are convinced that the unfit breed faster than the fit, and they want to control the sources of supply, be they immigration or the birth rate. In some such circles the fittest Americans are thought to be those from the colonial Nordic stocks, but they are not holding their own against the spawning of the non-Nordics of more recent immigrations.[42]

American cities have become ports of entry for the non-Nordic invasion, hence sore spots to the pro-Nordic eugenists. While there is no denying that certain characteristics, such as feeble-mindedness, do cling to the blood stream, yet it seems that many of these fears are unfounded. As far as immigration is concerned, however, these fears have been so widely accepted as to reverse our "melting pot" policy and to replace it with the present highly selective and pro-Nordic immigration laws.[43] This is essentially a negative legislative approach, being prohibitory to all who would enter the country except the small percentage of so-called "desirables."

The selective birth rate through legislation is another matter.

[42] Anonymous, "A Biological Forecast," *Harper's Magazine,* April, 1928; M. Grant, *The Passing of a Great Race* (1916); E. Huntington, *The Pulse of Progress* (1926); T. Simar, *Race Myth* (1925).

[43] H. P. Fairchild, *The Melting Pot Mistake* (1926).

It is a problem in eugenics. The eugenist is one who places his faith chiefly in heredity, and he banks on improving the race through proper mating and control of breeding.[44] Pinning his faith on such family histories as those of the Jukes, the Kallikaks or the Edwards, the eugenist is able to explain most insanity, crime, juvenile delinquency, vice, family disorganization, just as easily as he can account for superior forms of behavior.[45] The city is the great challenge; in fact, the city gives the eugenist much anxiety. There is so much irregularity in the city because of the too rapid increase of Jukes and Kallikaks. The eugenists' answer is as simple as their diagnosis; Jukes and Kallikaks must be limited in their breeding, either by sterilization or institutionalization. This must be done by legislation because such people are not amenable to education.

The superior classes, of which the Edwards family is the shining prototype, must be persuaded to marry and people the earth. This is to be done by education, exhortation, or by making the prospect of family rearing attractive. According to this point of view, the superior classes are being consumed by the city faster than they are being produced, and the ranks can be recruited only from the surplus from the country. Thus the city continues to attract the "best" blood from the country only to leave the country depleted. At the same time, it draws the "worst" from the foreign countries. Since the best in the city do not keep up their numbers and the worst overbreed, there is only one conclusion: American culture is being destroyed!

The difficulty with such reasoning is that we are not always sure about who is superior and who inferior. Are these quali-

[44] E. G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (1923); L. Darwin, *The Need of Eugenic Reform* (1926); C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics* (1911); F. Galton, *Hereditary Genius* (1869); H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence* (1920); S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of Race* (1922); P. Jacoby, *Études sur la sélection* (1881); A. Ploetz, *Socialanthropologie* (1923); P. B. Popenoe, *Problems of Human Reproduction* (1927); E. A. Ross, *World Trend* (1928).

[45] As an antidote for this point of view, read C. Darrow, "The Edwardses and the Jukeses," *The American Mercury,* Oct., 1925.

ties that run in the blood stream, or merely socially acquired behavior traits? Eugenists often mistake one for the other, or make no effort to distinguish the two. In facing social problems in the city, it is important that we begin thinking straight on such matters as this. We can do this and still recognize that there is a place in a scientific social control for something that approaches selective reproduction. We have as yet no grounds for assuming that the differential birth rate between social classes is either eugenic or dysgenic. We need some scientific basis for determining who is fit and who unfit. Certainly there is reason for assuming that by breeding alone we are going to overcome the effects of "bad teaching, bad environment, bad habit formation and evil experiences." We also need to examine the urban population to see what the so-called inferior classes are doing in other ways than in walks of crime.

X. Mobility and Mechanisms

It has been said that the country is separated from the city less by space than by time; that is, the country, being less stimulated, lags behind the city in its rate of change. The city is active, alert, aggressive; the country passive, inert, defensive, doggedly conserving the values of the past. Both city and country submit to change, but at varying rates, making the difference between them principally one of degree. The city is more mobile, mobility being a characteristic of its life, just as stability is characteristic of rural life. In either instance mobility, or the lack of it, has sociological significance.

Mobility has come to be used in a double sense among students of sociology. It may refer to movement through physical or geometric space, or movement through social space. Social space and social mobility are terms that Sorokin has recently put into use.[46] It relates to the movement of people up or down the social scale, and includes movement to and fro across class lines. We might call it the shifting of people from one social status to

[46] P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (1927).

another. Such mobility is at its minimum in a static society, a society stratified into caste groupings where people stay pretty well put. Social mobility is at its height in the fluxing industrial metropolis, where because of social ladder-climbing no class is immune to invasion, however much they may seek protection through the aid of social registers and "blue books." To avoid confusion, we will refer to movement through physical space as mobility, reserving the term "social mobility" for the kind of movement just described. The two forms of mobility are essentially two aspects of a single phenomenon, social mobility being more subjective and generally a resultant of mobility. Once people shift through space, they have no choice but to form new habits and set up new social relationships.

Urban mobility varies as much with the area as with the types of people. Men seem to be more mobile than women, and adults more than children. The children of the foreign-born are more mobile than their parents, who prefer to cling to language areas. Mobility seems to increase as we approach the urban center. Studies being made by the Institute for Social and Religious Research reveal that downtown churches draw as much attendance from a five-mile radius as a one-mile radius. The suburban churches tend to draw very few people from beyond the one-mile area.

The mobility of the city detaches and undomesticates the city man. It releases him from his primary group associations, the family and the neighborhood, bestowing upon him an independence that serves to weaken local loyalties. The city may give him the provincialism of the specialist, but it does so at the cost of that earlier form of provincialism which we identify with the village or country. The city man gains freedom; but the individualism that he achieves is often at the cost of his locus. He acquires other loyalties and in the flux of life he tends to retain a cultural equilibrium. But the equilibrium that the city man enjoys relates to a poise achieved in the midst of movement. The country man, on the contrary, comes to equilibrium with

reference to fixed associations in space.[47] Let it not be supposed that the city man in his gypsy-like orientation does not get in a rut in his spatial relations and stereotyped in his behavior. That tendency is ever present, though in the city, where stimuli are most varied and numerous as well as least constant, the tendency is weakest. But the tendency to equilibrium is constantly being invaded and disturbed; and this is as true of social institutions as of personal relations, though the institution recovers equilibrium with difficulty, if at all. This is especially noted in the case of the urban family.

The persistence of any culture pattern arises not from mobility but from isolation. Main Street and Broadway are at cultural extremes, differing in their tempo of life; yet each is the natural product of a situation. Main Street repeats itself day after day and resents disturbance. Broadway is bored with repetition. Main Street is hemmed in by the natural environment more intimately than Broadway. The environment of Broadway is cultural, being man-made and mechanized; and being mechanized, the urban environment has a mobility of its own quite distinct from the movement of the people. As compared with the man on Main Street, we may say that the Broadway man is nearer the artificial and farthest removed from the natural environment. His movements must gear in with a myriad of movements all about, and these movements tend to contribute momentum one to another. The mobility of the urban community involves movement of the total situation; movement of the people, movement of the home, of institutions and social organizations, movement of occupants in and out of areas, and finally, the movement even of the urban areas.

Equilibrium in the mobile urban society, such a society that calls itself "progressive," is never reached, though it is ever being approximated. To the degree that it is approached, we have the establishment of behavior-patterns or behavior mechanisms.

[47] R. E. Park, "Human Migrations and the Marginal Man," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology,* May, 1928.

Since so much of the urban environment reflects human nature more than nature, an inquiry into the behavior-patterns and mechanisms found there involves a study both of structures and processes. We need to study the movement of people, but also the structural changes—skyscrapers, transportation systems, water systems, lighting systems, sewers, etc.—for these also involve motion. These external non-social mechanisms which constitute the dynamic structural phase of the urban situation are sometimes designated by the blanket term, *the machine.*

XI. Urban Types and Groups

With a mobile society and a mechanized environment, what type of person does the city produce? If human nature is acquired out of experience, what kind of human nature is evolved in the urban situation? In his personality the city man incorporates, as does any other person, "physical make-up, intellectual powers, instinctive tendencies, emotions, feelings, and the will," but the composition of these elements in different people varies as their experience. Type distinctions between people really characterize backgrounds.[48] Personality is an end product, and in some respects a by-product, of association; and through it the person reflects the culture patterns of the groups to which he belongs. Literally he *is* the group or groups that figure in his life, and to the extent that they figure in his life. He takes on the attitudes, the values and all that characterizes his associates; hence the social scientist, to understand the person, must study him in his social setting. This task is relatively easy in the homogeneous setting, but extremely difficult in the heterogeneous setting. In the great city, where the most variables would be encountered, it would be most difficult.

In their occupational and intimate or primary relations the city differentiates, specializes and separates people, but it tends to reduce them all to a standardized mean in their secondary or

[48] H. B. Woolston, "The Urban Habit of Mind," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology,* March. 1912; K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology* (1927), pp. 299 *et seq.*

impersonal relations. Urban life seems to shunt city people about, group and segregate them into types or classes that differ in interest and activities, in race, religion, nationality, etc. Where country people are bound by propinquity, thrown upon one another by spatial distribution, city dwellers tend to draw together in terms of group interests. Their social relationships incline toward a member basis rather than a neighbor basis. The city man's life may be cast into a number and variety of groups among which he divides his time and loyalty, but his affiliations are the result of interest more than residential qualifications. The shift of society in the city from a neighborhood to a metropolitan character is fundamental to any scientific interpretation of urban life.[49]

The interest group arrangement of the city is both more and less confining than the neighborhood or propinquity group. While it contributes to cosmopolitanism, it also develops forms of provincialism that are as confining as the isolation of the village. If he hopes to understand and eventually control metropolitan society, the student of urban life needs to acquaint himself with these vital interest aggregates in which urban life is lived. In a common-sense way the urban politician has long known the value of cultivating clubs, fraternities, gangs and other homogeneous groupings through which he keeps his finger on the pulse of the city and manipulates its activities. There is no reason for believing that the social scientist would be less successful, though his objectives might differ vastly. He wants the facts so that those who would manipulate urban life might keep their ideals within the range of the possible.[50]

[49] F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924); E. W. Burgess, ed., *The Urban Community* (1926), see paper by W. I. Thomas, "The Problem of Personality in the Urban Environment," and paper by L. Wirth, "Some Jewish Types of Personality"; C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types* (1923); K. Young, "Integration of Personality," *Pedag. Seminary,* vol. xxx, 1923, pp. 264-285.

[50] N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (1928), chapters on urban types and urban groups; N. Spykman, *Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (1925), chap. i, "The Concept of Society."

XII. The Social Pathologies of the City

Social maladjustments in the changing urban situation are inevitable. Old behavior-patterns are invaded and broken down and new ones are developed. Pathology begins when the demands for adjustment outstrip the capacity of the organism to make the adjustment. Pathology may involve the individual or person; it may relate to the primary group, or it may concern the community.[51] The person is deemed in a pathological state whenever, because of some physical, mental, or personality maladjustment, he is not able to function normally in his social relations. Whether his problem is one of social friction or dependency, if the condition disorganizes him or inconveniences his associates, or society in general, he is to that extent pathological. The social maladjustments of persons or groups are often traceable to change differentials between stimuli systems and habit response systems. Whether he changes faster or slower than his group, in either case the person may be a behavior problem. He may be more responsive or less to new situations; it's a matter of rate of adjustment, in which he may be lagging behind his group or far in advance. Or it may be that his experience has been different so that his values and attitudes would not be in harmony with his group.[52]

In the final analysis, the pathology of the group becomes pathology of persons in their associational relationships. This is especially true of the family most frequently involved in group maladjustment. It has had so much trouble surviving the impact of urban life that, with its diminishing size, the mechanized apartment life, the passing of domestic social life, the waning of the old domestic economy, and the changing status of women, there is some question as to whether it can survive. The industrial econ-

[51] J. H. S. Bossard, *Problems of Social Well-Being* (1927); R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (1927); J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (1921); S. A. Queen and D. M. Mann, *Social Pathology* (1925).

[52] J. Colcord, *Broken Homes* (1919); W. Healy, *The Individual Delinquent* (1915); E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (1927); W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1927); W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928).

omy of the city, as well as the problem of distribution and habits of consumption, is involved in most pathology of the urban family. The set-up of industrial society puts its major emphasis on the employable individual as the unit of production; whereas the unit of production in all previous economies, especially that of the early homestead home, was the family. This contributes to the detachment and mobility of the individual. Group pathology takes other forms. One of the most perplexing of these is the gang, a phenomenon of the city, and particularly of the regions of social disorganization.[53]

Pathology of the community often relates to the distribution, density or the movements of the population, as well as to numerical maladjustments in sex groupings, age groupings, or in death rates, birth rates, divorce rates, etc. These disproportions are important socially only as they lead to social friction or contribute in some way to the social disorganization of the community. Problems of change usually hold the center of attention in community pathology. Such problems are generally characterized by clash between traditional and invading interests or points of view, or between old and new behavior-patterns. The challenge presented by the pathologies of urban life is essentially problems in social control, in social case work and community organization.

XIII. Social Science and Social Control

The initial purpose of science in its approach to the problems of the city is to describe and interpret them. Where maladjustment is a matter of social change, science measures the rates of change and seeks for generalizations about the trends of change that will be useful in developing techniques for control. But science, as such, ceases to figure in control at the point where fact-finding turns to fact-using. Science does not manipulate phenomena, it studies them. The ultimate objective of social science is social control, to reduce friction in change and to remove

[53] F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang.* (1927).

the devitalizing forces that prey upon the person or the group, yet the social scientist who assists in creating the tools and techniques for readjustment does not use these tools and techniques. If he did, his rôle would change from that of a social scientist to that of a technician. This has been a salient difficulty in the development of urban sociology; it has been too often intrigued into the manipulation of urban life. Much of this lies outside the field of measuring, examining, describing and interpreting the phenomena of the city. The manipulation belongs in other hands. In so far as it concerns the maladjustment of persons or groups, it is the responsibility of social work.

Social work has been described as the "art of adjusting human relationships." In the turmoil of urban life the social worker functions as a salvaging, reconciling, reorganizing agent. In the great city the social worker has become a substitute for the folk guidance and gossip of the village. It is her function to take charge of the defunct family organization, to rehabilitate the person when his own resources fail, to reconstitute disorganized group life, and to reinforce the community organization. There is some difference of opinion about the possibility of social work becoming a science—that is, the social worker becoming objective —which seems quite beside the point. Social work must remain an art and it can be an art without sacrificing its objectivity. It can be an art in human relations and still be equipped with techniques that grow out of scientific research as well as its own accumulated experience. The social worker at the point of change must rely primarily upon native intelligence and the methods of trial and error to make adjustments, and these adjustments often have less to do with rules than compromise.[54]

In some of the larger cities where social work organization embraces most phases of social maladjustment, at least three tendencies are in evidence: (1) Social work is turning more to re-

[54] For a full discussion of the rôle of social work, see the chapter by Phelps on "Sociology and Social Work." Also see M. E. Richmond, *What is Social Case Work?* (1922); and K. de Schweinitz, *The Art of Helping People out of Trouble* (1924).

search to establish factual bases for action; (2) There is a decided swing toward social planning in the specialization of agencies, the elimination of duplication and the concentration of effort through central guidance; and (3) More emphasis is being put on the coördination of agencies and their programs, also through central guidance. At least these trends indicate that panacea reform as a motive in social work is on the wane.[55]

Other factors than the conscious reconstructive controls figure in the life of the city, conditioning its behavior. An example would be the tendency toward the mechanization of movement, including such mechanisms as we have already referred to—those that figure in transportation, communication, supply and waste removal. We have never determined the extent to which such factors as the press agent, the advertiser, the real estate man and others contribute to the social organization or disorganization of the city. Precisely what influence on urban society are such factors as the political machine, the men of influence in civil life, men of wealth, funded wealth guided by the hands of dead men and, not the least, such established institutions as the church?

In the secondary urban society, the pressures of social control are largely indirect, compared with the direct compulsion of the face-to-face groups. Village gossip may not be here, but in its stead we find inner primary groups equally potent. The gang and the institution are typically representative. Both flourish in the complex urban situation, and in a sense both are products of the social disorganization of the city. Thrown on the defensive, social values often retreat to institutions for safety. Once inside, they become aggressive and conservative disciplines, resorting to law for the control that the mores no longer insure. The gang on mischief bent and the institution bent on doing good—both may be powers in dominating public policy, and either may be a problem in social control. In these we have named only a few of the factors that sway the life of the city. How significant

[55] Typical of this tendency is the Welfare Council of New York City; see booklet of this title by W. F. Persons (1925).

they are, how related to one another in making the city the kind of a place it is, and often in spite of conscious efforts to make it different, constitute for the urban sociologist a fertile field of study.[56]

XIV. Present Trends of Urban Sociology

The position taken in this chapter is that urban sociology is but a phase of sociology in the process of being formed. As a scientific method in fact-finding it has scarcely found itself, and any attempt to define its scope and aims would be hazardous. Accordingly, we have attempted to go no further than to call attention to some of the subject matter that might properly be included in the field, recognizing that the materials are scattered and fragmentary. The process of gathering these data into a related whole worthy to be called urban sociology can proceed no faster than social science is able to relinquish the well-wishing and often unsystematic reform motives for objective research.

During the formative period of the social sciences in this country, they were involved in numerous welfare moves, aiming at specific problems of the city but particularly those identified with slum areas. They were more concerned with finding solutions than in studying causes and relationships. The trend at present is in the direction of studying the city in larger perspective—in its entirety, rather than in terms of isolated problems. The urban sociology growing out of the more objective viewpoint is essentially a science of interrelationships of segments of the population, of the social processes involved in the creation of attitudes and values. It must eventually become a study of the total situation, of the total physical environment of the city and of human behavior in response to it. It thus becomes a study of the interdependence of function in the city and the coördinated occupancy of urban space. A very significant approach to this ideal is the recent survey of Middletown conducted by the Institute for

[56] S. Bent, *Ballyhoo: The Voice of the Press* (1927); F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control* (1925); P. Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (1928); M. R. Werner, *Tammany Hall* (1928).

Social and Religious Research. It is a study of an average American city with reference to the six "main-trunk activities" of a community: "getting a living, making a home, training the young, using leisure, engaging in religious practices and engaging in community activities." [57]

As a venture in research, urban sociology can only share the progress of social science in general. The research prospects of social science in the city are indicated by a number of trends which include: (1) The rapid accumulation of wealth in social science research funds and foundations; (2) The establishment of special projects in urban research. An example would be the institute for the study of land economics at Northwestern University. (3) The increasing number of bureaus for municipal research specializing on problems of administration and taxation. (4) The establishment of schools for city managers, secretaries of Chambers of Commerce and other municipal workers. (5) The increase in the number of city- and regional-planning commissions, and the tendency among these to base their programs on the findings of research. (6) The trend toward the coördination of social work agencies definitely committed to research and centralized administration. (7) An increasing use of research in business and industry. Examples would be the studies of such organizations as telephone companies, railroad companies and advertising firms. This includes income and population surveys and such market surveys as the newspapers have been making in the larger cities.

Urban sociology must look to other sources than the findings of social research for its data. It is equally dependent upon progress in the physical sciences as well as in the mechanical arts. Moreover, there is developing another fertile source of data; namely, the field of journalism. The realist in journalism is a po-

[57] R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown: A Study of Contemporary American Culture* (1928). Also J. F. Steiner, *The American Community in Action* (1928); and the University of Chicago Community Studies as: *The Ghetto* by L. Wirth (1928); *The Gold Coast and The Slum,* by H. W. Zorbaugh (1929); *Domestic Discord,* by E. R. Mowrer (1928); *Suicide,* by R. S. Cavan (1928); *The Gang,* by F. M. Thrasher (1927); *The Hobo,* by N. Anderson (1923).

tent factor in clearing our vision with reference to phenomena of the city. This, in spite of the fact that in his observations he often alternates between art and science. For an adequate urban sociology these and other sources must be tapped; thus the sociologist's approach to the city becomes a many-sided one. It must be so if he is to have any comprehensive view of the city in its entirety, not only within its limits, but beyond its limits to the most remote reaches of the hinterland.

CHAPTER VII

EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

By Daniel H. Kulp II

I. Introduction

Educational sociology is one of the various efforts to apply sociology to the work of schools, public and private, of all levels, nursery to university.

Its protagonists are far from either clarity or agreement as to what they understand "sociology" to mean. In general, it is interpreted as "findings" rather than as "methods." These findings are largely the "insights" or "hunches" of the earlier sociologists—Ward, Giddings, Small, Cooley and Ross—based upon some observation, but unchecked by such objective and experimental research as characterized the natural scientists.

Sociology was taken as a way of approach to the interpretation of human experience—a way which demanded a well-rounded consideration that integrated in functional relation the various knowledges of human experiences known as social sciences and titled economics, history, politics, jurisprudence, and the like. It was a sort of philosophy of the special social sciences, characterized by "laws," "principles," "generalizations," and compositions, and it called attention to the essential unity of human experiences. In the words of Small: "The social sciences are not many, but one; sociology cancels out the particular." [1]

While these social philosophers were wrangling about "What is Sociology?" and the writers of texts in sociology were putting the cosmos under a tent, certain professional educators became inoculated with the new "sociology" microbe. But first, let us examine the germs that began to fly about in the growing sociological atmosphere.

[1] *The Meaning of Social Science.*

II. Rise of Educational Sociology

1. THE SOCIOLOGY IMPULSE

All the "founders" of American sociology discursed on "education and schools." To Lester F. Ward,[2] education was the "proximate means of progress."

Probably influenced by Ward, who at that time was a government employee in Washington, the Commissioner of Education, Dr. W. T. Harris, revealed on several occasions an appreciation of the importance of sociology in relation to education. In 1893 he wrote: "But no philosophy of education is fundamental until it is based on sociology—not on physiology, not even on psychology, but on sociology."[3] And again, three years later: "It has been a motto of my theory of education for a great many years, that education is founded on sociology."[4]

Ward's work can best be appreciated in its setting of the time. His *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) represents a strong reaction against the general *"laissez-faire"* philosophy of Herbert Spencer.[5] Available to Ward also was Spencer's *Education,* in which the author criticizes education and sets up normative considerations inducted from his sociological thinking.

According to Ward, to insure progress, knowledge must be available to all. Schools must be free and compulsory. Thus was rationalized the halting evolution of our early school system which began as a means of permanently routing monarchy and the "old deluder—Satan." Progress, being the objective of sociology, became the lodestar of the infected educators. They would educate youth, not so much to maintain societal life or a political system (a notion that prevailed during the inception of our public school system),[6] but to insure "progress"—as they conceived it.

[2] *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), vol. ii, chap. xiv.
[3] *Educational Review,* vol. vi, p. 84.
[4] *N. E. A. Proceedings,* 1896, p. 196.
[5] *Social Statics* (1850); *Principles of Sociology* (1876-1896).
[6] See Washington's Farewell Address and Massachusetts State Laws on Schools.

It remained for Todd[7] to examine this concept more closely. He maintains that the possibility of progress lies chiefly in the plasticity and therefore the educability of "human [original] nature." Therefore the kind of "human natures" or personalities that develop depend on social environments. To insure social progress, personalities must be created which will not be merely adaptive or even exploitive but definitely contributive to human welfare. Such people can only be secured through a well-organized system of "social education"—one designed to prevent social waste, to enhance "social capital in men and goods," and to create in all of us social intelligence, power, efficiency and interests—in short, a coöperative and democratic society. But this, too, is a philosophy capable of severe attack, for "progress" is demonstrable only in its technological features. Who shall say what it all means when we have it?

To Cooley,[8] our public schools are primary groups peculiarly favorable to the stimulation of "social consciousness." Individual and society are not separate entities, but phases of social process. School experiences develop child minds and at the same time inculcate upon them habits and ideals essential to groups of all kinds—loyalty, unity, justice and fraternity.

Such was the general background of educators who tapped the literature of social philosophy. They found in it not a little that was familiar, and much that was impressive. The outcome was two-fold: to justify and support the educational system in our national economy on the one hand; and on the other, to raise some striking challenges as to detailed aspects of aims and practices.

2. FORERUNNERS OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

This continuing close relation between certain educators and the philosophizing about society known as sociology—from Ward on—is well illustrated by the statements of the Commissioner of Education referred to above. It is also shown by a publication

[7] A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress.*

[8] *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902); *The Social Process* (1918).

which Clow[9] regards as foreshadowing the rise of educational sociology—a pamphlet[10] containing an article by John Dewey on "My Pedagogic Creed" and one by Albion W. Small, "The Demands of Pedagogy on Sociology." The pamphlet was introduced by S. T. Dutton, Superintendent of Schools in Brookline, Massachusetts, and emphasized "that the school is a social institution, that its aims are social, and that its management, discipline, and methods of instruction should be dominated by this idea." A year before (1896) Dewey had started the University Elementary School in Chicago. In 1899 he published in *The School and Society* his convictions as they had emerged from the experiment. There is then represented in this one publication an educational experimenter and thinker, a sociologist, and a practical school man. In the same year Dutton published his *Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home.* By 1912 there had appeared Scott, *Social Education* (1908); O'Shea, *Social Development and Education* (1909); King, *Social Aspects of Education* (1912); and Betts, *Social Principles of Education* (1912).

During this period immediately preceding the World War, changing social and economic conditions were reflected in a general demand among school men for practicalizing education. Industrial and vocational education, continuation, part-time and special schools, and the increase of high schools, are among the significant developments. To these were added, during the subsequent decade, courses in health, ethics, foreign languages, and, especially significant, civics, Americanization and social sciences—history, economics, current events and sociology.

3. BEGINNINGS AND EXPANSION IN PROFESSIONAL PREPARATIONS OF TEACHERS

Due respect should be paid to the early efforts in the last part of the nineteenth century to utilize sociology in the service of education; for while the writings were philosophical, the chal-

[9] F. R. Clow, "The Rise of Educational Sociology," *Journal of Social Forces,* March, 1924, pp. 332ff.

[10] *Teachers Manuals,* No. 25 (1897).

lenges and points of view maintained had certain practical effects in placing sociology in programs for training teachers in normal schools and universities.

According to Clow, as early as 1895 the board of regents of normal schools in Minnesota made "social science" required. The following year it was introduced in the normal schools in Winona and in Milwaukee. By 1902, sociology was offered in all the teacher training schools of Wisconsin; by 1910 about forty normal schools in the United States offered a variety of courses in sociology; and by a decade later, this was the case in nearly one hundred of these institutions.[11]

Teacher training in six colleges and universities during the same general period was enriched by definite courses on the relations of sociology and education, so that by 1914 seventeen higher institutions made sociology required for teachers in training, others made it partly required or elective, and sixteen offered something under the definite term, educational sociology. While Gillette first used the term in the normal school of Valley City, North Dakota, to Henry Suzzallo goes the credit of popularizing it by offering the first course called "Educational Sociology" in Teachers College, Columbia University (1908). At the present time (1929) there are no complete statistics available, but it is safe to assert that "educational sociology" is offered in from 200 to 250 institutions throughout the United States—normal schools, teachers colleges, and colleges and universities in their departments of education.

III. The Literature of Educational Sociology

1. Isolated efforts

From the outset there is abundant evidence that the influences between education and sociology were mutual. Educators were stimulated by the writings of sociologists about the place of education in community processes and accordingly organized their materials to show that school processes are social processes.

[11] *American Journal of Sociology*, 1920.

O'Shea, King, Scott and Kirkpatrick (1909-1916) culled all the suggestions possible from extant sociology to describe and analyze education in its social phases, to show that education is a social process and that there is a close and most important relation between effective education and the knowledge of community backgrounds—both for school objectives and school methods. There was, however, no general agreement as to what educational sociology is either in the courses offered or in the earliest textbooks written.

There then followed three books that carried forward these tendencies to wed educational theory and sociology. They were: W. R. Smith, *Introduction to Educational Sociology* (1917); Chancellor, *Educational Sociology* (1919); F. R. Clow, *Sociology With Educational Applications* (1920). Meanwhile, in 1918, Robbins published *The School as a Social Institution,* a volume that should be classified with the first group, for he employs neither the concepts nor terminology of sociology. But Smith and Clow well illustrate what was happening in these early developments. Smith leads out from education and utilizes sociology to describe and illuminate educational processes; Clow sets forth sociology and applies it to education. The major emphasis of Smith is on education; of Clow, on sociology. Both, however, attempt to deal with all phases of education, from determining objectives to extra-curricular activities.

Smith, in his *Introduction to Educational Sociology,* argues for educational sociology as a distinct science. In this he is supported by most of the later writers. But with them all the contention is rather one of wishful thinking than of practical demonstration.

David Snedden, by far the most prolific writer in this field, had printed in 1917 *Educational Sociology, A Digest and Syllabus,* for use in connection with his classes at Teachers College, Columbia University. This was followed in 1921 by a more specialized treatment, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education.* The following year saw the "Digest" published

in an expanded textbook form as *Educational Sociology* (1922), which was in 1924 reissued without essential change of content in two books, *Sociology for Teachers,* and *Educational Applications* of *Sociology.* In 1922 he published *Civic Education: Sociological Foundations and Courses,* and, in 1928, *Educational Sociology for Beginners.*

He limits the task of educational sociology to the needs of policy-makers with reference to objectives, curricula and subject contents. He approaches the practical problems of education with originality, emphasizing the need of parting company with philosophical generalities, of differentiating problems precisely, and of analyzing their backgrounds. His method is that of logical analysis rather than of field or experimental research. Save for the sections entirely devoted to sociology, there seems to be little immediate use made of it in his treatment of practical problems.

Thus far, all the special contributors to the body of materials recognized as "educational sociology" were collectors and interpreters, though they added some definition of problems and but little definition of method. The raw materials for their sandwich of "educational sociology" were educational practices and theory, and social "philosophies" and "hunch sociologies." But they had at least staked out a claim. They have failed to pan much gold either in the limited claim of Snedden or the wider one of Smith.

C. C. Peters, in his *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (1924), should be allied with Snedden in his emphasis upon curricula contents; but he goes farther than Snedden in that he presents a more comprehensive discussion of methods of sociological analysis and offers research illustrations. He too hopes for an independent science of educational sociology, though his use of technical sociology is surprisingly limited. He would, however, attack educational problems and get methods not from sociology alone but from any source.

The most recent writers reveal no concerted tendency. Good, in *Sociology and Education,* subtitles the book "Sociology from

the Viewpoint of Education." He studies groups of all kinds and shows the relations and importance of such to education. Groves' *Sociology and Educational Problems* uses the same general approach as Smith and Good, but adds a new body of materials on personality. The major aspects of both of these works is sociological.

Ross L. Finney, *Sociological Philosophy of Education* (1928), challenges and criticizes current educational practices and theories in the light of sociological thought. While he does not advance the clarification of methods as contents of "educational sociology," his title is honest and his work exceedingly thought-provoking.

2. ORGANIZED EFFORTS

In 1922 a group of interested persons, in connection with the American Sociological Society in Chicago, discussed the organization of a society which was begun in 1923 in Cleveland in connection with the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association, and was called the National Society for the Study of Educational Sociology—surely a name modest enough! Meetings since then have been held regularly in connection with these two organizations, the former in December and the latter in February. An analysis of the programs and the papers read at these meetings shows the same general alignment of interest as the literature already mentioned. "What is Educational Sociology?" "The Status of Educational Sociology in Schools and Colleges," "What Can Sociology Do For Education?" are typical. A few reports of concrete studies may be found, but mainly they are papers of a general philosophical character, going in some cases to definitions of problems. This period is one of "wrangling" as to what it is all about. Probably because the aim was to sell the "new science" to sociologists on the one hand and to educational administrators on the other, they felt the necessity of talking one language if they could.

Aside from promoting general discussion about educational

sociology, one practical result of the society's activities has been to organize a series of committees under the direction of one on Research and Publication, whose special task is to stimulate research and aid in the publication of concrete studies of educational problems by sociological methods, and to issue Yearbooks.

The first Yearbook, published in 1928 under the leadership of F. R. Clow, was on *Bibliographies on Educational Sociology.* In compiling the journal and book references, great difficulty was met in classifying the materials. It was found that there were many works on education which possessed a sociological viewpoint or which represented research of a sociological kind without admitting indebtedness or employing its technical terminology. These were listed—and are by far the larger portion—but they are not strictly educational sociology as in Chapter I, but rather "social phases of education."

A brief list of the contents will indicate the range of materials available: (I) Scope and Method (strictly educational sociology), (II) School and Community, (III) The Major Institutions and Education, (IV) Special Institutions and Groups Affecting Education, (V) Educational Objectives, (VI) The Educational System, (VII) Objective Studies of School Subjects (an unusually fine synthetic analysis), (VIII) Learning and Teaching, (IX) Constructive Guidance and Corrective Control (discipline), (X) Extra-curricula Activities.

An analysis of Chapter I (Scope and Method)—the literature of educational sociology strictly regarded—reveals a total of 124 references, covering a period from 1893-1927 inclusive. The names most frequently recurring are D. S. Snedden, W. R. Smith, R. L. Finney, F. R. Clow, Ira W. Howerth, and C. C. Peters. The titles range from "The Theory of Education" to "Psychology of Human Society" and "Psychology of Secondary Education," from "Principles of Education" to "The Case-Group in Educational Sociology." Even in this restricted list one looks in vain for a homogeneous content; we find here history, philosophy, theory and principles of education, psychology and general sociol-

ogy listed under specific works that can be called "educational sociology."

A two-fold indexing is applied to indicate the viewpoints of the authors as to what educational sociology is:[12]

[A]. A course in the general principles of sociology should be a preliminary to the study of education. It may, however, include a relatively full treatment of education among forms of social activity, or it may draw its illustrations largely from the educational field.

[B]. A distinct science of educational sociology should be developed by selecting the sociological principles (*sic!*) which apply to education and arranging them around educational topics, rather than introducing the student to them in the merely logical order in which they come in pure sociology.

The two viewpoints are about equally divided, though the second increasingly prevails in the later materials. One may find much to criticize in the selection and arrangements of references in this *Bibliographies,* yet it has done a great service in revealing what has been done directly and contributively, what are the difficulties of demarcation, and what are the problems and contents of educational sociology as it has developed up to 1927.

The second Yearbook, 1929, is on *Objectives in Education.* There are three contributions: Part I is by Snedden—Chapter I, "Some Basic Assumptions"; Chapter II, "The Educator Asks the Sociologist" (what educations are of most worth? and can sociology help?); Chapter III, "The Sociologist Replies to the Educator." Part II is by Peters—Chapter I, "Relative Importance of Educational Objectives (with a summary of techniques); Chapter II, "The Objectives of Education for Worthy Home Membership" (an illustrative research); Chapter III, "The Relation of Standardized Tests to Educational Objectives." Part III is by Philip W. L. Cox, "Educational Sociology and Social Education." This presentation of the contents is warranted here because it helps define the present status of educational sociology:

[12] *Bibliographies on Educational Sociology: First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Educational Sociology,* p. 9.

first—even for a yearbook on a subject as important as this, when educators throughout the country are milling around crises in curriculum readjustment, when millions of dollars are being involved in new programming of the schools—only three offerings can be secured; second, the lack of integration of work done in the field is shown, and third, the lack of agreement. The three contributors well illustrate the kinds of work being done: generalized logical analysis of a semi-philosophical kind, concrete researches, and purely philosophical treatment. One can hardly dispute that this "infant science" of educational sociology is not yet out of its swaddling clothes, though occasionally it utters cries of lusty promise.

Finally, there is the *Journal of Educational Sociology*,[13] established in 1928, which aims to be the special organ for the new science. Its editorial policy is definitely in support of a distinct science, independent and in its own right. Most of the contributions are, however, not concrete objective researches but generalized semi-philosophical discussions. In effect, it has been the organ of the single institution backing it; but since the National Society for the Study of Educational Sociology has adopted it as its official organ, there is real promise of its achieving its aim.

It is then apparent that in the last two decades there has grown up a body of literature in educational sociology that is not large, is more or less specialized, deals with special problems, and promises to be increasingly significant in the general movement of scientizing education.

3. CONCURRENT EFFORTS

It should be noted that if the references listed in the first Yearbook on *Bibliographies in Educational Sociology* are to be taken seriously as constituting the content of the subject, then not a little of the materials have been contributed by others than educational sociologists. The fact is that while certain educators were devoting their time to general statement and wrangling, other specialists were attacking specific educational problems with

[13] Published by the American Viewpoint Society, New York.

available techniques or with new ones which they created for the purpose. Such studies of social phenomena should properly be included in the stuff of educational sociology, though they represent concurrent efforts and have frequently been confused with other sciences because of the specialties of the persons making them.

Psychologists, social psychologists, social workers, and educators have made contributions to the present content of educational sociology. E. L. Thorndike's study of the most frequently used words to secure a content for spelling in elementary schools, the study of common errors in spelling—in short, numerous studies of societal practices concerning language, reading habits, uses of arithmetic and the like—are cases in point; sociological because they reveal the facts of certain societal practices, which data are then incorporated in school curricula. More recently, one finds psychologists in connection with child welfare institutes, child guidance clinics, or university departments, investigating home and community backgrounds.

Social psychologists, particularly W. I. Thomas, using the monographic method of case analysis, and Allport, using the methods of experimental research, have secured important findings concerning motivation of behavior, child personality and group controls in learning.

Another field of effort highly significant for educational sociology but, curiously enough, hardly tapped by educational sociologists, is social work. From it have come into the schools visiting teachers and visiting nurses with theoretical training in social work and practical experience in dealing with maladjustments of personalities or physiques of school children. Their records constitute an increasingly significant contribution to the discovery of criteria for evaluating school curricula and practices by examining the effects of schools upon child personalities. Also they are throwing much light upon the ways in which neighborhoods, communities and homes as social worlds of pupils affect the behavior of pupils in and out of schools. They unquestion-

ably emphasize the need of clinical procedure in certain phases of educational sociology.[14]

Probably by far the bulk of materials garnered from concurrent efforts comes from various types of educators. The work of Bobbitt in analyzing community practices as a basis for determining curriculum content; of Charters in making job analyses, and of similar studies by specialists in vocational educations; the school surveys made by administrators checking up the adequacy of equipment by references to trends in population and the structural growth of communities and school surveys to reveal diseases of social organization in school systems (Providence School Survey); some of the newer studies of campus groups and practices for the training of deans; certain studies in extra-curricular activities dealing with leisure and recreations in non-school experiences; researches in experimental schools, such as those of H. O. Rugg of the Lincoln School, New York City, in building up vitalized contents in social studies—but it is not necessary to list further in order to illustrate how much sociological material has been collected by those who were not strictly educational sociologists but who could not wait for educational sociology to get on the job.[15]

IV. Present Problems

What are some of the present problems that interest or should interest educational sociologists?

This can best be answered by listing briefly the chief ranges of activities found in public school education:

1. Formulating objectives for schools or school systems
2. Organizing or reorganizing school systems
3. Determining curricula and contents
4. Administering schools or systems

[14] See publications of the Committee for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, New York City; also J. J. Oppenheimer, *The Visiting Teacher Movement* (1924).

[15] For a more complete array, see *Bibliographies in Educational Sociology, op. cit.*, ch. vii, "Objective Studies of School Subjects," by E. D. Randolph.

5. Supervising teachers—teaching teachers
6. Teaching pupils
7. Learning by pupils
8. Correcting or guiding pupils
9. Carrying on extra-curricular activities
10. Participating in non-school activities in communities

It is readily seen that each of these ranges of activities can be broken up into long lists of detailed practices from which educational problems can be formulated merely by raising the questions concerning them: How? Why? When? Where? It is also readily seen that all of these ranges of activities are capable of sociological analysis because they are social processes involving social situations, social worlds, communities, neighborhoods, groups, institutions, organizations, agencies, persons, attitudes and values, social interactions, relations, changes and breakdowns —in short, structures, processes and persons. It is the business of educational sociology, then, to attack with educators, all along the front of these ranges of activities. None of these ranges is a special province of psychology, or biology, or sociology or any other special social science. It is for educational sociology to marshal the techniques of sociology when available, or to invent them when not, alongside of the other sciences in an allied attack on the great tasks in education as above listed.[16]

The definition of problems for research in educational sociology is least troublesome, however, particularly when the above practical approach is followed. But what gives most concern is the fact that the young science carries a double duty—not only that of applying the methods of sociology but, because that science is still so young, of devising techniques needed by its special programs. For example, educational sociology needs a set of criteria for evaluating societal practices for their worths (a) to persons, (b) to groups and (c) to communities. But one looks

[16] For problems in this field so derived, see the writer's forthcoming book on *Educational Sociology*.

in vain to sociologists for any such measuring sticks of societal adequacies. Theories, yes; but concrete norms, few!

Educational sociology has at hand certain methods—case analysis, community survey, ecological analysis, statistics and tests, confessional documents, historical method, the monographic method, culture analysis; but they have to be adapted, utilized extensively, and new ones devised. The problem of methodologies is the most pressing one at present and is most far-reaching in its significance.

This suggests a second query—Are any of these problems of special urgency?

In answering the question, two approaches are possible: one can say (a) that sociology, urban sociology, rural sociology, and social work have developed techniques of fact-finding which should be mobilized at once in terms of pertinent practical application in education. Or one can say (b) that there are certain aspects of education of lively interest to educators, and that these should be studied at once to discover sociological findings and methods. The student may follow his preference in choosing his problems for research.

Without doubt, the problems of determining objectives press for immediate though necessarily tentative solution. Educators throughout this country and in many others—Europe, China, Japan, even India and Africa—are undertaking wholesale reorganization of curricula. But objective data of a sociological sort are generally lacking, so they fall back on theory and philosophy, supplemented by a modicum of experimentation. The valid determination of objectives and of contents designed for optimal societal outputs can only be achieved through sociological research.

There is also much activity administratively in the reorganization of schools and systems, which suggests an urgency for studies in the ecological base for satisfactory units of school administration.

In the fields of correction and guidance (discipline) and, by

corollary, in extra-curricula activities, problems are pressing, for little scientific work has been done, and the phenomena involved are essentially sociological. Here is where sociological tests of a diagnostic and predictive kind can serve not only teaching but guidance as well. The fact that educational psychologists are pushing over into these fields and examining as objectively as possible sociological data, by statistical analyses, indicates either that they lack problems in their special field or that they regard these problems as significant.

But it is difficult to assign priority for one is impressed with the relative importance of all types. How can one urge research into the relations of group-size to learning efficiency and exclude consideration of problems of supervision; or into personalities of teachers to the neglect of community attitudes toward school taxes for the support of new and more scientific school programs? And can it justifiably be maintained that "objectives" are more important than "learnings"?

The problems are there numerous enough, varied enough, and difficult enough to challenge the most courageous and skillful. The harvest is plenty, but the reapers are few.

V. Prospects

One would be bold indeed to forecast the future of educational sociology. While the subject is studied in many schools for training educators, it is generally taught as an incidental interest to *illumine* educational procedures. There are few specialists in the field, and their time is so taken up with routine instruction that relatively little *discovery* is achieved. One looks in vain for educational sociologists in bureaus of educational research or in educational clinics. Their status in higher institutions is not clearly established. A fear that their presence in some of the smaller schools may mean little more than an additional educational fad is not unreasonable. Judged by the enrollment of graduate students in those colleges of education equipped to do

serious work of discovery, its prestige is not high. But it has made a start.

If it is to have a real future so that sociology may affect education, several things will be necessary:

First, more sociologists must make schools and school groups and social problems related to schools subjects for research. Where can they find better laboratory material?

Second, administrators of training schools, particularly of the advanced kind, must take the science seriously by developing departments and affording attractive opportunity for capable graduates to enter the field.

Third, educational administrators must appreciate more clearly just what educational sociology can do for them. This calls for propagandist instruction of an appreciative or illuminating kind.

Fourth, educational sociologists must direct their attention and efforts less to armchair discussion and philosophizing and more to discovery on a quantitative and objective basis.

Finally, they would do well to encourage students to select limited, concrete, and practical problems of school men for their researches.

Thus, gradually they would build up a body of teachers and of findings of such practical worth that educators could not afford to be ignorant of, nor sociologists indifferent to, educational sociology.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

By Harold A. Phelps

Social work did not spring up full-grown, like Eve, to be a helpmate for man. As a concept, it is rather new, scarcely dating back to the beginning of the present century; as a social art, it is the most recent product of a vast system of philanthropic enterprises. In history the predecessors of social work appeared under a variety of names to contend with emergencies then current. Modern social work is simply one offspring of a general humanitarian movement.

Fortunately, the historical developments of social work contain hints as to its content, limits and functions. It is well to give a brief consideration to this history, since the child is apt to be misunderstood unless there is specific reference to its nurture. Its history in detail would show centuries of conflicting theories and practices; in general, it serves to correct several erroneous impressions. With this background it will be possible to venture further into the meaning of modern social work.

I. Historical Background of Social Work

There are three fairly distinct periods in the development of social work.[1] Its earliest form was humanitarian interest in the relief of misery in individual cases. It developed usually under religious auspices. The second period occurred in conjunction with a series of economic reforms and is distinguished by the public social agency which arose as a supplement to the existing

[1] F. S. Chapin, *Historical Introduction to Social Economy* (1917), pt. v; J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (1926), pts. iii and iv; E. R. Groves, *An Introduction to Sociology* (1928), chaps. xxii and xxiv; S. A. Queen, *Social Work in the Light of History* (1922); pts. ii-v; A. G. Warner, *American Charities* (1919), pt. iv; F. D. Watson, *The Charity Organization Movement in the United States* (1922), chaps. i, ii, and iii.

private charities. In general, the public agency was concerned more with classes of dependents than with individuals in distress. Recent developments in social work differentiate it sufficiently from these earlier forms to warrant designating a third stage.

The Charity Organization movement initiated this period, introducing practices, aptly described by its title, which led by gradual modification to current forms of social work. Modern social work marks a period of rapid transition, specialization and diversification. Perhaps it cannot be more accurately described. Its distinguishing feature is social case work, which differentiates it from the earlier stages of social work in that one of its professed obligations is to discover, by analysis of individual cases, the facts concerning the general problems of social work. Social case work may be undertaken by public agencies or by private agencies under religious or secular control. It is usually most fully exploited by the latter.

These periods roughly describe the historical stages of social work. It would be a matter of dispute to state precisely when one stage began or became predominant. Watson traced the organized charity movement, beginning about 1870, to several distinct charity movements which emerged from the economic reforms of the eighteenth century. And these, in turn, had their origin in the religious conceptions of charity which developed during the Middle Ages.[2] It is not only true that each succeeding type of social work incorporated earlier practices and dealt with practically the same kinds of distress, but each form has survived. Briefly, the predecessors of social work were concerned with misery, interpreted as such by current standards, or with a vast number of conditions implying unadjustment to a social life, or with demoralization.[3] These problems in the background

[2] F. D. Watson, *The Charity Organization Movement in the United States,* chap. ii.

[3] J. H. Hollander, *The Abolition of Poverty* (1914); A. G. Warner, *op. cit.,* pt. i; Bailey B. Burritt, "Preventing Poverty," *The Survey,* April 15, 1925.

of humanitarian enterprises proved to be constant stimuli to a general movement for social welfare or improvement. They did not, however, prove to be sufficiently powerful to deter the continuation of antiquated methods of charity, many of which are a distinct handicap to modern social work.

Indeed, Sumner's characterization of philanthropy in all its forms indicates a pronounced difference between the old and the new in humanitarianism. He wrote: "The humanitarians, philanthropists, and reformers, looking at the facts of life as they present themselves, find enough which is sad and unpromising in the conditions of many members of society. . . . They eagerly set about to attempt to account for what they see, and to devise schemes for remedying what they do not like. . . . Their schemes . . . may always be reduced to this type—that A and B decide what C shall do for D." [4] This is history in social work. But here and there remnants of the old order persist, so that in the present day one task of the professional social worker, namely, the interpretation of social work to the community, is still a matter of serious concern.[5]

II. What is Professional Social Work?

New forms of social work have evolved to supplant the older projects in humanitarianism. In treating the relationship between sociology and social work, the content of this new social work deserves primary consideration. It may not be scientific social work. Nevertheless, it is social work with a bias toward the sciences and with a distinct, professional spirit. This new development has stimulated inquiry into a wide range of human interests. It is the social work represented and interpreted by a group of trained specialists.[6]

[4] W. G. Sumner, *What the Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (1883), pp. 21-23.

[5] See pamphlet by the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, "A Perspective of Family Social Work," Dec., 1926, p. 5.

[6] L. A. Halbert, "What is Professional Social Work?" (1923); S. A. Queen, *op. cit.*, chap. i; J. F. Steiner, *Education for Social Work* (1921); A. J. Todd, *Scientific Spirit and Social Work* (1919), chap. iv; J. H. Tufts,

Modern social work is professional social work. The primary characteristic of this new profession is the recognition of the desirability of using facts in the diagnosis and treatment of social work problems. In the words of Halbert: "There have been people for centuries who have been making a special business of helping the poor and delinquent. Since the rise of the social sciences there has been an attempt to reduce this work to a scientific basis. Now only that portion of the business of helping the unfortunate which takes advantage of social science and tests its worth by scientific standards is entitled to call itself social work in the modern sense." "Social work," according to this writer, "is the business of producing, changing or adjusting social organization and procedure in the interests of human welfare according to scientific standards."[7] Whatever facts or problems may come to the attention of persons engaged in social work enterprises, there are three factors determining whether they fall within the scope of social work. They must consist of practices which (1) change or adjust social organization, (2) conform to established interests of human welfare, and (3) are adapted as far as possible to scientific standards. Social work, therefore, is not simply a philosophy or a system of acts, but primarily a method by which thoughts and acts may be put into practice. The chief factor which makes it a profession is the interdependence of social work practices, "limited to skilled service in the first place, to long-term, intensive care of difficult cases in the second place, and to service rendered under relatively unhampered, independent auspices in the third place."[8]

From this point of view, social work makes a distant break with its antecedents. As in the past, a primary task of social work in all its forms is to make provision for needs uncared for by any

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Education and Training for Social Work (1923); William Hodson, "Is Social Work Professional?" *National Conference of Social Work* (1925), pp. 629-639; Pearl Salsberry, "Techniques in Case Work," *The Family*, July, 1927, pp. 153-157.

[7] L. A. Halbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 and 25.

[8] M. E. Richmond, *What is Social Case Work?* (1922), pp. 89-90.

other social organization. In its ancient forms, social work was intimately connected with problems which cut across many fields of inquiry. It emerged, from a rather chaotic past, as a definite form of social control with a technical approach to these problems. This technical approach is professional social work. Obviously enough, this addition to the rôle of social work has contributed to its relationship with several arts and sciences.[9] It is this relationship, confirmed by a study of its scope and trends, which is of general interest in the present chapter.

III. Scope and Organization of Social Work

The range or fields of social work may be summarized by reference to its scope, organization and present development.[10]

There are three sources of information concerning the scope of social work. The first is the occupational groups in social work (classified by the American Association of Social Workers), which indicate its various contemporary activities. The second is the Conference of Social Work, which neglects these vocational aspects of social work in favor of a broad presentation of its problems. The third is the schools of social work, which offer a picture of the wider aspects and objectives of this movement in the training of students.[11] In order that our attention may be fixed upon the range of current practices, only the first two sources will be summarized here.

The entire field of social work is divided by the American Association of Social Workers into four groups. Under social case work there are eleven occupations, dealing primarily with individuals. In the second division, social group work, there

[9] J. L. Gillin, *op. cit.*, chap. xxxviii.

[10] L. A. Halbert, *op. cit.*, chap. ii-xix, and appended chart; S. A. Queen, *op. cit.*, chaps. ii and iii; S. H. Walker, *Social Work and the Training of Social Workers* (1928), chap. i.

[11] For example: The New York School of Social Work; The Training School for Jewish Social Work; Graduate School of Social Service Administration (University of Chicago). See E. E. Eubank, "Education for Social Work," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Jan.-Feb., 1924, p. 168. (A summary of the organization and number of schools giving social work training.)

are seven occupations, limited to work with small groups. The third class of occupations is concerned with general welfare programs and has five divisions. This class of vocations is called social reform work and is carried on without reference to any particular group. The fourth is limited to social research in which four vocations are enumerated. Frequently another division, limited to administrative vocations in social work, is also included. However, there is a tendency to reduce these divisions to three—namely, case work, group work, and social reform—classifying the various occupations according to the degree of intimacy with which they deal with individuals. From this point of view, tasks of administration or research are considered integral parts of each division.

The specific kinds of social agencies in these groups are the following:

(1) Social case work: (a) child welfare, (b) church visiting, (c) family welfare, (d) medical social work, (e) occupational therapy, (f) probation, protective, parole and prison work, (g) public health nursing, (h) psychiatric social work, (i) school visiting, (j) visiting dietitian, (k) vocational guidance.

(2) Social group work: (a) Americanization, (b) community organization, (c) community center, (d) club work, (e) playground, (f) recreation, (g) settlement.

(3) Social reform work: (a) civic work, (b) housing, (c) legislation, (d) publicity and financial work, (e) public health work.

(4) Social research work: (a) investigational work, (b) research, (c) survey and exhibit work, (d) statistical work.[12]

This survey of the range of social work is supplemented by the program of the Conference.[13] It furnishes a broad interpretation of social work problems, irrespective of vocational or ad-

[12] J. H. Tufts, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

[13] *Proceedings, Conference of Social Work,* Des Moines, 1927.

ministrative divisions. The division meetings in the Conference indicate these problems under the following captions: (1) children, (2) delinquents and correction, (3) health, (4) the family, (5) industrial and economic problems, (6) neighborhood and community life, (7) mental hygiene, (8) organization of social forces, (9) public officials and administration, (10) the immigrant, (11) professional standards and education, (12) educational publicity.

This outline of the scope of modern social work, with reference to general types of social work agencies and their problems, is a good demonstration of its specialization. It fails, however, to convey any idea concerning the organization or integration of particular social agencies. Social work began as a local movement under private control. It is now organized or federated on a national basis with an occasional international conference. The twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable development in the growth of social work in organization, personnel, and in financial strength.

In general, the movement toward the integration of these agencies in the various fields may be described as follows: Local agencies under private control form local federations for financial administration (the community fund movement), are united in local councils for mutual consultation, and maintain a "confidential exchange" to provide a method of exchanging information and to prevent duplication. It is also a growing custom for local agencies in restricted fields to merge into state as well as national federations for mutual aid. Social agencies under public control are associated with private agencies in all of these groups, separated only by the difference in financial support. Due to these differences in activities, in administration, and in financial control, it is difficult to make an exact statement concerning the movement toward federation.[14]

The accompanying diagram summarizes only general tend-

[14] Francis H. McLean, "The Family Society" (American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, 1927), part ii, Relations with the Public and with Other Agencies.

encies. It does show the two major functions of an organized social work. One, as indicated in the diagram, is to insure a steady and adequate income, either by public subscription (the community fund) or by taxation, in the case of public agencies. More important than this is the determination of social work policies. These policies are formulated for separate cities by community councils. State, national, or international councils attend to the problems which are more extensive. Briefly, these

THE FEDERATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL AGENCIES



councils and conferences direct the adjustments or readjustments of social organization to be undertaken in the interests of human welfare according to existing scientific knowledge. This is the

more important function, and actually the work of social work. Once the public is convinced of the desirability or possibility of a program constructed on these standards, its support is assured.

Within this organization, specialized agencies are classified according to the type of social adjustment which they undertake.[15] Unfortunately there is not much information on the number of specialized agencies, their personnel, or the cost of social work on a national basis. The National Information Bureau is authority for the statement that there are 2,791 national social agencies in the United States; but of course many of these do not function other than in name, or they are examples of gross duplication.[16] Only 110 of these societies are endorsed by this Bureau, whose standards aim to avoid duplication and to insure efficiency in administration. The most representative national agencies, of which there are more than a score, are affiliated with the National Conference of Social Work. According to the Russell Sage Foundation, it is estimated that there are over 25,000 persons engaged in professional social work. This estimate does not include borderline vocations, such as visiting nurses, of whom there are an equal number, or the various clerical vocations connected with social work.

The monetary cost of social work is a good index of its development and significance. But on this subject, especially, data are scanty. Epstein estimates that a "sum from $500,000,000 to $650,000,000 is spent annually by private social workers on current expenses, exclusive of the capital outlay. In 1925, public and private agencies disbursed three times as much money for relief as in 1916."[17] Another report, covering the expenditures for social work under public and private auspices in the 206 cities with a population over 30,000 in 1916, showed a total outlay of

[15] See bulletin by the Welfare Council of New York City, "The Welfare Council of New York City," p. 3, for a graphical description of the scope, organization, and specialized aspects of social work in that city.

[16] National Information Bureau, N. Y. C., *Bulletin 15* (1928).

[17] Abraham Epstein, "The Soullessness of Present-day Social Work," *Current History*, June, 1928, p. 390.

$47,528,940, and in 1926 of $116,234,568 for the same cities.[18] In a study of the costs of social work in nineteen American cities, F. W. Ramsey reported that in 1924 the total income *per capita* for public and private social work varied from a maximum of $14.44 to a minimum of $6.82.[19]

Reference to particular cities will probably give the most enlightening data on the economic importance of social work. According to a report of the Welfare Council of New York City, there is an annual expenditure of $75,000,000 for welfare work in that city, or a *per capita* expenditure of $12.60 by private agencies. Chicago spent $180,000,000 for private social work in 1923. Cleveland's total expenditure for social welfare services is approximately $12,000,000 a year. This sum includes contributions, endowment income, earnings, and such tax funds as are applied to welfare projects, supporting the community fund agencies and the parallel agencies under public control. Providence, a smaller city, with 130 social agencies under public and private control, disburses about $2,000,000 for welfare purposes. Approximately one-half of this sum is controlled by the thirty-eight Community Fund agencies.

IV. Trends in Social Work: A Summary

The major trends in social work have already been indicated by reference to social work in its historical and present aspects. In fact, the rise of professional social work, in which treatment is based upon a technique of observing and evaluating its problems, is its most distinctive modern tendency.[20] In addition, there are

[18] U. S. Bureau of the Census, pamphlet, "Citizens' Conference on Community Welfare," p. 5, (Association of Community Chests and Councils).

[19] F. W. Ramsey, "Why So Much for 'Charity'?" *The Clevelander,* July, 1926, p. 7. See also R. W. Kelso, *The Science of Public Welfare* (1928), chap. vii.

[20] Alexander Johnson, *Adventures in Social Work* (1923), pp. 3-78; J. A. Lapp, *Justice First* (1928), chap. ii; A. J. Todd, *op. cit.,* chap. vii and viii; A. G. Warner, *op. cit.,* chap., xxiii; E. T. Devine, "The Dominant Note in Modern Philanthropy," *Conference of Charities and Corrections,* 1910, p. 3; Ella C. Vollstedt, "The Trends of Social Work in the United States," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* Sept.-Oct., 1925, pp. 25-40.

a number of supplementary innovations, such as the specialization of agencies, division of labor between private and public control, federation, and the financing of social work, which were mentioned in the preceding section.

Two significant characteristics of social work deserve special attention. First of all, a professional social work requires an application of the discoveries of science to social diagnosis. This innovation, more than any other, has divorced social work from its subjective forbears. This was not an easy achievement. Many years of struggle were spent eliminating, amending or discarding forms of humanitarianism which possessed for their advocates great emotional value. Secondly, this transition has led to a growing body of methods, rudimentary though they still are, which requires professional training of social workers. The effects of these two tendencies may be noted already in the statement and analysis of social work problems, in the accuracy of recording data, in research and experimentation, in the demand for trained personnel, and in the quest for professional standards. For the first time in its history, a social work with an objective methodology has come into being. In consequence of this innovation, a social work with a technique is intimately connected with and often dependent upon science.

In summary, therefore, social work is a method of securing social adjustments. It is a series of technical achievements, based upon a summary of original data and evaluated by scientific methods. It may appear in a variety of specific acts, which are constantly being subjected to the criteria of this technique, and revised or eliminated.

In a *résumé* of present social work practices (whether viewed from the standpoint of its scope, organization, or trends), it is worth noting that the specific arts in social work may change without requiring a change in this technique. Comparing present social work with its historical antecedents, there have been marked variations in its scope and outlook. It is confusing to make social work as a technique synonymous with social work practices. In

the past, the charity movement introduced activities, such as playgrounds, community centers, special schools, legal aid, health work, and many similar services, some of which are no longer recognized as the functions of private social work. When any form of social work is taken over by the government, there need be no necessary change either in the content of the work performed, in its technique, or in its administration. Moreover, at present there are several forms of social work which were not initiated by any charity movement, private or public, and which are assumed by modern social agencies because they are effective means of securing adjustment.[21] In the concept of social work as a technique, there is no implication that the practices of present social work will be the social work of the future. There is no better evidence of these drastic changes than the continuous flux of contemporary social work. As a technique, social work is a social art. And, like any art, its specific manifestations change with increasing scientific knowledge.[22]

V. Dependence of Social Work on the Sciences

The conception of social work as an art, dependent upon scientific method for the development of its techniques of diagnosis, summary and treatments, leads directly to the conclusion that social work has much in common with the social sciences. As an applied social art, social work turns to the sciences for guidance.

For some time there has been a growing recognition that public welfare is intimately connected with social and economic change and, in consequence, that social work is more dependent upon the social and economic sciences than upon the early forms or philosophies of charity. The fact that social work is con-

[21] L. A. Halbert, *op. cit.*, p. 22; A. G. Warner *op. cit.*, pp. 479-480; "Fifty Years of Social Work," *The Survey,* June 15, 1923.

[22] For a similar point of view, see Alice S. Cheyney, *A Definition of Social Work* (1923), chap. iii, "The Scientific Element in Social Work." For a point of view differing from the above, see *The Goal of Social Work,* edited by Richard C. Cabot, (1927), pp. 182-192; Eva W. White, *Technique and the Development of Students in Social Work.*

stantly changing to provide new services and to meet unexpected needs is evidence of this bias toward the sciences. If social work is to approach its goal of objectivity or if it is to be preventive, it must necessarily proceed with reference to standards or measurements which are quite beyond its own range of investigation.

This need relates social work in a most intimate manner to the sciences which are concerned with the analysis of group relationships in their general or specialized forms. It is a function of the physical and social sciences to provide information which social work may use in treatment of individual cases or in general programs of relief. In this connection, particular agencies may be more intimately related to one science than to another; but since every agency in social work is concerned finally with the person who is living in a social world, there are some instances where social work will cut across or draw upon all of these sciences. Medical social work, psychiatric social work, or family social work, for example, may be more concerned with the sciences of biology, psychology, or sociology; but in actual practice they apply some of the facts of each of these sciences and can no more neglect one than all of them, if the results of social work are to harmonize with the facts of social life.

While it may be convenient for administrative purposes to divide social work, as previously mentioned, into four classifications, namely, (1) case work, (2) group work, (3) social reform, and (4) social research, in its practices and in research, social work demonstrates that this separation is arbitrary and largely fictitious. As a social art, social work in all its forms adapts the generalizations of the sciences to its problems, when society permits this adaptation. By definition it is limited to the use of science "in the interests of human welfare." The interests of human welfare are simply prevailing group judgments. It is primarily on this score that the objectives of social work are distinguished from generalizations of science. But this is the usual difference between an art and the science upon which it may draw for facts.

Both social work and the sciences with which it is connected have unquestionably been over-cautious in failing to combine forces in the attack upon common problems. In this connection, social work has an excellent opportunity to exploit the resources of the sciences by suggesting its own special problems as pertinent questions for scientific investigation. But this movement implies the obligation that the data and problems of social work should be formulated in conformity with the requirements of scientific analysis, a matter to which we shall return.

VI. Sociology and Social Work

In order to show the relationships between sociology and social work, it is necessary to call specific attention to their differences. It is customary to refer to social work as applied sociology. This is obviously not correct, because in its practical applications, social work uses the generalizations of several sciences. In a comparative statement of the relationship between the two, it is desirable to make the primary distinction between sociology as a science and social work as a social art. Both may be intimately connected with the same phenomena, or the same methods of study, but the problems susceptible to treatment by social work are not at all the problems of sociology.

Recently there has been a tendency to draw a sharp distinction between sociology and social work from the standpoint of their scope and problems, but this distinction implies a close relationship between the two subjects. Shenton has emphasized this matter in his definition of social work as an art which is limited by ethical considerations:

> Social work is at present the most highly integrated of the social arts. It has developed an extensive technology of social work which has several distinct subdivisions. Its technology has drawn heavily from economics, biology, psychology and sociology. The more comprehensive definitions of social work would include all social arts. It is customary to limit the use of this term to those social arts

practiced in the interest of human welfare and in which the profit motive either does not appear or else is a very minor factor.[23]

Although there most certainly are sociological bases for social ethics and social policy, the latter are more than applied sociology and they do not begin to represent all the possible applications of sociology.[24]

It is first of all made clear that no social art should be called applied social science or applied sociology. One is a science made available for practical application, the other is a practice in which the science is used.[25]

In the relation of sociology as a science and social work as an art, their convergence toward common interests is a recent development. There are still exponents of the idea that social work is related to no scientific mode of inquiry. But this attitude is passing. Both subjects are undergoing a rapid transition. Corresponding with the three stages or types of social work, sociology manifests a similar growth. Sociology wavered between several objectives before it adopted the look-and-see method. Like social work, it had a philosophy before it had facts. In its earlier stages sociology is described as philosophy of history. It drifted toward an objective description of its phenomena through a series of schools which pretended to explain society by a simple statement of its processes. As a technical method of analysis, sociology is in its first generation. In making a comparison between sociology and social work, it is well to consider their recent developments.

Sociology, like any science or like social work, makes use of the discoveries of other sciences to provide an adequate description of its phenomena. But as a science, it has a distinctive rôle. As already indicated in the previous chapters of this volume, sociology is concerned with the study of groups, of their relationships, of customs, traditions, and conventions, quite without the formal limitations of a moral evaluation which any one group or

[23] H. N. Shenton, *The Practical Applications of Sociology* (1928), p. 223.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

any particular age may put upon them. Sociology is concerned with the study of groups and persons with no other purpose than to formulate scientific generalizations from the facts of human association. The problems of sociology differ accordingly from the problems of social work, since social work is concerned merely with the study of maladjusted persons, of atypical cases, with the single objective of making the best possible readjustment. In theory, sociology is concerned with types of group behavior, aiming to arrive at generalizations concerning these phenomena; in research it is objective, and in its goal it is practical only to the extent that it endeavors to increase our knowledge concerning group life. In these processes it is not limited by prevailing standards or mores.

Social work, on the other hand, is a plastic body of practical rules, the theory of which aims toward the harmonious adjustment between the person or groups and social environment in so far as the social environment, because of its folkways and mores, will permit adjustment. Consequently, social work is primarily concerned with abnormal conditions or atypical individuals, with the definite and practical objective of securing the best possible adjustment, which is ethical. Social work, however, is definitely limited by the mores; this is the major hindrance to its goal of prevention. In evaluating present tendencies in social work, it is frequently asserted that the failure of social work to undertake the championship of fundamental reforms is due to the fear of the withdrawal of financial support by the wealthy few who support this work. But it is well to call attention to the fact that the mores of our economic system are only a small fraction of the customs and traditions which hem in and detract from the potential effectiveness of a scientific social work.

The intimacy with which social work is brought into contact with groups and persons and their problems, and with the technical methods of treatment or devising treatment, puts it into a complementary relationship with sociology which deserves careful analysis.

VII. Dependence of Social Work on Sociology

Social work for the most part does not interest itself directly in the study of typical group behavior or the complete group act. Its present objective is the study of the individual primarily, of personality and of adequate social relationships, in order to find out what principles of science apply to social work. When social work spends most of its time and energy in the analysis of individual cases, stressing abnormal conditions and emotional conflicts which presumably are the result of social contacts, but pays little or no attention to the groups or environmental contacts responsible for these phenomena, it journeys far from its original and professed objective.[26] Concerning this question of the relation between the individual and the group, it is not unreasonable to inquire whether the social worker will ever be able to effect adequate treatment or to be preventive or constructive unless there is a comprehensive study of the individual's social relationships, or until the data of social work can be analyzed from this point of view. It is certain that sociology will not be a valuable complement to social work until this is accomplished.

It is a common occurrence to find comment upon this omission in the literature of sociology and social work. Park and Burgess summarize it in this form:

> Every social group tends to create, from the individuals who compose it, its own type of character, and the characters thus formed become component parts of the social structure in which they are incorporated. All the problems of social life are thus problems of the individual; and all the problems of the individual are at the same time problems of the group. This point of view is already recognized in preventive medicine and to some extent in psychiatry. It is not yet adequately recognized in the technique of social case work.[27]

Conflict on this point is the principal barrier to a fruitful dependence of social work on sociology.

[26] H. N. Shenton, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-184.

[27] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1924), p. 57; see also Miriam Van Waters, *Youth in Conflict* (1925), pp. 1, 3-4, 236.

As a background to social work, sociology furnishes the generalizations concerning the behavior of groups from which a technique of control may be constructed. By its own confession, social work aims to play a part in social control. It is organized to treat cases of individual or group maladjustment. Frequently, however, it is unable through its own resources to make an adequate study of the relationship between the individual and the group. Sometimes it cannot determine whether a particular case is one of personal demoralization or the product of group unadjustments which need revision before the individual can be treated. In formulating its policies of treatment, social work necessarily must depend upon the sciences concerned with these problems. It is the only way to avoid policies which in the long run would be actually detrimental to the welfare of the individual and the group. In other words, the relationship which occurs between physics and engineering or physiology and medical practice is essentially the relationship between sociology and social work.

Aside from technical distinctions referred to previously, sociology and social work are growing mutually dependent and complementary. Obviously, a social worker who is acquainted with sociology is better equipped to handle the problems of social work than one who is laboring under the dictates of some ancient philosophy of charity and good works. And it is equally obvious that the data collected by social workers relative to their problems furnish an important source for sociological materials. There is, of course, much in sociology that is by no means related to the field of social work. Similarly, in the practices of social work, the technical measures used in treatment are distinctly the subject matter of social work. But between these extremes there are close resemblances between portions of social work and sociology in their data, problems, and methods, which are sufficiently important to warrant special consideration.

VIII. The Problems of Social Work

Social work treatment manifests itself in three distinct kinds of service. In some cases of maladjustment, only relief can be

administered. In cases more susceptible to diagnosis and available resources, there is opportunity for rehabilitation. When social work is most efficient, it is able to be preventive. Its success is dependent wholly upon the type of problem to be treated. The possible range of problems amenable to relief, rehabilitation, or prevention, is very extensive. A primary task of the social worker is to formulate a definite notion concerning the content of social work problems.

For the purpose of confirming the relationship between sociology and social work, especially from the standpoint of their problems, it is necessary to distinguish between a sociological problem, a social problem, and a social work problem. This distinction gives a rather specific limit to the content of social work. It also provides guides to the social worker in determining the working relationship between social work and the social sciences.

Since sociology is the study of group behavior, a sociological problem is simply the need for information, accurately observed, described and recorded, concerning the phenomena of group behavior. As indicated in a previous connection, this quest for objective social data is in no way related to current group sanctions. A social problem, on the contrary, is determined by group sanction, being the judgment of a group concerning the efficiency of a type of social organization in its structure or function. It is within the realm of folkways, mores, and opinions. Its content or the names of social problems may change rapidly, due to a variety of factors.[28] In contrast, a sociological problem would not change in content or name, except with improvements in the scientific technique which would permit more accurate observations, descriptions, and records.[29]

Granted that social work, as a social art, is dependent upon

[28] C. M. Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology* (1924), pp. 627-630; H. Hart, "What is a Social Problem?" *American Journal of Sociology*, Nov., 1923, pp. 345-348; E. C. Lindeman, "What is Maladjustment?" *The Survey*, Nov. 15, 1923, pp. 189-190.

[29] F. S. Chapin, "The Statistical Definition of a Societal Variable," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxx, pp. 154-176.

the generalizations of the sciences which it may desire to use in the treatment of social problems, its problems are neither the problems of a particular science nor specifically social problems. A social work problem is a problem of policy. In the case of a given social problem, the problem of the social worker is to determine the most efficient procedure in order to effect treatment, using scientific guides and group sanctions. Specifically, the problems of social work consist in the perfection of technical arrangements which will adapt efficiently and effectively the generalizations of science to social problems. A necessary prerequisite to the organization of this technique is a tentative statement of these problems.[30]

If you study the problems of social work with the hope of finding an organized system of bookkeeping or of treatment in which the various liabilities in a case are matched by assets of the social agency, you are bound to be disappointed. Treatment tends to be of the most implastic character. In some cases, the content of treatment is simple and effective. But in the treatment of a complex problem, when many factors are involved and treatment must be devised for a complicated situation, it is usually true that either the same type of simple expedients is followed, or nothing is attempted. Treatment in social work is by no means its strongest point, because treatment presupposes a careful case analysis plus an extensive background of experience with comparable cases. This information for the most part is not available. There has been no system of record keeping which would permit comparison of different cases or furnish an adequate check on the value of treatment. As a consequence, the problems of social work have never received adequate attention.

One of the most critical conceptions of social work indicates that the agencies in the field have not attempted to organize their work in terms of their problems. This is a general criticism. It would not hold as stringently for some of the specialized agencies.

[30] See a committee report of the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, "Content of Family Social Work," in the *Quarterly Bulletin* of this Association, June, 1926.

In general, it is a correct characterization of all social work. Formulation of policy or of treatment by the several agencies has proceeded with more reference to the immediate circumstances demanding relief than to the fundamental conditions which make these problems. There has been no extensive attempt either to classify problems or to determine the factors in these problems. This omission is traceable directly to the original emphasis upon case work or upon the individual, when investigation and treatment are devised with too much attention to the special variations of the individual case.

This criticism is illustrated by any outline of problems now used in social work for the purpose of summarizing and evaluating its tasks. Reference to the conditions which occur in the field of family social work serves the general purpose of this illustration, because these conditions indicate the entire range of individual or group maladjustments which social work aims to treat.

A recent statistical report of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities is given as a good example of the concept of problems now in vogue in social work. There are 59 "problems presented" under five general classifications, namely, industrial problems, physical disabilities, mental problems, social and behavior problems, and community problems. A total of 3,540 families comprising 18,512 individuals were under the care of this agency during the year. The purpose of the table is to show the relative frequency of these 59 problems in each family (Column 1) and their incidence in individual cases (Column 2) whenever the problems apply to persons only. This purpose is accomplished to some extent. It indicates that there are several problems to be found in each family, which is more than many social work reports would show. It has certain logical drawbacks which invite inquiry.

Ordinarily, statistical reports have other objectives than a simple review of routine. Their principal contribution is the provision of facts by which an organization may check its methods and orientate its activities. From this factual basis it is

INCIDENCE OF "PROBLEMS PRESENTED" IN SOCIAL WORK [31]

PROBLEMS	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS
Industrial Problems		
1. Unemployment	1,228	1,352
2. Underemployment	425	443
3. Insufficient earnings—working full time	300	318
4. Indebtedness	666	717
5. Disability from industrial accident or disease	303	308
Physical Disabilities		
6. Tuberculosis	308	337
7. Asthma	51	51
8. Cardiac	275	315
9. Syphilis	234	403
10. Gonorrhea	41	47
11. Gynæcological	121	126
12. Endocrine disturbance	89	105
13. Malnutrition—anæmia	398	677
14. Other chronic illnesses (excluding above)	652	733
15. Other acute illnesses (excluding above)	606	799
16. Drug habit	31	33
17. Alcoholism	322	350
18. Need of dental care	721	1,345
19. Need of optical care	338	430
20. Need of tonsillectomy	553	993
21. Maternity	406	*a*
22. Crippled or paralyzed	237	244
23. Blindness or sight seriously impaired	133	141
24. Other orthopædic or sensory difficulty	214	242
25. Old age	258	309
26. Convalescence	155	172
27. Death	184	189
Mental Problems		
28. Epilepsy	59	62
29. Mental disease diagnosed	161	163
30. Neurosis diagnosed	54	57
31. Mental disease or neurosis suspected	285	312
32. Mental defectiveness diagnosed	269	356
33. Mental defectiveness suspected	296	403

[31] *Brooklyn Bureau of Charities, Annual Statistical Report,* 1926-1927.

a Essentially a family problem

Social and Behavior Problems		
34. Begging tendency	249	278
35. Widow with dependent children	341	*a*
36. Widower with dependent children	45	*a*
37. Family desertion	386	395
38. Non-support of dependent parents	75	78
39. Domestic infelicity	508	727
40. Non-support of family	361	373
41. Neglect of children	205	246
42. Imprisonment	157	159
43. Children working illegally	38	40
44. Irregular school attendance	169	259
45. Juvenile delinquency	79	89
46. Known sexual immorality	161	178
47. Bad housekeeping	326	328
48. Other behavior problems	318	376
49. Illegitimacy	151	211
50. Dispossess notice served	121	*a*
51. Other legal entanglements	139	150
52. Unfriendliness of relatives	415	*a*
Community Problems		
53. Bad housing	255	*a*
54. Over-crowding—more than 2 to a room	245	*a*
55. Non-resident or immigration problem	100	*a*
56. Non-citizenship	778	1,112
57. Inability to read or write	447	562
58. Inability to speak English	496	621
59. Other vocational or educational need	101	125
Total	17,039	18,859

a Essentially a family problem

possible to discern the repetitive character of the phenomena with which social work is concerned, which in turn facilitates the organization of general policies or the formulation of treatment in specific cases.[32]

From this point of view, a classification of problems, especially when their incidence is shown, has but one function. It is supposed to be a first step in the detection of the causes of human ills. This objective is not achieved, however, if the classification of problems is not made carefully, or if the specific problems are not definite and mutually exclusive. It does not take a great deal

[32] The point of view in this evaluation of statistical methods in social work is that these methods should be used for diagnosis.

of imagination to observe that the 59 problems here listed, or their five-fold classification, are of no more value in the analysis and treatment of a specific problem than a random grouping (which it probably is), (1) because most of them are not social problems but isolated factors or complexes of factors which may or may not indicate the social character of the problem to be treated; (2) because there is no reference whatsoever that the families to be treated are human groups and that the individuals are human beings; (3) because there is no indication of major difficulties or the incidence of specific factors.

Social work requires a general knowledge of hypothetical problems; but in treatment it requires a definite knowledge of the specific factors in each case, and of their possible combinations. Without this elementary provision, a summary of the facts or diagnoses in social work is bound to be misleading, and a comparison of cases is prevented.

The inability to discover the problems of social work by a summary of individual case records is due to the fact that the case record is an organization of selected data. It is a good record if the data have been selected wisely. Generally, the content of each case is limited to those facts which are intimately connected with the immediate needs of treatment, with no data on factors which might make it comparable with other cases or which might assist in the classification of the problems in the record. This omission handicaps the development of systems of treatment as much as it limits a census of the frequency of problems.

A brief analysis of the particular names of problems in the above list, together with their incidence among families and individuals, will demonstrate the current practice of social work in the summary of its problems. In the first place, it is absurd to suppose that this list of problems is at all an approximation of actual conditions within these families. There are 3,540 families, in which 17,039 problems are tabulated, and 18,512 persons for whom 18,859 problems were found. This summary occurs when

really minor, unimportant or very common difficulties are included, such as "insufficient earnings," "need of dental care," "begging tendency," "bad housekeeping," and "educational needs," and are given equal consideration with a major complex of problems called "unemployment." A loose or too general system of analysis infers that there is too much dependence upon individual judgment in determining major and minor problems. Error from this source is a primary criticism in this method of summary. The names of problems are definite according to the degree that the problem represents an individual factor, such as any illness or physical defect; they are indefinite in so far as they are concerned with social relationships. The latter type of problem receives no specific analysis. Unemployment, for example, remains as a classification of a variety of problems. There is nothing to indicate whether the unemployment is due to a personal factor which may be an inherited defect, to industrial accident, temporary instability of an occupation, or to a general depression of industry. A careful analysis of the problems of social work according to the frequency of the specific factors which are responsible for these problems does not make the problem any more susceptible to immediate treatment; but no treatment can be successfully carried on except on the basis of correct diagnosis. This is especially important, since the major portion of treatment in social work is experimental.

There is another major source of error. It is commonly accepted that the major function of social work is economic relief. Let us assume that all the families which are obviously the victims of economic conditions, unemployment and the like, are eliminated, together with the social consequences of their poverty. It is probably not a wild assumption to infer that any random sample of families would produce as many and probably many more of the same respectable conditions of unadjustment which appear in this summary. In other words, if the difference between an adjusted and an unadjusted family is not simply economic, and the problems of social work are not simply the

distribution of relief, this alignment of causes gives no concrete idea why some families offer social problems which the community is called upon to analyze and treat. This leads to the second criticism, namely, that a summary of this sort gives no idea of what our social problems are, but handicaps the isolation of these problems by stating the frequency of certain findings. Social problems, or the problems of social work, are abstract. It is necessary to discover their factors as a preliminary step.

Any one who is familiar with the record of an unadjusted family will appreciate the significance of this two-fold criticism of social work and its problems. Treatment of maladjustments is the objective of social work. It requires, first, a general description of what these maladjustments are, and second, a statement of the factors which constitute these maladjustments. And yet, in summary, it is fairly typical of all social work that (1) problems have not been formulated in terms of social relations of adjustment or unadjustment; (2) agencies are dealing with isolated factors or complex factors in individuals and in families, most of which are unconnected with any known treatment, if indeed they ever will be susceptible to treatment; (3) social work oversimplifies its tasks by too much dependence upon the scattering of monetary relief to cover up its inability to give actual counsel; (4) no effort is made or is possible under present administrative methods to discover cause and effect relationships, simply because of (1), (2), and (3); (5) treatment is bound to be remedial and palliative until these defects have been overcome.

Naturally, this indictment cannot be assigned indiscriminately to the agencies engaged in social work. In general, it characterizes a transition stage. Like other organizations, social work is adapting itself, under the weight of its own tradition, to the demands of a complex social structure. If social work in any of its forms means more than (1) monetary relief, (2) assigning of cases to specialized agencies, (3) treatment of obviously unwholesome conditions (and more is implied in the general concept of the rôle of social work), it must consist in the analysis

and description of specific factors, of the combination of these factors in individuals or groups, of available methods of treatment, and of the results of treatment. This need implies as a primary requisite the reorganization of the case record to fit the problems in the case, instead of the adaptation of the case to the record.

The use of an adjustment-service card, of which there are many like the above tabulation, is fundamentally correct, if the factors in the problems to be treated are discovered in sufficient numbers, and in their significant relationships, to explain a case of individual or group unadjustment. This sort of statistical summary can be no more accurate than the methods of investigation upon which it depends. If the "problems presented" represent complex factors, or if specific conditions are noted simply because they are easy to detect (compare "need of dental care" with "unemployment" or "desertion"), the summary becomes too flexible in the hands of individual workers, permitting interpretation in the selection of names of problems and preventing the discovery of major conditions or the combination of specific factors in a given case. The statement of an agency's problems is as reliable as its case records. The hit or miss method which is now employed in the organization of case records may be one explanation why social workers are generally skeptical of the value of a statistical summary of such records.

It is feasible to inquire whether or not the problems in social work are susceptible to a tentative restatement in terms of its professed objective, namely, treatment. Burgess says in this connection, "The relation of the individual to the group is the basic problem both of research in sociology and of treatment in social work."[33] To make an initial inquiry into the major and minor problems of social work, it is well to make a preliminary study of the social relationships which constitute unadjustments and of the specific conditions which occur with these unadjust-

[33] E. W. Burgess, "What Social Case Records Should Contain to be Useful for Sociological Interpretation," *Social Forces,* vol. vi, 1928, p. 254.

ments. Obviously, problems develop in complex patterns, consisting of many dissimilar and apparently unconnected factors. A statement of any one or of all these factors, apart from the circumstances which produce them, is more a hindrance than a help to analysis and treatment. Two cases of widowhood might be classified as identical problems and yet differ from each other from the standpoint of treatment as markedly as a case of illegitimacy differs from a case of physical illness. The most common forms of social work deal with individuals whose capacity for adjustment has become impaired, but they cannot deal with these individuals in other than their social relationships. Tentatively, therefore, a restatement of problems might proceed with reference (1) to unadjustments in social relations and (2) to the specific factors manifested by the persons who make up these relationships.

This need for a restatement of the problems in social work is imperative, especially when policies and methods of treatment must be constructed. Like the physician who treated physical illness before the nature of the illness was understood, social work has been obliged to treat its problems without any knowledge of their causes or ramifications. As medicine developed a knowledge of its problems and their causes, it constructed remedies and proceeded to treat not the disease, but the person with the disease. In a similar manner, social work is concerned, not with cases of unemployment, mental deficiency, desertion, but with people in these unadjustments. In the description of "Social Case Work in Being," Miss Richmond used six typical cases to illustrate this development in social work.[34] Is it possible to summarize any one of these cases, using the present concept of problems?

Take, for example, the case of Winifred Jones and her children. Prior to her husband's death, using the classification of problems mentioned above, the family might fall under the major classification of "insufficient earnings," "alcoholism," "non-support of

[34] M. E. Richmond, *What is Social Case Work?* chaps. ii and iii.

family," "known sexual immorality," "domestic infelicity" and "chronic illness of father," and after his death as "widow with dependent children" or "mental defectiveness diagnosed." At both periods the following minor problems occurred: "bad housekeeping," "unfriendliness of relatives," "neglect of children," "behavior problems (children)," "need of dental care," "need of optical care," "need of tonsillectomy." It is apparent that the major problems have varied with different periods in the family's history. The difficulty of classification is equally obvious. In addition, there is every indication that the specific factors in this case have not been determined.

The tasks of case analysis, of devising treatment, and of relating treatment to problems, requires as an initial step the formulation of a statement of social relationships in which unadjustments occur, and a specific and detailed statement of the factors which combine to make this unadjustment. It requires a study of persons not as isolated units, but as members of interacting groups. By this procedure social work is organized to make effective use of sociology or other scientific knowledge.

There is a marked tendency in recent developments in social work to objectify the analysis, and consequently the methods of social investigation. Specialized agencies have made the most rapid progress in this direction.[35] But the movement has been contagious or has achieved popular approval, for it is invading every type of social work. It is distinguished by the appearance of home economists, statisticians, and other technicians. There are other evidences of this trend, especially in the demand for fact-finding inquiries by various social agencies, in the connection between social agencies and permanent research groups, and in the general receptivity of social work to critical analysis by agencies outside, as well as within, the field of social work. Though in its infancy, it is undoubtedly the most effective way to begin the struggle with the problems of social work.

[35] Note the work by Miss Gordon Hamilton in the study of social problems connected with the practice of medicine, "A Medical Social Terminology," Social Service Department of the Presbyterian Hospital, (1927).

IX. Summary

In this analysis of sociology and social work, much attention has been given to the need for scientific investigation in social work and to the possible extent that science may be used in the development of social work. But no effort has been made to underrate the significance of social work as an art. Social work essentially is an art. To be an effective art, it must necessarily use the sciences.

Naturally, the artistic characteristics or scientific possibilities of social work have received varying degrees of emphasis by its sponsors or enemies. In this review, the attempt has been made to show the special functions of sociology and social work, especially to show where and how they may be related in a common endeavor. The general relationship between social work and the social sciences has been well summarized by Professor Odum:

> Just as the great advances made in physics, chemistry, engineering, and the other physical sciences have contributed to the marvelous development of economic and material welfare, so economics, sociology, history, government, anthropology, social psychology, statistics, jurisprudence and the other social sciences must be utilized in the scientific adjustment of social relationships. Just as the loyal and devoted efforts of the physical scientists, working faithfully over long periods of time, have been rewarded by great success, so the zeal and persistency of the social scientists must ultimately bring to bear upon social work great contributions of value. Social study, social research, social work, all must go hand in hand in the new era of the development of human relationships.[36]

[36] H. W. Odum, *Public Welfare and Social Work* (1926), p. 29.

CHAPTER IX

TRENDS IN APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

By Read Bain and Joseph Cohen

It is a commonplace that the triumphs of modern physical science have come from the development of scientific methods and the scientific habit of mind. It is also a commonplace that modern physical science is roughly of two kinds, "pure" and "applied." The first is characterized by its non-practical, non-ethical point of view. It is concerned entirely with the conceptualized description of the relations and repetitive uniformities in the behavior of carefully defined and accurately observed physical units. Applied science is, on the other hand, fundamentally utilitarian. It is concerned with such scientific principles or generalizations as may be used to solve immediate and pressing problems of adjustment to our physical environment,—problems of food, shelter, transportation, health, communication and the like. Men work in applied science for the purpose of solving some problem of adjustment; in pure science, for the sake of "finding out."

The useful arts are the actual processes of providing the materials by which we adjust ourselves to our physical environment. To a large extent these techniques are still unaffected by science, but the rôle of applied science is rapidly increasing. To a much greater extent, the solution of problems of social adjustment is still on a common-sense, rule-of-thumb, trial and error basis. The findings of social science have not been applicable, or at least have not been applied, to problems of social adjustment as speedily and extensively as physical science has been applied to problems of physical adjustment.

It was probably due to the improved techniques of physical

adjustment resulting from the machine-age Industrial Revolution that men began to vision a society whose social adjustments should be achieved by reducing social phenomena to scientific principles which could then be applied to the solution of social problems. Plato, some of the Utopian philosophers and some of the religious reformers apparently had such vague visions, but it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that men began to formulate these visions in terms of natural science. Auguste Comte was one of the first. In this sense, he is the father of social science as well as of sociology. Other men even before him, such as Locke, Hume, La Mettrie, the Mercantilists, the Physiocrats, A. Smith, Saint-Simon, *et al.*, had made similar suggestions, but Comte and Positivism have become the symbols of the movement toward social engineering. Conceived in terms of natural science, social science thus falls into the categories of pure and applied science. These serve as the basis for erecting a comprehensive group of scientific social techniques, or social arts.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the concept of applied sociology as Chapter VIII examines that of the social art called social work. It is obvious that all applied social sciences deal with social problems. Just why the attempt to solve certain social problems, such as poverty, dependency, crime, recreation, housing, health, etc., by the methods of natural science, should be designated as applied sociology is not so obvious. About all one can say is that these delimitations are the products of historical development. People called sociologists were among the first to attack these problems scientifically, with the result that the boundaries of the fields have become more or less fixed by usage and consent. The actual division of labor often appears quite illogical.

There have been many varieties of applied sociology. All of them have been based upon some implicit or explicit conception of "progress," on some ethical or other philosophy, or on some religious ideal. Often these philosophies have been merely im-

plicit, but they all seem to imply that man is more or less master of his own destiny or, at least, that his destiny is mastered for him by natural or supernatural agencies which, if properly understood, will promote his welfare and "progress." The following is not offered as an exhaustive classification of these various viewpoints, but is merely suggestive of a few somewhat different approaches to the attempted solution of social problems.

I. THE MECHANISTIC EVOLUTIONISTS

It is not strange that the revolutionary geological and biological discoveries of the first half of the nineteenth century should have produced a school of theorists who attempted to bring social data under the comprehensive concept of cosmic evolution. Bachofen, Morgan, Tylor, and others, did this in the field of cultural ethnology; Maine in law and government; Ricardo, Senior and Marx in economics; and Spencer for all forms of social life. Social Darwinism became a popular school, perhaps best exemplified among sociologists by Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Buckle, Spencer and Sumner. Mankind became one with other biological species, dominated by natural selection, played upon by natural forces over which man could have little or no control. Attempts to interfere with the "natural" laws of social evolution were held to bring only confusion and disaster.

It would appear that such theory would leave no room for applied sociology; and it is true that these men, on the whole, decried conscious attempts at the amelioration of social ills. Yet Spencer, for example, in *The Study of Sociology* and in *The Data and Principles of Ethics,* develops the idea that man would be much better off if he knew the "laws" of social life. He would then be able to make better social adjustments. In this sense, all sociology would have an "applied" aspect. In Sumner's view there is also implicit faith in the beneficence of *laissez-faire* individualism and "natural laws."

These views have almost completely disappeared, although the rampant biological determinists, such as L. Stoddard, C. C.

Brigham, A. E. Wiggam, *et al.*, are reminiscent of it. Theirs is no mechanistic evolutionary doctrine, however, since they contend that man has the magic formula for the solution of all his social problems in applied biology, especially in that form of it known as positive and negative eugenics.

2. ECONOMIC PANACEAS

Karl Marx was mentioned as one who envisaged all social problems in terms of economic factors. His views are too well known to warrant discussion. It is interesting to note, however, that his concept of inevitable economic evolution toward the proletarian millennium has been so completely revised by his Russian followers that sovietism is one of the best examples in history of an attempt to reorganize society through conscious planning and control. Soviet Russia is practicing "social telesis" to an extent probably not imagined by Comte and Ward, even in their most optimistic dreams.

Passing to America, space permits only the mention of such economic reformers as the communistic Utopians of 1820-60, following Saint-Simon, C. Fourier and Robert Owen; the single tax adherents of Henry George; the socialists, like E. V. Debs, M. Hillquit, N. Thomas, Scott Nearing, Harry Laidlaw, and Upton Sinclair; the poverty fighters, like Robert Hunter and Jacob Riis; the modern communists, like W. Z. Foster and the I. W. W.'s; and possibly, the labor unionists who, following Gompers, think that if wages are raised and hours shortened all things else will be added unto them. The thread that connects all the economic reformers is the naïve faith that all social problems are fundamentally economic.

3. CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY

Religious people have always been more or less interested in helping the poor and sick. Their efforts have been, and still are, largely in the nature of "good works," perhaps best typified in this country by the Salvation Army—charity, pure and unde-

filed. But organizations inevitably arise when groups are agreed upon the need for certain services. So we find the churches firmly intrenched in what is commonly called "applied sociology," maintaining orphanages, old people's homes, recreation facilities, hospitals, missions, and so on.

The church eventually and partially realized that its charity was a costly and endless business. Hence the church has fostered many reforms to solve or prevent social problems as well as to improve morals and spirituality. The two motives tend to blend. Organizations like the Hebrew Charities, Catholic Charities, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Young Men's Christian Association, etc., spend an increasing amount of time and money in more or less scientific study of their problems and in spreading the "social gospel" thus revealed. Men like Josiah Strong, C. R. Henderson, Walter Rauschenbusch, John A. Ryan, Harry F. Ward, John H. Holmes, Sherwood Eddy and Kirby Page have done and are doing much to give the church a sociological approach to social problems. This approach is often labeled the "social gospel." It is a phase of applied sociology, although much so-called "social gospel" is stronger on fervor than on facts. As in the preaching and reform, the church social agencies have so far been only slightly influenced by the application of sociological and scientific techniques to the practice of their art.

4. CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY

What has just been said applies equally well to this type of "applied" sociology, but, on the whole, the private, non-religious agencies are probably much closer to the scientific approach. They have much more completely transferred their interests from the charitable relief of individuals to their socialized reëducation and to services which prevent individuals from becoming socially inadequate. There is commendable improvement in the standardization and recording of data, thus making them available for research in both pure and applied sociology.

To a considerable extent, this improvement has been due to the recognition on the part of the agencies themselves of the need for scientific study of the techniques and processes of social work. This has come about largely through the professionalization of social work, through the creation of research foundations like the Laura Spelman Rockefeller, Russell Sage, Milbank Memorial, Commonwealth Fund, etc., directed by men trained in sociology and other social sciences; and through the development of the Charity Organization movement and its modern counterpart, the Community Fund. Some of the latter maintain, from their own funds, research organizations like the Trounstine Foundation in Cincinnati, for the sole purpose of scientific investigation of immediate Community Fund administrative problems, as well as the more remote problems affecting general policy. This is very similar to the relation of research laboratories to modern industry.

Another indication of the transformation of private social work from mere emotional humanitarianism to laboratories of applied social science is the change that has taken taken in such periodicals as *The Survey* (formerly *Charities and Commons*—the change of name is eloquent) and *The Family.* These magazines publish a great deal of research material, as well as some "sob-sister" articles, considerable news, and much sound interpretative discussion. This policy is, of course, both cause and effect in the change from empirical to scientific social technology.

The work of such men and women as Edward H. Devine, Mary Richmond, Grace and Edith Abbott, Sophonisba Breckenridge, Julia Lathrop, Robert W. Kelso, C. H. Bookman, Amos Warner, Homer Folks, Hastings Hart and Graham Taylor, should be mentioned in this connection.

5. THE SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT

Another important antecedent of "applied" sociology is the settlement house. Coming to this country shortly after the establishment of Toynbee Hall in London, 1884, the settlement idea spread like wildfire. From the original purpose of residence

among the poor to learn "how the other half lives," the settlements soon expanded their activities to include such work as adult education, Americanization, shop work, recreation, nursing service, family case work, leadership in social reform, summer camps, training of social workers, etc.

The settlement was one of the first agencies to recognize the importance of the immigrant's own culture in effecting a constructive accommodation to our society. Sympathy, understanding, and proper appreciation of the interdependence of culture patterns have been marked characteristics of the "settlement house idea." Who has not heard of Jane Addams, the saint of social work and most beloved woman in America; Lillian Wald and the House on Henry Street from which emanated the visiting nurse movement and ungraded school classes; Robert Woods and South End House; Graham Taylor and Chicago University Commons; Goodrich House, Hiram House, The Neighborhood Guild, and hosts of others?

The settlements also soon found that both trained workers and research were necessary if the settlement was to render constructive service. So the trend toward applied sociology, while it has not gone far, appeared in the settlement movement as it had in the work of the other private agencies.

6. SOCIAL TELESIS AND APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

Finally, the work of Ward must be referred to again. He was perhaps the greatest single influence in leading sociology out of the blind alley into which Spencer and Sumner had headed it after 1850. No man was a "purer" sociologist of the arm-chair variety, unless it was Auguste Comte himself. Suffice it to say that Ward smote Spencer hip and thigh, and restated Comte's faith that mankind is intelligent enough, or may become so, to play a constructive part in the creation and organization of his social as well as of his physical environment.

This is such an obvious thing to anyone who thinks of science as merely refined and elaborated common sense, that it almost

passes belief that men like Spencer and Sumner could have become so befuddled as to doubt it. While Ward continually speaks of "artificial" and "natural," it is apparent that he regarded it as "natural" for man to be "artificial," *i. e.,* to interfere in the natural processes of which he is part and product in order to remold them nearer to the heart's desire. That is what man has always done throughout his entire history. Science is merely a better method of making the adjustments man has always made by his more or less bungling common sense. Ward saw this and suggested it in 1883, when *Dynamic Sociology* appeared. He elaborated it in *Psychic Factors in Civilization,* 1893, *Pure Sociology,* 1903, and further in *Applied Sociology,* 1906.

If applied sociology is to be a science, it must not be so greatly concerned with *"what for"* as Ward implied, because "what for" connotes ethical valuations. Of course, Ward's ethics was "the new ethics" by which he meant "the minimization of pain and the maximization of pleasure,"[1] but it is obvious that there is no known scientific method by which we can measure the "pleasure and pain" of social behavior as such. His "new ethics" is no different from all ethics in this respect. Some people value a short life and a merry one more than they do a long dull one. Shenton thus summarizes: "Ward's conception of applied sociology, independent of its ethical connotations, is that it must be practically useful in bringing to pass change based upon the prediction of the future in terms of probabilities scientifically ascertained from studies of the past and present,"[2] Shenton's own definition does not differ greatly from Ward's. He says: "Applied sociology refers to a systematically organized body of sociological knowledge which is practically useful for human, social and societal engineering." The chief difference is in Shenton's insistence that ethical ends, objects, or purposes must be eliminated from the concept.[3] In this he is probably correct. But it must be remarked that such a view would mean that most of what

[1] L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology,* p. 28.
[2] H. N. Shenton, *The Practical Application of Sociology* (1927), p. 103.
[3] *Op. cit.,* pp. 28, 29.

passes for sociology in America is really applied sociology as here defined. Shenton agrees with Hayes that sociology cannot escape the problems of ethics. This is probably true, as the recent proliferation of literature on progress seems to indicate.[4]

However, Ward's definition is quite evidently more in accord with the present usage of the term, applied sociology. When we study crime, poverty, divorce, sickness, etc., it is usually with the explicit object of deriving principles which will aid us in eliminating these maladjustments. We assume that they are "bad," "anti-social," etc., and try to devise techniques for preventing their occurrence. It is equally true that however objective and non-ethical science may be *in its methods,* there is still an implicit ethical end: the faith, hope, and expectation that our "scientific truth" is not only "good to know" but will also be "good to use." We may deplore some of the uses to which it is put, but we trust that men eventually will learn from sad experience what *are* bad uses and cleave to those which are good. It is also true that some scientific discipline must face the task of trying to define what is "good social policy." If this is left to the "general sociologist," he will be a highly honored and important individual. However, most sociologists would probably gladly avoid it.

In any case, it is agreed by Ward, Shenton, the authors of this chapter, and many others, that applied sociology must not be confused with the social arts: they are the actual performance of acts involved in effecting social change. It is also agreed that applied sociology is concerned with predicting what will happen in the future if certain conditions prevail and certain things are done. Carroll D. Wright and Richard Mayo-Smith are cited by Shenton as the two earliest American sociologists to apply statistical methods to the solution of social problems.[5] The trend in all American sociology, whether "pure" or "applied," is decidedly in this direction.

[4] See L. L. Bernard's review of some of this in *Social Forces,* Dec., 1928, pp. 314-316, and the discussion of progress in Chapter II of this volume.

[5] *Op. cit.,* pp. 108-118.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that what has come to be called applied sociology has had its origins, first, in the activities of people concerned with the alleviation of human misery and the enlargement of the personal lives and social usefulness of the disadvantaged classes. These people were chiefly religious groups, settlement workers, and other social workers. They were driven to supplement individual efforts by organization, then to keep records in order to eliminate overlapping, repetition and duplication of effort, and, finally, to study their methods, to seek for useful generalizations by surveys and intensive scientific analyses, and to increase their efficiency by shifting emphasis from palliation to prevention. The second source was the theoretical implications of the so-called "pure" sociologists, such as Ward, Mayo-Smith, Giddings, Ross, Cooley, Thomas, Small and others. These men must be given credit for demonstrating the unity of the social process and for establishing first principles and working hypotheses concerning social change, social organization, disorganization, and social control. It is upon the application of such concepts to concrete social problems and situations that applied sociology has come to be founded. Present study and investigation is engaged largely in verifying earlier hypotheses, in amplifying them with more precision and detail, and in examining their bearing on specific social situations. Modern applied sociology is a convergence of these two points of view.

We shall now turn to a more detailed discussion of the theoretical aspects of applied sociology. It should be borne clearly in mind that "applied" sociology as popularly used means social work, the actual procedures involved in effecting social change. As Ward, Shenton and the present authors use applied sociology, it means the scientific determination of relations among clearly defined social data which may be useful to social artists in making the adjustments that are approved by the community. Applied sociology is science; social work, education, religious work, political processes, etc., are social arts.

II. Theoretical Aspects of Applied Sociology

The growth of applied sociology has been beset with peculiar difficulties, but its credentials, taken at their face value, seem as valid as those of other branches of sociology. Every science has its "pure" or "descriptive" and its "applied" aspects. Sociology in its applied phase, it would appear, stands in a strategic position to clarify social purposes and suggest effective techniques for attaining them. Yet a large number of sociologists and an even larger number of laymen look upon efforts within this field either with indifference or with positive misgivings. A considerable group of sociologists protest vigorously against any interest in welfare, progress, or practical affairs on the part of "pure" sociologists. They regard this as mere manifestation of an "uplift complex" which they strictly tabu. What some take to be the final goal and full fruition of sociology, others look upon as a dread specter, to be slain if possible, but in any case to be sedulously avoided.

Some of the strictures against applied sociology are obviously specious and arise largely from a misunderstanding of its aims, scope, and methods. Such, for instance, are the criticisms of the unscientific-minded "professional" reformers. These are not valid attacks on applied sociology as such and so can be dismissed without comment. All who are even slightly familiar with sociological doctrines deplore the sentimental and often neurotic influences of social climbers, "sob sisters," and "Ladies Bountiful"; the "meddlesome tomfoolery" of religious zealots and cheap politicians; the misguided sincerity of condescending patronage that masks under the catchwords of "service" and "efficiency." In the forefront of most efforts to bring about social change have usually stood embodiments of Wells' disturbed and impatient "God-sakers," forever exhorting us to "do something about it." But such motives are not to be taken as typical or as necessary ingredients of applied sociology any more than the flighty at-

tempts to devise perpetual motion contrivances are to be taken as characteristic of applied physics.

But other objections must taken more seriously. These may be classed for the sake of clearness under three major heads: (1) Utilitarian motives inevitably jeopardize theoretical, *i. e.*, "pure social science." (2) "Natural forces," whether within or outside man, even though they may be reasonably well understood, are too gigantic and implacable or too subtle and devious to be controlled by the puny efforts of a handful of scientists. The second argument often accompanies a belief that science is based on a postulate of mechanism and determinism in human affairs which precludes the possibility of consciously directed control. (3) Finally, along with the recent reaction against democracy, has come a despair of the ability of the so-called inert and unintelligent masses to adjust themselves to scientific knowledge and technique.

I. APPLIED SOCIOLOGY AND PRACTICAL ENDS

The truly scientific man must always maintain his intellectual poise and critical-mindedness in the face of popular excitement and clamor. He must be in the group, but not of it—at least he must not be carried away by his group's transient and superficial impulses. "Nine-tenths of modern science is the product of men whom their contemporaries thought dreamers—who were laughed at for caring for what did not concern them—who, as the proverb went, 'walked into a well from looking at the stars'—who were believed to be useless." [6]

Those traits of mind which have produced modern science have been dispassionateness and austere aloofness from the disturbing whirl-and-go of immediate ends. Practical efforts in social affairs and attempts at social betterment, on the other hand, even at their best and when guided by the most competent of persons, usually have been accompanied by eagerness, fervor, haste, and lack of knowledge. The history of science presents numerous

[6] Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (1869), p. 186.

tragic instances of scientists whose perceptions and interpretations have been vitiated by the desires and limitations of worldly interests. The methods of science and practice are held, for this reason, to be antithetical.

It is argued that the practical achievements of the physical sciences became possible only after these sciences had attained a considerable stage of development. The remote theoretical investigations of Boyle, Faraday, Kelvin, Maxwell, Crookes, *et al.*, made possible the startling inventions of the electric generator, radio, and the automobile. Hence, by analogy, the sciences of society must be allowed an equal degree of seclusion until they are sufficiently developed to maintain their integrity against the disconcerting demands for action. Fruits are the efflorescence only of mature growth. So must it be with sociology.

If the demand for useful applications were equivalent to depriving sociology either of its effectiveness as an instrument of study or of its theoretical interest to the intellectually curious, that demand ought to be rigidly excluded. But the influence of practice upon theory, at the level of development which sociology has already reached, may not be so disastrous. Rather, any rigid dichotomy into the "theoretical" and the "practical" is to be avoided in sociology as in all other sciences. If sociology is to develop organically, if it is to be responsive to the life it attempts to interpret, it must take cognizance of and perhaps even initiate social experiments. If sociology is to advance as a science, it must focus attention on specific personalities, group relationships and institutions, for the purpose of getting precise conceptions of their life processes. In doing so, it can hardly avoid the consideration of human aims and values and attempts at their realization; these are integral to any human situation. The difficulty of the task is hardly justification for its evasion.

We have already begun to develop the tools and traditions upon which such analysis may be based. Some sociologists may desire to confine themselves to purely descriptive science. It is well that they should. They are the "useless dreamers" of whom

Bagehot speaks, who "are able to sit still in a room," unaffected by the evils and dissatisfactions of life or by the desire to efface them. To them, at least in their technical moods, the only really important value in life is the value of knowledge itself. Such an interest needs no further justification. In a differentiated field there is room for various kinds of talent.

But the community has a genuine interest in actively encouraging those who wish to further science, as Mumford says, "as an instrument for enabling us to establish more effective relations with other men and with the rest of our environment." [7] Sociology, of all the sciences, can isolate itself from communal life only at the cost of remaining partial and irrelevant. Those engaged in making studies of the social aspects of human behavior, who feel any urge toward a rounded completeness in their work, can hardly avoid *pointing out the diverse values and possible changes* suggested by their investigations. Such a technique calls for a serious shift of attention from historical, philosophical, and ethnological sociology to concrete contemporary situations.

That more persons should turn their attention to the latter field of study involves no serious loss to sociology. We need more and more to descend from the undisturbed quiet of the study to the world of affairs. Relevant data of a representative and abundant sort are to be found only in the variegated walks of life. The sociologist need not, of course, merge himself nor identify his purposes uncritically with those of his subjects; but his trained and guarded observations and analyses will inevitably, if only incidentally, point to conditions of weakness and strength in the functions and policies of the groups with which he deals. The continuous experiments in human behavior that are taking place in the courts of law, relief-giving agencies, community and housing planning commissions, public schools, churches, and large business organizations, are enterprises which might afford even to the pure sociologist unrivaled materials for

[7] Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias* (1922), pp. 278-279.

investigation. There is much room for the humanization even of sociology.[8]

We certainly need to guard against the danger of tinging theory with bias or preconception arising out of the desire to "influence human welfare." But an equally serious danger is the bias and inertia resident in an armchair hypothesis untested by the facts of critical, objectified experience. It is difficult to understand how we can assume the generally approved objective attitude without in a large measure involving ourselves in the consideration of goals and techniques of achievement. What we rather need to avoid is a sentimental, narrow, uncritical view of the situations we are studying. This is merely to say that applied sociology is science and must use scientific method.

2. APPLIED SOCIOLOGY AND DETERMINISM

A large group of persons hold that sociology is based on a thoroughgoing determinism, and hence, that hopes of change and beliefs in the efficacy of effort are based on a contrary and irreconcilable assumption of human freedom. According to the view of these persons, the consciousness we have of making choices, of projecting and attaining purposes, and of exercising volition is a delusion; according to the more extreme versions of the doctrine, it exists not at all. The evolution of society and the activities of its constituent members are held to go on mechanically, minutely determined by antecedent facts of nature, entirely uninfluenced by the ideologies of scheming man.

While Spencer, among the early writers, was somewhat equivocal on this point, Sumner left no doubt at all as to his views. The title of his essay, *The Absurd Attempt to Make the World*

[8] For examples of the sociological use to which such materials may be put, see W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928); E. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (1926); F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (1926). These sociological studies give implied if not direct suggestions as to practical uses that might be made of the generalizations derived from an intensive scientific study of the data. The same is true of a great deal of the recent sociological investigation. It becomes applied sociology when social changes are instigated in harmony with its findings.

Over, epitomizes his attitude. We are each of us as helpless as a cork ball floating on a turbulent sea. Our habits and the forces of external circumstances have us at their mercy. "Every one of us is a child of his age and cannot get out of it. He is in the stream and is swept along by it. All his science and philosophy come to him out of it. Therefore the tide will not be changed by us. It will swallow up both us and our experiments. It will absorb the efforts at change and take them into itself as new but trivial components, and the great movements of tradition and work will go on unchanged by our fads and schemes."[9] In his pamphlet on *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other,* Sumner pleads with nothing less than a reformer's zeal that they leave each other completely alone. Every chapter in *Folkways* proclaims that ideas are outgrowths of the mores of maintenance, and secondary to them, and that they are in no way initiatory or creative. Paradoxically enough, *Folkways* is the most imposing array of evidence we have of the relativity of social patterns. For those who cared to learn its lesson, it forever disposed of the old finality and dogmatism concerning the immutability of folkways and mores, and proclaimed the inevitability of comparison, change, choice and novelty. In the writings of Gumplowicz we have another example of that combination of mechanism and "paralyzing pessimism" that is implicit in uncritical determinism.[10]

This is largely a philosophical problem, but it is one that theoretical sociology has to face. It must be admitted that science is deterministic in the sense that it adopts the assumption that any defined event is the product of all antecedent events which directly and indirectly have influenced it. But this really means nothing more than, "events that occur, occur." When you read these words, it is logically correct to say that you read them as a result of all that has ever happened in the entire universe. In this sense, what you read is determined. But in this sense determin-

[9] W. G. Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (1911), p. 195; *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (1883).

[10] L. Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology.*

ism is nonsense, because innumerable similarly determined events have happened since you read the above sentence. The universe is in a sense a new universe each successive instant of time, and one must make new adjustments to it, on the basis of his past adjustments, every succeeding instant of time. Thus, while all one's past acts are determined, *i. e.,* have occurred, none of one's future acts are determined, since they have not occurred; and no one can tell what any act in a given future situation will be, because the future situation does not yet exist; nor can anyone foretell what may happen in the interim to him and to the world.

This is merely to say that all predictions are probabilities. When we define our units properly, we find a degree of stability in the behavior they exhibit. We abstract these stabilities from the infinite flux of events and arrive at valid generalizations. Thus our freedom is always relative, depending upon these valid, or relatively stable, factors in our environment as they are related to the relatively stable patterns of our own personality and physique. So it is reasonable to speak of indeterminate behavior in a deterministic world, the former referring to future action and the latter to past events. In strict logic, there are no present events; they are all past or future. Consequently, man may, within limits, modify his environment, though in a sense every such modification, once achieved, is determined and inevitable. It is probable that those inner acts of symbolical reference that we call thinking are just as determined and indeterminate as are all other natural phenomena. Each time we act or think, *i. e.,* respond in our appropriate and determined ways, we are *ipso facto* a new responding organism and so may respond quite differently in a future similar situation. Any simple learning response illustrates it. Some recent philosophy seems to support such a view.[11]

Whatever the dialectical merits of this discussion may be, the

[11] See John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1925). This whole volume is a masterly exposition of the precarious nature of nature and experience. For "freedom," see his *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), esp. pp. 303-313; C. J. Herrick, *Fatalism and Freedom* (1925); A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1925), esp. chaps. vi, ix, x.

pragmatic, common-sense experience of mankind is ample justification for the position that he is able to make choices that count. He has modified his environment by his responses thereto, and will in all probability continue to do so. That is all there is to say. Whether or not there is any such thing as metaphysical freedom, there is quite obviously a pragmatic freedom. Man is free to do what he can do, and science is one of the methods of responding to adjustment problems which gives him the sense of freedom, whether it is "real" or not. Clearly his future behavior in an undetermined universe is conditioned by all of his past experience—geological, biological and sociological. He can do only what these antecedent factors make possible. But they do make possible learning by symbolical responses, which in turn vastly extends his capacity for physical and social adjustments. Witness airplanes and school systems. Some writers, such as Cooley, prefer to approach the problem in this common-sense manner. The metaphysical question of freedom and determinism is a fool's puzzle to those who conceive of the physical universe and the sociological universe as an organic whole of reciprocal, variable energy systems of different degrees of stability when measured by human, social and biological structures.[12]

3. APPLIED SOCIOLOGY AND HUMAN LIMITATIONS

It is not surprising that in laying down fundamental principles of applied sociology, Lester Frank Ward should have given the major portion of his attention to questions of the educability of man, of genius, and of individual differences. His *Applied Sociology* is devoted almost exclusively to the view that the heritage of social achievement which we call culture or civilization can be distributed to all classes of society if only the proper methods of communication and education are invoked.

It was principally against the biological determinism of the Galtonian school that Ward was directing his shafts. If individ-

[12] See C. H. Cooley, *Social Process* (1918), pp. 170-172, for this common-sense organic view, and his *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), chap. xii, for a more extended discussion of freedom.

ual acts are directly the outgrowths of unmodifiable biological predispositions, and if collective achievements are determined by racial qualities, the point of remedial contact, if there be any at all, is biological selection rather than corrective social organization. This subject is less a matter for argument today than it was in Ward's time, since we have come to understand more and more of the principles of social organization and cultural growth by which persons and societies are governed; but periodically there are restatements of the extreme biological position. One of its latest manifestations is intelligence testing which presumes to separate the biological aptitudes from the acquired ones and to yield quantitative measurements of the former. To some people the results of these tests give small reason to hope for any great improvements in social life.[13]

In the light of what we now know and are learning, both about individual differences in intelligences and temperament, in which respects people probably vary at birth, and about superorganic social arrangements through which the various innate qualities are repressed, elicited, mediated, and developed, we are now much better able to determine both the possibilities and limits of consciously directed control. Since Ward's day, the problem of applied sociology has shifted from the abstract consideration of "egalitarianism versus biological inferiority" to specific investigations by both sociologists and social workers for the purpose of ascertaining the efficacy of different techniques in modifying social behavior.

So we may conclude from this brief analysis that there are no serious theoretical reasons for denying the possibility of applied sociology. Since applied sociology is a science as truly as pure sociology is, it is difficult to see how the latter can suffer from the practice of the former; determinism offers no difficulty, and all human limitations are not insuperable; finally, experience

[13] L. I. Terman, *Genetic Studies of Genius* (1925). For a more extended discussion of sociological theory and biological dogmatism, see Chapters II and III of this volume.

proves that men do consciously change their physical and social environments.

III. The Complementary Nature of Pure and Applied Sociology

Applied sociology, in a large view, is to be looked upon, not as a disparate branch of general sociology, autonomous and secluded within its realm, with a private subject matter and its own special methods, but rather as a phase of all sociology. It is a point of view with respect to the bearing of sociological principles in the world of affairs. Any sociologist who envisages the ends of his study in terms of usefulness or welfare and who seeks out practicable means of attaining those ends is, in so far as he does these things, an applied sociologist. The position of applied sociology is also that of mediator between those engaged in making specialized studies of the different aspects of society and those who may find these materials practically useful. It is the phase of sociology which serves as a bridge between these two groups. The applied sociologist has the task of showing how sociological principles may be of use under the existing and changing mores. His business is to effect the nexus between theory and practice, between science and public policy. Sociology, like all science, enables us to get outside the narrow and restricted mores of our own time and place, and to form more rational judgments of them; it enables us to modify the contingent and to adjust ourselves to the inevitable.

This relationship may be made clearer by the citation of illustrative situations. The research man in the field of urban sociology finds that certain "interstitial zones" or slum areas in a metropolitan area are correlated with juvenile delinquency. Further analysis shows that these areas have low standards of housing, inadequate recreational resources, improper sanitary provisions, and the like. Immediately are suggested the points at which remedial pressure may be effectively exerted. The rural sociologist, after intensive study of some locality, say a county,

finds that coöperative marketing, highly desired by the dominant opinion within the region and successfully practiced in other places, is impeded by the absence of certain organizing agencies; or that recreational opportunities within the same area are withheld because of the failure to take proper advantage of resources abundantly available. The social psychologist in studying specific personalities finds that certain types of crises have a corrosive effect, while others seem to be conducive to further adaptive growth. Studies of the educational facilities of a community may show them to be inadequately coördinated with domestic or industrial institutions. Detailed studies of the inner processes of gangs, political and religious organizations, likewise add to our knowledge of social leadership and control as they operate within such groups and forms of human association. The literature cited in Section VI of this chapter contains many illustrations of these and similar possible applications of sociological research.

This view of applied sociology extends its concern to every sphere of social life, instead of confining it to those situations where people fall below the minimum standards set by the group. In the past, the materials gathered by the applied sociologist have been concerned largely with pathological problems, such as crime, poverty, and vice. The present shift in attention, which is increasingly apparent, has been accelerated by the movement within the welfare fields themselves away from the relief of symptoms and the end products of pathology, toward reconstructive efforts to further the normal processes whose malfunctioning otherwise makes for trouble.[14]

The materials of sociology have their application in the case of any person or type of association which is amenable to scientific study. Some hope that sound principles concerning social functioning and the "status-getting" activities of men may so far displace our present rules of thumb as to lend themselves as ready instruments in the hands of the advertiser, the business man, the

[14] *Cf.* J. H. S. Bossard, *Problems of Social Well-Being* (1927), preface. Almost all recent books present the same point of view.

personnel manager, and anyone dealing executively or directly with human beings.[15] All branches of sociology in which there exist practicable, applicable, usable principles or findings may ultimately become centers of interest to the applied sociologist. The differences between theoretical and applied sociology, especially with respect to research, are largely differences of motive and emphasis and the uses to which the results of the research may be put. Many an investigation conducted in the spirit of "pure" sociology turns up generalizations far more practicable than those of much self-styled applied sociology. Pure scientific curiosity is often eminently practical. Thus one cannot be sure whether his research is pure or applied until after it has been done. "Useless-for-solving-immediate-problems" is the only criterion of "pure" sociology. As Mumford puts it: "The difference between science as a plaything and science as an instrument for enabling us to establish more effective relations with other men and with the rest of our environment, is the difference between firing a shot at a target and firing at a buck for provender. The practice one gets in firing at a target is great fun, and incidentally it improves one's marksmanship; such idle sport is perhaps one of the stigmata of a civilized community." [16] But we must contend that such practice is a powerful factor in producing good provender-providing marksmen. Further, the analogy falls down because the pure scientist shooting at a target often brings down whole herds of bucks. Men like Mumford are impatient. They do not see that remote ends are sometimes more profitable than immediate ones.

IV. Sociology and Values

Whether or not the applied phases of sociology are normative, whether they involve a scale of values, is a crucial question. It has given rise to conflicting opinions. Arrayed on one side are those who hold that applied sociology should be concerned only

[15] See Shenton, *op. cit.*, esp. chaps. ii, v.
[16] *Op. cit.*, pp. 278-279.

with generalizations which may provide techniques and means, and not with the ends or uses to which these techniques are put. They draw their lesson from the situation in other sciences. The chemist may show how explosives are compounded, but as a chemist, he does not care whether the explosives are used in war for the destruction of life or in the building of roads for its expansion. In such a fashion, point out the adherents of this view, the applied sociologist must help develop techniques of *how* man may be influenced to buy this kind of soap; to indulge in that form of amusement; to administer systems for the training of salesmen or stenographers; or to organize communities for this or that end. With the determination of the objectives themselves, however, he must have no concern. The means of attaining an end must be held distinct from the ends to be attained. The latter are ethical issues and matters to be determined by individuals or groups in the light of their desires and ideals. Science is not to be vitiated by any value other than "truth."

The contrary opinion lays emphasis on the fact that desires and ideals are themselves, willy-nilly, subject matters of sociology; hence, the situation is wholly different from that in the inorganic and organic sciences. Mechanical technology and social technology are with respect to this problem not at all comparable. "Man is a creator of *objectives* in the realm of nature," whereas chemical elements and even members of the animal kingdom below man are not.[17] Sociology, in one of its important phases, is the science of these objectives or values; that is, the enjoyments, desires, interests, beliefs, sentiments, ideals and aspirations as they become expressed in verbal and overt habits, activities, folkways and mores. In the purely descriptive phases of sociology, these patterns and their growth are set down as precisely and as detachedly as is possible, are examined, and scientifically formulated. The development of sociology has made this progressively more easy to do. But in the applied phase of sociology

[17] R. W. Sellars, *Principles and Problems of Philosophy* (1926). The last section discusses values and their place and function in society.

these values—whether material, ethical, religious, scientific, or educational—instead of being merely taken for granted as social facts, come to be regarded as standards to be clarified and furthered. Once they are understood and appreciated in the widest and clearest possible way, compared and made consistent among themselves, then their probable future can be charted out and under some circumstances brought under control.

As indicated above, this was Ward's view. It is probable those who insist that science must be non-ethical mean only that the scientist must approach his problem with no preconceived notion that will prevent him from making an impartial and complete investigation. He must guard against the danger of selecting data to validate his hypothesis. He must be alive continuously to the significance of negative facts. With this, Ward would undoubtedly agree. But the fact remains that all science is implicitly ethical in the sense suggested above. Ward clearly expounded this view.[18] Modern sociologists would not all agree with the statement: "Ethical sociology is applied sociology, and applied sociology is essentially ethical, in the sense of the new ethics, *i. e.*, in the sense of an attempt to show on scientific principles how society may be improved. For the improvement of society is the new ethics. All ethical systems based on science are at bottom programs of social reform, and even though they may be impracticable, they belong to sociology. Sociology is the science of welfare, and even pure sociology has this end in view." [19] In the first place, sociology cannot claim any monopoly in contributions to welfare. By Ward's own view, all other sciences share in that. Likewise, if the "new ethics" is dependent merely upon a hedonic calculus as Ward implied, we would have to part company with him. But if the "new ethics" means relative, objective, scientific, socialized, universalized standards, as Hertzler defines it, we would find considerable agreement. If "happiness" means

[18] *Applied Sociology* (1906), pp. 287-292.
[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 318.

balanced, harmonious, self-consistent, long-time adjustments, as Sapir and Hobhouse hold, we should also agree.[20]

The view of Ward and the others who would commit sociology to ethical ends has led to a partial *impasse* because of the difficulty of determining *whose* ends science is to serve. Within western society today there is a notable lack of unanimity with respect to which objects of experience it is worth while to devote ourselves. Ethical codes vary. Any proposal for social betterment presupposes a standard, an ideal, a desideratum. Why attempt one program rather than its opposite? Why advocate any change at all? There seems to be a hopeless vagueness and indeterminateness with respect to what men actually desire. Where there is any clarity at all, it is usually of a private and personal sort and apt to be in conflict with what other men desire. Is sociology to commit itself to factional ends and are we to have a Christian sociology and a Buddhist sociology; a capitalistic sociology and a proletarian sociology; a monogamic sociology and polygamic sociology? There is implied here the question whether sociology can treat of ends, and yet avoid partiality and befuddlement.

The answer of some is that it can. We find ourselves at present in a state of seemingly hopeless conflict, of personal and class bias, and of partial views, precisely because we do not get adequate clarification from science and intelligence. The rapid rate of transition in social arrangements and the increased diversity of experience have outdistanced our understanding of their meanings and implications. We need just as much to perceive clearly what our common goals are as we need to acquire means for attaining them. In both cases, help may be derived from science.

[20] J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress* (1928), pp. 507-511; E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," *American Journal of Sociology,* January, 1924, pp. 401-417; L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development* (1924), entire book, esp. chap. xiv. See also F. H. Giddings, "The Ethics of Social Progress," *International Journal of Ethics,* vol. iii, pp. 137-164; F. D. Henke, "A Note on the Relation of Ethics to Progress," *ibid.,* vol. xxvii, pp. 485-494; J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics* (1920), pp. 57-76; M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (1924), pp. 106-132; and discussion of progress in Chapter II, this volume.

What happens in the experience of a single individual embarking upon some crucial program or activity? He "takes stock": articulates as clearly as possible his abilities and weaknesses, his tastes and preferences, his likes and dislikes. He makes a similar survey of the environing circumstances. He then applies the methods by which he thinks he can best advance himself. If he has a taste for books, for instance, he inserts himself into the stream of culture where such habits are valued. In this process his original taste is both clarified and developed. If he has an interest in becoming a physician, he examines his own resources and the external possibilities for attaining success in this field. There is implied in this not a hedonic calculation of pleasures and pains but rather an exploration of a tentative, experimental character, first in imagination and eventually in practice. This may take place through reflective thought, or it may operate below the level of consciousness. In the former case it is analogous to the methods of science.

This procedure, when it becomes more critical, more observational, and more technical, is essentially that employed by the trained social worker in the rehabilitation of disturbed or disorganized personalities. All of us in daily living approximate this procedure in varying degrees of articulateness and discernment. Sociology and social psychology are the sciences which have most to contribute toward the elucidation and elaboration of such a technique for the solution of social problems.

In life the end to be sought and the means of attaining it are never sharply separated, but develop together and fertilize each other. The sharp distinction which is held to separate them is largely academic. To say that science deals with means—with *How*—and not with ends—*Why* and *What For*—is to beg the question. A complete picture of the individual must take into account what he values and regards as worthy of effort—the imaginative and emotional elements, as well as the merely outward (including verbal) responses, although the former can be known only by observation of the latter.

The community in its corporate capacity follows along the same line of growth as the individual. It tentatively, only too often fumblingly, searches out its economic, political and social functions. This has been called by some a teleological process since human needs, foresight, and volition are obviously qualifying, if not actually controlling, factors. The "pure" and applied social scientist alike can study these activities, make scientific appraisals of them as regards efficiency in promoting health and happiness, and yet retain scientific impartiality. Under such circumstances, the scientist is merely showing the relationship of the possible to the desirable. If people have been striving for objectives which are shown scientifically to be unattainable, the result will probably be a change in values. Normal people eventually cease to desire the impossible. On the other hand, science is continually showing that things formerly thought impossible can be attained. These things tend to become the desirable. The harmonious integration of possible adjustments and the exclusion of the unattainable and inharmonious is the business of the "new ethics" based on scientific findings.

This need for an organic concept of social life is evidenced by much of the recent literature. The plea for a realization of the interdependence of all social (and physical) science is perhaps best illustrated in the writings of such men as Cooley, Hobhouse, Robinson, Dewey, and Barnes.[21] Other social sciences, as well as sociology, have their non-normative and normative camps. Some economists insist that their science is "pure," and can and should be pursued without any relation to the other social sciences. Others insist upon an organic and normative view.[22] The same is true of political science, although the practical normative school

[21] In addition to citations of these writers elsewhere, see J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making* (1921), *The Humanizing of Knowledge* (1923), and *The Ordeal of Civilization* (1926); H. E. Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (1925), and *Living in the Twentieth Century* (1928).

[22] See R. G. Tugwell, *et al.*, *The Trend of Economics* (1924), esp. chaps. iii, x, xi; also the writings of Stuart Chase, such as *The Tragedy of Waste* (1925); also the classics: B. M. Anderson, Jr., *Social Value* (1911), and J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth* (1914).

is more important at present. Likewise, political science and jurisprudence are relating their studies to the other social sciences.[23] While cultural ethnology is largely monographic and esoteric, it is interesting to note that some of the best research men are also exponents of the normative and organic nature of anthropology. Some of them, such as Hobhouse, Goldenweiser, Wallis, Willey, Herskovits, and Thomas, are also sociologists. Implicitly, they agree with Tylor that cultural anthropology is "essentially a reformer's science." [24]

All of the social sciences are protesting against dealing with their phenomena as isolated materials. They realize that their real *raison d'être* is the necessity of relating their studies to human needs. This is a program of organic synthesis which cannot escape ethical implications. If social life is conceived organically, values must be an integral part of the whole complex. Applied sociology accepts this and tries to define its ethical assumptions in terms of pure scientific facts. Traditional norms are social data, and may be observed, generalized, and integrated with all other scientific knowledge.

V. Applied Sociology and Social Technology

The question has often been raised as to whether sociology alone, or any other single social science, affords a complete underlying basis for an applied sociology that will function extensively in the solution of social problems. The material with which any one science like sociology deals is limited in kind and extent, and differs in that respect from the integrated and complex organization of everyday experience. Progress in science takes place through an ever-increasing differentiation and specialization. Each science, or branch of a science, abstracts out of the original configuration of reality some class of phenomena which it at-

[23] See H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917), and *Grammar of Politics* (1925); R. Pound, *Law and Morals* (1924) and *The Spirit of the Common Law* (1921).

[24] See C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923); W. F. Ogburn and A. A. Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences* (1927), first ten chapters; F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), and *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928).

tempts to study intensively for the sake of discovering general principles. Any concrete social problem, on the other hand, contains phases whose scientific consideration falls within the bounds of many social sciences, and often within those of physical and biological science. The sociologist is interested primarily in certain general phases of the associational relations of men and the consequent structures, patterns, and processes.

In most programs of control and in the treatment of social ills it becomes necessary to consider many interrelated causal factors in the situation. For example, the worker in the field of criminology must draw upon many scientific disciplines: geography and chemistry; the various branches of biology, including psychology; as well as upon history, anthropology, economics, politics, law, social psychology, and sociology. The skill of the statistician, the architect, psychiatrist, and medical man, as well as that of the sociologist, need to be recruited for the complete understanding of crime. Merely because crime is a personal or a group phenomenon does not make it a narrowly sociological interest. Just as the sociological phase of crime is not the whole of the crime problem, so the sociological statement of the crime situation is not necessarily the best one for administrative purposes. The practical classifications of the police calendar and the court room are not always synonymous with the scientific categories of the sociologist. The division of crimes, for instance, into larceny, embezzlement, fraud, and robbery; into crimes against the person and crimes against property; and into felonies and misdemeanors, may be practically useful, but are manifestly of little use as scientific descriptions of human criminal behavior. It is neither possible nor desirable in this case that the one should be reduced to terms of the other. These classifications are dictated by separate and divergent interests. The sociologist, because he is a scientist, must forge out the concepts which are most adequate for his purposes, independent of immediate, practical considerations. The police, courts and penal agencies, having in mind certain prevailing social values,

are guided by what they regard as the most expedient means of abating crime. As the two purposes are different, so the two methods will in most cases be different. The bearing of sociology on problems of crime is in this case both indirect and incomplete.

What holds for crime holds equally for other social problems. We must beware of identifying "social" problems with "sociological" problems. Each of the larger fields of "applied" sociology represents an integration and coördination of materials from all or many sciences. Recognition of this fact lies behind the formulation of social economy or social technology as the science whose function is to mobilize materials from all sources and to organize them usefully for practical workers.[25] It is true that much of what is commonly called "applied sociology" is really what Shenton calls "social economy" and "social technology." All social problems have a sociological phase which may or may not be the most important one; certainly it is not the only one. This has already been widely recognized, for example, in the field of crime, where the numerous recent city-wide and state-wide surveys have been put in the hands not of sociologists alone but rather into those of all sorts of specialists. In the field of poverty, the economist has, along with the sociologist, a strong vested interest. And so for all other major social problems.

To recognize that sociology and social technology are not identical disciplines in no way lessens the value of interest in application by sociologists. In the first place, there are, as we have already seen, direct applications which may follow from purely sociological studies in the same way that certain aspects of the science of astronomy have a direct bearing on the problems of navigation. In the second place, it should help, rather than hinder, the investigations of applied sociologists if their findings are integrated and coördinated with materials from other sciences into social technology. Their interests may even become more intense as they become more restricted.

[25] *Cf.* Shenton, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-194.

VI. The Field of Applied Sociology

In defining applied sociology as the "immediately useful" generalizations of group behavior, it is obvious that it is given a much wider scope than that usually implied by "applied sociology," which is a confusion of what we have called applied sociology, social technology and social work. A generalization may be useful in effecting the acceleration of socially approved change as well as in remedying the disapproved "pathological" conditions. In one sense, however, these two uses of applied sociology are alike. Every application of a technique of change implies a condition that is regarded as undesirable—a "social problem."

The fact remains, however, that most of the sociological findings that are or may be applied, have come from the investigation of problems centering around the maladjustment of individuals and groups whose behavior is not in accord with the minimum standards tolerated by the larger group of which they are a part. These violations of our folkways and mores of order, decency, and normal life give rise to problems usually called "pathological." It is obviously impossible, in the space remaining, to discuss adequately even the major types of such problems. As an alternative, a brief outline of some of them is presented, with a few references to recent literature which will lead the interested reader into a more comprehensive study of the field. Needless to say, neither the outline nor the bibliography is exhaustive.[26]

I. SOME MAJOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS

There is no particular significance to the order of arrangement of these major social problems. The references given do

[26] Some recent general books: S. A. Queen and D. M. Mann, *Social Pathology,* Crowell, 1925; J. H. S. Bossard, *Problems of Social Well-Being,* Harper, 1927; R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment,* Knopf, 1927; H. W. Odum, *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* Holt, 1927, (excellent bibliography); A. E. Wood, *Community Problems,* Century, 1928; R. W. Kelso, *The Science of Public Welfare,* Holt, 1928; J. L. Gillin, C. G. Dittmer, R. J. Colbert, *Social Problems,* Century, 1928. All of these books have extensive further references.

not always refer to specific phases of the problem. A number of books are suggested that will furnish further materials on all aspects of the problem, some of which do not even appear in the outline.

I. Crime and Penology [27]

1. Social problems associated with offenders against the law
2. Police, jails, courts, and other agencies of law enforcement
3. Types and administration of penal institutions
4. Social causes and remedies of crime
5. Records and study of crime

II. Poverty and Economic Inadequacy [28]

1. Physical, psychological, sociological causes
2. Standards of living, household economy, spending and saving
3. Maladjustments in economic system—business cycles, unemployment, labor-capital conflict, mass production, wages, conditions of work, etc.
4. Inequality in distribution of wealth and income
5. Institutions and agencies for relief

III. Public Recreation [29]

[27] E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology,* Lippincott, 1924; P. A. Parsons, *Crime and the Criminal,* Knopf, 1926; H. E. Barnes, *Crime and Its Repression,* Doran, 1926; J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology,* Century, 1926.

[28] J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency,* Century, revised edition, 1926; T. S. McMahon, *Social and Economic Standards of Living,* Heath, 1925; M. B. Hexter, *Social Consequences of Business Cycles,* Houghton Mifflin, 1924; M. F. Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress,* Macmillan, 1916; J. H. Hollander, *The Abolition of Poverty,* Houghton Mifflin, 1914; E. T. Devine, *Misery and its Causes,* Macmillan, 1913; R. W. Kelso, *Poverty,* Longmans, Green, 1929.

[29] C. E. Rainwater, *The Play Movement in the United States,* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1922; Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets,* Macmillan, 1912; H. S. Curtis, *The Play Movement and its Significance,* Macmillan, 1917; R. Moley, *Commercialized Recreation,* Cleveland Recreation Survey, 1920; J. B. Nash, *Organization and Administration of Playgrounds,* 1927; files of *Playground.*

1. Use of leisure time and delinquency
2. Problems of commercialized recreation
3. Playground movement
4. Clubs, community centers, vacations, summer camps
5. Pageants, plays, little theaters
6. Public and private organizations; legal regulations

IV. Sickness, Disease, Mental and Physical Inadequacy [30]

1. Sanitation, housing, congestion
2. Communicable diseases, accidents, mentally deficient, insane, mentally diseased, blind, deaf, crippled, etc.
3. Malnutrition, fatigue, monotony, apathy
4. Degenerative diseases, drug habits, old age
5. Hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, visiting nurses
6. Public health organization, Red Cross, research foundations, industrial health organizations, education in mental and physical hygiene, health legislation
7. Social basis of ill health
8. Vital statistics and records

V. Family Maladjustments [31]

1. Sickness, disease, death, desertion, divorce
2. Causes of family tension and break down

[30] In both Bossard and Wood, cited above, are exceptionally good discussions of this topic. See also H. H. Moore, *Public Health in the United States,* Harper, 1923; A. C. Burnham, *Community Health Problems,* Macmillan, 1920; M. M. Davis, *Clinics, Hospitals, and Health Centers,* Harper, 1927; W. A. White, *Principles of Mental Hygiene,* Macmillan, 1917; A. F. Tredgold, *Mental Deficiency,* Wood, fourth edition, 1922; F. E. Williams, *et al., Social Aspects of Mental Hygiene,* Appleton, 1927, revised edition; C. Aronovici, *Housing and the Housing Problem,* McClurg, 1920; L. K. Frankel, *The Health of the Worker,* Funk and Wagnalls, 1924; G. C. Whipple, *Vital Statistics,* John Wiley and Sons, 1923.

[31] E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships,* Holt, 1928; W. Goodsell, *Problems of the Family,* Century, 1928; Ruth Reed, *The Modern Family,* Knopf, 1929; G. Hughes, *Mothers in Industry,* New Republic, 1925; J. Marchant (ed.), *The Control of Parenthood,* Putnam's, 1920; Mary Richmond, *Child Marriages,* Russell Sage Foundation, 1925; E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization,* University of Chicago Press,

3. Lack of income, poor management, working women
4. Agencies for helping the home, courts of domestic relations, family welfare agencies, day nurseries, maternity clinics, visiting nurses
5. Conscious control of the family

VI. Cultural and Racial Conflicts [32]

1. The immigrant and Americanization
2. Mobility—rural, urban, sectional
3. Changes due to urbanization and industrialization
4. Race conflict—Negro, Oriental, Mexican, Indian
5. Religious conflict—Jewish, Catholic, modernism
6. Class consciousness and class struggle

VII. Child Problems [33]

1. Prenatal and pre-school care, nutrition
2. Delinquency, mental, physical and sex hygiene and education

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1927, and *Domestic Discord, id.,* 1929; J. C. Colcord, *Broken Homes,* Russell Sage, 1919; E. R. Groves, *Social Problems of the Family,* Lippincott, 1927; M. Sanger, *Happiness in Marriage,* Brentano's, 1926; E. R. Groves, *The Drifting Home* and *Wholesome Marriage,* Houghton Mifflin, 1927; G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage,* A. & C. Boni, 1928.

[32] E. Abbott, *Immigration,* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1924; John Daniels, *America via the Neighborhood,* Harper, 1920; R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted,* Harper, 1921; G. Abbott, *The Immigrant and the Community,* Century, 1917; W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* five volumes, Badger, 1918; P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility,* Harper, 1927; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change,* B. W. Huebsch, 1922; F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change,* Century, 1928; E. E. Muntz, *Race Contact,* Century, 1927; J. T. Woofter, Jr., *The Basis of Racial Adjustment,* Ginn, 1925; W. D. Weatherford, *The Negro from Africa to America,* Doran, 1924; E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem,* Crowell, 1927; A. Locke (ed.), *The New Negro,* Boni, 1925; E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes,* Heath, 1928; H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations and Classes,* Lippincott, 1924; J. W. Jenks and W. J. Lauck, *The Immigration Problem,* sixth ed., Funk and Wagnalls, 1926; Chicago Race Relations Commission, *The Negro in Chicago,* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1922; J. M. Mecklin, *The Survival Value of Christianity,* Harcourt, 1926; E. T. Hiller, *The Strike,* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1928.

[33] W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America,* Knopf, 1928; S. Drucker and M. B. Hexter, *Children Astray,* Harvard University Press,

3. Illegitimate, orphaned and dependent children
4. Child labor, vocational guidance
5. Agencies for child care—placing, homes, hospitals, day nurseries, guidance clinics, juvenile courts, parental schools, "reform" schools
6. Education for parenthood

2. SOME TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL ART

The following outline attempts to suggest some of the methods of carrying into effect such generalizations of sociology as may be practicable. It is needless to remind the reader that in social technology the generalizations of many social, biological and physical sciences are applied, including those of sociology. It is a major thesis of this chapter that many generalizations of sociology are being found useful in the social arts. This will be increasingly true as sociology becomes more productive of scientific results.

The natural history of social technology is somewhat as follows. Individuals perceive that certain types of individuals and group behavior do not conform to the prevailing folkways and mores of order, decency, and well-being. They proceed to handle these unadjusted and maladjusted persons in an indiscriminate, common-sense manner, by charity, repression, ostracism, banishment, coercion. Others join them, and some kind of an organization is formed. Certain people to do these various tasks are sup-

1923; W. Healy, *The Individual Delinquent,* Little, Brown, 1915; W. Healy and A. F. Bronner, *Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies,* Boston, 1923; P. Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother,* Little, Brown, 1918; G. B. Mangold, *Problems of Child Welfare,* Macmillan, 1924, revised; P. Blanchard, *The Child and Society,* Longmans, 1928; M. B. Sayles, *The Problem Child in School,* 1925, and *The Problem Child in the Home,* 1928, both Commonwealth Fund, New York; J. B. Watson, *Psychological Care of Infant and Child,* Norton, 1928; Jane Addams, *et al., The Child, the Clinic, and the Court,* New Republic, 1925; M. Van Waters, *Youth in Conflict,* New Republic, 1925; H. H. Lou, *Juvenile Courts in the U. S.,* Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1927; W. E. Blatz and H. McM. Bott, *Parents and the Pre-School Child,* Morrow, 1929; R. G. Fuller, *The Meaning of Child Labor,* McClurg, 1922; and publications of the U. S. Children's Bureau and National Child Labor Committee; W. Healy, A. F. Bronner, *et al., Reconstructing Behavior in Youth,* Knopf, 1929.

ported by the group. Soon the leaders feel the necessity for more information; study of their problems gives rise to empirical generalizations based on experience. When that stage of specialization is reached where certain individuals are commissioned to study the problems by scientific method, applied sociology and other applied sciences are born. Scientific social technology then becomes possible. All of the techniques to be discussed have been developed empirically, and most of them are still on that basis; but scientific investigation is speedily replacing the old rule-of-thumb, hit-and-miss (usually "miss") methods.

The references appended to the social problems outlined above will be found useful in studying these techniques. A few that bear more directly upon them are here cited.

Community Organization.—By this term is meant "a social process which aims to direct and readjust the social forces of the community so as to allay, and to overcome as far as possible, the antagonisms which arise out of traditional, institutionalized situations, to the end that a more disciplined and coöperative community may be attained."[34] This program of course calls for some study of the community in order to find out what are the disturbing factors in community life and what resources exist or may be created for their elimination. Presumably this idea has its origin in such studies as those of Le Play in France and Charles Booth's monumental study of the *Life and Labor of the People in London* (1891-1903); but since the *Pittsburgh Survey* of 1907 there have been hundreds of such studies made in this country. The purpose of the survey as stated by Kellogg is "its synthesis of major factors entering into a given area or a given problem; its analysis of those factors in terms of individual experience; the graphic interpretation of these findings in ways to 'get them over' to the public, engage springs of action, and enable the forces of democracy to put the facts to work."[35] So the sur-

[34] A. E. Wood, "The Philosophy of Community Organization," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xvii, 1922, p. 183.

[35] Paul U. Kellogg, "Our Hidden Cities," *Survey-Graphic,* vol. lx, 1928, p. 410.

vey has become almost a routine procedure in planning for community organization.

When community organization began, it was confined largely to local areas, as the name of the National Community Center Association indicates. It was concerned with the school as a community forum and symbol. Later it began to foster community houses and to stimulate recreational programs. At present the interest seems to be shifting to community planning, including a regional plan for the suburban and rural areas surrounding cities. Much of the effort of community organizers has been devoted to the open country and small rural town.[36]

Social Legislation.—This includes all the action taken by national, state, and local governmental units for the purpose of solving such problems as have been outlined in this chapter. Very little such action is based upon any adequate scientific investigation or knowledge, yet it is usually true that social art must depend directly or indirectly upon some sort of legal sanction. The legal acts usually called social legislation are those dealing with such problems as housing, health, care and protection of children, workmen's compensation, regulations of hours and conditions of work, all types of institutional care for dependent, delinquent, and defective classes, regulation of divorce, etc. Social legislation is of two classes: remedial and preventive. For the most part, it has failed to accomplish either of these objectives. Here is a fruitful field for the application of sociological and other scientific knowledge, but only if legislators can develop the scientific habit of mind! However, there are a few encouraging signs on the political horizon. Facts count more with modern legislators

[36] J. F. Steiner, *Community Organization,* Century, 1925; B. A. McClenahan, *The Social Survey,* Univ. of Iowa, 1916, and *Organizing the Community,* Century, 1922; R. D. McKenzie, *The Neighborhood,* Univ. of Chicago Press, 1923; E. J. Ward, *The Social Center,* Appleton, 1913; H. P. Douglass, *The Little Town, Especially in its Rural Relationships,* Macmillan, 1919; C. J. Galpin, *Rural Life,* Century, 1918; G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research,* Longmans, 1929. See Chapter X of this volume for further discussion and references on the survey. For the transition of the community movement, see J. F. Steiner, "An Appraisal of the Community Movement," *Social Forces,* March, 1929, pp. 333-342.

than they have in any previous age. The federal government probably spends as much on research each year as it does on one first-class battleship.

Social Insurance.—Social insurance is a method of caring for economic social inadequacy by means of public funds accumulated through the voluntary or compulsory contributions of those who benefit therefrom. The governmental units may contribute all, or contributions may be largely from those who benefit directly. In case the government contributes all, the theory is that the whole community benefits indirectly from the security thus attained by the recipients of the fund. Citizens who are not recipients choose this method of caring for economic inadequacy rather than that of private or group philanthropy. It is argued by the proponents of public insurance that adequate wages would not solve the problem because there are great numbers of people who, through lack of intelligence or training, or because of the presence of conditions which even high intelligence and proper training cannot control, will always be economically inadequate. But their main contention is that wages are not adequate, work is not regular, sickness, accidents and old age do come to all. Hence social insurance is advocated for such types of economic inadequacy. There are many nice problems in connection with this question which we must pass over.

Social insurance has made very little progress in the United States. It is a phase of social legislation, and, as was pointed out above, legislative policy is as yet but little affected by scientific procedure. It is almost wholly dominated by "political expediency" (*i. e.*, the effect of return of person or party to office), by the lobbying of groups interested pecuniarily or "morally," and very little by the results of specific scientific investigation. The one exception to this is workmen's compensation, some form of which exists in almost all the states. The general policy seems fairly well established, acceptable alike to capital and labor. However, the criticism still holds when we study the forms and functioning of workmen's accident compensation laws. There is con-

siderable interest at present in old age insurance, and fifteen or twenty states have adopted some scheme. As yet sickness and unemployment insurance have made little headway, though these two are probably more important from the standpoint of economic insufficiency and social well-being than either or both of the others. Sickness and life insurance are available at reasonable rates to those who are intelligent enough and sufficiently above the poverty level to take advantage of it for themselves. The work of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in sickness insurance and health education is especially notable.

Public and private pensions and retirement funds of educational systems are somewhat like social insurance. The same is true of widows' pensions, which exist in some form in practically all states. Maternity pensions or insurance might well be provided for women who work. For all of these problems there is considerable sociological knowledge that would have a practical use in the event of the inauguration of social insurance.[37]

Social Work.—Halbert says, "Social Work is the business of producing, changing or adjusting social organization in the interests of human welfare according to scientific standards."[38] It is obvious that this is identical with our definition of social technology. It is perhaps too broad, because under this definition, teaching school would be social work. Yet on page 22 the author specifically excludes all social activities which "have become permanent." But he goes on to say that wherever there are exceptional individuals and discretionary power is exercised, we have

[37] I. M. Rubinow, *Social Insurance,* Holt, 1910; J. R. Commons and J. B. Andrews, *Principles of Labor Legislation,* Harper, 1920; G. W. Morgan, *The Public Relief of Sickness,* Macmillan, 1922; J. L. Cohen, *Insurance Against Unemployment, With Special Reference to British and American Conditions,* London, King and Sons, 1921; L. I. Dublin, *Mortality Statistics of Insured Wage Earners and their Families,* 1911-16, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., New York; the reports of the Workmen's Compensation Commissions of Ohio, California, Massachusetts and New York are especially valuable; I. M. Rubinow, *Standards of Health Insurance,* Holt, 1916; A. Epstein, *The Challenge of the Aged,* American Association for Old Age Security, New York, 1928.

[38] L. A. Halbert, *What Is Professional Social Work?* The Survey, (1923).

social work. This would still include in social work the practice of medicine and school teaching. This is quite contrary to the usual conception of social work, but it is probably sound. It conforms to our differentiation between applied sociology and "applied" sociology. Teaching is a social art, and is still largely governed by empirical techniques. But it is gradually yielding to the influence of the scientific spirit in education—is becoming a scientific social art performed by professional people. In this it is like the social arts that care for the pathological personal and groupal maladjustments which are usually regarded as the special function of "social work." This is social work in Halbert's usage, but it is only one phase of the general science of social technology. Applied sociology has some contributions to make to social work in both its limited and logical connotation. This is discussed in chapter VIII. References to the literature of social work will also be found there.

Public and Private Administrative Machinery.—These techniques are also largely empirical, but they are becoming more scientific. At present we have no institutions for training policemen, juvenile court judges, tax assessors, city managers, legislators, and other public officials. We are using experts and research methods increasingly, however, in both public and private organizations, but they are usually directed by inexpert executives—men who have learned their business in the "school of hard knocks." That we shall in the near future refuse to elect a man to public office who has not been specially trained for that most important function, seems doubtful. But we should remember that at one time little special training was required for the practice of medicine.

This refusal to demand scientific training for executives of important functions seems one of the outstanding absurdities of our civilization. That a man well-trained in the social sciences, having the habit of getting scientific information before making important decisions of policy or administration, would make a better governor or senator than a successful real estate broker or

lawyer seems evident. But our practice proves it is not evident. Likewise, that a successful politician should become Secretary of the Interior outrages belief. Yet it sometimes happens!

So we must conclude that legislative, judicial and administrative machinery, both public and private, is largely in the hands of men almost wholly devoid of the point of view of the social worker as defined by Halbert, or of the social technologist as defined by us. This is one of the major reasons for the lack of application of the findings of the social sciences. We are still in the dark ages so far as social technology is concerned.

VII. Trends in Applied Sociology

The remainder of this chapter will present a short summary of the exposition of applied sociology given above, and will outline briefly what the writers regard as some of the outstanding trends in applied sociology.

In the first place, we pointed out that what has come to be called applied sociology originated chiefly from two sources: the empirical need of practical social workers to attack their problems with more efficient tools than the largely unconscious generalizations of common sense; and the theory of certain pure sociologists that some of their findings might be applied to the solution of social problems, just as some generalizations of physical science have been applied to engineering and the industrial arts. We showed that there are no valid theoretical objections to this on the ground that it would vitiate pure disinterested research, that determinism precludes the possibility of forecasting or controlling social change, and that human limitations make the masses of men incapable of understanding scientific abstractions. We showed that in one sense all science is implicitly normative, and that the social sciences in particular cannot escape the problem of values. Values are social phenomena and can be studied and evaluated by science. We then distinguished applied sociology from social technology and outlined some of the principal social

problems and techniques to which certain generalizations of sociology are applicable.

This was our final conclusion: Applied sociology is made up of those generalizations of sociology which are immediately applicable to the solution of social problems. Its methods and points of view are as strictly scientific as those of so-called "pure" sociology. Often researches carried out with no thought of application produce results far more practical than those consciously undertaken for the purpose of application. We admitted that a considerable number of so-called pathological problems furnish opportunities for research, the results of which appear to be more immediately applicable than those of certain other types of research. These are the "major social problems" outlined above.

It remains then to discuss present trends. This must be done very briefly, but since such a discussion is largely a matter of subjective opinion based upon very little objective data, perhaps the briefer, the better.

1. There seems to be a slightly increasing interest in research into pathological problems. In 1920, pathology ranked third in masters' theses, and second in 1924. For doctors', tenth and fifth respectively. Publications on pathology in the *American Journal of Sociology* ranked third in 1894-1919, and fourth in 1920-24. This indicates slightly less interest in pathology on the part of contributors to this journal. Pathology ranked fifth in *Social Forces,* 1924-26. Obviously, in both journals and in doctoral dissertations, pathology played a much less important part than most of the other concepts.[39]

2. There is a very clear trend toward the subordination of pure sociology to applied. In the article referred to, by including theses on Social Process, Community, Institutions and Pathology in the category "practical," the percentages for 1920 and 1924 were 53 and 63, respectively, showing a marked increase in applicable sociology. If conflict groups be included, the figures are

[39] See Read Bain, "Trends in American Sociology," *Social Forces,* March, 1927, pp. 413-422.

61 and 70. In the most recent publication of theses in preparation, the percentage classified as practical was about 60.[40] These figures are close enough to indicate little change in interest in applied sociology since 1924, but a considerable increase since 1920. In the article cited, the percentage of articles classified as practical in the *American Journal* increased from 40 in 1894-1919 to 47 in 1920-24. In *Social Forces,* 1922-26, the percentage was 66. So the conclusion seems warranted that the trend in both publication and research is toward increasing interest in problems that have immediate need of solution. I think it safe to say that well over 60 per cent of the present research is of this character and is probably increasing. About the only pure sociological research being done is in the realm of history, methodology, logic and philosophy of the social sciences.

3. Another trend is the increasing amounts of time and money spent by social work agencies upon research. Some Community Chests have research departments; private agencies, such as the Hebrew Charities, have research staffs in all the large cities; social workers are increasingly present at meetings of the American Sociological Society; schools of social work are being established and are doing graduate research work; they are seeking applicants who have majored in sociology; the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is collecting reliable data and disseminating it. Many other examples might be given.

4. The same trend is noticeable in public agencies. State departments of welfare; municipal bureaus of research; the Child Welfare Bureau; Women's Bureau; Public Health Service; even Congressional investigations, are increasingly using scientific methodology in getting information as a preliminary to social action.

5. The same trend appears in industry. Applied sociology as a basis for industrial social technology is becoming more and more common. It pays. Chambers of Commerce hire sociolo-

[40] "Students' Dissertations in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* Sept. 1928, pp. 348-363, and Jan. 1929, pp. 700-702.

gists and others to make social surveys of their cities. The so-called service clubs—Rotary, Kiwanis, etc.—often finance such projects. It pays.

6. Another trend is the increasing number of endowed private foundations, such as Russell Sage, Laura Spelman Rockefeller, Milbank Memorial, etc., whose primary business is such research as appears to promise the alleviation of human ills.

7. Another trend is found in the increasing specialization in the teaching of "applied" sociology. The old type of social pathology text appears to be breaking up into courses given by specialists on particular problems. One man can no longer handle children's problems, labor problems, crime, poverty, race, immigration, etc., from one text in one semester. These general problems become the subject matter of separate courses.[41] Mr. Reinhardt got returns from only sixty institutions, so his findings are more suggestive than conclusive; but the order of frequency and importance of the major social problems taught in these institutions was somewhat as follows: Crime, Poverty, Family, Race, Population, Immigration, Divorce, Standards of Living, Childhood, Disease, to mention only the first ten out of a total of forty-four. The great defects of textbooks was found to be the unscientific approach and the absence of concrete data. There already seems to be a decided trend noticeable in recent texts in these subjects to remedy both defects. The general text in social problems is almost doomed from the start to be lacking in one if not both of these qualities. The unscientific approach is less likely to creep in if the writer is dealing with actual concrete data, although one can use such material unscientifically, of course, as many popular textbooks amply demonstrate.

8. Finally, there is a marked tendency for students of social problems to approach their task from an organic rather than a structural descriptive point of view. The earlier "applied sociologists" were usually particularistic in their approach. They

[41] J. M. Reinhardt, "Trends in the Teaching of Social Problems in the Colleges and Universities of the United States," *Social Forces,* March, 1929, pp. 379-384.

could not see the forest of social interdependence for their own cherished tree of single tax, poverty, drink, Christianity, education, or what not. Modern sociologists, both pure and applied, try to envisage their particular problem in terms of its relation to other problems; they study the dynamic, organic processes of social life, realizing that while delimitation of the field is necessary for methodological reasons, it must not result in the conclusion that the delimited aspect is the whole process.

For example, we do not think of poverty as a definite state or condition of an individual, but rather as a phase of the whole life of a particular community. To give relief to a man "in poverty" does him little good and may be harmful to the community. Poverty must be studied as an aspect of the total organic complex that is society. The same point of view will hold for all so-called social problems.

So we close our discussion with a reiteration of the faith that the time will come when all social technology will be dominated by science; when social engineers will be honored as highly as mining engineers; when mankind will reap the rich rewards of harmonious social integration and consciously controlled communal development by applying to social organization the scientific knowledge made available by the applied sociologist and his colleagues in pure sociology and the other social and physical sciences. This faith is a challenge as well as a hope. It calls for much labor and much patience.

CHAPTER X

THE LOGIC OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

By George A. Lundberg

THE preceding chapters of this book reveal the wide scope of the field of sociology and the variety of its subject matter. Corresponding to this breadth of scope and diversity of subject matter we find a number of methods of research. These methods range from *a priori* philosophical assumptions,[1] to laboratory experimentation.[2] The variety of methodology employed has been one of the counts on which sociology has been denied the status of a science.[3] For undoubtedly one of the principal requirements of a science is an objective technique of observing, recording, classifying, and generalizing its data.

I. THE EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF METHODS OF RESEARCH

Methodology in its widest meaning is a term denoting adjustment technique. Bernard has traced the evolution of technique from the lowest animal forms to the highly developed human being.[4] The same author has also traced the evolution of methodology for studying social phenomena from the speculations of the ancient Greeks down to the methods of modern scientists.[5]

[1] See C. A. Ellwood, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society," *Journal of Social Forces,* vol. ii, 1923-24, pp. 328-332; also *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (E. C. Hayes, ed.), (1927), chap. i, "Recent Developments in Sociology," pp. 41-46.

[2] See D. S. and W. I. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), chap. xii.

[3] F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. vii, 1901, p. 86.

[4] L. L. Bernard, "Neuro-Psychic Technique," *Psychological Review,* vol. xxx, Nov. 1923, pp. 407-437.

[5] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist,* April, 1928, pp. 292-320; also *The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control* (1911).

Both analyses are significant in emphasizing that even our most refined scientific method has been a natural growth instead of the result of divine revelation, as one would infer from the dogmatism with which some methods of social inquiry are repudiated and others extolled at the present time. Methods of research, then, are merely techniques of finding out what we want to know, techniques which have survived because of their utility.

The natural history of methodology teaches us several important facts regarding the nature of method. In the first place, the final test of the validity of any method must lie in its results. Whatever technique achieves the result sought is *ipso facto* a valid technique. The technique by which a result is achieved may vary from the blind trial and error groping of a rat in a maze to the solution of a highly abstract problem of mathematics. Usually, also, a given problem may be solved by a variety of methods. In that case, we adopt the method which will achieve the result by the most direct, certain, and easiest route. From this point of view, the discussion of the relative merits of different methods must be a discussion of their relative efficiency in achieving the results sought.

In the second place, all methodology must be regarded as tentative.[6] Cooley has wisely pointed out that we must not take the methodological dogmatist too seriously. "I am not sure," he says, "but that methodology is a little like religion. It is something we need every day, something we are irresistibly impelled to talk and think about, but regarding which we never seem to reach a definite conclusion. Each one, if he is clever, works out something adequate for his own use, but the more general principles remain unsettled." [7] It is true that in fields where we have attained a large body of systematized and verified knowledge, the methodology of adding to that knowledge has become highly

[6] For some examples of the high rate of turnover of methods in psychology and education, see P. A. Witty and H. C. Lehman, "Some Dangers of Oversimplification," *Educational Review*, vol. lxxvi, Oct., 1928, pp. 150-161.

[7] C. H. Cooley, "Sumner and Methodology," *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. xii, March-April, 1928, pp. 303-306.

formalized and objectified. But it is also true that even in such highly systematized fields as physics, new methods are constantly supplanting or modifying the old methods and the logic upon which they rest.[8] The fact is that the methods in vogue in any field are simply the residues of the great variety of techniques by which man has found out what he wanted to know. Experience has shown some methods to be more fruitful than others. The more effective have therefore become the methods recognized as valid with reference to particular types of problems.

Now it is generally agreed that through this process of survival of the fittest, one method or type of logic has evolved which has been especially and conspicuously successful in the fields where it has been applied. That is the logic and method of natural science.[9] The concrete processes and operations in the application of that logic in different fields vary very widely. For example, the tools, the concepts, and the subject matter are very different in some aspects of physics as compared with some aspects of biology. But the underlying logic is the same. Through the use of this logic and the refinement of its tools, man has attained an understanding and a control of the physical world beyond the fondest dreams of the ancient and medieval philosophers. Unquestionably, the logic and method of physical science are among the most useful tools which man has developed in his age-long march from caveman to contemporary life.

In view of the success of the method of natural science in the physical world, it is reasonable that we should be much interested in the question of its applicability to social phenomena. Analogies between social and physical phenomena have engaged the attention of thinkers from ancient times. This theorizing received

[8] For an account of developments in the logic and method of physics within the last twenty years, see H. Buckley, *A Short History of Physics* (1927), chaps. xiii, xiv, xv.

[9] The term "natural science" is employed here in its generally accepted sense, *i.e.*, to mean such sciences as chemistry, physics, biology, etc. All science is, of course, "natural," and social phenomena are as much so as the phenomena of chemistry and physics. The term "physical science" will be used in the same sense to distinguish these sciences from the social sciences.

a tremendous impetus in modern times from the writings of Comte, Darwin, Spencer, and Ward. In spite of the numerous analogies which have been drawn between the two types of data, however, there have been few serious attempts to study society systematically according to the methods of physical science. The view has for the most part obtained that there are certain fundamental differences between physical and social data which preclude the possibility of studying them by similar methods. It is necessary for us, therefore, to consider in some detail the basis of this view and its possible validity.

II. Are the Methods of Physical Science Applicable to Social Phenomena?

The first fact which appears in a consideration of the alleged inapplicability of the methods of physical science to social phenomena is a general failure to distinguish between the *logic* of physical science and the *concrete techniques* through which that logic is carried out.[10] Thus, when the subject is broached, we

[10] A. Wolf, in his *Essentials of Scientific Method* (1925), summarizes this distinction as follows (pp. 15, 16): "On the one hand, there are the technical or technological methods of manipulating and measuring the phenomena under investigation, and the conditions under which they can be observed fruitfully. . . . These technical methods are mostly different in the different sciences, and few men of science ever master the technical methods of more than one science or one group of connected sciences. On the other hand, there are the logical methods, that is to say, methods of reasoning according to the nature of the data obtained. . . . The technical methods . . . are mainly auxiliary to the logical methods. . . . They are aids either to observation or to inference. Sometimes they render possible the observation and measurement of certain phenomena which either could not be observed and measured at all otherwise, or could not be observed so well and measured so accurately. At other times the technical methods enable the investigator so to determine the conditions and circumstances of the occurrence of the phenomena which he is investigating that he can reason about them vaguely. . . . Whereas the technical methods are, for the most part, different from one science to another, the logical methods are more or less common to all the sciences. They are, moreover, the only scientific methods that can be studied with advantage by those who are not men of science, in the strict sense of the term, as well as by those who are."

See also F. N. House, "The Logic of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxxii, Sept., 1926, pp. 271-287; also F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (1929) chap. xxxviii; also S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928), pp. 5, 6.

have students of sociology skeptically remarking that they cannot see how we shall ever be able to put a piece of society in a test tube or to measure it with a micrometer. This attitude reveals, of course, the widespread tendency (even among scientists) to think of science in terms of subject matter rather than in terms of logic or method.

The incredible absurdities of which even brilliant scientists are capable when they venture into other fields than their own specialty, afford some striking examples of this inability of even highly educated people to employ the same system of logic with reference to different types of subject matter.[11] Thus, it is not unusual to find a physician who proceeds with the utmost rigor in his own field according to the logic of science, but who seems totally incapable of applying the same system of reasoning to social phenomena. Modern psychology has, of course, made clear that our action-patterns (learning, skills, etc.) are specific rather than generalized, as was formerly held under the doctrine of formal discipline. To the extent that situations are similar, however, skill or discipline attained in one is found applicable in another. Hence, if the emphasis in our teaching of science were placed more on method instead of on subject matter, a more integrated view, at least among scientists, might result.

Our preoccupation with subject matter in the study of methodology is again largely the result of pedagogical expediency. It is admittedly difficult, at least with immature students, to consider problems of technique and methodology in the abstract—apart from concrete material and practical problems. Whatever may be the justification of teaching methodology to beginners solely in terms of concrete material and practical problems, it remains a fact that no very advanced thinking is possible without a high degree of abstraction. The reaction in sociology at the present time against the philosophizing, scholasticism, and dialectic which characterized its earlier stages is a healthy sign.

[11] For an excellent discussion of this difficulty, with illustrations, see K. Young, "The Need of Integration of Attitudes among Scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. xviii, 1924, pp. 291-305.

The trend toward the objective, inductive approach deserves all encouragement. A note of warning needs to be sounded, however, lest this attitude causes us to become so absorbed in gathering data and in finding answers to substantive questions that we neglect to inquire into the meaning of the facts and the validity of our manipulation of them. There are, in fact, large numbers of workers in the social sciences who take a certain pride in their ignorance of theory, logic, (which is synonymous with the syllogism to many!) and philosophy generally. There is in some quarters a distinct tendency to scoff at all scholarship which does not solve practical problems, get "results," "make the world better," or serve other religio-ethical ends which have nothing to do with science. In some places this tendency is evidenced in attempts to turn departments of sociology into "welfare" clinics in the name of social work. The absurd attempts to apply the concepts, measures, and terminology of physics and chemistry to social phenomena are further illustrations of the inability to distinguish between logic and subject matter in considering questions of methodology.[12]

Objective data inductively employed must, it is generally agreed, be the basis of science. But such data can be gathered only under working hypotheses, and will have meaning only when interpreted according to some system of logic or social philosophy. All observation implies such a philosophy.[13] This philosophy and

[12] An excellent summary and criticism of such attempts may be found in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), chap. i.

[13] "We forget that facts are only data; that is, are only fragmentary, incomplete means, and unless they are rounded out into complete ideas—work which can only be done by hypotheses, by a free imagination of intellectual possibilities—they are as helpless as are all maimed things and as repellent as are needlessly thwarted ones."—J. Dewey, "The Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," *The Philosophical Review,* vol. xxxvi, pp. 1-9.

See also on this subject, G. M. Graham, "The Logics and the Social Sciences," *Social Forces,* vol. vii, Sept., 1928, pp. 24-32; W. D. Wallis, "The Problems of an Empirical Sociology," *Social Forces,* vol. vii, Sept., 1928, pp. 46-50; R. B. Lindsay, "Some Philosophical Aspects of Recent Atomic Theory," *The Scientific Monthly,* vol. xxvi, p. 299; G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research,* (1929), chap. iv; C. H. Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxxii, July, 1926, pp. 59-79; Read Bain, "The Scien-

this logic as they exist in the physical sciences (and scientific method is only a type of logic) we have reason to believe are applicable to social phenomena. Our justification for proceeding on this assumption is again the justification to which all method must appeal, namely, its practical usefulness. By the same token we should not hesitate to adopt any new systems of logic which at any time meet this pragmatic test more adequately. The logic of physical science is itself constantly undergoing such modification.

The first objection to the idea of sociology as a natural science thus turns out to be based on a confusion of subject matter with logic and method. The second objection, namely, that social data are so fundamentally different in their nature as to preclude reducing them to a natural science, is somewhat involved in the same confusion. In general, this objection takes one or more of the following forms:

(1) That social phenomena are less tangible and "real" than physical phenomena, and that the former are therefore not subject to the objectivity of observation and measurement required by science.
(2) That social phenomena are too variable and complex for scientific generalization.
(3) That, as a result of these differences in the nature of the subject matter, the method of natural science is not applicable to social phenomena so that their behavior can be predicted.

Most people (except religious and scientific fundamentalists) who urge these objections to the idea of a natural science of society would perhaps admit that these differences are, after all, a matter of degree. This does not, of course, render the objections any less serious, since the definition of science is itself a matter of what degree of objectivity and accuracy in our method

tific Viewpoint in Sociology," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* vol. xi, 1926, pp. 38-49.

we agree to insist on before calling the procedure scientific. However, the recognition of the difference as a matter of degree enables us to approach the objection from the standpoint of what are the reasons for the apparent differences between the two types of data. When approached from this point of view it appears that the differences are all relative to our state of knowledge of the two types of phenomena.

The question of the relative tangibility and reality of different phenomena has received a great deal of philosophical attention throughout the ages with varying results. Modern psychology has also addressed itself to the problem with more fruitful results. Psychological investigation has shown that knowledge—reactions to stimuli that come to have meaning—and especially reflective behavior, *i.e.*, thinking, are purely symbolic processes.[14] Now, there is a very widespread and deep-seated feeling that the data of physical science can be known directly through the "senses," while most of our social data can be known only symbolically through words representing such concepts as tradition, customs, attitudes, and so forth.[15] If this doctrine were true, it would

[14] For a full discussion of this point see J. F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process* (1928), chap. x. I have drawn freely on this source in the following discussion.

[15] An example of the same misconception differently stated is Kozlowski's statement that "social reality is given us directly in our psychical world, and does not haunt us by its mystery, as does the physical world."—W. M. Kozlowski, "The Logic of Sociology," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology,* vol. xxxiii, May, 1928, p. 918.

This appears to be the fundamental difficulty also in F. H. Allport's denial of the applicability of the natural science method to the study of society as an entity. ("'Group' and 'Institution' as Concepts in a Natural Science of Social Phenomena," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxii, 1928, pp. 83-99.) In the first place, Allport is concerned entirely with the nature of the subject matter of sociology instead of with the logic and methods of science. His criteria of "explicit denotation" and "reciprocal action of parts" are covered by Markey's discussion. Likewise, Allport in his criteria of "uniqueness of formulation" and "total inclusion" overlooks the fact that the "uniqueness" and "parts entirely included within the whole" which he finds in natural science objects are there only because we have chosen to regard certain aspects of the phenomena conceptually as categories or units. Consequently these categories are, of course, *ipso facto,* "unique" as compared with others, and "inclusive" of themselves. His discussion on this point contains

indeed constitute an important difference between physical and social data. It would mean that our means of observing and knowing the former are more direct and objective because of their intrinsic qualities. Recent psychological investigation, however, lends no support to the theory that our method of knowing physical phenomena is essentially different from our method of knowing social phenomena. We can know neither type of data except through the operation of symbolic behavior mechanisms, usually in the form of language. The specific causal processes involved in knowing different things are, of course, different. To use Markey's illustration, "the only difference between 'seeing' a chair in which one may sit and 'seeing' one in which one cannot sit is a matter of the causal factors involved and not a difference in the process of knowing. . . . To say that we know a physical object in the same manner that we know an idea is not to confuse the symbol with the object symbolized, the symbol tree with the tree itself, for instance. It merely means that to know either of these objects requires the symbolization of them and responses toward this symbol. . . ."[16]

It appears, therefore, that the notion of the greater inherent "tangibility" and reality of physical as compared with social data is a delusion based on the fact that we have developed more adequate symbolic behavior mechanisms with regard to the former type of data. It is true that our most objective symbolic processes have been developed with reference to physical objects. But there does not appear to be any reason why an equally objective set of symbolic processes cannot be developed with reference to social data.

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the metaphysical implication that scientific units and categories exist ready-made in natural science objects, instead of being merely our particular ways of responding to certain situations.

For fuller criticism of the point of view advanced by Allport, see W. D. Wallis, "The Independence of Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. xx, 1925, pp. 147-150; also M. A. Copeland, "An Instrumental View of the Part-Whole Relationship," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxiv, 1927, pp. 96-104.

[16] J. F. Markey *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

The commonly urged objection that social data are too variable and complex to lend themselves to generalization by the methods of natural science is largely another aspect of the mistaken notion as to the nature of knowledge, considered above. Complexity is simply a term which we apply to things that we understand comparatively imperfectly. It is a term designating the degree of our adjustment to a situation. Any situation or phenomenon is complex to the person who is unfamiliar with it. Such "simple" behavior as walking or speaking is incredibly complex to the child who has not yet learned to speak or walk. The apparent complexity of social phenomena, therefore, is merely a function of our ignorance of them.

The apparently greater variability of social data is again the result of a superficial view of the nature of scientific data. Human beings, we are told, are infinitely complex and variable as compared with plants, stones, or gases. But scientific observation in either case consists merely of selecting *some aspect* of an object for observation and recording. Even the simplest object might be observed from an indefinitely large number of points of view. The scientific observation of a stone might consist of observing it from any or all of its geological, geographical, physical, and chemical aspects. After all, it is really a part of an infinitely complex and variable universe. Its apparent simplicity is a fact of our own making—we select for observation only an infinitely small part of the universe and only a particular aspect or aspects of that part, such as its color, size, density, or atomic weight. We are able to select such highly specialized aspects of a stone because through a long process of study we have analyzed and classified so many of its characteristics. But this again is not due to intrinsic characteristics of the object. It is due to the symbolic behavior mechanisms we have built up with reference to it.

Finally, the "conscious" factor in human beings is urged as a fundamental difference between social and physical data.[17] By virtue of his "consciousness," man is alleged to be subject to un-

[17] *E.g.*, W. M. Kozlowski, *op. cit.*, p. 918.

accountable whims and notions, which precludes the possibility of predicting his behavior by application of the scientific method. Fortunately, behavioristic psychology has reduced to some extent the mystical aspects of "consciousness" and "mind" to an understandable cause and effect process in terms of physiology. The behavior of human beings, including their "wills," "whims," and "choices," is recognized as being caused and conditioned in the same general way as the behavior of other phenomena. It consists fundamentally of observable stimuli-and-response processes. A feather dropped from a tower falls in a very irregular, "whimsical," and seemingly unpredictable way. The path which it travels is determined by the characteristics of the feather relative to the environment through which it falls. The former would include such factors as size, shape, and structure. The latter would consist of a large number of factors, some of which are well understood and measurable, such as wind, moisture, etc., others of which are less tangible. The same may be said of the "whims" and "wills" of human beings. All their behavior is subject to analysis in terms of their characteristics and the stimuli which cause them to act.

The scientific significance of this fundamental similarity of the two types of phenomena is frequently overlooked on account of a common misconception of the nature of a scientific law. In discussions of the applicability of the method of physical science to social behavior, it is frequently assumed that a scientific law must be an exact description of the behavior of phenomena under any and all conditions. As a matter of fact, a scientific law merely states how phenomena behave under certain (usually highly artificial) conditions. Thus, to use Bernard's illustration, the law of falling bodies describes only how bodies fall *in a vacuum, at sea-level.*[18] Yet we do not hesitate to apply this law to the behavior of the feather in the above illustration. For scientific purposes, the law merely furnishes a norm from which we can compute the

[18] L. L. Bernard, "The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxv, 1919, p. 307.

behavior of the phenomena under any given conditions in the uncontrolled universe.[19]

Finally, it is sometimes urged that the method of physical science applied to social phenomena could only describe them, and what we must have in sociology is "explanation."[20] This is another survival of a metaphysical notion that it is the function of science to "explain" behavior in the sense of accounting for it in

[19] Kozlowski overlooks this important consideration in the following passage: "If we apply to social phenomena the statistical idea of law as expressed by Clerk Maxwell for physics, where the effect forecast by the law is considered as an average of a very large number of individual events (as, for instance, the number of encounters of the gas molecules, 'their free way,' etc.), the law, then, could be exact under two conditions: (1) *the great number of events;* (2) *the uniformity of reaction. Both of these conditions are lacking in social phenomena, especially the second.* The reactions of human individuals to the same impulsion are very diverse and incalculable because of the great diversity of motives depending upon previous individual experience."—W. M. Kozlowski, *op. cit.*, p. 917, (Italics mine).

The lack of "uniformity of reaction" which this author finds an insuperable obstacle to the formulation of social laws could be urged with equal validity against the possibility of laws of physical phenomena and the lower animal and plant life. The "uniformity of reaction" out of which we construct the laws of chemistry and physics is secured only by subjecting these phenomena to highly controlled and artificial conditions, designed to eliminate the influence of extraneous conditions including the "past experience" of the phenomena. It is true that the technique of laboratory experimentation which we have developed in chemistry, physics, biology, and other sciences has greatly facilitated the control of extraneous factors, as well as made convenient the "great number of events" required by a statistical law. This is a matter of the degree of development of technique in the two fields, however, and not an inherent difference in the two types of phenomena. (For a brief account of the development of experimental and laboratory technique in sociology, see G. A. Lundberg, "Social Research," *op. cit.*, pp. 37-48; also F. S. Chapin, "The Experimental Method in Sociology," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. iv, 1917, pp. 238-247; P. Sorokin, "Experimente zur Sociologie," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie and Sociologie*, vol. iv, 1928, pp. 1-10; D. S. and W. I. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), chap. xii.

The fact, of course, is that a scientific law is nothing but a concise description of how phenomena behave under given conditions—a new and more comprehensive way of responding to a situation. It is neither absolute nor exact, but is subject to constant modification as new data are observed and as our technique of observing and measuring data improves. See L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxxi, 1925, pp. 1-18.

[20] See F. H. Allport, "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxix, May, 1924, pp. 688-706, (especially A. Goldenweiser's discussion of this paper).

terms of first causes. No science pretends to do anything of the kind. All that science does is to describe concisely and objectively certain sequences in the behavior of the phenomena it studies. The only "explanation" known to science is conceptualized description.

The above arguments for the applicability of the methods of physical science to social phenomena are not advanced because we are under any external *obligation* to adopt these methods in sociology. Let it be emphasized again that we need be concerned in the last analysis only with the practical utility of our methods. Those which produce results are the methods to employ, regardless of their pedigree, the conventions which they violate, or the authorities which they flout. When we are confronted with a new problem, however, it is recognized as the sensible thing to approach it by methods which have proved successful *in analogous situations.* It is from this point of view that we are not only justified but, as a matter both of logic and common sense, bound to proceed on the hypothesis that the methods of physical science are applicable also to social phenomena. The theoretical considerations reviewed above are in every way compatible with this hypothesis. Furthermore, the growing number of studies in sociology employing the method of natural science with increasing rigor and exactness furnish sufficient proof of the applicability of this method, in all its essential respects, to social data.

In arguing for the more rigorous application of the method of physical science in sociology, we are, after all, only arguing for a principle to which man has adhered from the beginning of human culture. This is the principle that the general logic and adjustment techniques found useful with reference to one aspect of our environment are at least to be tried out with reference to other and analogous aspects. Following this principle, an ever-increasing portion of man's environment has come under scientific understanding and control. The field of social relations is the most recent to be invaded by this method of approach. The advance of science in the social field is being obstructed by the same obscurant-

ist attitudes that have always been a stumbling block to science. As Karl Pearson has said, "There is a certain school of thought which finds the laborious process by which science reaches the truth too irksome; the temperament of this school is such that it demands a short and easy cut to knowledge, where knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by the long and patient toiling of many groups of workers perhaps through several centuries. . . . Wherever science has succeeded in ascertaining the truth, there, according to the school we have referred to, are 'the legitimate problems of science.' Wherever science is yet ignorant there, we are told, its method is inapplicable." [21]

III. Sociology as a Natural Science

We have pointed out in the foregoing pages that methods of research have evolved by a process of survival in man's efforts to adjust himself to his environment. One of these residuary or surviving methods has proved itself incomparably superior to all others in the results it has achieved with reference to the phenomena on which it has been applied. This method is that of natural science, and the phenomena to which it has been chiefly applied up to the present time are physical phenomena. In view of the success of the method of natural science in the physical world, the question of its applicability to the social field has naturally arisen because of man's relatively imperfect adjustment and control in this field. The general objection that has been raised to the applicability of this method in sociology is that the phenomena of human society are so fundamentally different from the data of the inorganic physical world and of lower organic life as to render the method inapplicable to the study of social behavior and relations.

We have examined the reasons for this assumption of a fundamental difference between physical and social data. It appears that they are based on three considerations, none of which are inherent in the data themselves: (1) Our comparative ig-

[21] *The Grammar of Science* (Third Ed. 1911), pp. 17, 18.

norance of social phenomena and our undeveloped technique of studying them has caused us to attribute to social data a complexity which is purely a function of our ignorance of the field. Our inadequate terminology, our undeveloped methods of measuring the data objectively and our comparatively undeveloped experimental and laboratory technique, are largely responsible for this ignorance. (2) Adherence to antiquated psychology and biology causes us to attribute to social data all kinds of metaphysical characteristics, such as will, choice, whims, notions, mind, consciousness, etc. Perhaps most of the objections to the application of scientific method to social phenomena fall under this head. In a corresponding stage of development, these mystical qualities were also attributed to physical phenomena. The behavioristic point of view does not find these alleged unique characteristics of social phenomena an insuperable obstacle to scientific study by the same methods and on the same hypotheses we use in dealing with physical phenomena. (3) Finally, there is a common misconception of the nature of scientific law, which frequently is the basis of arguments against the applicability of the method of natural science to social phenomena. The tremendous variability and apparent unpredictability of social behavior under uncontrolled conditions make it appear highly dubious that this behavior could be described with any degree of accuracy by a scientific law. What is overlooked is that the laws of physical science do not pretend to describe the behavior of phenomena under natural conditions, but are merely descriptions of behavior under highly standardized and artificial conditions. From these artificial standards, behavior in the uncontrolled universe can be computed with an accuracy corresponding to our knowledge of the conditions in the uncontrolled universe which influence the behavior of the phenomena under consideration. Social phenomena are amenable to the same kind of measurement, generalization, and prediction.

The position that there are no characteristics inherent in social phenomena or in the nature of scientific method which pre

clude the application of this method to these phenomena carries with it a number of important implications for methods of research in sociology. In the first place, this method calls for an increasing development of the quantitative approach. We are entirely agreed with Ogburn and Goldenweiser when they say that "the 'scientific' future of the social sciences depends upon their amenability to statistical methods." [22] This does not mean that scientific method calls for the abandonment of all other methods than those of formal statistics.[23] The frontiers of knowledge will always be largely subjective and philosophical. Quantitative and qualitative methods must proceed side by side. They are, after all, only a matter of difference of degree in objectivity. Nor does the quantitative approach mean that all social relationships must or can be described in terms of mathematical symbols now employed in other sciences. Every science must work out its own concepts, symbols, and details of logic. Only in so far as experience shows the tools of one science to be useful in another are we justified in adopting the same tools and methods.

Another implication of the natural science viewpoint in sociology is the abandonment of the ethical and moralistic approaches which at present encumber social research. The social scientist must devote himself purely to a description of what is, regardless of how the data as they are coincide with his own notion of ethics or the mores of the community. Assessing praise and blame or attempting to reform the existing conditions are not the obligation or the privilege of the social scientist, as a scientist. It is not the business of a chemist who invents a high explosive to be influenced in his task by considerations as to whether his product will be used to blow up cathedrals or to build tunnels through the mountains. Nor is it the business of the social scientist in arriving at laws of group behavior to permit himself to be

[22] *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations* (1927), p. 9.

[23] *Cf.* G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research* (1929), chaps. i, viii; also W. C. Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," *American Economic Review,* vol. xv, 1925, pp. 1-2; also J. C. Cobb, "Quantitative Restating of Sociological and Economic Problems," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxii, 1927, pp. 921-930.

influenced by considerations of how his conclusions will coincide with existing notions, or what the effect of his findings on the social order will be.[24] When the biologist studies parasitism in the lower animal and plant life, he does not let his emotional or moralistic reaction to parasitism influence him in objectively seeing and describing the facts. Students of the class struggle in economics and sociology have much to learn from this attitude.

IV. The Meaning of Research

The great variety of forms of inquiry which are sometimes included under the term research makes it necessary to make clear the sense in which we shall use the word in the present chapter. Research might be used to include any inquiry or investigation, by whatever methods, through which knowledge or adjustment is secured. In this sense, a fish attempting to escape from a net might be thought of as engaged in research. Fasting, prayer, and securing revelation might likewise be called research in this sense. Usually, however, the term is reserved for the more objective and standardized methods whereby systematic and verifiable knowledge of some field is secured. Each field of human knowledge has developed such a technique which is recognized as valid. Excavating for fossil remains of early animal forms, or tabulating the usage of a given verb in the writings of Chaucer, may in their respective fields properly be regarded as research, especially, as the dictionary has it, if the inquiry is "for the purpose of adding to human knowledge." [25] In general, perhaps, we may say that the methods by which new knowledge is sought in any field are the methods of research in that field.[26]

[24] For an elaboration of this point of view see G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research* (1929), chap. ii; also E. B. Reuter, "The Problem of Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research,* vol. xiii, Nov.-Dec., 1928, pp. 119-132.

[25] Funk and Wagnalls, *New Standard Dictionary.*

[26] F. A. Ogg, in his *Research in the Humanistic and Social Sciences* (1928), p. 13, American Council of Learned Societies, published by the Century Company, discusses the definition of research as follows: "The term obviously excludes (although there is much popular confusion on the point) that which is only search by one man for what another already knows, or the mere rear-

Research in the present chapter will be used in a still more limited sense, namely, in the sense of scientific research. That is, we shall use the term to mean inquiry according to the accepted logic and general methods of natural science. This method is generally regarded as consisting of the objective observation, classification, and generalization of data, preceded by the formulation of a working hypothesis and followed by verification. A variety of techniques may, of course, be employed in each step of this process. In so far as each detailed technique is consistent with the complete process we may designate it as a method of scientific research in itself. But since data have scientific significance only when arranged with reference to other facts, we may insist that a scientific method of research must be sufficiently objective and systematic to make possible classification, generalization, and verification of the data observed.

Objectivity is, of course, a matter of degree. It consists fundamentally in the similarity of responses to a situation by large numbers of people. Whatever methods or instruments help to secure such uniformity of responses are objectifying devices. The scientific method as outlined above is, of course, carried out with the greatest degree of variation in objectivity and formality in actual life. The common-sense generalizations of the man on the street follow the general outline of the steps enumerated above. A child is engaged in rudimentary observation and classification as soon as he begins to experience likenesses and differences in his responses.[27] Likewise, he engages in a rudimentary

ranging of facts and materials. But the name is worthily bestowed on any investigative effort—in library, laboratory, field, or shop—which has for its object an increase of the sum total of human knowledge, either by additions to the stock of present knowledge or by the discovery of new bases of knowledge, which for the research worker, and ultimately for the future of intellectual life, is of course far the more important. Research may or may not come to success; it may or may not add anything to what is already known. It is sufficient that its objective be new knowledge, or at least a new mode of orientation of knowledge."

[27] *Cf.* Hornell Hart, "Science and Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxvii, 1921, pp. 364-383. See also Thorstein Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization* (1919), pp. 1-55.

generalization when the frequency of recurrence of certain similarities or sequences causes him to expect them to continue to occur that way. When this process is carried out with a deliberateness and system which enables any normal person to corroborate the findings, that is, when the process becomes comparatively *objective* and *accurate,* we call it scientific.

In limiting the definition of social research in this chapter to mean only the objective and formal method of natural science, there is no intent to imply that this complete process is the only valuable or desirable method of pursuing or accumulating knowledge. On the contrary, we have already admitted that, in the pursuit of knowledge, at least, any or all methods which achieve their ends are *ipso facto* legitimate and desirable. The formulation of scientific laws is certainly not the only way of contributing to human knowledge. The results of entirely random and subjective inquiry may have some value in suggesting hypotheses, problems, and solutions. Imaginative literature may have value to science in the same way. A knowledge of past events, even when they are in such form as to preclude the possibility of ever using them for purposes of scientific generalizations, may be of great importance for the purposes of intelligent behavior in situations demanding immediate adjustments. Or one may pursue knowledge and make valuable contributions thereto purely from motives of curiosity or for artistic and esthetic reasons. It remains true, however, that knowledge gained in any way attains its highest significance and meaning only when it is classified with reference to other knowledge and becomes the basis for a more or less conscious generalization. The more complete process is, in fact, always implied in any pursuit of knowledge. For this reason, while we shall admit the widest variety of methods as permissible and valuable in research, we shall evaluate them from the standpoint of their objectivity and utility in the complete method of natural science.

V. The Principal Types of Social Research

Various classifications have been made of the principal methods of social research.[28] Many of these classifications are de-

[28] The following classifications are to be found in current literature: C. A. Ellwood has made this classification of methods: (1) anthropological, (2) historical, (3) social survey, (4) deduction from biology and psychology, (5) philosophical assumptions and *a priori* methods ("Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society," *Journal of Social Forces,* vol. ii, 1923-24, pp. 328-332).

Floyd N. House classifies research techniques as implied in types of problems or phenomena as follows: (1) the "community survey," (2) the study of conflicts and conflict groups, (3) studies of social unrest, (4) the study of single phases of institutional life, *e.g.,* religion, cults, festivals, etc., (5) studies of personality types, personal experiences and case histories, and "personality problems," (6) the study of cultures, (7) the study of group symbols and group ideals, *e.g.,* folk-lore, literature, art, etc., from the sociological standpoint, (8) the study of public opinion and the political process, and (9) the study of economic competition and coöperation and of economic organization ("General Methodology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxi, 1927, p. 171). The same author refers to (1) the statistical method, (2) the method of case study, and (3) the method of cultural analysis as the three "most nearly standardized techniques of social investigation" (*ibid.,* p. 172).

W. M. Kozlowski's classification of the "types of science" is of methodological significance: (1) historical science, *e.g.,* chronological selection of events, (2) descriptive science, *e.g.,* natural history—a classification of things according to similarity, (3) nomologic science—generalization of observations into laws, (4) sciences of correlation and morphology, *e.g.,* comparative anatomy, etc., (5) sciences of operations—formal sciences, *e.g.,* logic and mathematics, (6) stichological sciences—those of evolution, whether partial or universal, (7) normative or "theorico-canonic" sciences—studies of intentional (telic) activity ("The Logic of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxxiii, 1928, pp. 914-915).

Hornell Hart classifies methods in sociological research as follows: (1) deductive reasoning, (2) the historical method, (3) the museum or census method, (4) the laboratory or experimental method, (5) the statistical method.

W. C. Schluter classifies the "four types of problems" to be met with in research as: (1) the historical, (2) the experimental or "laboratory," (3) the survey or "practical" and (4) the synthetical or "philosophical"—(*How to do Research Work,* 1926, p. 3).

E. W. Burgess reports the following classification of research projects at the Institute for Social Research (University of Chicago, 1923): (1) community studies, (2) personality studies, (3) studies of groups, (4) studies of public opinion ("The Trend of Sociological Research," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* vol. viii, Jan.-Feb., 1924, pp. 131-140).

F. S. Chapin classifies methods of social research as follows: (1) the historical method, (2) field work, (3) the statistical method (*Field Work and Social Research,* 1920, p. 17).

Bruce Melvin enumerates "six different techniques" in collecting material:

fective in that they do not specify the basis or purpose of the classification, and hence their categories are not mutually exclusive. Thus we hear discussions about the relative merits of the "historical method," the "case method," the "statistical method," the "survey method," etc. There is nothing mutually exclusive in these classifications. From one point of view, all past events are historical, and all collections of data are collections of "cases." The "survey" is merely a designation of a type of investigation with reference to scope, and may include any or all the other methods mentioned above. These classifications have been significant chiefly in creating confusion and a false notion of their mutual incompatibility. Bernard has shown, in the following excellent summary, the evolution and supplementary relationship of these various methods:

1. A conscious attempt at method in thinking was initiated by the sophists. In Socrates this took the form of the dialectic method, which aimed at "peeling off error" and leaving the kernel of truth in propositions by a process of comparison and elimination of ideas.

2. Aristotle formalized this process in the form of the syllogism. He also used various inductive methods, which have been more fully developed since, but he did not name these.

3. History was for a long time the major source of data for sociological generalization, because historical data were given artificial definition and fixity, while contemporaneous facts lacked fixity and definition and were correspondingly difficult to perceive because they must be seen without adequate perspective. Also their number and closeness made difficult adequate and discriminating selection. In the end, historical data proved inadequate for the purpose of sociological generalization.

4. For various reasons mentioned, anthropological data, as a source

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(1) the questionnaire, (2) the survey, (3) the case record, (4) the document, (5) the interview and, (6) the diary.

See also Emile Durkheim, *Les régles de la méthode sociologique* (1904); O. F. Boucke, "The Limits of Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. xxviii, 1922-23, pp. 300-318, 443-460; W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928); V. M. Palmer, *Field Studies in Sociology*, Univ. of Chicago Press (1928).

of sociological generalization, largely replaced the use of historical data. The use of anthropological data was an approach toward the employment of contemporaneous data in the immediate field of the generalizer, with the methodological advantages of being simpler and more detached from the observer and generalizer.

5. These two initial advantages, and others, later became disadvantages in the formulation of a completer sociology adequate for an interpretation of modern societies. As a consequence, sociological generalization makes increasing use of contemporaneous data. The disadvantages of immediacy to the observer and complexity are being overcome by certain methodological devices and by intensive study and analysis.

6. With the increase of comparable data, especially in the field of contemporaneous social phenomena, the primitive method of case analysis comes increasingly to be supplemented by that of statistical generalization. Statistical generalization arises as a method of seeing many like things together, *i.e.*, of increasing the range of the sociological vision. It is also a method of giving unlike or related items a common denominator and thus a common classification and perspective. But case analysis remains and is constantly improved as a method of getting at the meaning of events in a specifically defined situation. The two methods are supplementary.

7. The case method has gone through several stages of development from the parable, allegory, story, drama, novel, biography, etc. —which are primarily illustrative in function—down to the descriptive survey, analytical survey, and case history, which are used now largely as data for inductive and sociological generalization.

8. Statistical method has evolved from the informal to the formal. Recent abundance of data in various fields of social phenomena has made possible an accurate mathematical handling of the process of sociological generalization to supplement intensive case analysis and definition of data.

9. The analogical method of interpretation and generalization of sociological conclusions, although deductive rather than inductive, has persisted in our time in default of a completer development of the statistical method. In fact, the initial statistical process of choosing the sample perhaps inevitably involves some analogical elements,

although these may be removed by a fuller development of case analyses and of numerical definition of items to be generalized.

10. Analogical, case, and statistical methods are methods of analysis and comparison and generalization of data into sociological facts and principles or formulas. We may also speak of the historical, archeological, anthropological, and contemporaneous methods in the sense of methods of collecting facts as distinguished from methods of generalizing them. The application of statistics is so closely identified with the use of contemporaneous data that the collection as well as the generalization of these data is not infrequently termed statistical.[29]

This view of the supplementary nature of different methods should serve to set at rest absurd controversies over the relative merits of different methods, not to mention the tendency for "schools" to appear on the basis of their devotion to one or the other of these methods. Especial attention should be called to current discussions regarding the "case" method versus the statistical method. These methods are different only in that one is largely informal, subjective and qualitative, while the other is formal, objective, and quantitative. This being the distinction between the two, there can be little question as to their relative value for science. The so-called "case" method is merely an informal, comparatively unsystematic, and crude form of the statistical method.[30]

The fact that the "case" method represents merely informal and largely subjective statistical procedure does not mean, of course, that case studies are without value. In the early stages or on the frontier of any science, the more formal procedures can be developed only on the basis of the less formal and subjective observations, including "intuitions," "hunches," "guesses," etc. These observations and generalizations will be cast in highly

[29] L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist,* April, 1928, pp. 318-320. See also G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research* (1929), chap. iv.

[30] For an elaboration of this point, see G. A. Lundberg, "Case Work and the Statistical Method," *Social Forces,* vol. v, Sept., 1926, pp. 61-65; also G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research* (1929), chap. viii. It is recognized, of course, that case studies may employ statistics as part of their descriptive technique.

subjective and qualitative terms. As Mitchell has pointed out, "always our thinking will cover a field larger than our measurements; the preconceptions that shape our ends, our first glimpses of new problems, our widest generalizations will remain qualitative in form." [31] Life history documents of the kind in considerable vogue in sociological research today—autobiographies, case histories, letters, diaries, etc.—must therefore be regarded as valuable, although they represent the crudest form of scientific data. They are, when carefully analyzed, of considerable suggestive worth and should present a valuable basis for the formulation of more objective methods of recording and generalizing such data. Such studies as *The Polish Peasant* by Thomas and Znaniecki, *Middletown* by R. S. and H. M. Lynd, Wembridge's *Other People's Daughters,* Steiner's *The American Community in Action,* and many others, are of the greatest importance both in affording tentative sociological generalizations as well as in providing materials out of which to develop more objective procedures. We may agree with Cooley in his emphasis on the value of sympathetic literary description of a single institution and the life history as a descriptive technique which gives "a life-like or dramatic picture of typical functional behavior." [32] It is conceded, however, that the scientific value of this picture depends on its *typicality.* Now typicality is fundamentally a statistical concept. It rests, by definition, on *the degree of similarity* (in significant respects) *in a number of cases.* Thus typicality can be established only through a formal or informal statistical summarization of a number of cases. This typicality is, in fact, assumed in most case studies and other literary products. We say "it rings true," "how typical," etc., meaning that certain aspects

[31] W. C. Mitchell, *op. cit.,* p. 12. See also C. H. Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. xxxii, 1926, pp. 59-79.

[32] C. H. Cooley, "Case Study of a Small Institution as a Method of Research," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxii, 1928, pp. 123-132, and "The Life-History Method as Applied to Rural Social Research," *Publications of the American Sociological Society,* vol. xxiii, 1929.

of the case coincide with our own experience with other cases. This informal process is, however, subject to all the dangers of ignoring negative instances, generalizing from inadequate data, and yielding to our own preconceptions and prejudices. Typicality must, furthermore, always be a matter of *degree* of correspondence or similarity. The most objective description of typicality which we have developed, therefore, is represented by *an average, with its measure of dispersion and probable error.* The need for an approach to this type of description of cases is rapidly gaining recognition in attempts to standardize and objectify the case record and thus make this vast source of social data subject to scientific analysis.[33] It is not a question of abandoning literary description, whether it takes the form of life histories, case histories, or novels. It is a question of developing a technique of testing the generalizations suggested by such documents, and perhaps of analyzing the documents themselves, by methods which possess the objectivity and verifiability which we recognize as scientific.

It is not possible here to enter into the details of any method or to make detailed suggestions for the improvement of methods in present practice. We may conclude this section, however, with a brief classification of present methods with reference to (1) scope, (2) sources, and (3) techniques of collection.

(1) With reference to *scope,* Chapin has classified methods of research as follows: (a) Case work, or the study of individual cases. (b) Sampling, or the selection of a part of a field on the assumption that the part is representative of the whole. (c) Complete enumeration, or the inclusion of all the data in a field.[34]

[33] See the following papers in the *Publications of the Am. Sociological Society,* vol. xxiii, 1929: R. C. Angell, "A Study of Undergraduate Adjustment Based on 216 Unselected Students"; Joanna Colcord, "Techniques of Interviews"; S. A. Queen, "Trouble Patterns." See also Helen L. Myrick (Chairman) Committee of Chicago Chapter, American Association of Social Workers, *Interviews.*

[34] F. S. Chapin, *Field Work and Social Research* (1920), p. 17.

(2) With reference to *sources,* from which data may be drawn, there are two commonly recognized, namely:

(a) Historical sources (primary and secondary)
   1. Documents, papers, papyri, stone tablets, etc.
   2. Geological strata, fossil remains, etc.

(b) Contemporary or field sources
   1. Particular information, written or oral, from living individuals
   2. Direct observation of behavior in process (including verbal behavior when our interest is primarily in the verbal behavior, *per se,* rather than in the situations represented by the behavior)

Historical sources as here classified represent the records or traces which past events have left behind them and which are stored by devices external to human beings. It is recognized, of course, that the memories of living individuals are also traces of past events, and are historical in the sense that all events which have occurred are historical. From the standpoint of methods of research, however, they represent the contemporary or field source rather than an historical source as commonly understood.

(3) Techniques of collecting, classifying, and otherwise manipulating data are implied in each of these classifications. Thus, research into historical sources implies the accepted technique of historical method and criticism. Research based on information secured in oral or written form from individuals, or the mere study of language behavior itself, implies the various techniques of schedules, questionnaires, and other devices for gathering data, studying attitudes, etc. All of these types of research imply classification according to the principles of logical classification as outlined in any text on logic. Generalization and verification likewise proceed according to the accepted canons of logic.

The details of research method must, of course, be adapted to

the particular problem under consideration. It is not possible to describe in detail general methods of research which will be applicable to concrete and specific problems. Only the underlying logic of scientific research, *i. e.,* the procedure which has been found to be valid for all types of problems, can be discussed as "method" in the abstract. Concrete research projects call for an almost infinitely variable combination of detailed techniques which will probably not be exactly the same in any two problems. Research will, however, proceed largely by analogy—applying methods that have been found largely successful in one problem or in one field to analogous problems in the same or other fields. For this reason, the preparation of a "case book" illustrating the methodology of various types of research in the social science field would be a most valuable contribution to methodology and concrete research techniques. Such a case book is now in preparation under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council.[35] Obviously, it is beyond both the scope and purpose of the present chapter to attempt even a cursory examination of so large a field.

Summary.—The above brief survey of the theoretical aspects of social research has attempted to emphasize (1) that all questions of method are relative to the specific ends sought, and (2) that the broader the purpose the more composite must be the methods employed. Since natural science has for its purpose the formulation of generalized laws or formulas, it may be regarded as very broad in scope. It follows that this method calls for the fullest combination of all techniques which promise to produce any data or manipulative procedure relevant to complete, generalized description of the phenomena under consideration. Thus, it calls for the use of hypotheses, which in their most tentative form may be nothing but "intuitions," "hunches," "guesses," or other vague forms of "subconscious" induction. Inquiry into the historico-genetic aspects of the phenomena may next be neces-

[35] See Stuart A. Rice, "Case Analysis of Scientific Methods Employed in Contributions to Social Science," *Publications of the American Sociological* Society, vol. xxiii, 1929.

sary. This part of our procedure is frequently called the historical method. Then we are interested in an objective description of the present facts, a cross-section of each phenomenon as it is and behaves at the present time. We inquire in this connection into the presence or absence of factors, the degree or amount of each factor present in a given time, place, or situation. This individual scrutiny of each phenomenon of the class we are studying is, when regarded by itself, frequently referred to as the case method. But these methods individually do not bring the data within the category of natural science until they have been generalized by some form of statistical method. Whether this generalization is formal and mathematical, or informal and subjective, it is implicitly quantitative in nature and is an indispensable part of the method of natural science. This last step does not in itself constitute the scientific method, however, as it clearly rests upon the previous steps in the process. It is, therefore, obviously futile to discuss the relative merits of the various steps as independent or self-sufficient methods. What may be profitably discussed is the degree of objectivity and accuracy of different methods of performing each step. This is a question which experience alone can finally settle. In the meantime we are justified in employing all methods which yield some results. Gradually we shall be able to standardize our techniques on the basis of what experience has shown to be the most profitable approaches.

VI. The Present Situation in Sociology and Social Research

The first chapter of this book (Section III) has presented the significant trends in social research and sociological instruction. (1) The influence of such organizations as the Social Science Research Council and the various agencies and foundations giving financial assistance to social research was reviewed and evaluated. (2) The trend toward coöperative, large-scale research and the declining relative importance of the universities as research

centers was considered.[36] (3) The changing interests of sociologists as revealed in the type of subject matter appearing in the sociological journals was reviewed.[37] (4) Finally, the tremendous expansion of sociology as an academic discipline, both downward into the secondary curriculum and upward into advanced graduate work, was discussed.

The rapid extension of sociology in the universities has had certain effects on both the quality and quantity of research, which should be frankly recognized. E. B. Reuter has summarized the situation with admirable candor and perspicacity as follows:

> The actual increase in the sociology student population is mostly in elementary courses. In consequence, it has little positive significance to serious work. But it has certain unfortunate results. The serious and competent research into the social processes has been done and is being done by university professors in their leisure time. The growth in the sociology student population has tended so to swamp these men with administrative and instructional detail that they have little opportunity to develop as scholars or to subject their own objectives to critical examination. The result is often a success not based on scholarship. The sociology instructor can add nothing of original worth; he can contribute only agreeable methods of presenting second-hand information. It is perhaps odious to dwell upon this point, but the fact is hardly to be disputed that the popularity of sociology is in grave danger of transforming sociologists from scholars into schoolmasters.
>
> The popularity of the subject has had a second deleterious effect upon scholarly research. It has created a demand for instructors far in excess of the supply of trained and competent men. Second-rate and half-trained men have in consequence filled important positions. As a result of the demand for men, sociology has tended to be a sort of happy hunting ground for well-meaning sentimentalists, plausible charlatans, and other worthy persons unwilling or unable to weather the rigorous discipline of real scholarship.

[36] F. A. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[37] Read Bain, "Trends in American Sociology," *Social Forces,* vol. v, March 1927, pp. 413-422. See also H. Carter, "Research Interests of American Sociologists," *Social Forces,* vol. vi, Dec., 1927, pp. 209-212.

It is unfortunate, but none the less true, that while the number of sociologists and the amount of their productive work has enormously increased in the recent decades, the average quality has perhaps declined. The great majority of the practicing sociologists are mediocre and imperfectly trained men, and the bulk of their publication is worthless. The statement is of course relative. There are more able men in the field today than ever before, and there is more significant research and scholarly publication than at any earlier time; but the number of mediocre practitioners and the amount of published trash has increased even more rapidly.

This condition of the teaching personnel accounts in some part for the confused state of the subject matter that has been presented to college classes under the name of sociology. In the absence of a clear and adequate conception of the social processes, teachers presented whatever interesting information they had in hand. At different places and times almost everything has been taught as sociology—human geography, social biology, institutional economics, social philosophy, current problems, social work, and a great variety of odds and ends.[38]

Unquestionably one of the principal obstacles which sociologists have to overcome is the widespread confusion of the subject with various *Weltverbesserung* cults. The sociologist is constantly besieged with reformers of every kind, who blandly claim him as a fellow-crusader. If he succeeds in eluding the socialist, the labor cohorts, and the single taxers, he is likely to be adopted by the eugenists, the clergy, or other religious enthusiasts. Most powerful of all are the onslaughts of the social workers, many of whom regard a sociologist as merely a social worker who has gone wrong—lost his soul in theorizing or, still worse, sold it to the baleful "interests." The idea that it is possible for an intelligent person to be interested in the labor movement or in religion as a form of group behavior in the same sense that a zoölogist is interested in the behavior of a swarm of bees, seems immoral to many people. To wish to inquire into the

[38] E. B. Reuter, "Some Trends of Thought in Sociology," *McGraw-Hill Book Notes,* Sept., 1928, p. 3.

fundamental validity or practicability of eugenics, free speech, or other programs of social reform, is frequently interpreted as a cowardly attempt to curry favor with the administration and gain academic advancement. Undoubtedly such compromise with so-called "principles" is not unknown. It is perhaps greatly exaggerated, however. The fact is that the ultimate destiny of the human race and the justice of the existing social order are no more the concern of the sociologist, as such, than they are the concern of any other scientist. It is, therefore, not impossible for a sociologist to take by choice as detached a view of his field as a physicist takes of his. In fact, the abler minds will realize that this detachment is a *sine qua non* of scientific method. To see society steadily and see it whole, it is not only desirable but necessary to avoid the disturbing influences of participation in crusading with all its necessary emotional concomitants.

One of the principal academic results of this popular identification of sociology with social work and reform has been an excessive preoccupation with so-called "practical" courses—courses in social problems through which sophomores are in one semester, or at most in a year, fully supplied not only with the facts regarding family disorganization, race conflict, poverty, sickness, feeble-mindedness, vices, delinquency, crime, and other horrors; but are also instructed as to who is responsible for this sad state of affairs. Praise and blame are liberally assessed. Finally, and most important, they are fully informed as to what ought to be done about it, and imbued with a desire to do it. The latter phase naturally leads to courses in social work where an endless succession of cases comes under review, with the purpose of determining the therapeutic measures in each case. The admittedly touching nature of the cases, on the one hand, and their wickedness, on the other, also afford emotional cultivation and conduce to the development of a desirable bedside manner.

Now there is no objection to any or all of these courses in themselves. On the contrary, they may be regarded as very substantial and desirable food as compared with a great many

of the usual offerings of the college curriculum. The confusion of this subject matter with sociology as a natural science is, however, open to the most vigorous objection. The basis for the division of labor involved in the two fields and their relationship should be fairly clear by analogy from other fields, if not as a matter of simple logic. The relation between biology as a science and the art and technology of medical practice is clear to most informed people. Likewise, the distinction between physics, engineering, and practical construction work is found to be a profitable division of labor both in theory and practice. Reuter has summarized this division in the social world as follows: "There is now one group of men, sociologists, who concern themselves with a study of the social processes that determine personality and social organization. There is a second group of men, social technologists, who are interested in the formulation of rules of social practice in accordance with the findings of the abstract social sciences. There is a third group, social workers, who attempt to apply to specific cases the rules formulated for their guidance." [39]

VII. The Need for Research in Pure Science

The present status of the various aspects of sociology, as revealed in the chapters of this book, indicates that its greatest handicap and shortcoming is our comparative ignorance of the general principles of group behavior. In this respect, sociology suffers with the other sciences from the tendency to emphasize practical and immediately useful aspects of research at the expense of the more fundamental inquiry into the basic principles of human behavior. As Ogg says:

> Everyone recognizes that applied science rests down on pure science—that, to cite a single illustration, radio communication would have remained not only impossible but inconceivable save for the fundamental experiments of Faraday, the mathematical formulation of the wave theory by Maxwell, and the experimental realization of

[39] E. B. Reuter, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Maxwell's predictions by Hertz—all being advances in knowledge made without thought of practical application or financial return. All the ingenuity in the world could not have produced an automobile until science had brought to light the electrical, metallurgical, and mechanical principles involved in its construction.

Nevertheless, for every investigator in pure science there are, in this country, perhaps a dozen in applied science; for every dollar spent on pure science, twenty (it is computed) are spent on applied science; the industrial laboratories are fast drafting the personnel of pure science into their service, depleting the fundamental research staff, especially in the universities, and thus, as Mr. Hoover puts it, to some extent drying the stream of creative men at the source.[40] Realizing that applied science will itself dry up some day unless the fount of pure science is kept flowing, practical men of affairs like Mr. Hoover, General John J. Carty of the American Telegraph and Telephone Company, Mr. Julius Rosenwald, Mr. Felix Warburg, and others, are actively promoting the National Academy's twenty-million campaign, the objective of which is the more adequate support of research in pure science, particularly in the universities. A special and powerful incentive to this effort is the almost total suspension of pure science research in Europe, which, as Dr. Vernon Kellogg has pointed out, leaves our major industries, always until now accustomed to draw their new scientific ideas mainly from across the Atlantic, "in exactly the same position as that of the manufacturer who suddenly finds himself cut off from his supply of raw materials from which he fabricates his finished product." [41]

What is true of physical science in this respect is even more true of the social sciences. Here, too, the tendency is to direct research into channels which have an immediate money or other practical value, or at least into channels which have a direct and obvious bearing on current problems. Note as an example of this tendency the general worthlessness for scientific purposes of the great bulk of social surveys. Yet the need for fundamental

[40] Herbert Hoover, "The Vital Need for Greater Financial Support of Pure Science Research," *Reprint and Circular Series of the National Research Council*, No. 65 (1925).

[41] F. A. Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 16. See also p. 205 for a statement of the predicament of political science in this respect.

research in this field is even greater than in the physical sciences. Raymond Fosdick states the case well when he says:

> With the allegiance of our age and generation so completely committed to the natural sciences, we must face the fact that the social mechanism can be kept from cracking under the strain only as we develop the sciences that relate to man. Unless we can marshal behind such studies as economics, political science, and sociology the same enthusiasm, the same approach, and something of the same technique that characterize our treatment of physics and chemistry; unless the results of this research can be applied to human life as freely and boldly as we apply the natural sciences to modify our methods of living; unless we can free ourselves of prejudice and stale custom, and harness intelligence to the task of straightening out the relations of man with his fellowmen and promoting an intercourse of harmony and fairness—unless, in brief, in our generation we can make some appreciable progress toward this goal of social control, then pessimism has the better of the argument, and the chances of our keeping the train on the track are exceedingly slight.[42]

There are, of course, well-known reasons for this neglect of research. It would be beyond the scope of the present chapter to go into these reasons in detail. Ogg has summarized under nine heads the principal obstacles to research in the universities as follows:[43]

(1) Lack of appreciation of the importance and possibilities of productive scholarship
(2) Inadequate financial support
(3) Imperfect organization of instruction
(4) Multifariousness of university duties
(5) Inadequate facilities
(6) Insufficient provision for publication
(7) Attraction of research men into independent bureaus
(8) Shifting of research men to other employments
(9) Failure of the scholarly life to attract the ablest men

[42] Cited in Ogg, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-70.

Some of these obstacles, such as the lack of appreciation of the value of research, especially in pure science, the imperfect organization of instruction, and the multifariousness of university duties, have already been treated at some length. The failure of the universities to attract and to keep research men may be regarded merely as the result of the operation of the other conditions. There remain two very closely related factors which should receive particular attention because they are perhaps basic to most of the others, namely, (1) inadequate financial support and (2) inadequate facilities.

The outstanding trend in every phase of sociology as depicted in this volume is the trend toward the actual study of group structure and behavior instead of the analysis of literature and the exploitation of concepts. This trend is of especial significance from the standpoint of financial support and facilities for research. It means that research in sociology cannot be carried on with a few books and a typist as the principal equipment. Significant research in sociology in the future must frequently involve a field staff, a statistical laboratory, and a corps of computers. This at once brings us face to face with the problem of financial support.

Ogg's comprehensive survey of the financial support of research in the social and humanistic sciences shows that this item is on the whole a very small part of the average university budget.[44] The portion which becomes available for sociological research is generally negligible.[45] Research in sociology has in the past consisted of philosophical treatises written from the armchair, and administrators have not yet become aware of, or adjusted to, the new trend. It is taken for granted in the other natural sciences that substantial appropriations must be made for laboratory equipment and supplies. But when a department of sociology asks for a calculating machine and a few other essentials of statistical work, it is frequently looked upon as a question-

[44] *Ibid.*, chap. iii.
[45] See H. Carter, *op. cit.*

able expenditure. It is taken for granted in the physical sciences that the plants, animals, minerals, or other material studies must be provided at considerable cost. But the purchase of original sociological data or the gathering of them in the field is not yet regarded as a proper item for a university budget. This traditional attitude accounts in a large measure for the relatively inadequate support in the universities of research in the social as compared with the physical sciences. The latter are themselves inadequately financed. But relatively, they are well supported.

This lack of support of sociological research in the universities has naturally shifted the more comprehensive research projects to the research foundations, research councils and privately supported individual projects. Of special significance for sociology in this connection has been the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.[46] The Russell Sage Foundation and a large number of other organizations[47] carry on valuable work chiefly in practical and applied fields. The tendency for research to gravitate into these foundations raises interesting questions of how influential these sources will be in determining the direction of research. Jessie Bernard has considered this matter in Chapter I. The financing of research by large business corporations for their own purposes through the endowment of schools and the employment of pro-

[46] For an account of the activities of this important body see Ogg, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-168.

[47] The more important of these are the following: American Child Health Association, American Country Life Association, American Public Health Association, American Social Hygiene Association, Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Carnegie Corporation, Chicago Community Trust, Child Welfare League of America, Children's Bureau of U. S. Dep't of Labor, Cleveland Foundation, Commission on Interracial Coöperation, Commonwealth Club of California, Commonwealth Fund, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Foreign Policy Association, Judge Baker Foundation, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Child Labor Committee, National Child Welfare Association, National Committee for Mental Hygiene, National Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor, National Probation Association, National Urban League, United States Department of Agriculture (Research in Rural Sociology), Welfare Council of New York City. For an extensive survey of these organizations see Ogg, *op. cit.;* also E. G. Catlin, "American Research Foundations," *Contemporary Review,* vol. cxxxii, 1927, pp. 477-481.

fessors is another subject which has recently been called to public attention. The problem of financial control of research is, of course, the same as the control of education in general. The dominant economic interests perhaps always have controlled and always will, for the most part, control both.

VIII. The Outlook

If the above analysis appears pessimistic, it is due to the fact that any new science must necessarily appear at considerable disadvantage when compared to our present highly developed physical sciences. On the other hand, when viewed from the standpoint of its recent development as reviewed in Chapter I, there are substantial grounds for optimism. The rapidity of expansion and the development of sociology from philosophical and subjective speculations toward the objective methodology of natural science is unequaled by any other science. As sociology succeeds in getting itself increasingly recognized as a natural science, it will command the respect and support which are enjoyed by the physical sciences.

Sociology can attain this position of respect and support only through increasing attention to fundamental research. This will be materially stimulated through the increased support of national research bodies and private foundations. The appearance of *Social Science Abstracts* and the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* will materially facilitate and stimulate productive research through the avoidance of duplication and economy of time with which the ever-increasing literature can be surveyed. Increased opportunities for adequate graduate training may be expected to increase the number of persons interested and qualified for discriminating research. Further expansion of sociology in the curriculum is to be encouraged in every direction. But such expansion must not be at the expense of research, if sociology is to advance as a science. Sociologists, as well as other social scientists, could at present profitably cut down their teaching time and courses by one-half and spend the time so gained in determining to what extent what they now teach will bear scientific scrutiny.

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